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Panel Report

© Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1998

Catalogue No.: EN-106-30/1-1998E
ISBN: 0-662-26470-3

To obtain a list of the panel reports already published:

  • Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency
    13th Floor, Fontaine Building
    200 Sacré-Coeur Boulevard
    Hull, Quebec
    K1A 0H3
  • The Honourable Christine Stewart
    Minister of the Environment
    House of Commons
    Ottawa, Ontario
    K1A 0A6
  • The Honourable Ralph Goodale
    Minister of Natural Resources
    House of Commons
    Ottawa, Ontario
    K1A 0A6

Dear Ministers:

In accordance with the terms of reference announced in October 1989, the Environmental Assessment Panel has completed its review of nuclear fuel waste management and a disposal concept proposed by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited.

On behalf of the Panel, I am pleased to submit this report for your consideration.

Yours sincerely,

Blair Seaborn
Chairman

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Executive Summary

In a 1978 joint statement, the governments of Canada and Ontario directed Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) to develop the concept of deep geological disposal of nuclear fuel wastes. A subsequent joint statement in 1981 established that disposal site selection would not begin until after a full federal public hearing and approval of the concept by both governments.

In September 1988, the federal Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources referred the concept, along with a broad range of nuclear fuel waste management issues, for public review. He made this referral under the federal Environmental Assessment and Review Process Guidelines Order. On October 4, 1989, the federal Minister of the Environment appointed an independent environmental assessment panel to conduct the review. A copy of the Terms of Reference for the review is included in Appendix A, and biographies of the eight panel members are included in Appendix B.

The panel's mandate was unusual compared to that of any other federal environmental assessment panel in that it was asked:

  • to review a concept rather than a specific project at a specific site;
  • to review a proposal for which the implementing agency was not identified;
  • to establish a scientific review group of distinguished independent experts to examine the safety and scientific acceptability of the proposal;
  • to review a broad range of policy issues; and
  • to conduct the review in five provinces.

AECL describes its concept as a method for geological disposal of nuclear fuel wastes in which:

  • the waste form is either used Canada Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) fuel or the solidified high-level wastes from reprocessing;
  • the waste form is sealed in a container designed to last at least 500 years and possibly much longer;
  • the containers of waste are emplaced in rooms in a disposal vault or in boreholes drilled from the rooms;
  • the disposal rooms are between 500 and 1000 metres below the surface;
  • the geological medium is plutonic rock of the Canadian Shield;
  • each container of waste is surrounded by a buffer;
  • each room is sealed with backfill and other vault seals; and
  • all tunnels, shafts and exploration boreholes are ultimately sealed in such a way that a disposal facility would be passively safe-that is, long-term safety would not depend on institutional controls.

Such a facility would cost an estimated $8.7 billion to $13.3 billion in 1991 dollars, depending on the amount of waste to be disposed of.

The Panel conducted its review in Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, Quebec and New Brunswick. To develop guidelines to help AECL prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS), the Panel held scoping meetings in autumn 1990 in 14 communities. It also held a workshop on Aboriginal issues and met with members of Canadian Student Pugwash. The Panel then prepared draft guidelines, released them for public comment in June 1991, and issued them in final form on March 18, 1992. On October 26, 1994, AECL submitted an EIS, supported by nine primary reference documents. The period for public review of the EIS began on November 8, 1994, and ended on August 8, 1995.

Public hearings were held in 16 communities over three phases beginning March 11, 1996 and ending March 27, 1997. Phase I focused on broad societal issues related to managing nuclear fuel wastes; Phase II focused on the safety of the AECL concept from a technical viewpoint; and Phase III focused on the public's opinions of the safety and acceptability of the concept. During all three phases, the Panel heard from a total of 531 registered speakers and received 536 written submissions, as listed in Appendix F. Participants were also allowed to submit brief closing statements in writing by April 18, 1997. The Panel considered all written and oral information received in the period from its appointment to the end of the hearings, as well as the closing statements, in preparing this report. A detailed chronology of the panel's activities can be found in Appendix E.

Among other activities, the Terms of Reference directed the Panel:

  • to examine the criteria by which the safety and acceptability of a concept for long-term waste management and disposal should be evaluated; and
  • to prepare a final report addressing whether AECL's concept is safe and acceptable or should be modified, and the future steps to be taken in managing nuclear fuel wastes in Canada.

Criteria for Safety and Acceptability

The Panel examined the criteria by which the safety and acceptability of any concept for long-term waste management should be evaluated (Chapter 4 of this report). In doing so, it came to the following key conclusions.

Key Panel Conclusions:

  • Broad public support is necessary in Canada to ensure the acceptability of a concept for managing nuclear fuel wastes.
  • Safety is a key part, but only one part, of acceptability. Safety must be viewed from two complementary perspectives: technical and social.

On this basis, the Panel defined the safety and acceptability criteria as follows:

  • To be considered acceptable, a concept for managing nuclear fuel wastes must:
    1. have broad public support;
    2. be safe from both a technical and a social perspective;
    3. have been developed within a sound ethical and social assessment framework;
    4. have the support of Aboriginal people;
    5. be selected after comparison with the risks, costs and benefits of other options; and
    6. be advanced by a stable and trustworthy proponent and overseen by a trustworthy regulator.
  • To be considered safe, a concept for managing nuclear fuel wastes must be judged, on balance, to:
    1. demonstrate robustness in meeting appropriate regulatory requirements;
    2. be based on thorough and participatory scenario analyses;
    3. use realistic data, modelling and natural analogues;
    4. incorporate sound science and good practices;
    5. demonstrate flexibility;
    6. demonstrate that implementation is feasible; and
    7. integrate peer review and international expertise.

Safety and Acceptability of the AECL Concept

After applying these criteria to the AECL disposal concept, the Panel arrived at the key conclusions listed below. The rationale for them, and an elaboration on the technical and social perspectives of safety, are documented in Chapter 5.

Key Panel Conclusions:

  • From a technical perspective, safety of the AECL concept has been on balance adequately demon-strated for a conceptual stage of development, but from a social perspective, it has not.
  • As it stands, the AECL concept for deep geolog-ical disposal has not been demonstrated to have broad public support. The concept in its current form does not have the required level of accept-ability to be adopted as Canada's approach for managing nuclear fuel wastes.

Future Steps

The Panel considered the steps that must be taken to ensure the safe and acceptable long-term management of nuclear fuel wastes in Canada (in Chapter 6 of this report). It arrived at the following key recommendations.

Key Panel Recommendations

A number of additional steps are required to develop an approach for managing nuclear fuel wastes in a way that could achieve broad public support. These include:

  • issuing a policy statement on managing nuclear fuel wastes;
  • initiating an Aboriginal participation process;
  • creating a nuclear fuel waste management agency (NFWMA);
  • conducting a public review of AECB regulatory documents using a more effective consultation process;
  • developing a comprehensive public participation plan;
  • developing an ethical and social assessment framework; and
  • developing and comparing options for managing nuclear fuel wastes.

Taking into account the views of participants in our public hearings and our own analysis, we have developed the following basic recommendations to governments with respect to a management agency:

  • that an NFWMA as described in Chapter 6 be established quickly, at arm's length from the utilities and AECL, with the sole purpose of managing and co-ordinating the full range of activities relating to the long-term management of nuclear fuel wastes;
  • that it be fully funded in all its operations from a segregated fund to which only the producers and owners of nuclear fuel wastes would contribute;
  • that its board of directors, appointed by the federal government, be representative of key stakeholders;
  • that it have a strong and active advisory council representative of a wide variety of interested parties;
  • that its purposes, responsibilities and accountability, particularly in relation to the ownership of the wastes, be clearly and explicitly spelled out, preferably in legislation or in its charter of incorporation; and
  • that it be subject to multiple oversight mechanisms, including federal regulatory control with respect to its scientific-technical work and the adequacy of its financial guarantees; to policy direction from the federal government; and to regular public review, preferably by Parliament.

Until the foregoing steps have been completed and broad public acceptance of a nuclear fuel waste management approach has been achieved, the search for a specific site should not proceed.

If the AECL concept is chosen as the most acceptable option after implementation of the steps recom-mended above, governments should direct the NFWMA, together with Natural Resources Canada and the AECB or its successor, to undertake the following: review all the social and technical shortcomings identified by the Scientific Review Group and other review participants; establish their priority; and generate a plan to address them. The NFWMA should make this plan publicly available, invite public input, then implement the plan.

Additional and detailed recommendations on future steps are outlined in Chapter 6. Other aspects of the panel's mandate are dealt with in chapters 2 and 3 and in the appendices.

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1.0 Outline of the Review Process

1.1 How the Review Began

In the late 1970s, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) began to develop the concept of deep geological disposal of nuclear fuel wastes. In September 1988, the federal Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources referred the concept, along with a broad range of nuclear fuel waste management issues, for public review. He made this referral under the federal Environmental Assessment and Review Process Guidelines Order.

Since the federal and Ontario governments had decided that a disposal facility site would not be selected until the public had reviewed the concept and the governments had accepted it, the Minister asked that no site be contemplated during the review. A copy of the Terms of Reference for the review is included in Appendix A.

1.1.1 The AECL Concept

AECL describes the concept as a method for geological disposal of nuclear fuel wastes in which:

  • the waste form is either used Canada Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) fuel or the solidified high-level wastes from reprocessing;
  • the waste form is sealed in a container designed to last at least 500 years and possibly much longer;
  • the containers of waste are emplaced in rooms in a disposal vault or in boreholes drilled from the rooms;
  • the disposal rooms are between 500 and 1000 metres below the surface;
  • the geological medium is plutonic rock of the Canadian Shield;
  • each container of waste is surrounded by a buffer;
  • each room is sealed with backfill and other vault seals; and
  • all tunnels, shafts and exploration boreholes are ultimately sealed in such a way that a disposal facility would be passively safe-that is, long-term safety would not depend on institutional controls. [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Environmental Impact Statement on the Concept for Disposal of Canada's Nuclear Fuel Waste (Atomic Energy of Canada Limited Report AECL - 10711, COG - 93 - 1, 1994), p. 5.]

Figure 1 illustrates the AECL disposal concept. Such a facility would cost an estimated $8.7 billion to $13.3 billion in 1991 dollars, depending on the amount of wastes to be disposed of.

1.1.2 Historical Context

Over the past 25 years, numerous groups and governments in Canada have studied alternative approaches to managing nuclear fuel wastes. These are described in sections 1.2 and 3.1.2 of the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). A committee formed by AECL, Ontario Hydro and Hydro-Québec in 1972 concluded that geological media were most promising for disposal in Canada. As a result of consultations between the federal Department of Energy, Mines and Resources (EMR) and AECL in 1974, research was directed primarily to plutonic rock in the Ontario portion of the Canadian Shield.

To help Canada develop a long-term policy for managing nuclear fuel wastes, EMR in 1977 engaged a group of experts led by Dr. Kenneth Hare to study the problem. In their report, popularly referred to as the Hare Report, they considered various management options. These included reprocessing, immobilization, surface storage, and disposal in ice sheets, in space, on or beneath the sea floor, or in various types of underground rock. (These are discussed in Appendix L.) The authors concluded that burial in geologic formations had the best potential.

We feel that several different kinds of rock could profitably be studied but that resources ought not to be spread too thinly. We suggest that primary effort be given to the crystalline rocks of plutonic origin (i.e. deep in the earth), but that careful attention be paid to the work of other scientists in other countries on different rock types.

A.M. Aiken, J.M. Harrison and F.K. Hare [F.K. Hare, Chairman, A.M. Aiken and J.M. Harrison, The Management of Canada's Nuclear Wastes, (report of a study prepared under contract for the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources Canada, Report EP 77-6, 1977), p. 44.]

The authors named rock salt and shale as the second and third choices respectively, and urged the Government of Canada to keep a close watch on other rock types and to start some research on deep ocean burial. They also recommended placing the first repository in Ontario because it would be the principal waste-producing province.

The Ontario Royal Commission on Electric Power Planning, also known as the Porter Commission, further endorsed disposal in plutonic rock. [Royal Commission on Electric Power Planning, Arthur Porter, Chairman, A Race Against Time: Interim Report on Nuclear Power in Ontario (Toronto: Queen's Printer for Ontario, 1978), cited in Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Environmental Impact Statement, p. 3.] The governments of Canada and Ontario formally accepted the idea in 1978. A joint statement by the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources and his provincial counterpart announced a research and development program aimed at verifying

". . . that permanent disposal in a deep underground repository in intrusive igneous rock is a safe, secure and desirable method of disposing of radioactive waste." [Canada/Ontario Radioactive Waste Management Program (joint statement by the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources Canada and the Ontario Energy Minister, June 5, 1978), pp. 1-2.]

Figure 1: The AECL Disposal Concept (source: AECL)

Figure 1: The AECL Disposal Concept (source: AECL)

This initiative came to be known as the Nuclear Fuel Waste Management Program and resulted in the development of the AECL concept. Another joint statement in 1981 established that disposal site selection would not begin until after a full federal public hearing and approval of the concept by both governments.

The Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB) regulates the Canadian nuclear industry. In 1987, it issued Regulatory Policy Statement R-104, Regulatory Objectives, Requirements and Guidelines for the Disposal of Radioactive Wastes-Long-term Aspects. This statement confirmed that disposal was the AECB's preferred approach for the long-term management of radioactive wastes.

The following year, two House of Commons standing committees reported on issues related to managing nuclear wastes. The Committee on Environment and Forestry recommended that the disposal concept be reviewed independently with public participation; that recommendation led to the review that is the subject of this report. The Committee on Energy, Mines and Resources concluded that deep geological disposal was appropriate for Canada.

1.1.3 Mandates Conferred on AECL and Ontario Hydro

In their 1978 joint statement, the federal and provincial governments conferred co-operative research and development mandates on Ontario Hydro and AECL. Ontario Hydro was made responsible for work on interim storage and transportation of radioactive wastes. AECL became responsible for work on the immobilization and disposal of radioactive wastes from nuclear power reactors, including geological field and laboratory studies. In addition, AECL was designated the lead in maintaining close co-operation and consultation with the communities involved at all stages of the program, with the support of the Government of Ontario and Ontario Hydro in public information activities. At that time, a tentative planning schedule envisioned that a disposal site would be selected in 1983, a demonstration disposal program would take place between 1985 and 2000, and a full-scale facility would be operational by 2000.

In total, AECL spent $575 million on the research program between 1978 and February 1996. After publishing the EIS, AECL was subjected to the federal government's Program Review. This review reduced AECL's funding, as announced in February 1996, and recommended that the agency no longer fund nuclear fuel waste management. Consequently, downsizing decreased AECL's ability to sustain substantial research and development on nuclear fuel waste management beyond the concept review. On December 31, 1995, AECL and Ontario Hydro reached an agreement, under which Ontario Hydro provided funding for fiscal years 1995-96 and 1996-97 to help AECL address shortcomings identified by the environmental assessment panel and participate in public hearings.

1.2 The Environmental Assessment Review Panel

After the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources referred AECL's proposed concept for public review in 1988, the federal government spent a year consulting provincial governments and non-governmental organiza-tions in the three provinces that produce nuclear fuel wastes. They discussed the terms of reference and potential panel candidates.

On October 4, 1989, the federal Minister of the Environment appointed seven people to the Nuclear Fuel Waste Management and Disposal Concept Environmental Assessment Panel (the Panel) to conduct the public review of AECL's proposed concept. Recognizing the importance of the concerns of Aboriginal people in this review, the Minister appointed an eighth member of the Panel, drawn from the Aboriginal community, on April 24, 1991.

The composition of the Panel changed over the course of the review. Biographies of the current members are included in Appendix B, along with the names of previous panel members and the terms they served. The Panel was supported by a four-person secretariat provided by the Federal Environmental Assessment Review Office, now known as the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency.

1.3 The Scientific Review Group

In its terms of reference, the Panel was directed to establish a scientific review group (SRG) of distinguished independent experts from various disciplines to examine closely the safety and scientific acceptability of the proposal. The Panel established this group in August 1990. The SRG's examination culminated in a report released in October 1995, followed by an addendum submitted at the panel's request in September 1996. The SRG was a major participant in the June and November 1996 public hearings on technical issues. The SRG's terms of reference and biographies of the 15 members can be found in appendices C and D, respectively.

1.4 The Review Process

1.4.1 The Public Information and Participation Program

The Panel was asked to conduct its review in the three provinces producing nuclear fuel wastes: New Brunswick, Quebec and Ontario. It was also asked to include Manitoba, where an AECL research facility is located, and Saskatchewan, as requested by the provincial government. The Panel designed a public information and participation program to include these five provinces. As part of this program, the panel's secretariat hosted open houses before the scoping meetings and again shortly after the release of the EIS. The open houses were designed to increase public awareness of the review process, the proposal under review and the opportunities to participate. Operational procedures to help participants understand the panel's work were issued in November 1990. A World Wide Web site for the review, linked to the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency's Web site, was created in December 1995.

In spring 1996, a consultant was retained to approach community groups and individuals in communities that the Panel would visit during Phase III of the public hearings, to ensure that every segment of society was informed of the opportunity to participate. The consultant identified community groups and provided them and the media with the information they desired. Communication was established through federal, provincial and local elected representatives; school boards; universities; and community organizations. In addition, the Panel arranged to visit three First Nations communities on the Canadian Shield.

A detailed chronology of the panel's activities can be found in Appendix E.

1.4.2 Preparation of the EIS Guidelines

To develop guidelines to help AECL prepare an EIS, the Panel held scoping meetings in the autumn of 1990 in 14 communities. We also held a workshop on Aboriginal issues and met with members of Canadian Student Pugwash in 1991.

The Panel then prepared draft EIS guidelines and released them to the public in June 1991 for written comments by September 16, 1991. After reviewing comments received from 38 participants, the Panel finalized the guidelines and issued them to AECL and the public on March 18, 1992.

In the following months, the Panel requested additional information on issues outside AECL's mandate from a number of government departments and all three nuclear power utilities. [The following are examples of requests made by the Panel at that time: information on emergency response plans and contingency plans for accidental spills of toxic wastes that may apply to the disposal concept for nuclear fuel wastes (Health Canada); information on the general criteria for managing nuclear wastes as compared to those for managing wastes from other energy and industrial sources (Natural Resources Canada and Environment Canada); information on the impact of recycling or other processes on the volume of wastes (Natural Resources Canada); information on the historical development of the criteria for safety and acceptability of geologic disposal and the degree of public involvement in their development (Atomic Energy Control Board); and information on practices used by the utilities for long-term storage of nuclear wastes (Ontario Hydro, Hydro-Québec and New Brunswick Power).] We received responses to these requests between September 1992 and October 1994.

1.4.3 EIS Review

On October 26, 1994, AECL submitted an EIS, supported by nine primary reference documents that had been made available earlier.

The period for review of the EIS by the public, government agencies and technical specialists began on November 8, 1994, and ended on August 8, 1995. The Panel received 65 submissions, and the SRG submitted its report on October 6, 1995. After analyzing the EIS, the supporting documents, the SRG report and the written comments, the Panel concluded that sufficient information would be available to allow public hearings to begin in March 1996, even though reviewers had identified significant shortcomings.

In a letter dated December 8, 1995, the Panel asked AECL to provide further clarification and additional information to help evaluate the safety of the concept. [Some of the subjects for which additional information was requested include alternative disposal container material; container designs and container emplacement layouts; the role of backfill as a barrier; existing drill core data for estimating the availability of potentially acceptable sites; ranked selection and rejection criteria for suitable site characterization; and alternative disposal vault layouts.] It also asked AECL to provide any relevant information at its disposal that had not been included in the EIS, and to respond in writing by May 10, 1996 to issues that the SRG and review participants had raised. AECL provided its response on May 9, 1996.

1.4.4 Public Hearings

Public hearings were held in three phases beginning in March 1996. Phase I focused on broad societal issues related to long-term management of nuclear fuel wastes in general; hence, there was no proponent during this phase. Phase II focused on the safety of the AECL concept of geological disposal of nuclear fuel wastes from a scientific and engineering viewpoint. Community hearings during Phase III were the final opportunity in this process for members of the public to voice their opinions on the safety and acceptability of the proposed concept.

The phase I hearings were held over three weeks. The final week consisted of general sessions held in three communities. Each day during the other two weeks focused on a specific topic. The secretariat prepared short issue papers on the topic and distributed them in advance to participants. There were presentations each morning and round table discussions animated by a facilitator each afternoon. To help with the round table discussions, the Panel invited a number of speakers to make short presentations, giving an overview of the daily topic and raising points for discussion. They did not present positions on nuclear waste management.

The initial phase II hearings were held over 12 days in June 1996. The first 10 days consisted of technical sessions on long-term safety after the closure of a disposal facility. The remaining days consisted of sessions on issues specific to the period before the closure of a facility. The documentation for these hearings included the EIS, the reference documents and the additional information provided by AECL on May 9, 1996.

During the phase II hearings, some participants and panel members questioned AECL for referring, in its May 9 response or in presentations at the hearings, to studies that they had not seen. The Panel decided to postpone the closure of Phase II to give participants time to review these studies. In September, at the panel's request, the SRG submitted an addendum to its original report that took the new information into account. Four extra days of hearings were held in Toronto in November to allow for a technical discussion of the additional information.

During the phase III community hearings, the Panel visited a number of communities on the Canadian Shield and near nuclear facilities. The hearings were held every second week, starting in Saskatoon on January 13, 1997 and ending in Ottawa on March 27. They were conducted in the traditional manner, with some modification when Aboriginal communities hosted the Panel.

During all three phases the Panel heard from a total of 531 registered speakers and received 536 written submissions, as listed in Appendix F. In addition, the Panel received 108 responses to the various undertakings given by participants during the hearings. Transcripts for all three phases were made available to the public.

A bibliography of key review documents can be found in Appendix G.

1.4.5 Closing Statements

Since the review was not site specific, the Panel did not hear closing statements in one location, as is customary in other hearings. Therefore, the Panel modified its hearings procedures to allow participants to submit brief written statements by April 18, 1997. We received 38 such closing statements.

Following the public hearings, the Panel prepared this report for transmittal to the federal Minister of the Environment and Minister of Natural Resources.

1.4.6 Participant Funding

To assist the public to participate effectively, participant funding was made available. AECL initially agreed to provide $750,000 for this purpose and an independent funding administration committee distributed funds in two phases, according to a set of eligibility criteria. Up to $200,000 was available for scoping and review of the draft guidelines, while $550,000 was available for review of the EIS and public hearings.

In the end, the committee distributed a total of $842,515 in four separate allocations, all provided by AECL.

  • In September 1990, it distributed $152,500 to 17 of 33 applicants to help them participate in the scoping meetings and review of the draft guidelines.
  • A second allocation, totalling $387,235, was provided to 31 of 54 applicants in October 1994, to help them review the EIS and participate in public hearings. The committee withheld the remaining money to respond to needs to be identified during the open houses held between November 1994 and March 1995.
  • On March 31, 1995, the committee provided $210,265 to 25 of 60 applicants for the same purposes as the previous allocation.
  • In October 1996, an additional $92,515 was given to 16 participants, to help them review the supplementary information submitted in May 1996 and during the June hearings.

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2.0 The Nature of the Problem

To give context to the remainder of the report, this chapter describes the setting in which the Panel strove to fulfil its mandate. We begin by outlining the current waste management situation. Next, we introduce other perspectives on managing nuclear fuel wastes, including criteria applied to managing other wastes, international approaches and views, and alternatives to geological disposal. Finally, the discussion turns to some of the key complexities raised during the review, including societal issues and the perspective of Aboriginal people, and ends by framing the problem the Panel addressed.

2.1 Defining the Waste Management Problem

This section reflects the facts known to the Panel about these subjects when this report was written, and does not necessarily represent the panel's views.

2.1.1 Nuclear Power in Canada

In March 1997, 21 CANDU nuclear power reactors were operating in Canada, one (Bruce Unit 2) was shut down and none were under construction. The provincial distribution of the reactors and their contribution to each province's electricity generation are shown in Table 1.

Table 1 - Reactor Distribution and Contribution to Electricity Generation
Province Number of Operating Nuclear Reactors Percentage of Province's Electricity Generated by Nuclear Reactors in 1994*
Ontario 19 61
Quebec 1 3
New Brunswick 1 33

* Canadian Electricity Association and Natural Resources Canada,Electric Power in Canada 1994, (Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1995), p. 60.

In 1994, conventional (mostly coal-fired) thermal stations generated 19 per cent of Canada's electricity, hydro-electric stations 61 per cent, nuclear stations 19 per cent and other sources 1 per cent. [Canadian Electricity Association and Natural Resources Canada, Electric Power in Canada 1994 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1995), p. 68.] By 1996, the share generated by nuclear stations had declined to about 16 per cent, and this decline has continued.

To put the Canadian situation in a global perspective, 442 nuclear power reactors were operating in 30 countries around the world in 1996, and another 36 were under construction. Of global electricity production in 1992, conventional (mostly coal-fired) thermal stations generated 64 per cent, hydroelectric stations 18 per cent, nuclear stations 17 per cent and other sources less than 1 per cent. [Canadian Electricity Association and Natural Resources Canada, Electric Power in Canada 1994, p. 18.]

2.1.2 Canada's Nuclear Fuel Cycle

The nuclear fuel cycle, illustrated in Figure 2, can be separated into three stages:

  • the first stage or front end incorporates uranium mining, milling, refining and conversion, and fuel fabrication;
  • the second stage consists of irradiating the fuel in nuclear reactors to generate electricity; and
  • the third stage or back end comprises managing spent fuel and reactor wastes.

The cycle is an open or once-through fuel cycle if the fuel is used once and then disposed of. Closed fuel cycles reprocess spent fuel to recycle its useful components and dispose of reprocessing wastes. In 1996, about 16 per cent of the uranium produced in Canada was converted into uranium oxide fuel for domestic use in CANDU reactors in an open fuel cycle.

2.1.3 Type of Wastes

While wastes are created at each step of the fuel cycle, the Panel reviewed "nuclear fuel wastes," which "consist of solid used fuel bundles discharged from CANDU reactors or derived high-level wastes, should the used fuel ever be reprocessed at some future date." [See Terms of Reference in Appendix A.] As shown in Figure 3, fuel bundles are about the size of a fireplace log and consist of tubular zirconium alloy sheaths containing ceramic uranium oxide pellets. A bundle for Ontario Hydro's Bruce Generating Station weighs about 24 kilograms, which includes about 19 kilograms of uranium. Since the Bruce Station has the largest inventory of spent fuel, its bundles were used as the standard waste form in the case studies in AECL's EIS. The case studies assumed that the fuel had been out of the reactor and in storage for 10 years.

If reprocessing and recycling were to be implemented in the future, high-level and other liquid radioactive wastes would be derived from used CANDU fuel bundles. The high-level wastes would be immobilized by dissolving and solidifying it in a host matrix, such as glass or a glass-ceramic composite, in the form of a large solid block or log. Reprocessing, recycling and their waste products are discussed further in Appendix L.

Figure 2: The Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Primary Waste Management Options in Canada

Figure 2: The Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Primary Waste Management Options in Canada

Figure 3: A CANDU Fuel Bundle (Source: AECL)

Figure 3: A CANDU Fuel Bundle (Source: AECL)

-- Each bundle produces about 1 million kilowatt-hours of electricity, equivalent to burning about 400 tonnes of coal, and enough to supply about 100 homes for a year.

CANDU reactors could operate with several advanced fuel cycles, including one based on mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel, a combination of plutonium oxide and uranium oxide. In April 1996, the Prime Minister announced that Canada had agreed in principle to using MOX fuel in its CANDU reactors to help the U.S. and Russia reduce their inventory of up to 100 tonnes of surplus plutonium from dismantled nuclear weapons. When this report was written, the feasibility of this proposal was still being studied. The Minister of the Environment and the Minister of Natural Resources had stated that "a full environmental review," including "a public study by an independent panel," would occur before any final decisions were made.

2.1.4 Amount of Wastes

At the end of 1996, a total of about 1.2 million used CANDU fuel bundles (weighing 29,400 metric tonnes) were stored at Canadian reactor sites. This quantity would roughly fill three regulation-size hockey rinks up to the top of the boards. About 87 per cent of these wastes were produced by Ontario Hydro, six per cent by New Brunswick Power, five per cent by Hydro-Québec and two per cent by AECL.

According to AECL, about 85,000 spent fuel bundles are produced per year; if no new reactors were constructed, a total of about 3.6 million bundles would exist by the end of 2033, with 3.3 million of these belonging to Ontario Hydro. Although currently there are no plans to construct new reactors, the situation could change according to the economics of power generation and the energy needs and policies of the provinces. As estimated in the EIS, if the nuclear generating capacity existing as of March 1993 was maintained by constructing new reactors as old ones were retired, 10 million bundles or 240,000 tonnes would be produced by 2073. If capacity was to increase by an average of three per cent per year after 1994, 10 million bundles would be produced by 2035. AECL's reference case study facility was designed to accommodate 10 million spent fuel bundles.

2.1.5 Composition, Longevity and Toxicity of Wastes

Fresh CANDU fuel contains three different nuclides of uranium. When neutrons bombard the fuel in a CANDU reactor, fission and activation products are created. Some of these products undergo radioactive decay by emitting radiation, forming new nuclides and generating heat.

Radioactive decay continues when the spent fuel is removed from the reactor, causing it to emit radiation and heat at decreasing rates and to change its composition over time. After 10 years of cooling, the used CANDU fuel designated for the EIS case studies contained about 98.7 per cent of the original uranium, 0.65 per cent stable fission products, 0.16 per cent radioactive fission products, and 0.49 per cent activation products (per cent of the total mass of uranium in the fresh fuel). In total, spent fuel contains roughly 350 different nuclides, about 200 of which are radioactive. Its level of activity per unit mass declines to that of natural uranium and its associated radioactive decay products after about one million years.

Radioactive decay entails the emission of alpha, beta or gamma radiation. The type of radiation determines whether the radionuclide emitting it presents an external or internal hazard to an organism, the latter through ingestion and/or inhalation, or both. Alpha radiation poses largely an internal hazard; beta radiation poses a slight external hazard but a greater internal hazard; gamma radiation poses both.

The potential biological effects of radiation exposure depend on the dose absorbed per unit of biomass, the duration of the exposure, the dose rate, the type of radiation, and the susceptibility of the tissues or organs exposed. Doses to humans are discussed in terms of the dose equivalent (measured in sievert), which accounts for the differing reactions to the different types of radiation within the body. For reference, the annual dose that most Canadians receive due to natural background radiation is approximately three thousandths of a sievert. As discussed in Appendix H, there is a small probability that radiation exposure may initiate either a malignancy, which may not become evident for 30 years or more, or a change in the individual's genetic code, which would affect his or her offspring. Such effects are known as probabilistic, and their probability increases proportionately with the tissue dose received. Even for very high doses of the order of one sievert, such as those received by the atomic bomb survivors, the risk of developing a radiation-induced cancer remains very small. For the most commonly occurring occupational exposures received by radiation workers (exposures which are comparable to natural background levels), the annual risk of fatal cancers and serious genetic effects will not greatly exceed one in a million.

For unusually high doses of several sievert or more, immediate tissue damage may also occur. Such damage is known as an acute or deterministic effect. For whole body doses above three to four sievert, the acute radiation damage may be so severe that it proves fatal, usually within a matter of days.

In addition to radionuclides, used fuel contains several chemically toxic elements, including heavy metals. These elements may also have biological effects, which similarly depend on a number of factors. Unlike radionuclides, which undergo radioactive decay that decreases their potential toxicity over time, the potential toxicity of these elements remains constant.

2.1.6 Current Storage Practice

Spent nuclear fuel is currently stored, on an interim basis, either indoors in water-filled pools or outdoors in concrete canisters at nuclear reactor sites. The objectives of this storage are "to manage the fuel in a safe, reliable, and economic manner; and to maintain used fuel integrity to ensure that the fuel is retrievable for future downstream post-storage operations, e.g., transportation and fuel disposal." According to an Ontario Hydro publication, with continuing institutional controls such as physical security, monitoring, maintenance and funding, there is reason to expect that these objectives will be met for as long as required in the future. This implies that the level of risk associated with storage facilities is currently acceptable to society.

There is enough storage capacity at the sites to accommodate all the spent fuel that will be produced up to the end of the life of the existing reactors. However, Ontario Hydro stated during the hearings that, although it felt extended surface storage was technically feasible, it needed to do more studies to decide whether using surface storage alone was an acceptable long-term strategy. Researchers in both Canada and other countries are exploring methods for improved on-site long-term storage.

2.1.7 AECL's Justification for Disposal and its Timing

Although AECL does not have the mandate to implement disposal, its justification for its proposed disposal concept is summarized below, as stated in its EIS. See Section 2.3.3 for the views of participants on this subject.

  • A significant quantity of nuclear fuel wastes currently exists, and more will arise from the continuing generation of nuclear power in Canada.
  • Toxic elements, human health and the natural environment must be protected from their potentially harmful effects far into the future.
  • Current storage practices, while safe, require ongoing institutional controls.
  • Because the methods of ensuring the continuity of institutional controls are not considered very reliable beyond a few hundred years, a permanent disposal method that does not rely on such controls for its long-term safety is preferable to storage. Disposal does not preclude institutional controls, but they must be such that, if they were to fail, human health and the natural environment would still be protected, as required by the AECB.
  • As the present generation benefits significantly from the activities that produce nuclear fuel wastes, it ought to assume disposal responsibilities and minimize any burden placed on future generations as much as possible.
  • Since Canada cannot expect to dispose of its nuclear fuel wastes elsewhere, it needs a practical disposal method.

Furthermore, AECL recommends moving towards siting and disposal for the following reasons:

  • to minimize the burden on future generations;
  • to eliminate the dependence on long-term institutional controls before their possible failure makes safe storage or disposal impossible;
  • to maintain the technology that has been developed, including the knowledge and skills of scientists and engineers, and to protect the investments in it by the governments of Canada and Ontario;
  • to increase public confidence in Canada's ability to dispose of nuclear fuel wastes, rather than decreasing it through delay; and
  • to allow site-specific and design-specific issues to be addressed in the most effective and efficient way.

As additional justification, AECL raised the following points.

  • If disposal is delayed because storage is cheaper, future generations would not make a different decision, and thus disposal may never be implemented.
  • If disposal is delayed to await technological advances, even though a safe method is available now, future generations would not make a different decision, and thus disposal may never be implemented.
  • Delaying disposal so that the used fuel's activity and heat output will decrease with time is not warranted, because reductions beyond the first 10 years will be small.
  • If desired, used fuel could be reprocessed and recycled during siting and operation of a disposal facility, and the solidified high-level wastes could be disposed of in the repository.

Other arguments for proceeding now have been put forward. In 1995, the Auditor General of Canada urged immediate action on implementing long-term, cost-effective solutions for Canada's radioactive wastes. He highlighted the need to minimize not only the financial burden on future generations, but future federal government liabilities. Federal liabilities will arise when the government deals with its own wastes (AECL's portion), and could arise when the original producer or current owner of the wastes can no longer reasonably be held responsible, or is unable or unwilling to pay. The latter situation has already occurred with some radioactive wastes.

2.1.8 Regulatory and Policy Context

As the federal government has jurisdiction over and regulatory responsibility for nuclear energy, it develops the national policies, strategies and regulations for managing radioactive wastes. These roles are fulfilled by Natural Resources Canada, as well as by the AECB, which reports to Parliament through the Minister of Natural Resources but operates at arm's length from the Minister. Many other federal, provincial and municipal acts, regulations and requirements would also apply to certain elements of implementing a disposal facility.

2.1.8.1 Regulations

The AECB is the primary regulator of the health, safety and physical security aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle in Canada. All phases of developing nuclear facilities and managing radioactive substances are subject to the Atomic Energy Control Actand the Atomic Energy Control Regulations. In addition, the Nuclear Liability Act, which is currently under review, applies to nuclear facilities but not, at this point, to disposal facilities.

At each licensing stage of a disposal facility (site preparation, construction, operation and decommissioning), an environmental assessment would be required under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act. The Act provides for public input, including review by an independent panel under certain circumstances, such as when public concerns warrant it.

Along with its regulations, the AECB employs licence conditions, regulatory policy statements and regulatory guides to exercise varying degrees of control over the nuclear industry. Given the technical nature of its legislated mandate, the AECB does not have jurisdiction over the social, economic or lifestyle issues associated with nuclear development.

Of particular relevance to the concept under review are the AECB regulatory documents listed in Table 2.

Table 2: Pertinent Regulatory Documents of the Atomic Energy Control Board
No. Type Title Year
R-71 Regulatory Policy Statement Deep Geological Disposal of Nuclear Fuel Waste: Background Information and Regulatory Requirements Regarding the Concept Assessment Phase 1985
R-72 Regulatory Guide Geological Considerations in Siting a Repository for Underground Disposal of High-level Radioactive Waste 1987
R-90 Regulatory Policy Statement Policy on the Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities 1988
R-104 Regulatory Policy Statement Regulatory Objectives, Requirements and Guidelines for the Disposal of Radioactive Wastes-Long-term Aspects 1987

By early 1998, the Atomic Energy Control Act and the AECB will likely be succeeded by the Nuclear Safety and Control Act and the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC). Unlike the AECB, the CNSC will be empowered to order remedial actions and to require financial guarantees from waste producers as a condition of licensing. Unlike the present act, the Nuclear Safety and Control Act will make protecting the environment an explicit rather than an implicit requirement. The AECB is currently developing a regulatory policy on environmental protection, including radiological impacts on non-human species.

Further information on the regulatory requirements for nuclear fuel waste disposal can be found in Appendix B of both the EIS andR-Preclosure.

2.1.8.2 International Standards

Several international organizations recommend standards and guidelines for managing nuclear fuel wastes. These include the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD/NEA). They are further described in the EIS (Chapter 3 and Appendix D). The objectives and requirements enunciated by these and other international agencies have formed the basis of the AECB regulatory regime and Canadian government policy. Together with those of the AECB and those developed by AECL, they have shaped the Canadian disposal concept.

2.1.8.3 Policy

Federal government policy complements the regulations, regulatory documents and international standards on managing nuclear fuel wastes. In his 1995 report on federal radioactive waste management, the Auditor General noted that there was only one formal federal policy on radioactive wastes, and that that policy covered only low-level wastes. He concluded that "Natural Resources Canada needs to develop federal policies to cover all classes of radioactive waste."

In response, the Minister of Natural Resources announced the Radioactive Waste Policy Framework (reproduced in Appendix I) in July 1996. It specifies that, in relation to radioactive waste disposal, the federal government develops policy, and regulates waste producers and owners. According to the "polluter pays" principle, producers and owners are to fund, organize, manage and operate waste disposal and other management facilities. In late 1996, Natural Resources Canada also carried out consultations on institutional and financial arrangements for the disposal of radioactive wastes. It reported that the federal government is awaiting this panel's report before deciding on future directions.

2.2 Other Perspectives on Managing Nuclear Fuel Wastes

2.2.1 Comparison with Management of Other Wastes

The Panel will also examine the general criteria for the management of nuclear fuel wastes as compared to those for wastes from other energy and industrial sources. In addition, the impact of recycling or other processes on the volume of wastes should be examined.

Terms of Reference

This section summarizes the examinations requested in the Terms of Reference. Appendix J contains a fuller comparison of the characteristics, volumes, management approaches and regulatory criteria pertinent to nuclear fuel and analogous wastes, as well as a brief discussion of the impact of recycling and other processes on waste volumes. More details on the latter subject are found in Appendix L.

Hazardous wastes and their management provide the nearest analogue to the nuclear fuel waste question. Although some common themes exist in the regulations and policy on radioactive wastes and those on other hazardous wastes, there is no comprehensive and uniform approach to dealing with the two types of wastes. Because of federal responsibility for nuclear matters, the regulation of all radioactive wastes is largely in the hands of the AECB. Wastes from other energy and industrial sources, however, are subject to regulation by federal, provincial and even municipal authorities. Bodies such as the Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment (CCME) co-ordinate the establishment of national guidelines for different waste problems.

According to the Joint AECB Advisory Committees/ Health Canada Working Group on assessing and managing cancer risks from chemical and radiological hazards, risk management practices for both nuclear fuel wastes and chemicals are designed to minimize risk, yet balance the benefits of reducing risk with the costs and feasibility of controls. [David Myers, Assessment and Management of Cancer Risks from Chemical and Radiological Hazards (abstract and overheads of a presentation at the 1996 Conference of the Canadian Radiation Protection Association, Trois-Rivières, June 10, 1996, Undertaking 7), p. 17.] This is known as the ALARA principle: exposures shall be kept as low as reasonably achievable, economic and social factors being taken into account.

However, the Panel was told that, in relation to radiation, the ALARA principle is applied to achieve exposures that are a small fraction of the regulatory limits, whereas the limits for chemicals already include a form of ALARA. [David Myers, Assessment and Management of Cancer Risks from Chemical and Radiological Hazards, p. 20, and J.A.L. Robertson, Some Additional Comments on Submissions to the Panel (PH3Pub.234(c), March 26, 1997), p. 2.] Thus, the ALARA principle is applied inconsistently in meeting or exceeding regulatory limits. For both types of substances, lower acceptable risk levels are specified for the general population than for workers in the industry.

For nuclear fuel wastes, which are not currently reprocessed in Canada, the AECB prefers disposal. A repository is to be deep underground; minimize the burden on future generations; not rely on long-term institutional controls as a necessary safety feature; and maintain radiological risk below a designated level for 10,000 years after closure.

For hazardous wastes, the increasingly preferred approach for managing wastes is to use the 4Rs hierarchy (reduce, re-use, recycle, recover), followed by disposal as a last resort. However, this preference stands in contrast to past and many current waste management practices. In Canada, 60 per cent of hazardous wastes is either landfilled or discharged to municipal sewers, while 40 per cent is treated. Surface landfills, engineered to control leaching processes and products, are the usual system of disposal. The CCME guidelines for hazardous waste landfilling place more emphasis on immediate postclosure controls and less on very long-term safety compared to those of the AECB for radioactive waste disposal, which rule out dependence on such controls in an attempt to ensure long-term passive safety.

In our hearings, the question was raised as to whether a common set of criteria should apply to both nuclear and other hazardous wastes, and particularly whether the 4Rs principle could and should apply to nuclear fuel wastes. These issues are discussed in Appendix J. Some consensus may emerge from the AECB's plans to work with Environment Canada and the provinces to establish a regulatory approach to protect the environment, including non-human species, from industrial radiation sources, consistent with the federalToxic Substances Management Policy. Additional consensus may result from the recent work of the Joint AECB Advisory Committees/Health Canada Working Group.

The Panel considers that it would be desirable to work towards common risk assessment and management methods and common and publicly accepted risk criteria, so that relative risks might be fairly judged, whether they arise from radioactivity or not. The differing characteristics of various waste types would still have to be taken into account, but such common measures might be a useful first step.

The panel's examination of the general criteria for managing wastes from other energy and industrial sources did not provide explicit analogues for use in developing criteria for managing nuclear fuel wastes. However, in the course of our hearings, we gleaned much useful information about the management of low-level radioactive wastes and hazardous wastes, as well as interim storage practices for nuclear fuel wastes. This has all proven valuable in framing the conclusions and recommendations elsewhere in this report.

2.2.2 International Experience

In reviewing AECL's concept, the Panel should become fully aware of the programs of other leading countries in this field, in particular those countries' consideration of different geological media and their development of appropriate plans and schedules for siting and construction of nuclear fuel waste management facilities.

Terms of Reference

Appendix K of this report describes the nuclear fuel waste management programs of nine countries and includes a tabular synopsis. It provides an international context for managing high-level nuclear wastes in Canada and shows how the AECL concept for deep geological disposal fits into the "international consensus" for managing nuclear wastes. We have not summarized each country's programs in the body of the report. However, we do offer a few general observations as part of the background to later chapters.

Most countries with significant nuclear power programs are developing a management strategy involving deep geological disposal of nuclear fuel wastes. The programs and research generally focus on a single waste facility in the hope that it will be operational by the first quarter of the next century. Although various geological media are used, varying with the conditions in each country, the generic characteristics are consistent in most countries: geological disposal of canisters containing wastes within an excavated vault environment.

Demonstration disposal projects and centralized interim storage are two fundamental elements of some national programs. Of note is the Dutch program, which recently turned its attention to retrievable disposal, following a government decision to reject non-retrievable methods. [Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Nuclear Energy Agency, "Update on Waste Management Policies and Programs," Nuclear Waste Bulletin, Volume 11 (June 1996), pp. 38-39.] While we focused on leading countries, as directed in the Terms of Reference, we note that Eastern European countries with nuclear programs are also pursuing deep geological disposal, in salt formations.

The international scientific and technical community dealing with nuclear waste management exchanges a great deal of factual information and experience. It does so bilaterally, as well as through multilateral fora such as the OECD/NEA in Paris and the IAEA in Vienna. This helps to ensure that research results are widely shared. Without safeguards, however, this process could lead to uniform thinking that would not welcome new or radical ideas for long-term management.

There is a broad consensus among the scientific and technical experts in the leading nuclear nations that geological disposal could form part of a generic approach to long-term management. The Panel notes that to date no country has achieved the social consensus necessary to build a disposal facility for high-level nuclear wastes.

In several countries, there are vocal and vigorous opponents of the deep geological solution and of the transportation implications of a single centralized waste facility. This resistance is frequently linked to opposition to nuclear power, and is contributing to some re-appraisal of the political feasibility of this approach. It is becoming clear that societal acceptance will be more difficult to achieve than scientific and technical acceptance. As a result, governments are exploring the alternative of longer-term interim storage, either on site or centralized, since acceptance of disposal seems unlikely to come quickly or easily.

2.2.3 Various Approaches to Long-term Nuclear Fuel Waste Management

It will examine AECL's proposed concept along with other approaches for nuclear fuel waste disposal being developed elsewhere in the world. . . . In its review, the Panel will take into consideration the various approaches to the long-term management of nuclear fuel wastes which are presently being stored at reactor sites. These long-term manage-ment approaches include long-term storage with a capability for continuing intervention in the form of monitoring, retrieval and remedial action; and the transition from storage to permanent disposal.

Terms of Reference

Appendix L describes and summarizes the various approaches to managing nuclear fuel wastes that have been suggested over the years. It compares them from the point of view of technical feasibility, risks, cost, other advantages and other disadvantages.

One key element of acceptability is that the public and decision-makers be in a position to make informed comparisons and a considered choice among reasonable alternatives. A considered choice requires adequate knowledge of those alternatives, especially the risks, costs and benefits associated with each. The principal alternatives to which attention was drawn at our hearings were deep geological disposal, storage at nuclear reactor sites, long-term storage at a central facility either at or below surface, and transmutation.

2.3 Key Issues and Complixities

At first reading, the task assigned to this Panel might appear straightforward. As the panel members and participants delved more deeply into it, however, a number of subtleties and complexities became apparent. Several of these are highlighted in this section, and we explore some of them in later chapters.

2.3.1 Societal Context

Assessment of the safety and environmental implications of any major proposal is likely to involve related social and ethical questions. Nowhere is this more evident than in the nuclear field, for reasons that we shall refer to frequently in this report. Technical, social and ethical aspects of nuclear fuel waste management are inextricably related and must be viewed within the full context of contemporary societal thinking, as the Panel was frequently reminded during its hearings.

Many ethical questions related to long-term management are far from resolved: collective versus individual rights and obligations; intergenerational and intragenerational equity and responsibilities; acceptability of regulatory standards; conflicts between human and environmental values; appropriate consultation of Aboriginal people; the actual urgency of actions required; and the lack of information about, and a forum for discussion of, alternative approaches to managing nuclear fuel wastes, let alone energy options. Open discussion of these questions and continual updating of a changing ethical framework will be required to reach decisions that are acceptable within the broad context of our society.

Societal priorities are also important, including the appropriate allocation of scarce human, financial and physical resources to nuclear fuel wastes in relation to the other problems besetting society. The cost of a disposal facility, for example, would be substantial, estimated at between $10 billion for 3.6 million bundles (1995 dollars) [John Van Den Hengel and Fred Long, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearings Transcripts, March 29, 1996, p. 19.] and $13.3 billion for 10 million bundles (1991 dollars). [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Environmental Impact Statement, p. 232.] Ontario Hydro and others contended that the charge to ratepayers for disposal, at less than a tenth of a cent per kilowatt-hour or roughly two per cent of the price of electricity, is small and reasonable. [Ken Nash and Ken Smith, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearings Transcripts, March 11, 1996, p. 45 and p. 300.] Others feared that future ratepayers or even taxpayers in general might end up paying for the facility. A cost-benefit analysis could help to demonstrate whether a reasonable percentage of resources was allocated to managing nuclear fuel wastes; whether the cost was reasonable compared to the revenue and benefits generated by nuclear energy and was equitably assigned; and whether resources were either being denied from efforts to seek sound solutions, or were being wasted on reducing risks for marginal benefit.

As signalled by the United Nations' Brundtland Commission report and by growing acceptance of the concept of sustainable development, changing societal values were reflected in many of the presentations made to the Panel. These presentations stressed the obligations of current generations not only to themselves but also to future generations and to the well-being of planet Earth itself; the need to reduce consumption and waste generation; the importance of re-using and recycling resources; and a trend away from disposal as a waste management approach.

Finally, the Panel was aware of differing value systems based in differing cultural or ethical approaches, sometimes referred to as "world views," which tended to accentuate the differences among review participants. There were those who emphasized the importance of economic growth to improving the lot of humankind; valued the natural environment primarily for its usefulness to humans; and had faith in rationality, science and technology to solve difficult technical problems. On the other hand, there were those who questioned both the desirability and the possibility of continued economic growth unless it could be demonstrated to be sustainable; were uneasy with the anthropocentric view of the other group; and had less faith in rationality, science and technology, government or institutions. Although few participants would subscribe unequivocally to either "world view," the two tendencies were evident, reflecting deep societal divisions over what constitutes acceptable management of nuclear fuel wastes.

The emphasis that many participants placed on the ethical framework, on social priorities and on changing societal values-the centrality of which the Panel fully accepts-argues in favour of a prudent, step-by-step approach to developing a long-term strategy for managing nuclear wastes, so that irreversible decisions are not made in haste.

The process of developing an appropriate plan for managing nuclear wastes must reflect our societal context. That context includes widespread public concern over the handling of all toxic and persistent industrial wastes, fear of losing control in the planning and decision-making process, lack of trust in political and institutional leaders, scepticism of scientific predictions that are based on uncertainty, and a healthy suspicion that, in the final analysis, no one will be accountable. Factors such as these are legitimate and important concerns which strongly influenced the way the Panel addressed its mandate.

2.3.2 Dread Factor

A deeply entrenched fear and mistrust of nuclear technology exists within some segments of our society. This "dread factor" is real and palpable. It is an important element in decision-making processes concerning nuclear matters, as it will undoubtedly affect the public confidence resulting from such processes. The dread factor stems not only from the imperceptibility, mobility and longevity of the radiation hazard and its disturbing potential health effects, but also from association with nuclear weapons and with past disasters, nuclear and other, involving human error or engineering failures. A combination of these elements led many participants to express great anxiety over worst-case scenarios with terrible and long-lasting consequences, regardless of their low likelihood. Although experts may challenge or debate the perception that nuclear fuel wastes pose unprecedented hazards due to their extreme toxicity and longevity, these challenges are not, by themselves, likely to materially reduce the dread factor.

2.3.3 Need for and Timing of Disposal

As outlined in section 2.1.7, AECL reasons that disposal is needed now to permanently protect human health and the natural environment from the potentially harmful effects of nuclear fuel wastes, and to minimize the burden on future generations. In the view of both AECL and the AECB, achieving both of these goals means not relying on institutional controls.

Many participants held somewhat different views.

. . . we should not require that man's endeavours be managed to account for societal breakdown, since this calls into question the viability of any industry which relies on institutional control to manage its risks. Such an approach would have slowed the progress of society as we know it and would deny society many of the benefits of science and technology.

New Brunswick Power [New Brunswick Power, The Ethics of the Management of High-level Radioactive Waste (PH3Pub.225, March 26, 1997), p. 2.]

The Canadian Nuclear Association supported disposal to minimize the burden on future generations and to remove a major barrier to their continued use of nuclear energy. But it suggested that wastes should be retrievable as long as society might consider recycling them, and that successful siting of a repository should not preclude long-term parallel storage. [Murray Stewart, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, November 19, 1996, pp. 226-227 and pp. 231-232, and Murray Stewart, The Canadian Nuclear Association (presentation to the CEAA Panel Reviewing the Nuclear Fuel Waste Disposal Concept, Phase II Public Hearings, PH2Pub.027(a), November 19, 1996), p. 8.]

Other participants argued against the AECL disposal concept and its timing on the following grounds:

  • that relying on undemonstrated technology to achieve passive safety for many thousands of years was less acceptable than the assumption of societal break-down and the loss of institutional control;
  • that leaving wastes on the surface near heavily populated areas or seats of government would constantly remind people of its presence, thereby ensuring that institutional controls did not lapse;
  • that, as long as nuclear power continues, the most hazardous waste inventory will always be stored at the surface, and ongoing care will be required not only for the wastes in storage but also for the power plants;
  • that disposal would burden future generations because they would have limited options for managing the wastes, they would not want to leave the facility unmonitored, and they would find it expensive and difficult to retrieve the wastes if desired; and
  • that science was likely in the relatively near future to develop a better solution than passive geological disposal.

Faced with these contradictions, many participants believed that Canada should not rush to implement disposal, but should keep the wastes in storage and look for a better solution.

2.3.4 Reviewing a Concept

The panel's mandate was unusual compared to that of most other federal environmental assessment panels in that we were asked to review a concept rather than a specific project at a specific site. Because its proposal did not focus on a specific site, design or community, AECL found it difficult to respond precisely to detailed questions in our guidelines related to the biophysical or, especially, the socio-economic impacts of the proposal. In addition, AECL found it difficult to explain how the concept could be applied equally effectively to a sufficiently wide range of potential sites. The public also found it troublesome to review a concept, as the discussion was necessarily abstract, allowing everyone to bypass complex and controversial social issues that they would have addressed otherwise. Also, the fact that the potential implementing organization for the concept remained to be identified meant that nobody could give the guarantees that participants sought on how impacts would be assessed and managed in the future.

Many participants were confused because the EIS did not distinguish sufficiently between the generic concept and the detailed case studies used to demonstrate its safety. Quite late in the hearings, a number of participants did not know whether they were being asked to judge the concept itself, the EIS case study or the second case study presented during the technical hearings. For others, the distinction was clear enough.

The approach of approving a concept made some participants suspicious. They feared that if the Panel endorsed the concept as safe and acceptable, that endorsement would constitute a "green light" for continuing nuclear power, and that it would be difficult for any community to resist accepting a facility, to negotiate modifications to the concept or to strike a hard bargain for acceptance. Some participants expressed the latter fear despite assurances that another environmental assessment process would apply during siting and that the principle of voluntarism would effectively give the potential host community veto power.

2.3.5 Long-term Predictions

Compounding the complexity of assessing a concept was the longevity of the wastes, the intended permanence of disposal and, thus, the need to consider safety and acceptability over thousands of years. Some participants could not imagine a facility that could last for a period extending well beyond that of recorded history, let alone predict its performance over that time, given human fallibility and uncertainties in the data, mathematical modelling techniques, and future environmental and social conditions. Others believed that these problems were not insurmountable, given long-lived natural analogues, the stability of the Canadian Shield on the geological time scale, and the margins of safety in AECB's risk criterion and in AECL's results. Safety aside, some argued that we can never predict the long-term acceptability of any concept to future generations. Nonetheless, long-term predictions are not unique to nuclear fuel waste management.

2.3.6 How Safe is Safe Enough?

It became clear that there are widely differing views on the definition of safety, and on the question of how safe is safe enough, based on different technical and social perspectives. Balancing these views was one of the panel's major challenges. It will continue to be an issue during further stages of developing strategies for managing nuclear fuel wastes.

The questions of what degree of safety and what degree of proof are required when assessing safety at a conceptual design stage, compared to the licensing stage of a site-specific design, were contentious. At the extremes, one view was that virtually "absolute safety" must be guaranteed, while another countered that safety can never be guaranteed and that there is some remnant risk in everything we do, including doing nothing. The Panel has considered these and many positions in between. From a technical viewpoint, there is another question: if the predicted radiological or chemical dose rates are well below natural fluctuations, does it make sense to try to reduce them further through expenditure on additional safeguards? From a social viewpoint, an understanding of safety is based not only on technical data, but on previous experience with similar under-takings, and within a cultural context. Therefore, current social values must be incorporated into the safety assessment of disposal at the conceptual level.

2.3.7 Transportation of Nuclear Fuel Wastes

A multitude of concerns was voiced on waste transportation: the state and safety of Canadian highways, particularly northern ones; the potential for accidents and terrorism; the testing and integrity of shipping casks; emergency preparedness; and the notification and rights of communities along the routes. Speakers often recounted the events in Gorleben, Germany, where a great deal of policing, time and money were needed to clear opponents from the route used to ship reprocessing wastes. Strong worries about transportation led some participants to reject any option other than on-site waste management.

2.3.8 Issues Outside the Mandate

The panel's terms of reference stated clearly that the following were outside our mandate: the energy policies of Canada and the provinces; the role of nuclear energy within these policies, including the construction, operation and safety of new or existing nuclear power plants; fuel reprocessing as an energy policy; and military applica-tions of nuclear technology. However, a number of participants found it difficult to consider nuclear fuel waste management in isolation from one or more of these subjects. Others found it unacceptable, while a third group had no problem with it.

When the panel's review was announced, ministers had committed the government to conducting a parallel review in a different forum, which would put the nuclear fuel waste question in a broader context. Despite repeated letters from the Chairman reminding ministers of the importance of the parallel review, this commitment has not been fulfilled.

Among the issues that frequently arose in this review were the following: the need for policies on either the continuing use or the phase-out of nuclear energy; the importation of radioactive wastes for commercial disposal; and the importation of mixed oxide (MOX) fuel containing weapons plutonium. Further comment on these topics is found in Chapter 7.

2.3.9 The Legacy of Previous Reviews and Decisions

When the Hare Report was submitted in 1977, it may have been true that the public felt comfortable with a permanent disposal solution, preferably in a "remote" location. However, Dr. Hare and his colleagues advised that, before their recommendations were adopted as policy, they should be subject to wide public discussion and have broad public support. [F.K. Hare et al, The Management of Canada's Nuclear Wastes, p. 51.] This wide public discussion did not take place.

Dr. Stella Swanson: My question therefore is, in your opinion, has the wider public discussion you called for in 1977 taken place?

Dr. F. Kenneth Hare: I don't think it has. I'm not sure that it can. . . . But not to carry it out, or not to attempt it is-and I will use an old-fashioned word -immoral in my judgment.

Public Hearing Transcripts [Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, June 20, 1996, pp. 68-69.]

Twenty years later, many participants in the current review were calling for a comparative risk, cost and benefit analysis of all the available waste management options or, even more broadly, of all electricity generation options. The limitations of our mandate and of the information made available to us made it impossible to satisfy these concerns. Repeatedly raised was the possibility that long-term storage-with the ability to monitor and retrieve wastes and to integrate new technologies-might be a better solution than geological disposal, even if it meant keeping the wastes at or near their present locations indefinitely.

2.4 Involvement and Perspectives of Aboriginal People

The Panel was particularly concerned about the involvement and perspectives of Aboriginal people. This was a key element of the setting in which the Panel strove to fulfil its mandate.

In a special workshop held as part of our scoping meetings, at regular public hearings and at hearings held on three reserves on the Canadian Shield, the Panel heard strong and often moving statements from Aboriginal participants. Those who spoke to us ranged from schoolchildren and ordinary men and women to elders, chiefs and the Grand Chief of the Assembly of First Nations. Much of what they said to the Panel about the AECL concept and the broader problem of the long-term management of nuclear fuel wastes had a great deal in common with the statements of non-Aboriginal participants. However, some messages were particular to Aboriginal participants.

Virtually all of the Canadian Shield is inhabited, claimed or used for traditional purposes (hunting, fishing, trapping and food gathering) by Aboriginal people. If a storage or disposal facility were located on the Shield, the facility itself, or the transport of nuclear fuel wastes and building materials, would clearly affect Aboriginal people. Many other economic and industrial developments in northern Canada have affected traditional lifestyles in a similar way.

Aboriginal people are not a homogenous segment of the Canadian population. With 580 Indian bands (127 First Nations in Ontario alone), numerous Inuit and Metis communities and 53 Aboriginal languages spoken in Canada, there is extreme cultural diversity among Aboriginal people. This diversity includes differing views on the management of nuclear fuel wastes. However, the principal messages presented by Aboriginal participants throughout the review process can, we think, be summarized as follows.

  • Neither the proponent nor the Panel had consulted Aboriginal people in an appropriate manner that respected their culture, languages and consultative processes. This must be done if there is to be any chance of meaningful Aboriginal participation in solving the nuclear waste problem.
  • Aboriginal people have not been given the time or opportunity, in their own languages and in their own way, to study and understand the proposals for deep geological disposal. From their present understanding, it appeared to many participants that the concept strongly conflicted with their deeply held beliefs about humankind's relationship with and responsibility to Mother Earth, as well as with their sense of responsibility for the welfare of the traditional next seven generations.
  • Most Aboriginal participants did not have great confidence in the current proposals of science and technology to manage nuclear fuel wastes safely, in part because these proposals do not incorporate traditional knowledge.
  • There was little confidence that the principle of voluntarism and a community's right to refuse a facility would apply to Aboriginal people. The decision-making process proposed did not fit with their traditions and culture and did not correspond with the Aboriginal view of community. Their suspicion in this regard was heightened by the past history of broken promises and broken agreements in dealings with non-native people and governments.
  • Aboriginal people have not shared proportionately in the economic prosperity of other Canadians and they feel they should not be forced to accept the waste products from the industrialized economy. They doubted that they would derive any significant benefit from agreeing to accept a facility.

The unhappiness and the frustration of the Aboriginal participants was epitomized by the request, put most strongly on the last day of our hearings, that the entire review process be stopped and that they be given the time and resources to conduct their own consultation with their people before the Panel made its recommendations to governments.

. . . we would like to participate in these hearings and develop a parallel process before the final recommendations are out. We would also like to be given the time and resources to be able to develop with our leadership . . . a process that would look directly at the recommendations that have come from these hearings as well as to develop our own recommendations in a parallel sense. Lyle Morrisseau, Sagkeeng First Nation [Lyle Morrisseau, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, March 27, 1997, pp. 72-73.]

The Panel believes that it would carry more weight for it to endorse strongly a fully participatory self-designed Aboriginal consultation process as an integral part of the next steps recommended in this report, rather than delaying the report to accommodate the required consultation process at this time.

2.5 Framing the Problem

We have described the complexities of the review that the participants and the Panel faced, both those related to its mandate and those related to the societal context in which nuclear fuel waste management must be placed. We hope this will contribute to a better understanding of the remainder of our report and of its recommendations. With this backdrop in mind, the Panel set forth to answer two fundamental questions during the review:

  • Is AECL's concept a safe and acceptable response to the need for long-term management of Canada's nuclear fuel wastes?
  • What future steps should be taken?

By safe, the Panel means meeting, on balance, criteria for safety as interpreted from both a technical and a social perspective. By acceptable, the Panel means broad societal consensus that the proposed course of action is the best available, taking into account ethical, social, technical and economic views.

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3.0 The AECL Concept: Description, Performance Assessment Analyses and Implications

3.1 Requirements and Objectives

To guide the development of its disposal concept, AECL established four general requirements, as discussed in the EIS. [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Environmental Impact Statement, pp. 62-70.]

  • Protect human health and the natural environment.
  • Minimize the burden placed on future generations, taking social and economic factors into account.
  • Ensure there is scope for public involvement during all stages of implementing the concept.
  • Develop a disposal concept that is appropriate for Canada - that is, a concept that is compatible with the country's geographical features and economic factors.

AECL also instituted a number of technical objectives for the concept. [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Environmental Impact Statement, pp. 70-74.]

  • Develop and demonstrate the technology for siting, constructing, operating, decommissioning and closing a disposal facility in plutonic rock. The technology should:
    • not rely on long-term institutional controls as a necessary safety feature-that is, a disposal facility should be passively safe following closure;
    • be currently available or readily achievable;
    • be adaptable to a wide range of physical conditions and societal requirements and to potential changes in criteria, guidelines and standards;
    • allow for monitoring; and
    • allow for retrieving the wastes, but provisions for retrieval should not compromise passive safety.
  • Develop and demonstrate a methodology for evaluating the safety of a disposal system against established safety criteria, guidelines and standards.
  • Determine whether technically suitable disposal sites are likely to exist in Canada.

AECL derived these requirements and objectives from various initiatives undertaken since the mid-1970s by international organizations, the governments of Canada and Ontario, the AECB and AECL itself.

3.2 Concept Overview

AECL has proposed a multiple barrier containment system to dispose of nuclear fuel wastes deep within the plutonic rock of the Canadian Shield. Each of the engineered or natural barriers can retain various components of the wastes for differing durations. Their combined performance would impede the migration of radioactive and chemical contaminants to the earth's surface for several thousand to hundreds of thousands of years, by which time substantial radioactive decay will have taken place.

Options exist for each of the engineered barriers and other design components. The final choices would be made according to site-specific and other requirements, such as volume of used fuel, once a disposal site is selected. In general, the barriers, components and possible options for each are as follows.

  • The waste form - The wastes would be either used CANDU reactor fuel bundles or, should reprocessing be implemented, derived solidified high-level wastes from reprocessed used fuel. In either case, the waste form would serve as a barrier itself, due to its low solubility under anticipated groundwater conditions.
  • The container - The wastes would be encased in a container designed to isolate them from groundwater for at least 500 years and as long as over a million years, depending on which material and design are selected. Several alternatives are discussed in the EIS and in R-Barriers, one of the primary reference documents.
  • The buffer - The containers would be surrounded by a buffer material, likely clay-based, that would limit groundwater movement, container corrosion, mechanical damage, and contaminant dissolution and movement. The containers and buffer would be placed either in underground rooms or in boreholes drilled from the rooms. A horizontal network of rooms and tunnels, on one or more levels, would form the disposal vault. See the EIS and R-Facility, one of the primary reference documents, for more details on vault design.
  • The backfill and other vault seals - Each room, tunnel, shaft and exploration borehole would be filled with clay- or cement-based backfill and other seals designed to delay the transport of contaminants out of the vault. Vault seals are further described in the EIS and R-Barriers.
  • The geosphere - The vault would be excavated at a nominal depth of 500 to 1000 metres in plutonic rock of the Canadian Shield. This would protect the vault from natural or human disruptions, maintain conditions favourable for isolating wastes and retard the release of contaminants to the surface.

AECL's system is intended to be passively safe after closure-that is, safe without the need for ongoing monitoring and maintenance-as required by the AECB in its regulatory documents R-71 and R-90. [Atomic Energy Control Board, Regulatory Policy Statement, Deep Geological Disposal of Nuclear Fuel Waste: Background Information and Regulatory Requirements Regarding the Concept Assessment Phase (Atomic Energy Control Board Regulatory Document R - 71, January 29, 1985), p. 10; Regulatory Policy Statement, Policy on the Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities (Atomic Energy Control Board Regulatory Document R-90, August 22, 1988), p. 4.] Although future generations may provide long-term care, such a facility would remain safe if they were either unwilling or unable to do so.

The cost of a facility based on the concept, estimated by AECL in 1991 dollars, would range from $8.7 billion for five million fuel bundles to $13.3 billion for 10 million bundles, excluding financing costs, taxes, non-routine activities (such as waste retrieval), transportation and any extended monitoring stages.

3.3 Implementation Stages

At the broadest level, the concept can be conceived in two phases: preclosure and postclosure.

The preclosure period is expected to last about 100 years. AECL proposes the following preclosure stages, as illustrated in Figure 4, with possible extended monitoring either before or after decommissioning:

  • siting (at least 20 years);
  • construction (5 years);
  • operation (from 20 to 80 or more years);
  • decommissioning (10 years); and
  • closure (at least 2 years).

Public involvement would be ongoing, founded on the principles of safety and environmental protection, voluntarism, shared decision-making, openness and fairness. Chapter 5 of the EIS, R-Siting (one of the primary reference documents) and Chapter 6 of this report discuss public participation in more detail.

Before beginning each stage of preclosure after siting, the implementing organization would have to obtain a licence from the AECB, as well as other approvals. While no implementing organization has yet been identified, the Panel makes recommendations on this subject in Chapter 6 of this report.

During the siting stage, governments and waste owners would probably identify broad siting territories of plutonic rock, which would not necessarily be contiguous. Within these, the implementing organization would identify willing host communities and one or more candidate sites. The implementing organization would consult with governments and potential host communities to develop criteria to exclude sites and, if necessary, processes to rank sites. Using the criteria and increasingly detailed site characterization methods, the implementing organization would select a preferred candidate site. The organizations responsible for transportation, in consultation with affected communities, would choose transportation routes and modes.

In this stage, the implementing organization would begin characterizing and monitoring the biophysical environ-ment and affected communities, modifying the design, and assessing and managing environmental effects. These tasks would continue, as necessary, through subsequent stages. By the end of siting, the design would be fully adapted to the site conditions. A list of AECL's proposed siting steps can be found in Appendix M. The availability of potential sites and the methodology used to characterize sites are described more fully in the next sections.

Depending on the design chosen, the construction stage would involve building transportation facilities and equipment, access routes, utilities and surface facilities, including a used-fuel packaging plant; excavating shafts, tunnels and some of the disposal rooms; building underground ancillary facilities; and testing all systems.

The operation stage would involve transporting wastes from storage at reactor sites to the facility, as well as preparing for and carrying out underground emplacement. Its duration, estimated to range between 20 and 80 years, would depend on the quantity of used fuel to be transported and on whether limited demonstration disposal would be done first. Used fuel would be transported in specialized casks along the chosen transportation route by road, rail, water or some combination of these. The number of annual shipments would be determined by the waste quantity, transport mode and cask capacity. On-site activities would include transferring the wastes from transportation casks to sealed disposal containers, transporting the containers to the vault, and sealing them in with buffer and backfill. Operations would cease once all the wastes were emplaced and approvals were granted to proceed to decommissioning.

Decommissioning would include sealing remaining excavations (such as shafts, tunnels and boreholes), dismantling surface facilities, decontaminating and remediating the site, and, possibly, installing location markers. Extended monitoring could be done either immediately before or after decommissioning, to obtain performance data sufficient to secure approvals to proceed.

Figure 4: Implementation Schedule (Source: AECL)

Figure 4: Implementation Schedule (Source: AECL)

Closure, the last part of the preclosure phase, would occur when the repository no longer depended on human intervention to perform its function. While limited types of monitoring could be done during the postclosure phase, closure would entail removing any monitoring equipment and sealing associated boreholes that could compromise safety if left in place. AECL proposes that the closure stage would end once the regulatory agencies, the host community and the implementing organization agreed that the facility could be safely abandoned.

Although the concept does not include plans for retrieving wastes, such retrieval would be feasible during both the operation stage and after decommissioning. It would be more complex and expensive during the latter period. A design-specific description for retrieving wastes during the operation phase is given inR-Facility; a similar description for the phase after decommissioning is given in one of the additional information documents reviewed during the autumn of 1996.

More detailed discussions of concept implementation can be found in Chapter 5 of the EIS, as well as in R-Siting andR-Facility.

3.3.1 Availability and Characterization of Sites

Since site selection will not take place until a disposal concept has been accepted as safe, the Panel shall not consider any specific potential sites. However, the Panel may review the methodology required to characterize sites and the potential availability of sites in Canada. It may also review general criteria for site selection . . .

Terms of Reference

3.3.1.1 Potential Availability of Sites

AECL's concept is designed for plutonic rock of the Canadian Shield. As illustrated in Figure 5, the Canadian Shield extends through much of the Northwest Territories, roughly the northern halves of Saskatchewan and Manitoba, and most of Ontario, Quebec and Labrador.

Figure 5: Potential Availability of Sites in Canada (source: AECL, afterR-Siting, page 45) Suggested exclusion areas: seismic zones 2 and above Canadian Shield

Figure 5: Potential Availability of Sites in Canada (source: AECL, afterR-Siting, page 45) Suggested exclusion areas: seismic zones 2 and above Canadian Shield

Plutonic rock such as granite, otherwise known as crystalline or igneous intrusive rock, was formed deep in the earth by the crystallization of magma and by chemical alteration. It is widely distributed on the Canadian Shield and elsewhere in Canada. In 1981, 1,365 plutons (large individual bodies of plutonic rock) were documented within the Canadian Shield in Ontario alone.

AECL stipulates that a suitable site, as well as being located within plutonic rock of the Canadian Shield, must have two main features: characteristics permitting construction of a safe, environmentally acceptable disposal system; and a willing host community.

AECB Regulatory Document R-72 discusses the requirements for a geologically acceptable site and host rock. Such a site must:

  • have combined properties that significantly retard the movement or release of radionuclides;
  • be an unlikely candidate for exploitation as a natural resource;
  • be geologically stable; and
  • be large enough so that the repository can be built deep underground and far away from geological discontinuities.

To meet some of these requirements, AECL specified that the following areas should be excluded from siting:

  • those near operating and abandoned mines;
  • those near known or inferred mineral deposits with future economic potential;
  • those outside of the relatively stable seismic zones 0 and 1 (this would exclude eastern Ontario, southern Quebec and almost all of New Brunswick, as shown in Figure 5); and
  • those with ancient rifts or clustering of historic earth-quake activity.

The concept requires a volume of suitable plutonic rock large enough to contain a vault at a nominal depth of between 500 and 1000 metres. AECL established that an area at vault depth of roughly 9 square kilometres would likely be needed for the reference case study facility. Of 373 plutons in a sample area of north central Ontario, 75 per cent had an area exceeding 9 square kilometres, 50 per cent exceeded 35 square kilometres, and about 10 per cent exceeded 400 square kilometres. On the surface, the site boundary would encompass about 25 square kilometres, and access would be required to at least the surrounding 400 square kilometres to characterize the hydrogeological setting.

AECL points out that plutonic rock of the Canadian Shield has many properties favourable for disposal, including potentially large areas of low permeability. However, it stresses that the latter is not required to ensure long-term safety-rather, the combined effect of engineered and geosphere barriers must be considered. With the options available for the engineered barriers, AECL believes that technically suitable disposal sites are widely available in Canada.

Since AECL proposes that communities should volunteer to host a site, the second major requirement for a suitable site is a willing host community with jurisdiction over the area. If such jurisdiction is lacking-for instance, if the site is located on Crown land-a willing government with jurisdiction is necessary. On Crown land, the implementing organization would encourage the government to identify a potential host community. Neither AECL nor any other organization has been asked to investigate the potential availability of a willing host community.

3.3.1.2 Methodology for Characterizing Sites

The proposed approach to characterizing sites is to study increasingly smaller areas in increasingly greater detail. AECL divides the process into two stages: site screening, which would last about 3 to 5 years, and site evaluation, which would last about 15 to 20 years. The last 6 years of site evaluation would involve work underground.

During site screening, the implementing organization would use readily available information and exclusion criteria to map out potential siting regions within siting territories identified by governments and waste owners. The pre-existing information would include satellite images, air photos, reports, records, maps and data from a variety of sources. To map the siting regions, the information and exclusion criteria would be integrated using a geographic information system.

At this stage, communities within those regions would be invited to volunteer as potential hosts for the facility. Within those areas permitted by potential host communities or governments with jurisdiction, the implementing organization would then conduct reconnaissance-level remote sensing and surface studies. These would make it possible to do preliminary modelling of the conditions at up to two or three potential candidate areas of roughly 25 square kilometres each.

During the site evaluation stage, the implementing organization would identify a preferred vault location, develop a preliminary design for each potential candidate area and, ultimately, select a preferred candidate site. Site evaluation would entail several tasks:

  • a more thorough analysis of pre-existing information;
  • additional reconnaissance studies;
  • more detailed and expensive aerial, surface and borehole investigations of potential vault locations and at least 400 square kilometres surrounding them; and
  • integration of all the information into three-dimensional regional groundwater flow and contaminant movement models.

Once an engineering conceptual design for the candidate sites had been developed, the implementing organization would use modelling to assess potential environmental effects. If more than one candidate site passed scrutiny, they would be ranked to select one on which to excavate exploratory shafts and tunnels.

At this point, the organizations responsible for transportation would study conditions along potential transportation routes to select a route, mode and detailed design, and to evaluate their potential effects.

Finally, at the preferred candidate site, the implementing organization would employ comprehensive underground studies to confirm site suitability, prepare a detailed design and complete the environmental assessment. If this site did not meet all requirements, the latter steps would be repeated for the second-ranked candidate site.

Appendix J of the EIS, and the primary reference documentsR-Siting and R-Preclosure, describe site characterization in detail. Even though this process would involve state-of-the-art technology, the investigation of large areas and the integration of copious quantities of data, AECL is confident that the methods are currently available and sufficiently well developed to allow siting to proceed.

3.4 Concept Performance Assessment Analyses

AECL presented assessments of the preclosure and postclosure performance of the concept and its environmental and safety effects, as directed by the panel's EIS guidelines and the AECB's regulatory documents. Ontario Hydro, which provided technical assistance to AECL and studied interim storage and transportation, did the preclosure assessment. Given the absence of a specific site, there was neither a known environmental setting nor a site-specific facility design. Therefore, to meet the AECB requirements for quantitative estimates of risk, AECL and Ontario Hydro adopted a case study approach; they specified and evaluated hypothetical reference disposal systems.

Although the reference case studies were hypothetical, they incorporated data from extensive research and engineering studies, both laboratory- and field-based. Since conservative assumptions were used, AECL and Ontario Hydro believe that the results should over-estimate the potential effects of any eventual implementation of the concept.

One case study was presented for preclosure and for postclosure in the EIS and primary reference documents. AECL introduced a second postclosure case study in its May 1996 Response to Request for Information and presented it during the phase II technical hearings.

3.4.1 Preclosure Performance Assessment Analyses

Ontario Hydro based its preclosure assessment on a hypothetical facility and transportation system designed to dispose of 10 million used CANDU fuel bundles. The designs are described in the EIS, R-Preclosure and R-Facility. Three regions of the Canadian Shield in Ontario-northern, central and southern-were selected as alternative environments.

Transportation was analyzed separately from other operation stage activities. The utility examined three projected modes of transportation (road, rail and water), along with eight possible transportation routes originating from the three nuclear generating stations in Ontario.

Ontario Hydro used a combination of information and techniques, including real case studies, existing data, interaction matrices, contaminant pathways analysis, deterministic mathematical modelling, and scenario and sensitivity analyses. It described and, where possible, quantified potential effects on human health, the natural environment and the socio-economic environment, for both normal and accident conditions, and for each implementation stage.

To estimate radiological risk to the public during operation, Ontario Hydro used a hypothetical "critical group" living on a farm at the facility boundary, whose members consumed contaminated farm products, water and fish. A hypothetical generic freshwater fish, plant, mammal and bird were used to estimate doses to non-human biota. Ontario Hydro suggested measures to mitigate and compensate for adverse effects. It gauged the significance of effects by comparing results with appropriate federal and provincial regulatory limits, guidelines, standards, background conditions or threshold values, as documented in Appendix B of the EIS and in R-Preclosure.

The findings of the preclosure assessment, which are summarized in Chapter 6 of the EIS and detailed in R-Preclosure, are briefly reviewed here.

Although a facility of this type has never been constructed, Ontario Hydro concluded that its preclosure effects would be comparable to those associated with other large industrial projects, such as nuclear generating stations. Hence, existing experience in managing the effects of such projects, as well as in transporting radioactive materials, could be applied.

Radiological doses to the public from facility operations and transportation, during both normal and accident conditions, were estimated to be below the AECB limits for existing nuclear facilities and to be a small fraction of the annual exposure from natural background radiation. Exposure to workers was estimated to be well below AECB limits for atomic radiation workers under normal and accident conditions. Radionuclide concentrations in the natural environment and radiological doses to non-human biota were estimated to be a small proportion of background levels. Ontario Hydro found that potential non-radiological effects were either negligible or small, and that they could be mitigated using known technologies and practices.

While it estimated that potential radiological effects would be below existing limits, Ontario Hydro recognized that they would likely concern people living near the facility and along transportation routes, and that this concern could potentially cause significant socio-economic effects. Aboriginal and northern communities would be more susceptible than others to the effects of construction and operation, including transportation. The most positive socio-economic effects were identified as permanent waste isolation, employment and local economic growth. The amounts of raw and manufactured materials required for implementation were anticipated to be small in comparison to those available in Canada or elsewhere, yet the estimated cost of the case study facility would be substantial.

Ontario Hydro concluded that the precision of the preclosure assessment was limited by its generic nature, and that it was impossible to evaluate the significance of the socio-economic effects without consulting the people who would be affected.

Included in the additional information reviewed during the autumn of 1996 was a selective probabilistic analysis of the effects of preclosure operations. [Sean B. Russell, "Preclosure Probabilistic Assessment of the Canadian Concept for Used Fuel Disposal Focussing on Key Radionuclides and Exposure Pathways for Routine Emissions," Proceedings of the International Conference on Deep Geologic Disposal of Radioactive Waste, Canadian Nuclear Society, September 16-19, 1996 (Lac du Bonnet: Canadian Nuclear Society, 1996, Undertaking 96 and Additional Information 75).] The estimates of mean dose and radionuclide concentrations in the natural environment at the end of routine operations (after 41 years) were roughly comparable to those presented in the EIS, and declined thereafter. The author therefore concluded that long-term effects from operations are expected to be negligible.

At the panel's request, AECL and Ontario Hydro provided a brief qualitative analysis of the preclosure implications of a 10-million-bundle disposal vault using in-room emplacement, rather than in-borehole emplacement. [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Response to Undertaking 100, Preclosure Implications of a Disposal Vault using the In-room Emplacement Method (Undertaking 100, November 15, 1996).] In general, they said that the implications were within the scope of the reference case study and sensitivity analyses documented in the EIS and R-Preclosure, which was based on in-borehole emplacement. However, there were a few notable differences.

Due to the need to reduce container loading density (for worker radiation shielding purposes), the plan area of the vault would roughly double to about 7.25 square kilo-metres, thus requiring a larger volume of suitable host rock and a somewhat larger site surface area. While the required volume of backfill material would be approximately halved, that of bentonite buffer would be doubled. Used fuel transportation, radioactive emissions from the surface facilities and their potential effects would remain unchanged. [Kurt Johansen, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, November 20, 1996, p. 15.] The estimated cost of in-room emplacement would be about 15 per cent to 20 per cent more per fuel bundle than in-borehole emplacement.

3.4.2 Postclosure Performance Assessment Analyses

AECL's postclosure assessment is documented in Chapter 7 of the EIS and in four of the primary reference documents (R-Postclosure, R-Vault, R-Geosphere and R-Biosphere). It includes a qualitative discussion of long-term disposal system conditions and performance, a quantitative estimate of the performance of a hypothetical disposal system during the first 10,000 years and a qualitative treatment thereafter.

AECL intended the quantitative performance assessment to demonstrate that this methodology could be applied to a real facility, and that the facility could achieve safety indefinitely using available or readily achievable technology. The assessment includes scenario and sensitivity analyses and an explanation of the sources of and treatment of uncertainty. It also uses extensive field, laboratory and engineering study results; expert judgment; contaminant pathways analysis; and deterministic and probabilistic mathematical modelling. AECL evaluated models by comparing them with natural analogue case studies, actual observations and independent model predictions.

The qualitative description of the postclosure disposal system focuses on the processes and assumptions critical to assessments of long-term system performance. AECL concludes that a series of engineered barriers designed and placed to take advantage of a well-chosen site would effectively contain the wastes.

For the quantitative analysis, AECL represented the hypothetical reference disposal system by using linked mathematical models consisting of biosphere, geosphere and vault components. The biosphere and geosphere models were based on information obtained from AECL's Whiteshell Research Area. The geosphere model also embodied data from surface investigations for the underground research laboratory, and specified a context of low-permeability, sparsely fractured plutonic rock for the vault. The vault component was based on a capacity of 8.6 million fuel bundles, titanium-shell packed-particulate containers, emplacement in boreholes in the floors of vault rooms, and a depth of 500 metres.

AECL simulated a number of processes: changes in radionuclide inventories over time; container corrosion; contaminant release from the wastes and migration through the vault, geosphere and biosphere, including food chains; and exposure of organisms to internal and external radiation. It defined the "critical group" as a self-sufficient rural household residing in the vault ground-water discharge area and obtaining all its food, supplies and water nearby. As in the preclosure analysis, hypothetical organisms representing a plant, a mammal, a bird and a fish were used.

AECL excluded a number of scenarios from the modelling process, including criticality, earthquakes, biosphere evolution and climate change, because it judged them to be highly unlikely or implicitly accounted for by the data used. In the general system model, it included a scenario in which the critical group accidentally drilled a water supply well into the centre of the contaminant plume in a permeable fracture zone near the vault, and used the contaminated water for drinking and irrigation. Separately, AECL analyzed four additional inadvertent intrusion scenarios in which a drilling operation penetrated a waste container in a sealed vault, bringing wastes to the surface. Depending on the scenario, the wastes either expose a drill crew member or a laboratory technician to radiation, or are dispersed at the site and later expose a construction worker or a resident to radiation.

To account for and quantify the uncertainty inherent in modelling complex systems over long time frames, AECL used a probabilistic approach. Each of the modelled system characteristics was represented by a parameter which, depending on the nature of the characteristic, would take on a "constant" value, a "switch" value chosen from two or more alternatives, or a value selected from a probability distribution of possible values.

AECL used a computer program called SYVAC (SYstems Variability Analysis Code) to select the values for each of the vault, geosphere and biosphere model parameters. SYVAC randomly samples the parameter values from input probability distributions, and then calculates the outcome for that combination of values. The variability in parameter values was based primarily on expert input. The sampling process for the seven most influential radionuclides was repeated over more than 40,000 simulations to produce a frequency distribution of estimated radiological dose rates to a member of the critical group, plotted as trends versus time up to 100,000 years. The frequency distributions illustrate the range of possible doses and their probabilities of occurrence. SYVAC also calculated average concentrations of contaminants in the environment, as well as average dose rates to the four hypothetical organisms.

AECL compared the SYVAC simulation results with the appropriate federal and provincial regulatory criteria, guidelines, standards and background levels to establish their significance. The mean of the annual total dose estimates at 10,000 years for the 40,000 simulations was found to be 300 million times below that of natural background radiation. Its associated risk was five million times below the AECB Regulatory Document R-104 individual risk criterion of one in a million fatal cancers and serious genetic effects in a year. The maximum annual dose estimate calculated from these analyses for times up to 10,000 years was 81,000 times below natural background levels and its associated risk was 1,350 times below the regulatory criterion. The inadvertent human intrusion scenarios analyzed separately were estimated to increase the risk to about 3333 times below the AECB criterion. AECL expected that chemical toxicity and radiation effects on the natural environment would be insignificant, as demonstrated by the model. It concluded that while uncertainty cannot be entirely eliminated, their approach met the AECB R-104 requirements that the predicted risk should be "sufficiently low so as to allow for uncertainties in exposure scenarios and their consequences." [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Environmental Impact Statement, p. 317.]

Since predicted doses did not peak before 10,000 years-the limit for quantitative analyses required by AECB R-104-AECL furnished a qualitative discussion of effects anticipated thereafter. Iodine-129, with a half-life of 15.7 million years, is the major contributor to the estimated dose within the first 100,000 years. Its contribution does not peak in that period. Other radionuclides that are unimportant before 100,000 years could potentially increase in influence thereafter. AECL argues that any radionuclide releases beyond 10,000 years would be gradual, that resulting doses would be of the same order as natural background ones and that no major effects would occur.

As noted earlier, a second postclosure case study was introduced during the technical hearings. [A.G. Wikjord, P. Baumgartner, L.H. Johnson, F.W. Stanchell, R. Zach and B.W. Goodwin, The Disposal of Canada's Nuclear Fuel Waste: A Study of Postclosure Safety of In-Room Emplacement of Used CANDU Fuel in Copper Containers in Permeable Plutonic Rock, Volume 1: Summary (Atomic Energy of Canada Limited Report AECL - 11494 - 1, COG - 95 - 552 - 1, 1996, Part of Undertaking 58, Additional Information 60).] AECL maintains that adequate evidence for the safety and acceptability of the concept had been presented in the EIS and primary reference documents. However, it explains that the second case study shows that the concept and the assessment and modelling methods are flexible enough to adapt to differing site characteristics, designs and safety requirements. Thus, the second case study responds to a number of criticisms of the concept and of the EIS case study.

While the EIS case study was based on titanium containers emplaced in boreholes in low-permeability, sparsely fractured rock, the second case study is based on copper containers emplaced in rooms in permeable rock. The dominant safety feature in the first instance is the nature of the rock; in the second, it is the long-lasting copper container. Because it is more difficult to shield workers from radiation during in-room emplacement, the density of container placement in the second case study is reduced by 50 per cent from that used in the EIS case study. This entails a comparable reduction of the vault capacity from 8.6 to 4.3 million fuel bundles for vaults of roughly the same area.

Although the assessment methodology used for the second case study is similar to that used for the first, it is selective because it is based on only 14,000 simulations, and it examines only the most likely contaminant transport scenario, the 16 most influential radionuclides, and a restricted water-supply well depth. In addition, it does not evaluate the effects of chemically toxic elements. Furthermore, it uses, among other changes, a significantly modified vault model, hypothetical and unfavourable geosphere parameter values, and a prototype computer code that has not undergone the same degree of quality assurance as previous ones.

Due to the contrast in container materials and their expected lifetimes, contaminant release from containers is modelled to occur only through undetected pinhole-sized fabrication defects rather than through container failure by corrosion, as in the EIS. Since the containers are placed within rooms, they are surrounded by backfill materials, which is not the case in in-borehole emplacement. The conditions assigned to the geosphere model are less favourable than those observed below 500 metres depth at any of AECL's research areas, producing greatly increased rates of groundwater flow from the vault to the surface.

The results show that radiological effects occur relatively early compared to the EIS case study. AECL attributes this to the reduced groundwater flow times and consequent contributions from radionuclides with shorter half-lives and greater specific activities. The average dose rate reaches a maximum at 10,000 years and is 25 times below the dose rate associated with the AECB radiological risk criterion and 1500 times below the background dose rate for Ontario. AECL infers that the maximum radiological risk is not necessarily larger than that of the EIS case study, but it is shifted to an earlier time. As in the EIS case study, dose rates to non-human biota were estimated to be below the lower range of background levels, leading to the conclusion that there would be no significant radiological effects on them.

3.5 Implications of a Facility Based on the AECL Concept

It should also examine the social, economic and environmental implications of a possible nuclear fuel waste management facility . . . in addition to examining, in general terms, the costs and benefits to potential host communities.

In addition, the impact of transportation of nuclear fuel wastes to a generic site will also be examined.

Terms of Reference

The Panel examined the various implications of a facility and its associated transportation. This section highlights the implications, while Appendix N presents them in greater detail. Some of these implications could also apply to other options for managing nuclear fuel wastes. Appendix L outlines some implications of other options, but the Panel did not have sufficient information to examine them fully.

The discussion in this section is divided into subsections covering human health, environmental, economic, social and transportation implications. The Panel recognizes, of course, that these implications are greatly interrelated. Discussion of the costs and benefits to potential host communities is integrated throughout. While human health and transportation implications were well developed in the EIS and supporting documents, the other subject areas were not. Therefore, most review participants did not discuss them in any detail.

Many implications of the proposed facility relate to the fact that it will be a relatively large, long-term, technologically complex project, and that it is intended for nuclear waste disposal. These implications would, in many ways, be relevant in discussing a nuclear power plant, a uranium mine or a large facility for managing hazardous wastes. We also know that the proposed location lies within the relatively sensitive Canadian Shield. Nevertheless, the types and magnitudes of effects depend on factors that are unknown at this conceptual stage. As one gets closer to site selection and later phases of implementation, these factors will be known with a greater degree of certainty.

Perhaps the most critical of these unknown factors is the social setting of the facility. According to the proponent, one cannot know whether the potential socio-economic effects will be positive or negative, or even whether they will be significant, without knowing two things about the people who will experience them: how will these people perceive these effects, and can they manage the effects? Small, northern or Aboriginal communities may be especially vulnerable to adverse impacts.

Another uncertain factor is the capacity of the facility. This will control not only its cost, but also the number of fuel bundle and other shipments, the duration of the project and other elements. For example, AECL estimates that a 5-million-bundle facility would cost $8.7 billion (1991 dollars) and take 63 years to implement. A 10-million-bundle facility, on the other hand, would cost $13.3 billion (1991 dollars) and take 89 years. [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Environmental Impact Statement, p. 233.] While the AECL reference case facility was intended to accommodate 10 million spent fuel bundles, only about one third of this quantity was forecast to be produced by the time the existing Canadian reactors were taken out of service.

All the factors controlling the implications of the proposed facility are interdependent. As long as they remain indefinite, the best that can be done is to sketch out some of the possibilities.

3.5.1 Human Health Implications

The AECB licensing requirements for the 10,000 years following the closure of a facility set a maximum radiation risk to the most exposed individuals living in the vicinity of the site of one in a million fatal cancers and serious genetic effects each year. If these licensing requirements are met, it is clear that transport and storage plant workers will experience the greatest radiation risk during the lifetime of the facility. This risk will be limited to the maximum permissible dose for occupationally exposed workers. During the public hearings, participants repeatedly noted that current AECB regulations for occupational exposures do not reflect the latest recommendations of the ICRP. However, AECB limits are being amended to comply with the latest international recommendations. The Panel expects amended limits will be in place before any disposal facility becomes operational.

A more serious concern was raised in several presentations. Several participants were concerned that even the latest ICRP estimate for the numerical risk associated with unit radiation dose is too low. The Panel reviewed this matter carefully (see Appendix H). It concluded that the current ICRP estimate for numerical risk adequately protects public health. However, apart from the health effects on workers resulting from exposure to radiation, a significant number of normal industrial and transportation accidents will inevitably affect a substantial number of individuals during the operation of the facility.

If one assumes that 10 million bundles of used fuel would be placed in a facility at a remote northern Ontario site, and that all transport would be by truck, one can use data provided by Ontario Hydro to estimate a ceiling or "highest volume projection" value for the number of health effects likely to occur over the operational lifetime of the facility. Based on the data presented in Appendix N, the panel's view is that the normal industrial risks associated with transportation, construction and mining activities would greatly exceed those associated with the radiation exposures that either workers or the general public would likely incur. Furthermore, these risks are not unusual for such a large and extended operation.

The Panel recognizes, however, that concerns about radiological risks will lead to high levels of stress in some individuals. Moreover, the size of the project may strain the social cohesion of a given community. This in turn adds to the stress on individuals, and may manifest itself in behaviour detrimental to a healthy community. Many Aboriginal participants expressed concern that a project that would disrupt a community's social and cultural fabric would have a devastating impact on their lifestyles.

3.5.2 Environmental Implications

The Panel concurs with the SRG that the greatest environmental impact of a disposal facility based on the AECL concept is expected to take place during the preclosure phase. [Scientific Review Group, An Evaluation of the Environmental Impact Statement on Atomic Energy of Canada Limited's Concept for the Disposal of Canada's Nuclear Fuel Waste (Hull: Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, October 6, 1995), p. 3.] Like any major project built in a natural environment, the construction of surface facilities and access corridors could have implications for terrestrial, wetland and fresh water habitats. The potential contamination of waterways and alteration of wildlife migration patterns due to project activities could have implications for Aboriginal and northern people who depend on them for their survival. However, if proper regulations are applied and good engineering and management practices are followed, it should be possible to mitigate adverse environmental impacts.

Radionuclides circulate within the biosphere through defined pathways and complex processes of geological, biological and chemical cycling. Since radionuclides are subject to these complex natural pathways, they do not follow a linear hydrological flow-through to the surface. Attempts to model the movement of radionuclides within the biosphere will have to account for these constant movements within the ecosystem.

3.5.3 Economic Implications

The economic effects of a nuclear fuel waste disposal facility on a community or region depend on the size and nature of the existing economy and the views of residents. From one viewpoint, a facility would offer local employment and business opportunities over a relatively long period. Viewed from a different perspective, a disposal facility could overwhelm or displace the existing economies of small communities. Property values may increase or decrease, depending on their proximity to the facility or its transportation routes, altered accessibility and housing demand.

Attention during the review also focused on availability of the non-renewable resources required to construct and operate a disposal facility. Will there be an adequate supply of these materials, and would the needed amounts represent a disproportionate consumption of resources in local, regional, national or international terms? Many participants were also very concerned about the availability of the financial resources needed to construct and operate a facility.

3.5.4 Social Implications

As stated earlier, the type and magnitude of social impacts cannot be determined with precision in the absence of a known social setting. These impacts would depend on such factors as: the types of potential host and affected communities; the values, needs and desires of these communities and their ability to manage the effects of the project; as well as the relationships between individuals, communities and their natural environment.

During the siting stage, even a voluntary process embodying AECL's principles of shared decision-making, openness and fairness could initiate widespread division among those living in the siting territories. Consequently, communities could experience a variety of political repercussions arising from conflicting values, opinions and interests, and either increased cohesion or conflict as a result. During construction and operation, many of the socio-economic effects will hinge on the size, demography, place of residence and other characteristics of the workforce and their families, relative to the size of the host community and its ability to supply workers and assimilate non-local workers and, possibly, their families. A collective stress could result from either a rapid population increase or, at the decommissioning stage, a population decrease, and the social and cultural changes that accompany them. Furthermore, introducing a non-Aboriginal population into traditional Aboriginal territory may conflict with Aboriginal values, culture and language, and with the traditional way of life. Special measures conforming to the wishes of the community would be needed to avoid or minimize such impacts.

Experience in past similar projects shows that one of the most significant socio-economic impacts would be any forced relocation of residents to acquire property for a facility. [L. Grondin et al, R-Preclosure, p. 6-140.] Residents may also perceive that a large portion of their physical environment is being modified and dedicated to high-risk activities. This could alter community land use patterns and traditional, recreational or economic activities that depend upon them.

3.5.5 Transportation Implications

The potential effects of transporting nuclear fuel wastes depend on many factors that remain to be determined. Some factors include the location of the facility, the distance from reactor sites, and shipping modes and routes. Except for the highly radioactive nature of the cargo and its implications, the effects would be similar to those of transporting materials and supplies to build and operate the facility. In many respects, transportation of spent nuclear fuel would be no different than transportation of radioactive or other hazardous substances, which occurs frequently.

The unusual level of fear associated with the transportation of nuclear fuel wastes is one of the most important implications of the proposed facility. Predominant concerns raised during the review included highway safety; cask integrity; security threats; emergency response capabilities; liability and insurance; and public consultation. For example, some participants were concerned that an accident in a remote area, especially one involving a release of radioactive materials, would cause long blockages of the only available highway. This could subject local communities to long periods of isolation. Participants also expressed concern that cargo might be stolen or sabotaged, especially along remote sections of the transportation routes. These issues stress the importance of developing a comprehensive emergency response plan in consultation with communities along the transportation routes.

Related to transportation accidents and emergency response are the issues of responsibility, liability and insurance. The various acts and regulations governing transportation of nuclear fuel wastes are unclear as they pertain to the implications of these issues for the utilities and a waste management agency.

Return to Table of Contents

4.0 Criteria for Safety and Acceptability

In conducting its review, the Panel will include the examination of the criteria by which the safety and acceptability of a concept for long-term waste management and disposal should be evaluated.

Terms of Reference

In the Terms of Reference, the Panel was asked to examine criteria for long-term waste management. We assumed that meant examining not only those criteria applying to AECL's concept, but also criteria applying to any concept for the long-term management of nuclear fuel wastes.

4.1 Overview of Safety and Acceptability

The Panel wrestled with two major issues: how to define safety and acceptability; and how to formulate criteria applicable to a concept, as opposed to a real project.

While some aspects of safety can be accurately calculated, in the broadest sense neither safety nor acceptability is an absolute or measurable construct. Both are relative, value-laden, and subject to differing interpretations by different people in any given situation or under different conditions. These considerations affect the members of this Panel as well as the public at large. In particular, conceptions of safety and acceptability are greatly influenced by an individual's or a group's perception of risk. Since there is often little correlation between the expert's and the public's perceptions of risk, it is not surprising that there are disparate views of what is safe or acceptable.

AECL defines safe as "meeting criteria, guidelines, and standards for protecting the health of humans and non-human biota." [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Environmental Impact Statement, p. 63.] As the Panel heard, safety standards are not only a technical matter, because they explicitly or implicitly designate "acceptable" levels of risk or safety. Regulators often set risk levels in a particular standard by making them comparable to those calculated for everyday activities that the public generally-although often subconsciously-tolerates. However, considering that risk perception and acceptance are specific to each context and vary widely with the circumstances, safety standards set without broad consultation may not reflect general public acceptance.

. . . the public indeed makes judgments on acceptable risk, but they do it almost entirely implicitly. . . . There's no pattern in society as to what we find acceptable. It depends entirely on the type of risk. That's a tragic conclusion for a lot of the old risk experts from the engineering profession who thought we could sort of rationalize everything and get a common and uniform risk standard across society. It will never happen.

Dr. William Leiss, Queen's University [William Leiss, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, March 15, 1996, pp. 101-103.]

In recent years there has arisen the concept of the "perception of risk". This concept carries with it the implication that ordinary citizens perceive risk differently from experts, and are therefore prone to misguided illusions and vague psychological responses. More recently it has been understood that people's "perceptions of risk" derive from more fundamental "conceptions of risk" which are rooted in personal experience, social and economic status, and cultural practices. What becomes labelled as a "risk" seldom suddenly appears for analysis or assessment: it comes out of previous experience with risks.

Canadian Coalition for Ecology, Ethics and Religion [Canadian Coalition for Ecology, Ethics and Religion, A Report to the FEARO Panel on the Proposed Nuclear Fuel Waste Disposal Concept, Volume I: Key Questions (The Project Team for the Canadian Coalition for Ecology, Ethics and Religion (CCEER), PHPub.043), p. 26.]

It is clear that conceptions of safety, risk and acceptability are coloured by each individual's or community's perspectives. Hence, one person's definition of safety may correspond to another's definition of acceptability. Yet it seems to be universally agreed that safety is an essential component of the broader notion of acceptability.

Panel Conclusion

Safety is a key part, but only one part, of acceptability.

The Panel also faced difficulties formulating criteria to apply to a concept, as distinct from a site-specific proposal. Those who were familiar with the step-wise refinement and review of engineering designs from conceptual through final stages were relatively comfortable with devising criteria to judge a general concept in the absence of final details. Others concentrated on the way communities would evaluate what they would perceive as a risky undertaking. These people examined such a project's potential effects on communities, the equity of the distribution of its risks and benefits, its net benefit to society and the extent to which it incorporated participatory decision-making. Therefore, they found it impractical to establish criteria that did not also reflect the way a concept would be implemented, whom it would affect and how it would affect them. In this respect, the panel members' differing views reflect the broad cross-section of views of participants at our hearings.

4.2 Ethical and Social Considerations

Virtually all environmental decisions and policies are based on competing ethical and social values. Therefore, it is desirable to make explicit the ethical considerations and assumptions underlying the criteria for evaluating a concept for managing nuclear fuel wastes. If this is not done, there is a greater risk of developing policies that will perpetuate inequitable relationships between present and future generations, or that may damage the relationships between human beings and the ecosystem. [After Fen Osler Hampson and Judith Reppy, "Environmental Change and Social Justice," Environment, 39, 3 (April 1997), pp. 13-15.] Ethical and social assumptions may affect key policy decisions, such as those concerning the extent of public participation, or those concerning the involvement of potential host and affected communities in the siting process. As much as possible, the Panel has made ethical and social considerations and assumptions explicit in the safety and acceptability criteria listed in this chapter.

Panel Conclusion

An ethical and social framework is fundamental to framing the problem of nuclear waste management and to finding acceptable solutions to that problem.

4.3 Acceptability Criteria

Since acceptability is a subjective notion, devising criteria to evaluate it raises the question: acceptable to whom? Our Terms of Reference require this report to state whether AECL's disposal concept is safe and acceptable. Thus, they imply that panel members will judge acceptability, presumably using both personal and review participants' views. However, the Terms of Reference also state that our recommendations will help governments determine acceptability. This implies that ministers will make the final decision, based in part upon this report. We believe that, regardless of what the Panel or ministers conclude, the Canadian public will ultimately determine the acceptability of a concept for managing nuclear fuel wastes, because such a concept can only be implemented with the public's consent and co-operation. On risk-related issues, the public is demanding more openness, public scrutiny and debate, and shared decision-making. Without public acceptance, there will be vigorous opposition to any imposed solution. It is worth noting that no country has yet achieved the social consensus necessary to build a disposal facility for high-level nuclear wastes.

. . . I would submit that, before a concept is proved acceptable, it must do two things. It must reflect the values of the Canadian public, in that sense be acceptable; and it must be very likely to produce a result that will be widely judged to be acceptable.

Norm Rubin, Energy Probe [Norm Rubin, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, November 21, 1996, p. 172.]

The practical reality is that the wastes are going to have to be transported to a site, and they are therefore going to have to move through a particular province that is the host province, in effect, and if you don't have the support of the people in the host province and the provincial government itself, you simply don't have a workable situation. In the same way, if you don't have the support of the First Nations people, if it's on aboriginal lands, you don't have a workable situation, an acceptable situation, even if the province wants to host it.

Peter Prebble,

Saskatchewan Environmental Society [Peter Prebble, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, March 27, 1996, p. 43.]

Panel Conclusion

Broad public support is necessary in Canada to ensure the acceptability of a concept for managing nuclear fuel wastes.

With this conclusion in mind, the Panel defined the criteria for evaluating acceptability to reflect what we heard was most important to assessing broad public acceptance of a concept. Meeting these criteria does not guarantee such acceptance but will increase its likelihood. We note that, although public acceptance might be demonstrated at the conceptual stage, it would have to be demonstrated again at the site- and design-specific stages before the concept could be implemented. At those stages, acceptability would be determined from the point of view of the general public, governments and the regulator, in addition to the potential host and other directly affected communities. The panel's six criteria for evaluating concept acceptability are listed in this section, followed by explanatory text.

To be considered acceptable, a concept for managing nuclear fuel wastes must

  1. have broad public support;
  2. be safe from both a technical and a social perspective;
  3. have been developed within a sound ethical and social assessment framework;
  4. have the support of Aboriginal people;
  5. be selected after comparison with the risks, costs and benefits of other options; and
  6. be advanced by a stable and trustworthy proponent and overseen by a trustworthy regulator.
a) Broad public support

Founded on the preceding discussion, this all-encompassing or "umbrella" criterion represents the highest order of acceptability. The remaining criteria reflect more detailed components of acceptability.

To meet this criterion, a concept must demonstrate some or all of the following elements:

  • broad support from an informed Canadian public, particularly from public review participants representing technical, social, environmental and other groups, as well as from residents of the proposed siting territory and individual members of the public;
  • a comprehensive strategy for public participation, information and communication, from initial formulation of the concept through implementation;
  • a clear decision-making strategy that defines key decision points, decision-makers and their jurisdic-tions, the level of public and community participation in each decision, and a mechanism for resolving disputes; and
  • public involvement in defining public participation and establishing decision-making strategies.

The application of the principles advocated in the EIS of safety, environmental protection, shared decision making, openness and fairness, will require an educated, well informed public. It would seem imperative that a major investment must be made to achieve a meaningful dialogue with the public and ensure adequate preparation for the political decisions that will be taken. These will be at various levels ranging from national (or even international) to local.

Joint Committee of the Canadian Academy of Engineering and The Royal Society of Canada [Joint Committee of the Canadian Academy of Engineering and The Royal Society of Canada, Presentation to the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency Panel Reviewing the Environmental Impact Statement Prepared by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited on the Management and Disposal of Canada's Nuclear Fuel Waste, Phase I: The Social and Ethical Issues of Waste Disposal (PHPub.031, March 1996), p. 4.]

b) Safety from both a technical and a social perspective

Despite the diversity of views on safety outlined in section 4.1, it seems to be universally agreed that safety is an essential component of acceptability. Criteria for evaluating the safety of a concept for managing nuclear fuel wastes are set out in section 4.4. In light of the diversity of views, a concept must satisfy both technical and social interpretations of the criteria to be considered broadly acceptable.

The need to dispose of the waste nuclear fuel from Canadian reactors in a fashion that removes it as a threat to present and future generations is governed first and foremost by considerations of public safety. The Joint Committee therefore places safety paramount among both social and technical considerations. . . . The Committee, representing as it does viewpoints from the social, natural and applied sciences and engineering, places particular emphasis on a satisfactory interweaving of these complementary approaches to the waste disposal problem.

Joint Committee of the Canadian Academy of Engineering and The Royal Society of Canada [Joint Committee of the Canadian Academy of Engineering and The Royal Society of Canada, Presentation, Phase I, p. 1.]

c) Development within a sound ethical and social assessment framework

People judging acceptability base their decisions on criteria they deem important, or on their own ethical and social values. No matter how it is defined, safety appears to be a universal societal value. However, there are many others, as discussed in section 2.3.1. Hence, to assess the broad public acceptability of a concept for managing nuclear fuel wastes, one must first identify the predominant values held by Canadian society and then measure the concept against them. The Panel has attempted to incorporate its reading of ethical and social values into the criteria in this chapter. As values change over time, the framework of values must be updated, and the concept remeasured against it and readjusted if necessary, to maintain ongoing public acceptance. Any concept for managing nuclear fuel wastes in Canada should be developed within such a framework.

To meet this criterion, a concept would reflect the following elements of an ethical and social assessment framework, among others:

  • justification of the need for and timing of action;
  • equitable distribution of costs, risks and benefits among groups, areas and generations;
  • a net benefit for society at large and for those directly affected, commensurate with protection of the environment;
  • acceptable costs, commensurate with risks and benefits;
  • consideration of issues of public concern directly related to the nuclear fuel cycle, such as the future of nuclear power and the importation of nuclear fuel wastes;
  • input from social and applied scientists; and
  • a voluntary siting approach in which a potential host community gives its consent freely and without undue economic pressure.

Social and ethical issues are directly related to the nature of the concept of deep underground storage and disposal. . . . the Joint Committee urges that they be given the same attention in the assessment stage as during implementation. Issues must be seen to be given a fair hearing and the public needs assurance that they will have a significant role as issues are discussed and judgements made.

Joint Committee of the Canadian Academy of Engineering and The Royal Society of Canada [Joint Committee of the Canadian Academy of Engineering and The Royal Society of Canada, Presentation, Phase I, p. 4.]

d) Support of Aboriginal people

In section 2.4, we pointed out that any concept for managing nuclear fuel wastes that involves lands inhabited, claimed or used by Aboriginal people will clearly affect them. Thus, a concept should be developed with their co-operation. To respect Aboriginal rights and concerns, a concept must allow Aboriginal people to have ongoing input, from its initial formulation through to its implementation. The participation process used must be appropriate to Aboriginal cultural practices, values and languages. Thus, Aboriginal people should design it.

Please understand that our peoples are not opposed per se to developments in our traditional lands. But we are saying, as we have said many times before, that if the process fails to address our vital concerns and our fundamental rights in a full and fair way, then we will oppose it until our concerns and rights are justly and equitably addressed. And if First Nations peoples conclude that this concept is too uncertain, or unacceptable, or has no merit, or is being forced upon us through a distortion of the principles of informed and valid consent, First Nations will oppose it.

Grand Chief Phil Fontaine,

Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs [Phil Fontaine, Presentation by Grand Chief Phil Fontaine, Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs, to the Nuclear Fuel Waste Management and Disposal Concept Environmental Assessment Panel (PH3Pub.217, March 27, 1997), pp. 6-7.]

e) Selection after comparison with the risks, costs and benefits of other options

After considering the various approaches to the long-term management of nuclear fuel wastes, the Panel concluded that a key element of acceptability is allowing the public and decision-makers to make informed comparisons and a considered choice among reasonable alternatives (see section 2.2.3 and Appendix L). At the very least, it is unethical to ask people to accept one approach without informing them of other options and the consequences of rejecting the current proposal. The question of " acceptable compared to what?" must be answered.

The risks, costs and benefits of practical alternatives must be compared for three principal reasons. First, since some people will reject any proposal put forward without alternatives, simply offering a choice will enhance the probability of public acceptance of one alternative. Second, showing that an option offers a greater net benefit in terms of risks, costs and benefits will also increase the likelihood of acceptance of that option. Third, a second choice will serve as a back-up in case the first choice cannot be implemented.

As much as possible, a comparative assessment should involve potentially affected residents of the proposed siting territory(ies) for each option. These people will identify and help to weigh the social and environmental issues at stake, and the acceptability of each option. To identify these people, one must first define the siting territory(ies) as clearly as possible.

. . . the only way for us to get a societally credible decision on the management of these wastes is to do it in a comparative risk setting, where all technically credible options are put side by side in a comparative risk framework. And then we look and see what's better or worse on the various criteria, a comparison. And that's the way we will get a result. So I do not think you can answer the question or any panel can answer the question about the acceptability of the disposal concept in itself.

Dr. William Leiss, Queen's University [William Leiss, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, March 15, 1996, p. 120.]

f) Advancement by a stable and trustworthy proponent and supervision by a trustworthy regulator

Before they can accept a concept for managing nuclear fuel wastes, people must trust the proponent and regulator, as well as the processes used to develop and implement the concept. A concept will be more acceptable if it is advanced by the same proponent that intends to implement it. In addition, both the proponent and the regulator must routinely ensure effective public participation. They must also be independent of conflicts of interest, transparent, accountable, sensitive to a wide range of stakeholders and guided by a clear government policy framework.

. . . what we have here is the classic low-probability, high-consequence risk management problem. With respect to such risks the issue of public trust in the risk producer/manager becomes one of the most critical components in public acceptance of risk. Studies of risk perception and attitudes within the so-called non-expert community are consistent in their findings that levels of trust or mistrust in the producers and managers of technological risks are major factors in people's willingness to accept risks.

Dr. Conrad Brunk, University of Waterloo [Conrad Brunk, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, March 13, 1996, pp. 99-100.]

4.4 Safety Criteria

Safety from both a technical and a social perspective, listed as the second acceptability criterion in section 4.3, is a key aspect of public acceptability of an approach to managing nuclear fuel wastes. Both perspectives are reflected not only within the Panel and among review participants, but also within Canadian society. They should not be viewed as competing, but as complementary, because they must both be satisfied if an approach is to be widely regarded as acceptable. While there are many similarities between the two perspectives, there are also subtle differences between them. The panel's seven criteria for evaluating safety are listed in this section, followed by explanatory text. The two perspectives are not evident in the criteria themselves, but in their application, as will be apparent in the next chapter.

To be considered safe, a concept for managing nuclear fuel wastes must be judged, on balance, to

  1. demonstrate robustness in meeting appropriate regulatory requirements;
  2. be based on thorough and participatory scenario analyses;
  3. use realistic data, modelling and natural analogues;
  4. incorporate sound science and good practices;
  5. demonstrate flexibility;
  6. demonstrate that implementation is feasible; and
  7. integrate peer review and international expertise.

a) Robustness in meeting appropriate regulatory requirements

"Robustness" refers to the ability of a system to continue to perform within acceptable limits despite unanticipated and possibly extreme conditions. Thus, this criterion refers to the degree to which a concept has been demonstrated to meet or exceed regulatory requirements for protecting human health and the natural environment under a range of conditions. Robustness refers to the resilience of the system which, as in a biological system, results primarily from diversity. In other words, the overall system does not fail due to an unanticipated failure of a single element. To be diverse, a system for managing nuclear fuel wastes would make reasonable use of defence-in-depth measures such as multiple barriers, passive and active safety features, mitigation and sound industrial practices.

The AECB must be satisfied, within the constraints of a generic study, that deep geological disposal in a pluton can be a safe, adequate and feasible method for the long-term management of nuclear fuel wastes. If Concept Assessment does demon-strate the likelihood that deep disposal in a pluton can satisfy the technical requirements for health, safety, security and environmental protection, the AECB will consider this concept to be acceptable.

Atomic Energy Control Board [Atomic Energy Control Board, Regulatory Document R - 71, p. 6.]

This criterion also alludes to the appropriateness of regulatory requirements to assure safety, as interpreted from both a technical and a social perspective. From a social perspective, regulatory standards must: be developed through consultation processes involving varied groups and reflecting all relevant technical and social factors; protect generations living in the distant future; require quantitative analyses to include the periods of greatest risk; and present results and uncertainties clearly.

In our view the AECB should set the form of the standards to protect human and environmental health and safety. The level of the standards is a public policy concern, however, and should be the subject of a thorough public debate on acceptability. After such a debate, standards should be set at a level that can be shown to have wide public approval.

Canadian Coalition for Ecology, Ethics and Religion [Canadian Coalition for Ecology, Ethics and Religion, A Report to the FEARO Panel on the Proposed Nuclear Fuel Waste Disposal Concept, Volume I: Key Questions, p. 20.]

b) Based on thorough and participatory scenario analyses

This criterion relates to the range of conditions or scenarios for which a concept must be demonstrated to be robust, and how those scenarios are identified and evaluated. The Panel believes that both specialist and non-specialist groups must be assured that all conditions that could significantly affect the long-term safety of the system have been adequately assessed, and that all biases and uncertainties have been adequately taken into account. In particular, there should be diverse public input to negotiating an agreed set of worst-case scenarios to be assessed, and it must be shown that acceptable emergency response and mitigation measures for these scenarios can and will be implemented.

A scenario with a low probability of occurrence makes it a candidate for exclusion only if one is interested in probable, average risks. The interest of the public will likely be focused on extreme cases, or worst-case scenarios.

Scientific Review Group [Scientific Review Group, Report of the Scientific Review Group (1995), p. 78.]

We believe that if stakeholders were intimately involved at the initial stage, it would facilitate substantially a review process such as this one.

Dr. Ray Price, Scientific Review Group [Ray Price, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, November 19, 1996, pp. 120-121.]

c) Use of realistic data, modelling and natural analogues

Mathematical modelling is the primary means of predicting the long-term performance of a system for managing nuclear fuel wastes. Confidence in the predictions hinges on the degree to which the data and modelling represent the real system they are intended to simulate. Models must adequately capture all important aspects and interactions of the physical and biological systems under consideration; account for biases and uncertainties; and be independently verified and validated, where possible. Both generic and site-specific data must be scientifically adequate. Ultimately, site-specific data and designs must be used to validate the safety of the system.

At the concept assessment stage, when a generic concept is being assessed, if comprehensive actual field observations are not available, simple scoping calculations can be much more informative and reliable than complex, comprehensive probabilistic analysis that is not based on appropriate models, nor supported by actual data.

Scientific Review Group [Scientific Review Group, An Evaluation of the Environmental Impact Statement on Atomic Energy of Canada Limited's Concept for the Disposal of Canada's Nuclear Fuel Waste: An Addendum to the Report of the Scientific Review Group. (Hull: Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, September 16, 1996), p. 12.]

d) Sound science and good practices

A system for managing nuclear fuel wastes must be based on: established scientific principles, including those of established social science disciplines; known or readily achievable technology; and sound engineering and industrial practices pertaining to safety and environmental protection. Suitable evidence would include, but not be limited to, documentation showing that:

  • overall health and environmental impacts would be no worse than those achievable for conventional projects of comparable scale, using the best available technologies;
  • proposed technologies had performed safely and in compliance with regulations when employed in projects of a similar nature or magnitude;
  • nuclear fuel waste handling, repackaging and transfer, as well as transportation distances, would be optimized to reduce risk; and
  • management practices could ensure compliance with safety standards.

The SRG conclusion concerning criteria for the evaluation of the AECL nuclear fuel waste disposal concept is that the concept must . . . follow good engineering practice. Attributes of good engineering practice include flexibility, responsiveness to new information and technologies, transparency, robust-ness and cost effectiveness.

Scientific Review Group [Scientific Review Group, Report of the Scientific Review Group (1995), p. 3.]

e) Flexibility

To be flexible, a concept must be capable of adapting to and incorporating new information. In conventional underground construction, when it is impossible to know all the details of the ground that lies ahead before it is exposed, this concept is known as "the observational approach," an "adaptive management strategy" or, more informally, "design-as-you-go." Such an approach is not an abdication of responsibility, but a wise expression of humility. It is also considered a prudent and practical approach to large, complex above-ground construction projects.

In the case of a long-term concept for managing nuclear fuel wastes, new information could pertain not only to site characteristics, but to developments in science and technology, or in societal and community values, especially those of the future generations that will eventually implement the concept. Thus, one aspect of flexibility would be the ability of a concept to adapt to the wishes of those generations regarding the appropriate balance between passive safety and active institutional control. For example, the system could be designed to achieve a high degree of passive safety after full implementation, while also providing for effective monitoring and retrieval.

Another aspect of flexibility would be the degree to which a concept could be implemented in stages. Thus, feedback loops must allow new information to be incorporated during each stage of development, starting with the formulation of a concept. This does not mean that changes will be massive, random or completely unforeseen. It simply means that as much room as possible must be left in which to manoeuvre.

. . . the Disposal Concept should not simply be founded on the premise of protecting future generations from having to take any responsibility for the treatment of radioactive waste-though this is clearly an important option. It should also be sufficiently flexible, or robust, to allow for ongoing monitoring should future generations choose to do so, or for active intervention in the case of future advances in technology and economics.

Chemical Institute of Canada [The Chemical Institute of Canada, Assessment of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited's Environmental Impact Statement on the Concept for Disposal of Canada's Nuclear Fuel Waste (Ottawa: The Chemical Institute of Canada, August 1995, Tec.005), p. i.]

f) Feasibility of implementation

To meet this criterion, a concept must be based on known or readily achievable technology and must be able to meet the specific constraints of siting criteria as well as of an actual site. Adequate human, technological, financial, material and infrastructure resources to implement the concept must also be available. With regard to siting, feasibility could be demonstrated in part by showing that technically suitable sites are likely to exist. It could be demonstrated even more clearly by showing that the combination of features and processes contributing to safety actually exists at a range of potential sites in Canada.

The chosen concept must be shown to be technically feasible with available technology or with reasonably achievable developments. The concept will be judged on the basis of whether or not there is a reasonable expectation that the performance requirements established by the regulatory agencies could be met. Because it is possible at the Concept Assessment stage to advance a solution which can be shown to be safe but which is difficult to achieve, the technical feasibility of the proposed concept must be established.

Atomic Energy Control Board [Atomic Energy Control Board, Regulatory Document R-71, p. 12.]

The SRG criterion for the applicability of the disposal concept is that it will be readily achievable, with convincing or reasonable evidence that at the time of implementation the technology and manage-ment practices will be such that the work can be carried out satisfactorily at a cost that can be borne by the society at the time.

Scientific Review Group [Scientific Review Group, Report of the Scientific Review Group (1995), p. 3.]

g) Peer review and international expertise

To meet this criterion, a concept must reflect input from ongoing independent peer review processes, both technical and social, and all relevant international experience.

4.5 Fundamental Questions

Based on these criteria for safety and acceptability, we now move on to answer the two fundamental questions of this review:

  • Is AECL's concept a safe and acceptable response to the need for long-term management of Canada's nuclear fuel wastes?
  • What future steps should be taken?

Return to Table of Contents

5.0 Safety and Acceptability of the AECL Concept

As a result of this review the Panel will make recommendations to assist the governments of Canada and Ontario in reaching decisions on the acceptability of the disposal concept. . . .

Preparation of the panel's final report addressing:

a) whether AECL's concept for geological disposal of nuclear fuel wastes is safe and acceptable or should be modified . . .

Terms of Reference 

5.1 Summary of the Panel's Views

In Chapter 4, the Panel examined the criteria that should be used to evaluate the safety and acceptability of any concept for long-term waste management. The Panel reached the following conclusions:

  • Broad public support is necessary in Canada to ensure the acceptability of a concept for managing nuclear fuel wastes.
  • Safety is a key part, but only one part, of acceptability. Safety must be viewed from two complementary perspectives: technical and social.

On this basis, the Panel defined the safety and acceptability criteria as follows:

  • To be considered acceptable, a concept for managing nuclear fuel wastes must:
    1. have broad public support;
    2. be safe from both a technical and a social perspective;
    3. have been developed within a sound ethical and social assessment framework;
    4. have the support of Aboriginal people;
    5. be selected after comparison with the risks, costs and benefits of other options; and
    6. be advanced by a stable and trustworthy propo-nent and overseen by a trustworthy regulator.
  • To be considered safe, a concept for managing nuclear fuel wastes must be judged, on balance, to:
    1. demonstrate robustness in meeting appropriate regulatory requirements;
    2. be based on thorough and participatory scenario analyses;
    3. use realistic data, modelling and natural analogues;
    4. incorporate sound science and good practices;
    5. demonstrate flexibility;
    6. demonstrate that implementation is feasible; and
    7. integrate peer review and international expertise.

After applying these criteria to the AECL disposal concept, the Panel arrived at the conclusions and recommendations listed below. The rationale for them appears later in this chapter.

Panel Conclusions:

  • From a technical perspective, safety of the AECL concept has been on balance adequately demonstrated for a conceptual stage of development, but from a social perspective, it has not.
  • As it stands, the AECL concept for deep geological disposal has not been demonstrated to have broad public support. The concept in its current form does not have the required level of acceptability to be adopted as Canada's approach for managing nuclear fuel wastes.

Panel Recommendations:

  • A number of additional steps are required to develop an approach for managing nuclear fuel wastes in a way that could achieve broad public support. They are described in Chapter 6.
  • Until these steps have been completed and broad public acceptance of a nuclear fuel waste management approach has been achieved, the search for a specific site should not proceed.

An appropriate process for determining the acceptability of the AECL concept has not yet been developed. Ultimately, broad acceptability will only be demonstrated if and when Canadians agree that deep geological disposal in the Canadian Shield is the preferred concept for managing nuclear fuel wastes in the long term. Furthermore, an informed and willing host community would have to agree to accept a facility. A new plan for building and determining acceptability will be required. Chapter 6 outlines the panel's recommendations for future steps. 

5.2 Safety of the AECL Concept: Technical and Social

5.2.1 Safety from a Technical Perspective

We present these views of the safety of the AECL concept to clarify the question of safety as seen from a technical perspective, to which the social perspective is a complementary view. Not all members of the Panel subscribe to all of these views, but all think it important to present them. 

5.2.1.1 Introduction and Summary

In applying the safety criteria noted in Chapter 4 to the AECL concept of deep geological disposal, we considered three points important from a technical perspective.

First, this is a concept review, not a licensing procedure. We distinguished between the level of knowledge and understanding required for approval of a generic concept, and that needed to meet more stringent "burden-of-proof" licensing requirements.

Second, we are well aware that the nature, and indeed the intent, of any intensive technical peer review process is to uncover many points of lively debate, issues of concern regarding future work, and downright disagreement, as well as to identify points of agreement and consensus. Our challenge has been to form technical judgments based on a balanced view of the many opinions expressed, avoiding undue influence from extreme views at either end of the spectrum of technical opinion. We have been particularly careful to keep in mind the context of any specific technical comment. While we consider any significant technical critique of a specific topic to be important, we have tried to view such a critique within the context of the overall or "on balance" position put forward by the reviewing organization or individual. Many presentations to the Panel included detailed and important technical criticisms, but concluded by giving overall support for moving to the next step, siting. We do not find this to be an unusual result of a detailed technical peer review process.

The overall conclusion that AECB staff have drawn from the technical review of the EIS is that the EIS, by itself, does not adequately demonstrate the case for deep geological disposal for nuclear fuel wastes. However, AECB staff believe that the EIS information, in combination with a variety of generic national and international assessments, has provided confidence that the deep geological concept is safe and viable. Accordingly, Board staff are of the opinion that proceeding to siting is the most appropriate next step and are recommending this option to the Panel.

Atomic Energy Control Board Staff [Atomic Energy Control Board Staff, AECB Staff Response to the Environmental Impact Statement on the Concept for Disposal of Canada's Nuclear Fuel Waste (Ottawa: Atomic Energy Control Board, July 25, 1995, Gov.002), p. 2.]

Similarly, the Scientific Review Group (SRG) identified a number of technical concerns, but also recommended that siting proceed.

There are a number of fundamental shortcomings in AECL's methodology for assessing the long-term safety of the disposal concept. . . . The new information strengthens the SRG's conviction that . . . the multiple-barrier deep geological disposal concept is applicable and acceptable, and would provide the required margin of safety. . . . the site selection process should begin.

Scientific Review Group [Scientific Review Group, An Addendum to the Report of the Scientific Review Group (1996), p. 1, p. 5, p. 20.]

Finally, we emphasize that the safety criteria presented in Chapter 4 and reviewed below are closely interrelated. The panel's views on any single criterion should not be taken out of context of the related items. Once again, we view this as a matter of balance. Our overall conclusions are based on a blended evaluation of all seven criteria.

Our overall technical judgment is well reflected in the position taken by the Joint Committee of the Canadian Academy of Engineering and the Royal Society of Canada.

With safety as the prime objective, the Joint Committee considers the disposal concept developed by AECL to have good technical integrity, and to be a viable and satisfactory means of managing the accumulation of nuclear fuel waste in Canada.[Joint Committee of the Canadian Academy of Engineering and The Royal Society of Canada, Presentation, Phase I, p. 1.]

To repeat, the Joint Committee endorses the concept on technical grounds, but urges care once the concept proceeds to implementation. [Joint Committee of the Canadian Academy of Engineering and The Royal Society of Canada, Presentation to the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency Panel Reviewing the Environmental Impact Statement Prepared by Atomic Energy of Canada Research Limited on the Management and Disposal of Canada's Nuclear Fuel Waste, Phase III: Public Hearings . (PH3Pub.034, January 1997), p. 2.]

Joint Committee of the Canadian Academy of Engineering and the Royal Society of Canada

While important concerns and issues remain to be addressed, as noted by many participants in the hearings and as summarized in Chapter 6, we have arrived at the following conclusion.

Technical Conclusion

From a technical perspective, safety of the AECL concept has been on balance adequately demonstrated for a conceptual stage of development. 

5.2.1.2 Technical Commentary on Safety Criteria Applied to the AECL Concept

Our evaluation of the proponent's concept from a technical perspective is discussed below in terms of each of the seven safety criteria previously noted.

a)Robustness in meeting appropriate regulatory requirements

To comply with this criterion, and to allow for uncertainty, the concept should meet appropriate regulatory criteria by a wide margin under a wide range of operating and accident scenarios. Within reason, failure of a critical component of the concept should not eliminate or seriously reduce this margin. Furthermore, the regulatory criteria themselves should provide a substantial margin of safety in terms of the health and environmental risks that a given magnitude of radiological dose poses.

For the EIS case study, under postclosure (long-term) conditions, the proponent argues that reasonable quantitative analyses show that regulatory risk criteria will be met at all points up to 100,000 years. This is well beyond the required 10,000-year regulatory time frame. For the 10,000-year period, based on the arithmetic mean of 40,000 simulations of possible dose releases, reflecting randomly sampled values of all the input parameters, the margin of safety was calculated to be more than 5,000,000 times below the AECB regulatory criteria. Based on the maximum dose rate calculated from the single most severe or extreme of these 40,000 runs, the margin of safety was calculated to be about 1,350 times below regulatory limits. [B.W. Goodwin, D.B. McConnell, T.H. Andres, W.C. Hajas, D.M. LeNeveu, T.W. Melnyk, G.R. Sherman, M.E. Stephens, J.G. Szekely, P.C. Bera, C.M. Cosgrove, K.D. Dougan, S.B. Keeling, C.I. Kitson, B.C. Kummen, S.E. Oliver, K. Witzke, L. Wojciechowski and A.G. Wikjord. The disposal of Canada's nuclear fuel waste: Postclosure assessment of a reference system (R-Postclosure) (Atomic Energy of Canada Limited Report, AECL - 10717, COG - 93 - 7, 1994), pp. 198-199.] In this context, "regulatory limits" correspond to a radiation dose that is about 60 times below natural background radiation levels.

The proponent analyzed a second case study, assuming substantially less desirable site characteristics, and, based on 14,000 simulations, calculated that regulatory criteria were met even under these conditions. In this case, the margin decreased to a factor of about 25 times below requirements. Some participants found the second case study presented by AECL convincing.

AECL has done much to demonstrate that, even under conditions that seem to be more severe . . . the concept can still be implemented soundly.

Natural Resources Canada [Natural Resources Canada, Natural Resources Canada's Submission to the Environmental Assessment Panel, Nuclear Fuel Waste Management and Disposal Concept (Resumption of Phase II: Technical Hearings), (PH2Gov.015, October 18, 1996), p. 1.]

These predictions of performance depend in part on whether the modelling approach used is valid, as discussed under criterion c). The proponent and others argue that an important element of the disposal concept is the use of multiple barriers, the combined effect of which is "a multiplicative reduction in contaminant movement." [B.W. Goodwin et al, R-Postclosure, p. 263.] The primary barriers the proponent identified were the stability and relative insolubility of the used fuel form, the waste container, the buffer and backfill materials, and the rock within the exclusion distance around the vault.

For preclosure, the proponent concluded that the potential effects would be "similar to effects encountered at large civil engineering projects, mining developments, nuclear generating stations, waste management facilities, and other large-scale projects." [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Environmental Impact Statement, p. 265.]

In general, the established technical community expressed the view that the ability of the concept to meet or exceed regulatory requirements had been adequately demonstrated to allow it to proceed to the next step, siting. This view was indicated in the previous quotations from the Joint Committee of the Canadian Academy of Engineering and the Royal Society of Canada and the SRG, and was reinforced by others.

Our overall conclusion is that the documented work is adequate to allow further steps to be taken toward burial of high-level nuclear waste.

Canadian Geoscience Council [Canadian Geoscience Council, Geoscience Aspects of Nuclear Fuel Waste Disposal Committee, Review of the AECL Environmental Impact Statement on the Concept for Disposal of Canada's Nuclear Fuel Waste: Final Report (Waterloo: Canadian Geoscience Council, August 8, 1995, Tec.002), p. 4.]

The concept is defensible and robust in its individual components as well as collectively in a disposal system with its demonstrated adaptability to a range of realistic conditions.

Technical Advisory Committee [Technical Advisory Committee, L.W. Shemilt, Chairman, Submission to Nuclear Fuel Waste Disposal Concept Environmental Assessment Panel (November 18, 1996, PH2Tec.035(a)), p. 4.]

The conclusion that current regulatory requirements could be satisfied is adequately justified at present. . .

OECD Nuclear Energy Agency Review Group [Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Nuclear Energy Agency Review Group, The Disposal of Canada's Nuclear Fuel Waste: Report of the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency Review Group (Ottawa: prepared for Natural Resources Canada, April 27, 1995, Tec.001), p. 20.]

. . . it is possible to safely transport spent nuclear fuel and high level radioactive wastes.

Transport Canada [Transport Canada, Transport Dangerous Goods Directorate, Transport Dangerous Goods Directorate Closing Statement Re: Nuclear Fuel Waste Management and Disposal Concept Review, (CSS.012, April 15, 1997), p. 1.]

We emphasize that such broad summary positions of technical support do not exclude a number of significant concerns that the organizations involved in the review expressed. Foremost among these is the concern of the SRG that, while "the concept could be implemented safely and effectively," it views the proponent's methodology for assessing postclosure performance as "unreliable and it cannot be used to determine whether the generic concept is safe or is not safe." [Scientific Review Group, An Addendum to the Report of the Scientific Review Group (1996), p. 1.] This concern is discussed further under criterion c). Technical concerns related to specific barriers in the multi-barrier system, and hence to the robustness of the system, were expressed to the Panel. Some of the concerns mentioned were the ability to weld the proposed container, the calculation of crevice corrosion rates, the long-term performance of buffer and backfill materials, the availability of low-permeability rock at an adequate distance to provide waste exclusion, the thermal-mechanical response of the vault and the absence of a unified conceptual model of biological processes.

From a technical perspective, our view is that the proponent's concept is robust enough to provide a reasonable assurance of meeting regulatory requirements at a specific site selected for this explicit purpose. The concept incorporated multiple barriers and defence-in-depth design principles, so that errors or unforeseen circumstances affecting one of the barriers would not be likely to compromise the ability of the facility to meet regulatory requirements. We agree with the SRG that, taken in combination, the following elements provide a reasonable basis for this view: the use of well-engineered containers containing a low-solubility waste form; the likely presence of sparsely fractured, low-permeability plutonic rock containing very old saline groundwater; the presence of a buffer-backfill-seal system to inhibit transport of contaminants; and the ability to build a stable vault. [Scientific Review Group, An Addendum to the Report of the Scientific Review Group (1996), p. 1.]

With respect to the current AECB regulatory documents, we have concluded that these provide an adequate margin of safety for this stage of concept development, in terms of the health and environmental risks that a given magnitude of radiological dose poses. However, we note that, in the first case study, AECL based its methods for converting radiation doses to health risk on recommendations the ICRP made in 1977. It used some of the more recent ICRP recommendations for the second case study. These should be followed in their entirety for any further development of a disposal concept, as discussed in Appendix H. The Panel notes that we have recommended some future steps to ensure that regulatory requirements are appropriate within an evolving societal context (Chapter 6).

b)Based on thorough and participatory scenario analyses

By "scenario analyses," the Panel refers to evaluations of the risk that would stem from the behaviour of the proposed disposal system under possible future conditions or scenarios. In Regulatory Document R-104, the AECB requires that, to meet the specified risk thresholds (health effects), risk must be calculated as "the sum over all significant scenarios of the products of the probability of the scenario, the magnitude of the resultant dose and the probability of the health effect per unit dose." [Atomic Energy Control Board, Regulatory Policy Statement: Regulatory Objectives, Requirements and Guidelines for the Disposal of Radioactive Wastes, Long-term Aspects (Atomic Energy Control Board, Regulatory Document R-104, June 5, 1987), p. 5.]

In other words, three issues are involved: defining the significant scenarios, defining the probability of the occurrence of each scenario and calculating the health consequences. We deal with the first two of these in discussing this safety criterion. The third is discussed under criterion c), which is closely related.

To demonstrate a sufficient technical basis for proceeding with further development of the proponent's disposal concept, we focused on two questions. First, are we persuaded that the number and nature of the scenarios that could significantly affect public and environmental safety have been adequately defined? Second, is there widespread agreement on the probability of the occurrence of these scenarios? In addressing these questions, we remained aware that the issue of risk straddles the boundary of technical and social perspectives of safety. This was repeatedly emphasized during the public hearings.

As noted in Chapter 3, the proponent constructed "significant scenarios" for analysis by combining various events or processes that could occur, as identified primarily by expert opinion. For both preclosure and postclosure, the proponent relied on expert opinion, as well as a variety of methods using relevant historical data, to develop the probabilities of occurrence of the potential scenarios. The approach all of the analyses used was intended to respond directly to the AECB regulatory guidelines. It dealt quantitatively with risk by multiplying the calculated consequences of each scenario by the estimated probability that that scenario would occur.

Many presentations to the Panel focused on possible risks arising from accident scenarios or from unforeseen events. In particular, two broad themes emerged. First, as noted in the SRG report to the Panel and by several participants, the interest of the public is generally more focused on the potentially high consequences of extreme or worst-case events than on the potentially low probability of their occurrence.

. . . probabilities tend to be what the professional experts focus on, and consequences tend to be what citizens and other critics focus on.

Canadian Coalition for Ecology, Ethics and Religion [Anna Cathrall, Mary Lou Harley, Brenda Lee and Peter Timmerman, A Report to the FEARO Panel on the Proposed Nuclear Fuel Waste Disposal Concept, Volume 2 (The Project Team for the Canadian Coalition for Ecology, Ethics and Religion (CCEER), PH2Pub.021), p. 61.]

Second, the public is vitally interested in and concerned about whether the range of worst-case scenarios has been fully and completely defined, and whether the scenarios reflect the input and views of the public(s) potentially affected. What may be a reasonable worst case to one party may not reflect the concerns and fears of another.

Most people make technological choices based in part on technical and scientific factors, but mostly on societal values.

M. Paez-Victor [M. Paez-Victor, Socio-economic impact assessment of the conceptual system for the disposal of nuclear fuel waste. Support Document A-4 to the Preclosure Environmental and Safety Assessment (Toronto: Ontario Hydro Nuclear, Nuclear Waste and Environment Services Division Report No. N - 03784-939996 (UFMED), 1993), p. 7, cited in Anna Cathrall, Mary Lou Harley, Brenda Lee and Peter Timmerman, A Report to the FEARO Panel, Volume 2, p. 45.]

A number of technical reviews raised concerns regarding the proponent's scenario analyses.

In the opinion of the SRG, the selection of the scenarios and the scenario analysis performed by AECL are problematic. . . . Moreover, the SRG notes that non-expert stakeholders are not mentioned as part of the group that initially developed and then screened factors. . . . The SRG is also concerned about AECL's decision not to consider worst-case scenarios.

Scientific Review Group [Scientific Review Group, Report of the Scientific Review Group (1995), p. 78.]

Specific criticisms of the selected scenarios concerned such issues as the size and nature of the "critical group" and changing climatic, geological or socio-economic conditions. [Maurice Elzas and Raymond Vles, Review of the AECL Post-closure Assessment and Related Documents for the Scientific Review Group of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Panel on the Nuclear Fuel Waste Management and Disposal Concept (Thornhill: M.T.C. Inc., April 25, 1995), p. 21.] Many of these areas are candidates for future development of significant scenarios.

As noted above, the issue of "scenario analysis" as a basis for assessing risk cannot be cleanly divided into separate technical and social components. This contrasts with the rather narrow view of the AECB.

If the concept assessment does demonstrate the likelihood that deep disposal in a pluton can satisfy thetechnical requirements for health, safety, security and environmental protection, the AECB will consider this concept to be acceptable.

Atomic Energy Control Board; emphasis added [Atomic Energy Control Board, Regulatory Document R-71, p. 6.]

From a purely technical perspective, we are persuaded that the generic scenarios evaluated during this concept assessment stage are sufficiently broad and severe to provide reasonable confidence that a site-specific design is not likely to encounter significantly worse scenarios. Therefore we conclude that, on balance, the concept is based on scenario analyses that are sufficiently complete for the short-term purpose of proceeding with further developmental work. However, we are not persuaded that there is widespread agreement on the probabilities that the selected scenarios might occur, nor that these scenarios are thought to adequately represent "worst-case" conditions. Thus, the concept is not based on thorough and participatory scenario analyses. Further work must be undertaken as a priority during further developmental stages, as noted in Chapter 6.

c)Use of realistic data, modelling and natural analogues

Any predictions of environmental and human health effects over time periods of tens of thousands of years will be subject to debate, criticism and differences of opinion because it is not possible to validate them directly. Thus, computer models play an important role in judgments concerning the long-term safety of the concept. Inevitably, models will simplify reality by capturing and focusing on the important factors and mechanisms, while ignoring factors judged or demonstrated to be irrelevant or minor. As noted to the Panel, the behaviour of the model must not be confused with the behaviour of the real system. [Maurice Elzas, Nuclear Fuel Waste Review Public Hearings June 18, 1996, MTC Findings - Performance Assessment: Criteria, risk and uncertainty (PH2Tec.018, June 18, 1996), p. 2.]

In evaluating the technical adequacy of predictions based on models, particularly mathematical models, three questions arise. First, do the models consider all of the mechanisms that may be important? Second, are the methods of solution the models use correct and reliable, and is there confidence in the validity of the input data? Third, has output from the models (i.e. the predictions) been adequately compared to observations, experience, other test results or relevant natural analogues, so that there is confidence that the predictions are unlikely to be misleading? In assessing the proponent's conceptual-stage, generic design, the Panel faced additional complexities arising from the lack of site-specific designs and data.

The proponent's preclosure and postclosure assessments depended on the use of modelling. In the latter case, the individual elements of the model (VAULT, GEONET and BIOTRAC) are linked together in a probabilistic analysis program called SYVAC. Within each element of the models, input data regarding the shape of a probability density function (PDF) for any given parameter are defined probabilistically on the basis of expert judgment. In the EIS case study, using random selection techniques, a total of about 40,000 analyses were then undertaken, each run representing some different combination of parameter values. The proponent concludes [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Environmental Impact Statement, p. 317.] that its approach has met the AECB R-104 requirement that the predicted risk be "sufficiently low so as to allow for uncertainties in exposure scenarios and their consequences." [Atomic Energy Control Board, Regulatory Document R-104, p. 5.]

Virtually all submissions to the Panel on this subject emphasized the need to critically review and update the predictive models the proponent has developed and used over the last 20 years. There was also broad agreement that real, site-specific designs and data would be needed to produce final calculations of risk and safety. There was general agreement, too, that all predictions would have to be constantly and iteratively validated through ongoing tests and observations. Beyond these points of general agreement, debate, disagreement and a range of opinions exist on the issue of modelling validity.

Modelling these complex processes over the time periods involved is an ambitious undertaking, stretching the boundaries of technical capability and public credibility. On the one hand, the Panel was advised that, in its field, the AECL approach represented an internationally recognized, state-of-the-art approach.

Attention should be drawn to the pioneering step forward taken by AECL in the development of the SYVAC code and the probabilistic approach to safety assessment. SYVAC has a high profile internationally and has been used in a number of other programmes (e.g. Sweden, UK); the emphasis on the PSA (probabilistic safety assessment) approach is, however, stronger in the Canadian programme than in most other programmes.

OECD Nuclear Energy Agency Review Group [Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Nuclear Energy Agency Review Group, The Disposal of Canada's Nuclear Fuel Waste, p. 13.]

However, the Panel was also advised that the AECL modelling approach had a number of weaknesses. These include the complexity and lack of transparency of the probabilistic methodology; a lack of sufficient participation by modelling practitioners from other, allied fields; the use of statistical methods at or over the limit of their applicability; the need for significant updating; and disagreements concerning the conceptual basis of the geosphere models.

The SRG expressed major concerns.

. . . AECL's postclosure performance assessment of the concept, using its SYVAC technology and hypothetical reference case studies . . . is unreliable and cannot be used to determine whether the generic concept is safe or is not safe. There are a number of fundamental shortcomings . . . but among the foremost is that it relies upon an inadequate conceptual model of the geosphere. . . .

Scientific Review Group [Scientific Review Group, An Addendum to the Report of the Scientific Review Group (1996), p. 1.]

The Canadian Geoscience Council, representing 13 professional societies, disagreed.

. . . the EIS is adequate and sufficient in regards to the geological aspects of the concept. . . . The models used by the AECL teams are typical of modern codes and understanding of processes . . . the characterization and modelling reported in the EIS are sufficiently reliable to be accepted for the intended purpose, i.e., for showing that a satisfactory performance likely can be achieved in a site in the Canadian Shield.

Canadian Geoscience Council [Canadian Geoscience Council, Geoscience Aspects of Nuclear Fuel Waste Disposal Committee, Review of the AECL Environmental Impact Statement, pp. i-ii, p. 5.]

The Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) also concluded that the development of SYVAC had reached an appropriate stage for concept assessment and that it could be used to produce a reliable performance assessment. [Technical Advisory Committee, L.W. Shemilt, Chairman, Fifteenth Annual Report of the Technical Advisory Committee on the Nuclear Fuel Waste Management Program (Hamilton: submitted to Atomic Energy of Canada Limited October 1996, TAC-15, PH2Tec.035), p. 27, p. 29.] The TAC referred to its difference of opinion with the SRG as a matter of judgment on the "extent reasonably achievable" for a generic research program. [Technical Advisory Committee, L.W. Shemilt, Chairman, Final Submission to Nuclear Fuel Waste Disposal Concept Environmental Assessment Panel (March 27, 1997, PH3Pub.207), p. 10.]

Many of the technical submissions to the Panel noted that site-specific data were essential, and that "further study would be hampered by not knowing the exact geological conditions of the candidate site." [Canadian Geotechnical Society, An Overview of AECL's Environmental Impact Statement on the Disposal Concept for Nuclear Fuel Waste for Canada, Submitted to the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency for Presentation to the Environmental Assessment Panel (Rexdale: August 1995, Pub.020), p. 8.]

The SRG supported this overall view, despite its concerns regarding modelling.

The SRG confirms and reiterates its conclusion that AECL's multiple-barrier concept for the disposal of Canada's nuclear fuel waste is potentially acceptable and applicable, but this needs to be demonstrated for each individual site. Therefore the site selection process should begin.

Scientific Review Group [Scientific Review Group, An Addendum to the Report of the Scientific Review Group (1996), p. 2.]

Several participants expressed concern about whether the computer programs the proponent wrote and used had been independently reviewed and were reliable-that is, whether they had been verified. Others questioned whether the underlying conceptual models had been validated by testing their predictions against known results or against other well-validated predictive models. The role of natural analogues in providing valid observational data was widely discussed, providing confidence to some participants while being unpersuasive to others.

In our judgment, uncertainties in any predictive modelling process will continue to exist. The question is whether or not these modelling uncertainties are large enough to critically reduce or eliminate the margin of safety by which the proponent has calculated that a deep geological repository meets the regulatory risk criteria. On balance, we think that the models the proponent used are sufficiently well developed to demonstrate that its concept of deep geological disposal can be used as the basis for designing a site-specific facility that is likely to meet regulatory requirements. There is general agreement that a final conclusion would require site-specific data and performance analyses that are based on site-specific designs.

However, the Panel also recognizes in Chapter 6 that the models must be critically reviewed and updated, and that this process must include significant and transparent external input. For instance, concern was expressed that the system model used would not be applicable to any other type of concept. In the event that models based on new knowledge and on site-specific data ultimately show that the proponent's current risk calculations and predictions were misleading or in error, it will be the responsibility of the licensing authority to review the results of the new calculations at the appropriate time. In summary, we consider that there is a sufficient basis of confidence in the modelling process to proceed with further technical development of the deep geological disposal concept on a site-specific basis.

d)Sound science and good practices

The major technical reviews submitted to the Panel commented positively on the overall quality of the scientific and engineering work underlying the develop-ment of the proponent's concept.

AECL has conducted extensive, high quality, world-class research on the technology for nuclear fuel waste disposal in plutonic rocks of the Canadian Shield.

Scientific Review Group [Scientific Review Group, Report of the Scientific Review Group (1995), p. 17.]

The EIS documents and the supporting reference documents reflect an excellent understanding of the scientific issues involved corresponding to the internationally recognized state-of-the-art in the field.

OECD Nuclear Energy Agency Review Group [Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Nuclear Energy Agency Review Group, The Disposal of Canada's Nuclear Fuel Waste, p. 23.]

It is the consensus of the CIC that AECL's proposal is comprehensive and well thought out, and the people involved are to be congratulated on the high level of scientific and engineering expertise that they have been able to bring to bear to resolve this complex issue.

Chemical Institute of Canada [The Chemical Institute of Canada, Assessment of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited's Environmental Impact Statement on the Concept for Disposal of Canada's Nuclear Fuel Waste (Ottawa: The Chemical Institute of Canada, August 1995, Tec.005), p. ii.]

We believe that the overall concept . . . is clearly based on extensive and sound scientific principles and research.

Risk Assessment Society [Risk Assessment Society, Saskatchewan Division, Review by Saskatchewan Division, Risk Assessment Society, August 7, 1995 (Regina: August 7, 1995, Pub.021), p. 2.]

Based on these comments and our own analysis, we are satisfied that the proposed technologies are realistic from a scientific and engineering viewpoint, yet have chal-lenges that must be overcome. Particular challenges lie on the periphery of the proponent's in-house expertise, such as modelling techniques and quality control processes, canister design and fabrication, and the field of neotectonics.

In terms of the preclosure period, technical consensus exists that environmental impacts would be equivalent to those of other major nuclear projects.

The preclosure project activities and environmental impacts of the reference case study are equivalent to those of a major nuclear project of comparable magnitude and duration . . . not likely to have unacceptable adverse environmental impacts provided environmental regulations and good engineering practice are followed.

Scientific Review Group [Scientific Review Group, Report of the Scientific Review Group (1995), p. 4.]

Parallels for a conventional project of comparable scale during the postclosure period might include a large underground mining project, a nuclear power plant or a toxic waste disposal facility. Our view is that the overall health and environmental impacts are expected to be no worse than those achievable for conventional projects of comparable scale, providing best available technologies and industrial safety practices are used during implementation.

We draw particular attention to the critical importance of good management practices to avoid the types of problems that have beset other parts of Canada's nuclear power program. Current nuclear industry experiences notwithstanding, there appears to be no fundamental reason why the concept could not be managed safely throughout its implementation and postclosure stages.

e) Flexibility

One of the realities of underground construction is that conditions cannot be fully foreseen, and that a "design-as-you-go" or flexible approach is therefore necessary. Several presentations to the Panel commented on the inherent flexibility of the approach the proponent put forward.

The flexibility of the Canadian (and Swedish) proce-dures for developing a program for disposal of high-level waste has been cited favourably by the Board of Radioactive Waste Management of the U.S. Commission on Geosciences, Environment, and Resources for the integration of technical concepts into flexible planning.

Canadian Geoscience Council [Canadian Geoscience Council, Geoscience Aspects of Nuclear Fuel Waste Disposal Committee, Review of the AECL Environmental Impact Statement, p. 10.]

The concept is flexible, applicable to a variety of potential vault sites and capable of adaptation to unforeseen circumstances which may arise during and after site selection.

Technical Advisory Committee [Technical Advisory Committee, L.W. Shemilt, Chairman, Final Submission, p. 2.]

The disposal concept reduces the burden on future generations whilst being sufficiently flexible to allow a significant element of choice to immediately future generations (e.g. in allowing retrievability). . . .

The concept appears, therefore, sufficiently flexible to allow the matching of various designs to the geological features of any site that would be geologically suitable for a repository.

OECD Nuclear Energy Agency Review Group [Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Nuclear Energy Agency Review Group, The Disposal of Canada's Nuclear Fuel Waste, p. 20 and p. 23.]

The proponent indicated that there was a substantial ability to vary the design elements of the proposal to meet the particular constraints of a real site. This was shown in part by its second case study, which assumed poor quality conditions in the rock mass.

We note that the underground vault system is inherently flexible in its ability to be mined incrementally. Any specific excavation could be stopped or started, depending on the conditions encountered, the waste volumes or new knowledge. Several expert reviews identified potential problems related to localized rock fracturing around canisters emplaced using the in-floor approach. This concern will require careful review within the context of the characteristics of a specific site, once identified. The proponent's second case study showed that an in-room emplacement approach could be used to provide the flexibility necessary to use a range of sites. The proponent emphasized that the observational method would guide operations. Furthermore, there would be virtually limitless flexibility to delay decommissioning and final closure to accommodate whatever extended monitoring stages future generations might desire. [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Environmental Impact Statement, p. 167.]

On the basis of our review, we consider that the proposed deep geological disposal concept incorporates a significant and appropriate degree of flexibility throughout the stages of development, siting and implementation. In the panel's view, this concept of flexibility must be maintained as an important attribute of any disposal system.

f) Feasibility of implementation

If there were uncertainty that the concept could in fact be built and operated in a practical manner, without demanding extraordinary technological advances or commitment of human and financial resources, then confidence in the safety of the final facility would be jeopardized.

One element of feasibility is whether technically acceptable sites are likely to exist, and to be widely distributed, across the Canadian Shield. The proponent argues that this situation is likely, as the concept itself is sufficiently flexible to accommodate a wide range of site conditions. Furthermore, the concept was demonstrated to be suitable for the conditions assumed in its two case studies. While a number of reviewers agreed with this view, others were not satisfied that AECL had done sufficient work to demonstrate this.

Based on generic understanding of crystalline rocks it is considered very likely that suitable sites will exist in the Canadian Shield.

OECD Nuclear Energy Agency Review Group [Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Nuclear Energy Agency Review Group, The Disposal of Canada's Nuclear Fuel Waste, p. 21.]

It is plausible, although not documented, that similar bodies of low-permeability rock may also exist at other sites in the Canadian Shield.

Scientific Review Group [Scientific Review Group, An Addendum to the Report of the Scientific Review Group (1996), p. 1.]

There was also debate as to whether or not the current state of technology is adequate to provide confidence in the ability to search for and characterize potentially suitable sites.

AECL has not provided reasonable confidence that it is feasible to collect the types and quantities of information for a site that would be required to demonstrate safety.

Atomic Energy Control Board Staff [Atomic Energy Control Board Staff, AECB Staff Response, p. 19.]

Site characterization technology is readily available and sufficiently developed to allow the commence-ment of implementation.

OECD Nuclear Energy Agency Review Group [Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Nuclear Energy Agency Review Group, The Disposal of Canada's Nuclear Fuel Waste, p. 20.]

On balance, we consider that, given the flexibility of the concept, it is likely that a significant number of technically suitable sites could be identified in the Canadian Shield. However, this remains to be demonstrated.

A second key element of feasibility is that the concept be based on known or readily achievable technology. This factor is closely related to criterion d), which deals with sound science and good practices, as previously discussed.

There is international consensus that the technology needed to safely dispose of nuclear fuel waste in a variety of media . . . currently exists . . . . Thus there is no general need to delay until major technological advances are made, even though some advances may be needed for particular components of some designs.

Atomic Energy Control Board Staff [Atomic Energy Control Board Staff, AECB Staff Response, p. 4.]

We concur with this view.

Finally, adequate human and financial resources will have to be available to implement the concept safely. We are convinced that appropriate human resources currently exist in Canada, as demonstrated by the involvement of world-class scientists and engineers in developing the concept, and by the ability of Canada to safely build large conventional projects. Thus, the core question is whether adequate human resources will continue to exist in the future, and whether sufficient financial resources will exist to ensure that they can be applied to this project. It is important to note that a specialist's technical skills are expensive and time consuming to develop. They can easily be lost if society does not value and use them. The special skills needed will be available only if the further development and implementation of an acceptable project for managing nuclear fuel wastes is not unduly delayed.

It is important to note that if decisions are not taken, Canada will run the risk of becoming dependent on outside technical skills to solve its own problem of managing nuclear fuel wastes.

Like many of the participants, the Panel remains unconvinced that sufficient financial resources are currently being collected and protected. Differences are apparent in the levies various utilities apply for this purpose. No independent audit has been conducted to provide confidence that sufficient funds are and will continue to be available. We recognize that the funds required will depend on many variables, not least of which are which waste management approach Canada will use and when. Nevertheless, we are not satisfied that this portion of the feasibility criterion has been adequately addressed at the current stage.

The other issue that I think is extremely important, and may totally dwarf that first question, and every other question, is whether in fact Ontario Hydro has anything like $13 billion or $20 billion or whatever, or whether they really have $1 billion to put toward this effort. I think that this is a discussion that we have just scratched the surface of.

Norm Rubin, Energy Probe [Norm Rubin, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, March 29, 1996, p. 168.]

On balance, our view is that the proposed concept would be feasible to implement, provided that adequate human resources and funding are available.

g) Peer review and international expertise

Peer review throughout the past 20 years of concept development has been based on open and unimpeded access to all technical reports, extensive publishing in peer-reviewed scientific journals, and the use of numerous expert panels, task forces and technical review groups. Strong collaborative efforts exist within Canada between AECL and consulting engineering firms, universities, federal departments, industrial entities and utilities. AECL has also collaborated extensively with other interested scientists, governments and utilities internationally through conferences, bilateral research agreements, working and study groups, and co-operation with organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD/NEA).

Foremost in providing peer review to AECL was the Technical Advisory Committee (TAC), formed in 1979. Eight of Canada's leading professional societies select TAC's members. Many of Canada's top scientists and engineers have been included as TAC members, and we have given due weight to the technical opinions of this knowledgeable peer review group.

We are satisfied that the proponent has actively and continuously sought out technical peer review, both nationally and internationally, and has incorporated the results of such reviews into the development of the concept. During future work, additional peer review steps will be required in areas such as updated modelling techniques, canister design and fabrication, and neo-tectonics, to keep Canada in the forefront of these important fields.

5.2.2 Safety from a Social Perspective

We present these views of the safety of the AECL concept to clarify the question of safety as seen from a social perspective, a complementary view to the technical perspective. Not all members of the Panel subscribe to all of these views, but all think it important to present them. 

5.2.2.1 Introduction

In applying the safety criteria in Chapter 4 to the AECL concept of deep geological disposal, we take a different approach than if we were applying them strictly on a scientific and technical basis. We have three concerns.

First, some components of high-level nuclear wastes will pose a serious hazard to human health and the environment for hundreds of thousands of years. Hence, more so than for most human activity, we have to think of potential repercussions far into the future. This leads us to take a very cautious approach to any decisions on safety flowing from judgments made now. Society must be confident that human institutions will have the knowledge and capacity to manage a risky situation and to change direction to deal with things that might go wrong.

Second, we are very concerned about the number, nature and importance of the scientific uncertainties that are inevitable in such a new field over such a long time frame. Few precedents guide us, but we do have previous historical and community experience with similar undertakings to inform our view of safety. We are also concerned about the specific shortcomings in the AECL proposal that many eminent scientists identified. We are not greatly reassured that these same scientists nonetheless suggest that the concept is suitable for proceeding to the next stage.

Whatever the claims of some technical experts to the contrary, in the public mind and in the mind of many risk experts any risk assessment which has to take into account the behaviour of natural and technological to say nothing of social and political systems over spans of time far exceeding those of recorded human history will be dogged by high levels of uncertainty.

Dr. Conrad Brunk, University of Waterloo [Conrad Brunk, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, March 13, 1996, p. 98.]

Third, we recognize that the public tends to be concerned less about the probability of extreme events than about their potentially negative consequences and the magnitude, the reversibility and the extent over time of these consequences. For the public, safety is not a matter of probabilities and meeting standards and regulations. It is, rather, the opposite of danger; it is protection from harm.

These three basic concerns, which we share with many members of the public, are critical to our analysis of safety from a social perspective. They are reflected in what we have to say about each of the safety criteria, and are vital to the following overall conclusion.

Social Conclusion

From a social perspective, safety of the AECL concept has not been adequately demonstrated for a conceptual stage of development. 

5.2.2.2 Social Commentary on Safety Criteria Applied to the AECL Concept

Our evaluation of the proponent's concept from a social perspective appears below in terms of each of the seven safety criteria previously noted.

a) Robustness in meeting appropriate regulatory requirements

In addressing this criterion, various questions arise. Can AECL's concept assure the same level of protection to generations living far into the future as it does to current generations? Do AECB standards represent what Canadian society deems to be acceptable risks to human health and the environment? Our view on this criterion relate to two points. One is the lack of confidence in the methodologies and some of the critical scientific tools AECL used to demonstrate that its proposal will meet the regulatory criteria. The other is the adequacy of the regulatory requirements.

The presentations to the Panel show that the scientific community's opinion is divided on the issue of robustness. Many experts expressed confidence in the safety of the concept. They based this confidence on AECL's state-ment that its concept would meet the regulatory requirements by a wide margin of safety (three to six or seven orders of magnitude for the first case study [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Environmental Impact Statement, p. 319.] and one order of magnitude for the second one [A.G. Wikjord, P. Baumgartner, L.H. Johnson, F.W. Stanchell, R. Zach, and B.W. Goodwin, The Disposal of Canada's Nuclear Fuel Waste: A Study of Postclosure Safety of In-room Emplacement of Used CANDU Fuel in Copper Containers in Permeable Plutonic Rock, Volume 1: Summary (Atomic Energy of Canada Limited Report, AECL - 11494 - 1, COG - 95 - 552 - 1, 1996, Part of Undertaking 58, Additional Information 60), p. 25.] ). Others criticized the adequacy of AECL's scientific tools, particularly the modelling systems, and the rigour and comprehensiveness of the demonstration of safety. They expressed reservations and doubts about the validity of the safety results obtained through AECL's research because of the shortcomings and weaknesses found in the methodologies, and the use of arguments based on unsupported assumptions, to draw conclusions on safety.

AECL has claimed, on the basis of its probabilistic and deterministic risk characterization, that impacts are well below the AECB guidelines, both in terms of the total annual radiation dose and of chemical toxicity effects. This claim, however, assumes that the reference system functions as intended, that the models and data used are valid and that the underlying assumptions are justified or conser-vative. The SRG review of the postclosure assessment document shows that many of these assumptions are not acceptable and that AECL's risk characterization does not convincingly demonstrate compliance.

Scientific Review Group [Scientific Review Group, Report of the Scientific Review Group (1995), p. 14.]

Later in its report, the SRG concludes that the results of the assessment of postclosure performance are not reliable. Some of the reasons for this conclusion are that the uncertainty analysis is not convincing; the choice of input parameters, initial boundary conditions and source terms for the model are not satisfactory; and the modelling of the exposure of human and other living organisms to contaminants passing through the biosphere does not accommodate the likelihood of environmental or ecological changes over a 10,000-year period. [Scientific Review Group, Report of the Scientific Review Group (1995), p. 16.]

The AECB staff statement to the Panel presented five main deficiencies. The following is the first of these statements.

AECL does not attempt to demonstrate the overall safety of the deep geological disposal concept. The postclosure safety assessment is intended only to demonstrate how the assessment tools could be used at an early stage of concept implementation.

. . . Demonstrating a methodology to assess safety falls short of demonstrating the overall safety of the disposal concept.

Atomic Energy Control Board Staff [Atomic Energy Control Board Staff, AECB Staff Response, pp. 13-14.]

AECB staff also submitted the following statement.

It is not clear if the 6 to 7 orders of magnitude between the predictions and the risk limit is ade-quate considering the possible large variation in predicted results and when, contrary to what is stated in Section 1.3.5 (Postclosure PRD, p. 13), the postclosure assessment appears to be neither conservative nor realistic.

Atomic Energy Control Board Staff [Atomic Energy Control Board Staff, AECB Staff Response, p. 33.]

Given the criticisms expressed by technical reviewers, some participants found it difficult to have confidence in the safety of the concept.

The public at the end of phase II [technical hearings]was left with a feeling of grave unease. The best that could be said in favour of AECL's concept was stated by the SRG-that it could, might, should be do-able.

Provincial Council of Women of Ontario [Provincial Council of Women of Ontario, The Provincial Council of Women of Ontario Presentation to the Nuclear Fuel Waste Management and Disposal Concept Environmental Assessment Panel, Phase III Hearings (February 26, 1997, PH3Pub.130), p. 5.]

Scientific bodies expressed an overall confidence in the safety of AECL's concept and recommended a move to siting. However, several of them used very careful wording.

. . . in principle, the concept could be implemented safely and effectively. . . . this needs to be demonstrated for each individual site.

Scientific Review Group [Scientific Review Group, An Addendum to the Report of the Scientific Review Group (1996), pp. 1-2.]

The Committee considers the concept, as set out in the several concept documents, to be sound in principle and achievable, and . . . endorses it.

Joint Committee of the Canadian Academy of Engineering and the Royal Society of Canada [Joint Committee of the Canadian Academy of Engineering and the Royal Society of Canada, Presentation to the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency Panel Reviewing the Environmental Impact Statement Prepared by Atomic Energy of Canada Research Limited on the Management and Disposal of Canada's Nuclear Fuel Waste, Phase II, Technical Aspects of the Concept of Geologic Disposal, Engineered Barriers and the Vault System (May 1996, PH2Tec.010), p. 2.]

NRCan believes that, while the assessment methodology developed is adequate to demonstrate the feasibility of the concept, it should not be used in its current form for future site-specific assessments.

Natural Resources Canada [Natural Resources Canada, Natural Resources Canada's Submission to the Environmental Assessment Panel, Nuclear Fuel Waste Management and Disposal Concept (Phase II: Technical Sessions) (June 5, 1996, PH2Gov.001(a)), p. 21.]

Many participants again felt a sense of unease, based on their judgment that the case for safety had not been made.

CCNR considers that the recommendations of the AECB and the Scientific Review Group to proceed to siting are based largely on the belief that the problem will be solved because it must be solved, despite the fact that the scientific evidence is not at all conclusive, convincing or complete.

Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility [Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility, Summary Argument Submitted to the FEARO Panel on the Management of Canada's Nuclear Fuel Waste (April 18, 1997, CSS.031), p. 4.]

The AECL "concept" should be rejected; AECL has failed to demonstrate safety and acceptability.

Northwatch [Northwatch, Northwatch Final Submission to the Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Review Panel, (North Bay: April 18, 1997, CSS.029), p. 3.]

Some participants questioned how the scientific and technical community could conclude that the AECL concept was safe after it had expressed major caveats. Furthermore, they questioned how a concept designed for the Canadian Shield could be judged safe by relying significantly on work done in other countries.

For more than 15 years the proponent has researched a concept recommended 20 years ago, and made a significant investment of $575 million to verify its safety. Nevertheless, we believe that the methodologies the proponent developed to demonstrate safety have not yet gained sufficient recognition as valid and robust tools to enable the public to gain confidence in the safety of the disposal concept.

Also, participants during the hearings criticized the adequacy of the current AECB standards because they felt a wider range of Canadian society should help establish acceptable levels of risk. The standards did not adequately address social concerns related to human health and ecological integrity, as discussed in criterion d).

Regulatory Document R-104 does not require quantitative analysis to determine when estimated doses reach their peak if this occurs more than 10,000 years after closure of a facility. AECL's studies acknowledge that the estimated dose rate does not peak before 10,000 years and is still increasing at 100,000 years. [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Environmental Impact Statement, p. 309.] Where there may be an increase in risk to humans and the environment over time, the peak dose and the peak risk should be used as references to develop assessment scenarios and eventually to verify compliance.

The primary problem with it [R-104] is the clause which states that: "The period for demonstrating compliance with the individual risk requirements using predictive mathematical models need not exceed 10,000 years." The US National Research Council (NRC) in its recent (1995) report on a proposed used fuel repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, found no scientific basis for so limiting the time period of an individual risk standard, and noted that some potentially important exposures might not occur until after several hundred thousand years from now.

Canadian Coalition for Ecology, Ethics and Religion [Canadian Coalition for Ecology, Ethics and Religion, A Report to the FEARO Panel, Volume I, p. 30.]

In its analysis, the OECD/NEA Review Group mentioned that "large portions of dominant radionuclides remain in the waste form and container over time periods longer than 100,000 years." We agree with this group in advocating that the presentation to the public should have emphasized what happens over long periods to this remaining inventory and its almost unchanged hazard potential. [Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Nuclear Energy Agency Review Group, The Disposal of Canada's Nuclear Fuel Waste, p. 14.]

Furthermore, Regulatory Document R-104 fails to reflect the new and still evolving standards that the ICRP recommended in 1991 and subsequently. Yet, AECL fol-lowed Regulatory Document R-104. [For AECL and AECB staff points of view on whether it was appropriate to follow R-104, see Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, June 17, 1996, pp. 55-56 and Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Response to Request for Information, p. 83-84.]

For all these reasons, we recommend in Chapter 6 that the public be allowed greater input into the development of AECB standards.

We think that major scientific uncertainties about the long-term safety performance of the disposal system have not been adequately resolved and shortcomings have not been addressed. The impacts of miscalculations or mistakes are potentially grave for future generations and the environment. It is therefore better to delay decisions than to approve a concept that could generate serious negative consequences, even if some might consider the margin of safety adequate.

In summary, it is our judgment from a social point of view that the demonstration of safety should be much more robust to justify selecting this disposal concept as Canada's approach for managing nuclear fuel wastes. Moreover, we believe that robustness in meeting appropriate regulatory requirements to protect human health and the environment has not been convincingly demonstrated.

b)Based on thorough and participatory scenario analyses

In presenting its most reasonable case scenarios, AECL failed to address a wide enough range of different possibilities about which participants expressed concerns. It did not, for example, deal adequately with the consequences of cumulative minor accidents, with the handling of emergencies or with major unforeseen events. It did not identify the extent of the consequences of scenarios at various points in time. Nor did it seek wide public input when developing scenarios.

Compliance is judged by risk rather than by extreme consequences. This, however, does not mean that it is without interest to know the size of extreme consequences and the associated probabilities.

OECD Nuclear Energy Agency Review Group [Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Nuclear Energy Agency Review Group, The Disposal of Canada's Nuclear Fuel Waste, p. 13.]

Moreover, where firm predictions were impossible, the proponent ignored or downplayed issues of interest.

. . . in the face of this uncertainty [on the future impact of human activity on the biosphere] , any attempt to predict the effects of humans on the evolution of the biosphere would have been futile. Accordingly, we have assumed that future human activities, whether for better or worse, would not alter the biosphere in any fundamental way over long periods of time.

R-Biosphere [P.A. Davis, R. Zach, M.E. Stephens, B.D. Amiro, G.A. Bird, J.A.K. Reid, M.I. Sheppard, S.C. Sheppard and M. Stephenson. The disposal of Canada's nuclear fuel waste: The biosphere model, BIOTRAC, for postclosure assessment (R-Biosphere) (Atomic Energy of Canada Limited Report, AECL - 10720, COG - 93 - 10, 1993), p. 57.]

Following the direction it received from Regulatory Document R-104, AECL did not make any "attempt in the model to incorporate temporal changes in man's cultural or social behaviour, in his physiology, or in the changes in the biosphere caused by anthropogenic effects." [P.A. Davis et al, R-Biosphere, p. 20.] Although we recognize the difficulty of making long-term predictions, we believe that the sensitivity of the safety results to the nature of these assumptions should have been more extensively tested and discussed. For the sake of completeness, AECL should have called upon other disciplines in a co-ordinated way to contribute ideas about future developments that would have led to the assessment of other or modified scenarios. Examples of these other disciplines would be economics, demography, sociology, history, anthropology, ethics and nuclear medicine. [Scientific Review Group, Report of the Scientific Review Group (1995), p. 78.]

If we accept that the future will be like the present, the model seems reasonable. But is it reasonable to think that the future will be like the present?

Raymond Vles [Raymond Vles, in Appendix A of Maurice Elzas and Raymond Vles, Review of the AECL Post-closure Assessment and Related Documents, p. 56.]

The EIS presents three groups of scenarios. There is no mention that any non-expert stakeholders were involved in developing and screening risk factors to be analyzed. The consequences were estimated for limited scenarios. These scenarios do not reflect the full reality of life on the Canadian Shield. One could have legitimately expected to benefit from more scenarios modelling various unexpected events that would have an impact on non-human biota, as well as on different human settlements-that is, rural, urban, remote and Aboriginal communities.

There is a need to examine the Concept for both optimistic and pessimistic scenarios for future generations in terms of technical capabilities, resource availability, social stability, etc.

United Church of Canada [United Church of Canada, A Submission from The United Church of Canada Program Unit on Peace, Environment and Rural Life Division of Mission in Canada to the Public Hearings of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Panel Reviewing the Nuclear Fuel Waste Management and Disposal Concept (Toronto: March 1996, PHPub.124), pp. 3-15.]

The SRG and other participants felt that some scenarios were dismissed too easily.

The scenario analysis methodology is not described in sufficient detail to allow a thorough evaluation of the resulting three [groups of] scenarios used by AECL. The absence of detailed screening argu-ments from either the postclosure assessment document or other primary reference documents creates concern that some questionable selection mechanisms might have been used to eliminate factors (events, processes, and features) during scenario screening.

Scientific Review Group [Scientific Review Group, Report of the Scientific Review Group (1995), p. 13.]

From a social point of view, insufficient scenarios have been provided to estimate the range of potential hazards to humans and the environment or to conclude that the concept is based on a thorough and participatory scenario analysis that could adequately protect human health and the environment.

c) Use of realistic data, modelling and natural analogues

In the earlier section on the technical perspective, attention was drawn under this criterion to the shortcomings of the modelling used in the EIS. In this we concur. However, the conclusion was reached that, while considerable improvement and updating would be required for future models, the models the proponent used "are sufficiently well developed to demonstrate that [the proponent's] concept of deep geological disposal can be used as the basis for designing a site-specific facility." We do not share this optimism. We consider that the shortcomings of the modelling make it impossible to say that the AECL concept meets this criterion.

The major problem with this report is a philosophical one: the model is trying to demonstrate that, if reasonable assumptions about the future hold, then there should be no problems. What it should do instead is to demonstrate the robustness of the waste disposal concept: how extreme do situations have to get before they start getting dangerous? In other words, the model should show what has to occur to cause unacceptable exposure, and let decision makers and the public judge the probabilities and therefore the acceptability of the risk.

Raymond Vles [Raymond Vles, in Appendix A of Maurice Elzas and Raymond Vles, Review of the AECL Post-closure Assessment and Related Documents, p. 55.]

It is our judgment that the models used are insufficiently developed to demonstrate that the proponent's concept of deep geological disposal can be used as a basis for a site-specific facility. Considerable improvement and updating of the model would be required before there would be enough confidence to proceed.

d) Sound science and good practices

AECL's proposal deals with a nuclear mega-project that presents a unique social and political challenge. Many communities along transportation routes, or potential host and other communities, might be affected. Clearly, the development of an approach to managing nuclear fuel wastes must be based on sound physical science. While this is necessary, it is not sufficient. The approach must equally be based on sound social science and traditional Aboriginal knowledge. Without these complementary bases, there can be no assurance that public safety issues have been comprehensively identified, nor that they have been adequately addressed in the concept as presented.

AECL has conducted several interesting participation exercises to identify public issues related to the nuclear fuel waste disposal concept. However, this did not satisfy members of the Canadian Coalition for Ecology, Ethics and Religion.

. . . it [R-Public] fails to assess the real content of those concerns, and their actual merit. Public concerns are never matched to those expressed by the scientific community, for example. By failing to present the debate as also a feature of current medical and social scientific analyses, the authors wrongly characterize it as a battle between pro-nuclear experts and anti-nuclear laymen. . . .

Anna Cathrall, Mary Lou Harley, Brenda Lee and Peter Timmerman [Anna Cathrall et al, A Report to the FEARO Panel, Volume 2, p. 47.]

We concur with this view.

Although it is likely that such a project could have the greatest impact on Aboriginal communities, their unique perception of safety was not considered. The Aboriginal community views safety in a holistic sense, in that it considers potential impacts on all elements of the natural world. AECL did not consider the potential risk to the health of Aboriginal people, especially given their health status, which is below average. In addition, incorporating traditional knowledge would bring a different dimension to the perception of safety.

Our closest tie to these beings from our earth is from the people who have the traditional knowledge of the land, knowledge passed on to them by the thousands of years of inhabiting this island. The elders are the best indicator of the truth of the harm to our beings from the earth. They are the biologists, the chemists, the archaeologists, and their titles come without diplomas and degrees. Their titles come from the knowledge of generations.

Jamie Leary, Norway House First Nation [Jamie Leary, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, January 16, 1997, pp. 98-99.]

The Panel accepts the World Health Organization's definition of health as "a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity." This is an all-embracing definition that requires a very broad review of all the possible implications of developing a high-level waste facility, for both the individuals and the communities concerned. In its assessment of postclosure health effects, AECL used only fatal cancers or serious genetic effects as significant consequences.

At the very least, the risk of non-fatal cancer should be included and there should be a discussion of other effects reported in the literature for exposure to low level radiation. To this should be added the effects of stress and anxiety on a host community and surrounding populations.

Health Canada [Health Canada, Health Canada Submission to the Public Hearings of the Environmental Assessment Panel for the Nuclear Fuel Waste Management and Disposal Concept (June 11, 1996, PH2Gov.011), p. 4.]

The proponent has not addressed the risk and potential consequences of significant social turmoil and opposition, at least at the individual and community level. Experience in Canada and elsewhere in the world indicates, however, that these would be likely.

Although many countries have researched passively safe deep underground disposal, no country has ever implemented it. Many of the operations that will be carried out routinely will be unique to this type of facility. It is therefore very difficult to determine the potential consequences of these operations on the workers, the public and the environment.

AECL did not use case studies appropriately to provide sufficient confidence in decisions to be made on the safety of the concept. The proponent did not demonstrate that the proposed technologies have performed adequate-ly in the past to protect human health and the environment when used in projects of similar size. It gave few concrete references and little systematic analysis or discussion of relevant previous technical and managerial achievements to give us confidence that the proposed technologies will perform adequately in the future.

In our judgment, more sustained and comprehensive use of the social sciences would have provided additional key information to identify and assess societal safety concerns, particularly those related to impacts on Aboriginal communities, conflict situations and significant social turmoil.

e) Flexibility

AECL was asked to develop a passively safe deep underground disposal concept that would not rely on long-term institutional controls as a necessary safety feature. Both the AECB and the ICRP consider institutional controls to be unreliable beyond a few hundred years. [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Environmental Impact Statement, p. 76.]

We recognize that there is no known precedent for institutional controls being successfully implemented over periods extending beyond tens of thousands of years. However, many participants and groups viewed institutional controls, imperfect as they may be, to be an indication of responsible management, at least for a significant time period. These participants and groups considered such controls to be a greater guarantee of safety than disposal, which was seen as an unsafe "out of sight, out of mind" approach, for which there is also no precedent. Prudence requires that control and verification capability be included and maintained as a safety factor that is strategically as important as technical passive safety capability.

Long-term monitoring is, in many people's minds, an essential safety feature. AECL has considered it mostly as an add-on, to detect radiation, especially at or near the surface, after the disposal system is closed. This is understandable. Built-in intrusive monitoring could easily be seen as contradictory to a passively safe system. Furthermore, AECL confirmed that such monitoring could jeopardize the passive safety of its concept. Nevertheless, along with many other participants in the hearing process, we believe that a system of early detection of failures, inside the vault or close to it, should be built into the defence-in-depth approach.

A management strategy that can adapt to changes is essential. While AECL presented the engineered barriers as being adaptable to a range of site conditions and not fixed in design, it did not clearly define or limit them. AECL also stated that design options included in the case studies were not meant to be standard components of the disposal system and would not necessarily be selected for a final design. There was no definition of the range within which site conditions could vary, or engineered barriers could be flexible, and still conform to concept specifications and safety.

It is clear that there is still a great deal of confusion regarding what constitutes the concept and what constitutes illustrative examples of the concept. . . . The public wants some brackets, some frame within which safety of any example is assured.

Dr. Stella Swanson, Scientific Review Group [Stella Swanson, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, June 19, 1996, pp. 137-138.]

The lack of a clear statement on the limits to this flexibility impinges significantly, in our view, on the ability to foresee the potential consequences of implementing the concept, and its safety performance at a real site. In such a context, the concept becomes an abstraction that can be safely adapted to almost all site conditions. In our view, the proponent should have presented, compared and assessed designs and site characteristics that enhance long-term safety.

Our conclusion is that a system of early detection of failures inside the vault or close to it should be researched further. Such monitoring would provide forewarning and trigger appropriate safety action, including retrieval if deemed necessary, if a series of unexpected events were to thwart the passive safety system.

f) Feasibility of implementation

We believe that a favourable judgment on the feasibility of AECL's concept can be made only if there is reasonable evidence of the likelihood of finding a suitable site on which to implement the concept. We need to know if there is a wide range of potential siting areas in Canada where AECL's safety results could be obtained. This is necessary to develop confidence that a suitable site can be found despite the social and technical constraints.

. . . the case study geosphere model, although hypothetical, is a realistic representation of the site-specific conditions that were known to exist at the URL site. Another site would require the develop-ment of another geosphere model to represent the specific arrangement of features at that site.

Atomic Energy of Canada Limited [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Response to Request for Information, p. 111.]

. . . an analysis based on the specific properties of one site does leave open the question of the transferability of the safety and engineering feasibility to other sites, with different characteristics, i.e., until a site is chosen only the potential of a concept can be judged.

OECD Nuclear Energy Agency Review Group [Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Nuclear Energy Agency Review Group, The Disposal of Canada's Nuclear Fuel Waste, p. 4.]

It is absolutely essential that the siting process is seen to be completely open and transparent, a fact recognized by AECL. Therefore the Panel should recommend that prior to any final decision on concept suitability, AECL demonstrate the applic-ability of the safety assessment methodology to one or more other sites. . . .

Philip J. Richardson, for Northwatch [Philip J. Richardson, Site Characterization and Site Evaluation: Comment on Atomic Energy of Canada Limited's Nuclear Fuel Waste Management and Disposal Concept (North Bay: prepared for Northwatch, June 20, 1996, PH2Pub.009), p. 16.]

According to many participants in the hearings, few quantitative data were presented by which the properties of the underground research laboratory's rock mass could be compared with those elsewhere in the Canadian Shield. According to the SRG, AECL's R-Siting does not reflect the information gathered during extensive geotechnical investigations at several sites in the Canadian Shield nor incorporate it in developing methods for site characterization, siting criteria or site ranking. [Scientific Review Group, Report of the Scientific Review Group (1995), pp. 106-107.]

Another important issue to be addressed is the siting inclusion and exclusion criteria. AECL has failed to describe clearly enough the critical factors and the range of these factors that would allow a site to be considered suitable. On the contrary, to allow for flexibility and community input, it has put forward a strategy where it would apply only a limited number of criteria in the early siting stage. For a significant number of participants, this approach avoids difficult questions, putting them aside for the next phase. As mentioned by the SRG, R-Siting is largely generalized and qualitative.

The document does not indicate how either qualitative or quantitative and defensible criteria for siting a nuclear fuel waste disposal facility will be developed and ranked to determine which sites can be disregarded and which sites merit further evaluation.

Scientific Review Group [Scientific Review Group, Report of the Scientific Review Group (1995), p. 105.]

Clearly spelling out the siting inclusion and exclusion criteria would allow us to estimate whether the socio-economic and technical considerations can be adequately reconciled to guarantee the safety, acceptability and feasibility of the concept.

If the siting process is to be recognized and accepted by the affected publics further down the site screening road, it is crucial that the screening criteria are seen to have been drawn up in an open and transparent fashion. Otherwise the process will be laid open to charges of manipulation.

Philip J. Richardson, for Northwatch [Philip J. Richardson, Site Characterization and Site Evaluation, p. 3.]

For a process to be credible, the proponent has to specify clearly what knowledge it expects to acquire about the technical and social factors that determine safety at various stages in the site selection process, prior to the selection of any site. The proponent also has to indicate how the sites would be compared for priority.

With regard to voluntary siting processes, AECL states that applying the principles of safety and environmental protection, voluntarism, shared decision-making, openness and fairness "could result in a site for a nuclear fuel waste disposal facility that is both technically and socially acceptable." [M.A. Greber, E.R. Frech and J.A.R. Hillier. The disposal of Canada's nuclear fuel waste: Public involvement and social aspects (R-Public) (Atomic Energy of Canada Limited Report AECL - 10712, COG - 93 - 2, 1994), p. 195.] But there were contrary views from many participants.

Covering less than two pages, it [ R-Public'sdiscussion on experience with voluntary siting processes]contains virtually no information on what made the successful processes work, what their key components were, what opposition they met, what other problems they faced, or how the siting organization addressed such problems.

Elizabeth Brubaker, Borealis Energy Research Association, for Energy Probe [Elizabeth Brubaker, Siting a Nuclear Waste Disposal Facility: Energy Probe's Submission on the Adequacy of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited's Environmental Impact Statement on the Concept for Disposal of Canada's Nuclear Fuel Waste (Toronto: Energy Probe Research Foundation, July 28, 1995, Pub.014), p. 2.]

No comments were made about the conflicts that could occur between communities and their neighbours and the implications of these conflicts on the siting process. We realized, especially in discussing the siting process for low-level radioactive wastes with people who participated in its implementation, the complexity and the usefulness of a detailed analysis in judging the feasibility of AECL's concept.

The experience of other countries demonstrates that social processes and financial considerations might dominate the site screening stage. The EIS does not provide any assurance that the current technical characterization and assessment tools can adequately address this contingency. From a social perspective, AECL failed to demonstrate that it had developed an adequate decision-making strategy for successfully selecting a safe site in a cost-effective way.

. . . AECL clearly states that siting is the first stage of implementation of the concept, and the likelihood of abandoning this project gets progressively more remote as new milestones are passed and more money is spent.

Voice of Women [Voice of Women, Presentation to Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel (Toronto: February 26, 1997, PH3Pub.129), pp. 2-3.]

In summary, we believe that the proponent has not provided the Panel with sufficient information, available through the social sciences, as to how it would proceed to site a disposal facility. That comprehensive information would be needed for the Panel to conclude that a site that would be socially as well as technically feasible could be found.

g) Peer review and international expertise

The EIS reflects little peer review by social scientists and ethicists who have thoughtfully studied the nuclear waste question. Nor is much attention given to international experience with the actual siting of disposal facilities for high-level and low-level wastes. We conclude that peer review by social scientists, as well as consideration of international experience in actually siting disposal facilities, could inform the social perspective on safety, and bolster confidence in the entire process.

In light of all the foregoing, the safety merits of the AECL concept should be carefully compared with those of realistic alternatives. 

5.3 Acceptability of the AECL Concept

In this section, the Panel comments on the acceptability of the AECL concept, following the criteria set forth in Chapter 4.

a) Broad public support

Broad support from an informed Canadian public is a prerequisite to being able to make decisions on the long-term management of nuclear fuel wastes. An agency for managing nuclear fuel wastes must engage the public through a sustained information and communication program. The public must know about the scientific considerations and the social implications of the proposal. It must be aware of, and have participated in developing, the decision-making process, which will include the key points at which safety and acceptability are assessed, who makes the decisions, how disputes are resolved and how the needs of significant minorities are addressed.

. . . there has to be a much more broadly distributed communications strategy to bring home the nature of the kind of issue here because this is an issue that we believe affects all Canadians.

David Smith,

Joint Committee of the Canadian Academy of Engineering and The Royal Society of Canada [David Smith, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, March 25, 1996, p. 130.]

The AECL concept does not, in our view, meet this criterion. In one of its supporting documents to the EIS, R-Public, AECL describes earlier government attempts to obtain public advice. AECL also describes its own attempts to inform the public about its proposals and to seek the public's views. These have, we think, helped to broaden public understanding of the facts and issues involved, as have hearings of this Panel. But data are lacking that would indicate how widespread this understanding is, let alone what kind of public support there is. Even if there were better understanding of the technical aspects of the question, clear information is lacking as to how and when the broader Canadian public and the provinces would be involved in decision-making related to future steps.

When he put forward his recommendation in 1977 that deep geological disposal was the most promising approach for Canada, Dr. Kenneth Hare called for wide public discussion and broad public support before adopting a national plan for managing radioactive wastes. [F.K. Hare et al, The Management of Canada's Nuclear Wastes, p. 51.] When he was asked at our hearings whether, in his view, such consultation had taken place, he replied in the negative.

I don't think it has. I'm not sure that it can. . . . But not to carry it out, or not to attempt it is-and I will use an old-fashioned word-immoral in my judgment.

Dr. F. Kenneth Hare [Kenneth Hare, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, June 20, 1996, pp. 68-69.]

We recognize that it is difficult to determine whether participants in our hearings, both those opposed to and those supportive of the AECL concept, were representative of the larger public. We recognize also that it may be difficult to gauge with precision the extent of support for or opposition to the AECL concept, particularly in the absence of a real site and a real design. We judge, however, that significant numbers of the public are currently sufficiently opposed to the AECL concept that it would be ill advised to proceed with it now.

It is evident from the record of the public hearings to date that the participants in this issue do not represent Canadian public opinion. Presenters are very clearly drawn from extremes and the views expressed indicate a polarization that is difficult to accept exists in the Canadian public.

Risk Assessment Society [Risk Assessment Society, Saskatchewan Division, Submission to the Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel (Regina: February 28, 1997, PH3Pub.175), p. 5.]

I have counted 144 separate presentations since mid-January by citizens and spokespeople for organizations that either completely reject AECL's proposal or have grave doubts about it. That's 144 people who read up on the subject, consulted their peers, took a day off work, travelled sometimes long distances to the hearing to say their piece. Most of them were not paid for this.

Penny Sanger [Penny Sanger, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, March 26, 1997. p. 186.]

After 7 years of public hearings, it is obvious to us that the concept is not acceptable to the majority of citizens and interest groups that have participated.

Marc Chénier,

Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility [Marc Chénier, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, March 25, 1997, p. 58.]

These considerations indicate to the Panel that the AECL concept for deep geological disposal has not been demonstrated to have broad public support.

b) Safety from both a technical and a social perspective

As noted in this chapter's analysis of the safety of the AECL concept, conclusions on safety differ, depending on whether they are based on technical or social perspectives. The Panel considers that from a technical perspective, safety has on balance been adequately demonstrated for a conceptual stage of development, but from a social perspective it has not. Safety is a key part of acceptability. Thus the concept cannot be regarded as acceptable if it fails to demonstrate safety from both perspectives.

c) Development within a sound ethical and social assessment framework

In Chapter 4 and elsewhere in this report, we have stressed the importance of reaching decisions on the long-term management of nuclear fuel wastes that are consistent with the predominant ethical and social values of Canadian society. It is difficult to describe these values with precision, both because they vary within a society as diverse as Canada's, and because they vary over time.

The Panel wishes to acknowledge that AECL addressed a number of the aspects of such a framework, either in its EIS or in other ways, to a greater extent than is usually found in technical proposals. In doing so, it drew on work done by the ICRP, OECD/NEA and AECB. It held a workshop in Canada in 1991 on the moral and ethical implications of its concept [See Hardy Stevens and Associates, Moral and Ethical Issues Related to the Nuclear Fuel Waste Disposal Concept. Report on AECL's Consultation Workshop: Toronto, Ontario, Canada: March 7-8, 1991 (Toronto: April 1991, Undertaking 1).] and participated in an OECD/NEA workshop on the environmental and ethical aspects of long-lived radioactive waste disposal. [See Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Nuclear Energy Agency, The Environmental and Ethical Basis of Geological Disposal. A Collective Opinion of the NEA Radioactive Waste Management Committee . (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1995).]

In the EIS and R-Public, AECL gave its views on a number of ethical issues, including justification for disposal and its timing, and the responsibilities of present and future generations. In proposals regarding siting, it also put forward thoughts on distributional fairness. We commend AECL for that work, but suggest that it has to be taken somewhat further.

Section 2.3.3 of this report outlines AECL's views on the need for and timing of disposal, and the reaction of participants, many of whom were not persuaded by its reasoning. In brief, these participants' concerns stemmed from considerations such as:

  • lack of confidence in technical solutions to cover such a long period;
  • confidence in the safety of present storage practices, which could be retained for 100 years or more to allow for development of options and greater scientific certainty;
  • discomfort with the lack of monitoring and an "out of sight, out of mind" approach; and
  • lack of flexibility and choice for future generations to make decisions in the light of their own social and ethical framework.

In these participants' view, such considerations argued against hasty decisions now and in favour of monitored, retrievable storage, with the greater control this implies, at least for the present.

Given the availability of storage technologies, there is no imperative to proceed with a geological repository until such time as safety can be reasonably assured and public acceptance of the concept has been achieved.

Dr. Michael Kraft,

University of Wisconsin-Green Bay [Michael Kraft, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, March 27, 1996, p. 114.]

AECL argues that those who have benefited significantly from nuclear power should assume disposal responsibilities, and that the burden on future generations is best minimized by moving now to a passive disposal system. Some participants found this argument unconvincing on the grounds that it denied future generations freedom of choice with respect to monitoring, retrieval, recycling and new technology. This question requires further examination in the context of an ethical and social framework. The panel's view is that, while greater attention should be paid to an enlarged choice for future generations, the present generation should not use this as a basis to justify postponing decisions indefinitely. Specifically, there should be an element of passive safety in any concept in the event future generations should be unwilling or unable to care for a storage or disposal facility.

On the matter of distributional equity, AECL has put forward principles for siting with a view to protecting the interests of host and affected communities. For those principles to be effective, however, they must be translated into safeguards and procedures. Yet even principles and procedures do not deal adequately with some of the larger questions. Do the principal beneficiaries of nuclear power bear an appropriate share of risks and costs? Are risks, costs and benefits distributed equitably among different groups in society, among areas in the country, and between present and future generations? Does the AECL concept provide for a net benefit to society at large and for those directly affected? All of these require more elaboration in an ethical and social framework than appears in AECL's proposals.

Many participants said it was not ethically possible to consider the AECL concept in isolation from other questions related to the nuclear fuel cycle, such as the future of nuclear power in Canada and the importation of nuclear fuel wastes. These may be outside the mandate of this Panel, but they cannot be ignored when looking at acceptability.

Several of the less technical barriers to acceptability are items which are themselves, on their face, outside this panel's mandate. I would submit, on the other hand, that their impact on the acceptability of the concept cannot be totally ignored on that basis.

Norm Rubin, Energy Probe [Norm Rubin, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, November 21, 1996, p. 175.]

On the question of importation, which I know we're not supposed to talk about, but we really can't avoid it if we are going to talk about ethical concerns. . . . this level of uncertainty and, as noted previously, the number of unknown and unknowable variables in this process, are unacceptable for an environmental review in which the public is called upon to give an opinion.

Anne Lindsey, Concerned Citizens of Manitoba [Anne Lindsey, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, April 29, 1996, pp. 40-42.]

Finally, many participants felt the relative lack of systematic input into the EIS by social scientists and ethicists led to an inadequate balance between the technical and social considerations that ought to govern thinking on the AECL concept.

There is really no sort of matching level of knowledge in the social and ethical issues that matches that of the technical side of the report . . . the level of social expertise and ethical expertise seems to us not as strong in the report as the technical. . . .

David Smith,

Joint Committee of the Canadian Academy of Engineering and The Royal Society of Canada [David Smith, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, March 25, 1996, pp. 130-134.]

Based on these considerations, we have concluded that the development of the AECL concept did not take place within the context of a comprehensive social and ethical framework. In the absence of this framework, the concept cannot be said to have met this criterion for acceptability.

d) Support of Aboriginal people

Any approach to managing nuclear wastes that involves lands inhabited, claimed or used by Aboriginal people will affect them in particularly acute ways. Aboriginal people rely on the land for sustenance and hold deep beliefs about humankind's relationship with and responsibility for the natural environment. Hence their active involvement, consent and co-operation are essential throughout all phases, from acceptance of the concept through its implementation.

This consideration applies strongly in the case of the AECL concept, as the facility is expected to be located on the Canadian Shield, where there is a significant Aboriginal presence. In its guidelines document, the Panel admonished AECL to pay special attention to the viewpoints of Aboriginal people. Yet the EIS gave little indication that AECL had attempted to do this, or of how the traditional knowledge and experience of Aboriginal people might be incorporated into any analysis of the effects of a facility.

Throughout the hearings process, during our visits to Aboriginal communities, and in 20 Aboriginal association and band council resolutions opposing disposal and transport in treaty areas covering virtually all of central and northern Ontario and elsewhere, we heard that Aboriginal participants were mistrustful of AECL's concept. They felt that the proponent-and the Panel-had shown lack of respect for their cultural differences and consultative processes. They said that they lacked the knowledge to reach their own judgments on the concept and they resented what they viewed as the proponent's failure to involve them in dialogue at the concept's inception and during its development.

AECL has failed to consult with First Nations generally and has made no substantive effort to consider the potential impacts of this concept on our communities. . . . Due to health concerns and our dependence on the land, we will be the most vulnerable group exposed to such a depository. . . If our opinions and knowledge are not valued by AECL, then how can we have any confidence in this process or in the proposal itself?

Chief Earl Commanda,

on behalf of the Union of Ontario Indians [Earl Commanda, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, February 13, 1996, pp. 61-65.]

We believe that the disposal of something so toxic and so dangerous as high level radioactive waste requires this level of commitment to wide ranging and thorough consultation. . . . Yet neither AECL or Ontario Hydro seriously engage in a consultation process with our people. Neither AECL or Ontario Hydro offered to provide us with the appropriate timing or necessary resources to conduct our consultation in a manner respecting our culture, our relationships and our leadership and our rights.

Deputy Grand Chief Brian Davey,

Nishnawbe Aski Nation [Brian Davey, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, March 11, 1996, pp. 239-240.]

For these reasons, the panel's view is that Aboriginal people do not support the concept as presented. Whether the concept might in future gain that support depends in part on whether governments and their agents are prepared to take the steps we recommend in Chapter 6.

e)Selection after comparison with the risks, costs and benefits of other options

The Hare Report suggested that primary attention be given to plutonic rock but that "careful attention be paid to the work of other scientists in other countries on different rock types." [F.K. Hare et al, The Management of Canada's Nuclear Wastes, p. 44.] The AECB also endorsed plutonic disposal but said that AECL "should maintain a current awareness of studies on other disposal methods." [Atomic Energy Control Board, Regulatory Document R-71, p. 6.] The proponent, in putting forward only one option for the long-term management of nuclear fuel wastes, acted in accordance with the instructions given by governments. AECL was asked to demonstrate whether nuclear fuel wastes could be disposed of safely in deep geological formations, particularly intrusive igneous rock, and its research and the EIS set out to do just that. It was not instructed to make a comparative assessment of options.

We must point out, however, that the panel's guidelines document of 1992 explicitly asked AECL to discuss possible alternatives to its concept, and in sufficient detail to permit a meaningful comparison. [Federal Environmental Assessment Review Panel. Final Guidelines for the Preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement on the Nuclear Fuel Waste Management and Disposal Concept (March 1992), p. 12.] We drew special attention to storage alternatives in the guidelines and in requests for presentation during Phase II of our hearings. In spite of these requests, AECL provided little comparative information about alternatives.

The issue is whether the Canadian public wants sealed, walk-away disposal of spent fuel, or would prefer monitored, retrievable long-term storage. In the original 1977 Federal Inquiry report we opted for permanent disposal in a walk-away repository, because the evidence we could gather in the brief period available pointed to a strong public demand for it. But in the early 1990s I heard from several sources that public opinion-where the public had any opinion-had moved towards long-term, monitored and managed storage of the fuel, in most cases because there were doubts as to the wisdom of sealing the chambers until there was assurance that the performance was as predicted. I tended to agree with this view. . .

Dr. F. Kenneth Hare [F.K. Hare, An Addendum by F. Kenneth Hare to the Joint Submission, p. 1, in Albert A. Driedger, F. Kenneth Hare, Jon H.F. Jennekens, J. Terry Rogers, and Leslie W. Shemilt, A Submission to the Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel on the Environmental Impact Statement by AECL (Oakville: PHPub.150, April 2, 1996).]

It seems to us that the Canadian public no longer finds it acceptable to be asked to make a decision based on one option only. A choice of one is not a choice. People want to know, at least in some reasonably comparable way, the implications of other options; their risks, costs and net benefits; and the implications if deep geological disposal is rejected.

. . . people generally are more likely to judge a risk acceptable if they see all the other alternatives as even more risky. . . . If the deep geological disposal concept appears to reduce most effectively the risk to the values the public takes most seriously this will, of course, come to be regarded as the "safe" alternative, but only because the imposed alternatives are perceived to involve even greater risk.

Dr. Conrad Brunk, University of Waterloo [Conrad Brunk, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, March 13, 1996, pp. 107-108.]

. . . the situation today is that above ground spent fuel dry storage facilities are accepted by the public, are judged safe, use the very simplest of technologies, require only rudimentary care, are inexpensive and have considerable siting flexibility.

. . . we believe that the ethical arguments for preferring deep disposal to other management strategies are not convincing and that above ground storage should be explored technically to determine if it is an alternative solution.

New Brunswick Power [New Brunswick Power, The Ethics of the Management of High-level Radioactive Waste (PH3Pub.225, March 26, 1997), pp. 2-3.]

AECL has told us there is no urgency to move to permanent disposal. They should be asked to go back and produce a proposal for an extended temporary storage system and for replacement and renewal of such a system as needed in the expectation that it will probably be many decades before it is possible to consider a permanent solution.

Ann Coxworth,

Saskatchewan Environmental Society [Ann Coxworth, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, March 11, 1996, p. 340.]

From the public hearings process and from our study of the subject over a number of years, the Panel now believes that the concept of deep geological disposal could be accepted only if it is placed in the context of other alternatives. In our judgment, the proponent's proposals and concept do not meet this basic criterion of acceptability.

f) Advancement by a stable and trustworthy proponent and supervision by a trustworthy regulator

Trust in both the proponent and the regulator is critical to gaining public acceptance of a concept. Among other factors, a concept will be more acceptable if it is advanced by the same proponent that intends to implement it, and if both the proponent and the regulator are free of conflicts of interest.

The CNA believes that it is very important that the corporate entity which undertakes the siting pro-cess, and in the course of which makes promises and undertakings to the public, should be the same entity responsible, and held accountable, for all subsequent phases of the process. Such continuity, and assurance of funding stability, is necessary if the public is to place their trust in the integrity of the siting process.

Ian Wilson, Canadian Nuclear Association [Ian Wilson, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, March 29, 1996, pp. 52 -53.]

AECL has made it clear that it expects to have no primary, and perhaps not any, responsibilities in the area of nuclear fuel wastes in the future. To that extent, it cannot be regarded as a "stable" proponent and its concept cannot meet this part of the criterion. Ontario Hydro indicated at our hearings that it was prepared to act as implementing agency and it presumably will continue in existence in one form or another. However, neither AECL nor Ontario Hydro could give details and guarantees that participants sought on how the proponent would proceed in future since the potential implementing organization for the concept has not yet been identified.

Rightly or wrongly, and for a variety of reasons, AECL does not appear to enjoy-at least in some quarters in Canada-the degree of trust the Panel considers essential for any agency responsible for long-term management of nuclear fuel wastes. Many participants complained about AECL's alleged lack of openness and transparency, its insensitivity to a wide range of stakeholders, and its failure in practice to ensure effective public participation. Ontario Hydro received many of the same criticisms. There was, moreover, at least a perception of conflict of interest in that both were said to be looking for a solution to the nuclear waste problem as a means of ensuring either continued sales of CANDU reactors or continued use of reactors in power generation.

. . . the preferred option is neither the utilities running the implementing organization, whether it be directly or through some joint parties that the utilities jointly create-I don't favour that option. I think it leaves too much control with the utilities who will have a vested interest to undertake disposal as cheaply as possible and as quickly as possible. I don't trust the utilities to do this job. Nor do I think that we would necessarily be as well served by the standard federal Crown corporation model. AECL is a federal Crown corporation and look where it's got us.

Peter Prebble,

Saskatchewan Environmental Society [Peter Prebble, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, March 29, 1996, pp. 192-193.]

The whole issue of nuclear energy-and particularly, perhaps, the issue of nuclear wastes-is such a controversial one that a high degree of public confidence in the responsible agency is a prerequisite to acceptability. We doubt whether that degree of confidence exists at present in either AECL or Ontario Hydro.

There were also criticisms of the regulator, the AECB, during our hearings. These criticisms were based on its slowness in adapting to changes in international standards, on its reporting to the same minister as AECL and on its failure to ensure wide public participation in setting standards.

R-104 . . . was developed with a handful of written comments from outside the AECB, almost all of them from government and industry, and clearly was not an attempt to reflect the values of the Canadian public, and clearly did not have the input that this process does in testing the values of the Canadian public, or indeed that the public informa-tion polling and other mechanisms used by the proponents have.

Norm Rubin, Energy Probe [Norm Rubin, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, November 21, 1996, pp. 174-175.]

We note the importance of this aspect of acceptability. We hope that the changes in the AECB's mandate under the new legislation, passed by Parliament but not yet proclaimed as of the date of this document, as well as the AECB's stated willingness to encourage greater public input, will make it the trustworthy regulator we consider an essential element of acceptability.

Finally, we note that the absence of clear policy statements by governments with respect to the future of nuclear energy in Canada makes it more difficult for the public to develop trust in a proponent and regulator. 

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6.0 Future Steps

As a result of this review the panel will make recommendations to assist the governments of Canada and Ontario in reaching decisions ... on the steps that must be taken to ensure the safe long-term management of nuclear fuel wastes in Canada... . the Panel will take into consideration the degree to which we should relieve future generations of the burden of looking after the waste... .

Preparation of the panel's final report addressing:

... b) the future steps to be taken in the management of nuclear fuel wastes in Canada ...

Terms of Reference

In addition to the technical challenges involved, the long-term management of nuclear fuel wastes in Canada is likely to encounter formidable social and political obstacles if governments and the nuclear industry do not plan carefully. In the previous chapter, we concluded that the AECL disposal concept has not been demonstrated to have the level of acceptability required to be selected as Canada's approach for managing nuclear fuel wastes. To build public acceptability, as defined by the criteria given in Chapter 4, proponents and governments must follow a number of steps. A site should be sought only after the public has broadly accepted a particular concept for managing nuclear fuel wastes.

Our recommended plan for building and determining acceptability is divided into four phases:

  • Phase I: Set-up (about one year): measures to be initiated immediately;
  • Phase II: Concept Acceptance (about two years): measures to determine which concept for managing nuclear fuel wastes is most acceptable;
  • Phase III: Project Acceptance: measures to determine whether a site-specific project based on the selected concept is acceptable; and
  • Phase IV: Implementation: measures to implement the project, if the project is accepted.

The overall plan, phases and component measures are illustrated in Figure 6 and described in the following sections. Some measures are processes that continue through two or more phases, while others are discrete steps. Many of the interrelationships between them cannot be fully depicted in the figure, but are described in the text. They will require careful co-ordination. In the panel's opinion, inadequate attention to any one element of the plan might well bring the orderly long-term management of nuclear fuel wastes to a halt. 

6.1 Phase I: Set-Up

During the set-up phase, the federal government should issue a policy statement governing the long-term management of nuclear fuel wastes, and initiate an Aboriginal participation process as described in the next section. The policy should call for the immediate creation of a nuclear fuel waste management agency (NFWMA). The policy should also specify the NFWMA's mandate and responsibilities in the plan for building and determining acceptability, as detailed in this chapter. During the same phase, the AECB should begin a public review of the regulatory documents pertinent to managing nuclear fuel wastes, as suggested below. The Panel estimates that Phase I should last about one year.

Panel Recommendation

The federal government should issue a policy statement governing the long-term management of nuclear fuel wastes. 

6.1.1 Aboriginal Participation Process

Despite the fact that Aboriginal people may be among those most affected by a concept for managing nuclear fuel wastes, their involvement to date has been inadequate. An Aboriginal participation process would enable them to participate fully in building and determining the acceptability of a concept. Such a process would allow them to thoroughly understand and assess the waste management problem; to help develop options and the ethical and social assessment framework in Phase II; and to participate in all relevant steps and decisions thereafter. Aboriginal people should design and execute the process so that it will be appropriate to their value systems and decision-making processes. They must therefore be given adequate time and resources to do so. While recognizing that this process is critical to Aboriginal people, the Panel believes that it must incorporate negotiated deadlines so that the rights of other concerned participants are respected. Government should begin the process immediately and transfer responsibility for sustaining it to the NFWMA, once that agency is established.

Figure 6: Plan for Building and Determining Acceptability

Figure 6: Plan for Building and Determining Acceptability

In particular, we recommend that the proponent be required to undertake a meaningful process of consultation with representative First Nations communities and umbrella organizations regarding this concept in the Canadian Shield. Such consultation should be funded by AECL but undertaken by First Nations people themselves according to their own methodologies, with their own experts, and according to their own concerns, values and priorities.

Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs, Assembly of First Nations of Quebec and Labrador, and Grand Council of the Crees (Eenou Estchee) [Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs, Assembly of First Nations of Quebec and Labrador, and Grand Council of the Crees (Eenou Estchee), Summary Final Submission to the Environmental Assessment of the Atomic Energy of Canada Limited High-level Nuclear Waste Disposal Concept (CSS.036, April 1997), p. 3.]

Panel Recommendation

The federal government should immediately initiate an adequately funded participation process with Aboriginal people, who should design and execute the process.

The perspectives and insights of Aboriginal people may usefully inform and influence the future steps this report proposes. Since their culture and way of life rest on their inseparable relationship with the natural environment, they may help to clarify the question of how respect and concern for other species should be weighed against a human-centred ethic. Human and environmental values must be reconciled for the ethical and social assessment framework described in Phase II.

In giving thanks each day and at every meeting, we are reminded that we are no more important than any other parts of this balanced system. Any part of the world which falls or fails can break the chain and circle of life completely. No part of this world is more important than any other. The circle of life is round because it is in balance. Human beings have been given the gift of reason because they have a particular set of responsibilities to the natural world, but it is not a dominion.

Carol Jacobs,
Haudenosaunee Environment Delegate [Carol Jacobs, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, June 27, 1996, pp. 249-250.] 

6.1.2 Creation of a Nuclear Fuel Waste Management Agency (NFWMA)

For various reasons, there is in many quarters an apprehension about nuclear power that bedevils the activities and proposals of the nuclear industry. If there is to be any confidence in a system for the long-term management of nuclear fuel wastes, a fresh start must be made in the form of a new agency. The agency must be at arm's length from the producers and current owners of the wastes. Its overall commitment must be to safety.

The Joint Committee is concerned that this body have high public credibility and considers that this requires detachment from the organizations which have been closely associated with the generation and handling of nuclear fuel waste.

Joint Committee of the Canadian Academy of Engineering and The Royal Society of Canada [Joint Committee of the Canadian Academy of Engineering and The Royal Society of Canada, Presentation, Phase I, p. 2.]

The mandate and sole purpose of the agency must be to manage and co-ordinate the full range of activities related to all nuclear fuel wastes produced in Canada, whatever management option is chosen. Participants in our public hearings referred to this necessity repeatedly. 

6.1.2.1 Responsibilities: Tasks to be Undertaken

Initially, the NFWMA would launch, guide and/or partici-pate in the Phase II measures of the plan for building and determining acceptability. As soon as it was formed, therefore, the NFWMA would:

  • encourage and facilitate Aboriginal participation in all steps and decisions;
  • develop a plan for, and initiate, public participation in all steps and decisions;
  • develop options for managing nuclear fuel wastes;
  • develop an ethical and social assessment framework;
  • develop technical considerations;
  • prepare and present a comparison of the options, as measured against the assessment framework, revised AECB requirements and technical considerations; and
  • closely track social and technical developments in other countries to stay aware of those that might be relevant to Canada.

These tasks are crucial to fostering trust and confidence in the NFWMA, as well as public acceptance of a waste management concept. 

6.1.2.2 Board and Staff

The NFWMA should have a small board of directors. Its members' backgrounds and skills should reflect, in a balanced way, the interests of, for example, federal and provincial governments, electrical utilities, and the engineering, science and social science communities. The board would approve agency policy and major agency decisions. The federal government should appoint the board of directors and the president, in consultation with the governments of the provinces with nuclear power.

The staff should be drawn from socio-economic fields (including public involvement and education) and from scientific-technical disciplines (including environment, health and engineering). The staff should be limited to the number of employees needed to ensure effective management and co-ordination.

A mature social program will require a comparable level of expertise and capability to that of the technical program. This requires an assurance that resources will be made available as needed for the proper involvement of highly qualified personnel, skilled in this special field. Their responsibility will be to ensure that the public is well informed about the essential issues and that the different viewpoints of the public are respected in the debates that will inevitably take place as the program evolves.

Joint Committee of the Canadian Academy of Engineering and The Royal Society of Canada [Joint Committee of the Canadian Academy of Engineering and The Royal Society of Canada, Presentation, Phase I, p. 2.]

Most of the agency's scientific and social development work, as well as its operational program, should be carried out under contract. This would make it possible to draw on the wide range of expertise and skills the NFWMA will require at different stages of its life. The agency should make special efforts to hire, train and contract northern, local and Aboriginal individuals and enterprises. 

6.1.2.3 Financing

The NFWMA should be fully financed by proportional contributions from the waste producers and owners. There should be no charge to the general taxpayer.

Contributions should be kept in a segregated fund and independently managed. The contributions would come from a levy on users of nuclear-generated electricity and from a proportional contribution by AECL for the wastes it produces. An independent audit should be done to ensure that the present levies are adequate for this purpose and are consistent among the utilities.

The Panel should recommend that the federal government require nuclear reactor operators to establish financial guarantees and real segregated funds to cover the full cost of high-level waste management and burial. The estimates prepared for these costs should be subject to independent public review.

Irene Kock, Nuclear Awareness Project [Irene Kock, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, March 26, 1996, p. 147.]

The fund, with an appropriate cash-flow mechanism, must be large enough to meet the agency's full costs for developing and comparing waste management options, for siting and designing the selected option, and for completely implementing the project, if a site-specific proposal is accepted. It would also have to cover all costs related to public and Aboriginal participation, environmental assessment, and mitigation and compensation for communities. 

6.1.2.4 Advisory Council

The board of directors, president and staff should be complemented by a strong and active advisory council comprising roughly 12 to 20 people. Members should represent a broad range of interested parties: the engineering, science, health and social sciences fields; Aboriginal people; workers; environmental and other non-governmental organizations; ethical and religious groups; concerned Canadians; host and affected communities, once identified; and international bodies. They should be appointed by the federal government, at the same time as the board of directors and the president, on the basis of proposals from professional and other organizations, including those that played an active role in the panel's hearings.

The council should be attentive to the openness and transparency of the NFWMA. It should be particularly active in those areas related to public and Aboriginal participation, environmental assessment, monitoring, mediation and dispute settlement. In addition, it should be heavily involved in all stages of the agency's work on options for long-term management.

Council members should meet frequently with the board and with staff. The council should issue periodic public reports.

Consideration should also be given to the formation of an independent advisory body which would play a role for social and ethical concerns comparable to that of AECL's Technical Advisory Committee.

Joint Committee of the Canadian Academy of Engineering and The Royal Society of Canada [Joint Committee of the Canadian Academy of Engineering and The Royal Society of Canada, Presentation, Phase I, p. 2.]

I think it is very, very important that there are advisory bodies, both to the implementing organization and to government, and that these advisory bodies should include multi-stakeholders because this is a multi-stakeholder problem ...

Ken Nash, Ontario Hydro [Ken Nash, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, March 29, 1996, p. 144.] 

6.1.2.5 Mediation and Dispute Settlement

No matter how much care is taken in establishing the NFWMA and its procedures, disputes will likely arise between the NFWMA and certain interested parties, particularly those in potential host or other potentially affected communities. To help resolve such disputes, an independent authority should be established to receive complaints, to mediate them and, possibly, to arbitrate them. This authority might be an ombudsman or someone attached to the office of the Commissioner for the Environment and Sustainable Development. 

6.1.2.6 Oversight Mechanisms and Accountability

As part of the process of building trust and credibility, and of establishing its accountability, the NFWMA should be subject to what one participant in the hearings called "a redundancy of oversight mechanisms." [Paul Brown, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, March 29, 1996, p. 95.] The successor to the AECB would regulate the agency's activities with respect to human health, the natural environment and the adequacy of financial guarantees. The agency's actions should however be driven by the purpose of the regulations, rather than by a narrow interpretation of compliance with the regulations. The NFWMA should be subject to the federal Access to Information Act. It should also receive broad policy direction from the federal government, possibly through the Minister of Health and the Minister of the Environment, to reflect the public concerns it is meant to address. In addition, the NFWMA should be subject to scrutiny by the Auditor General and the Commissioner for the Environment and Sustainable Development. It should produce an annual report on its work for Parliament to review. 

6.1.2.7 Organizational Options

Broadly, there are two alternatives for the agency's status, with a number of hybrid options. One alternative is a not-for-profit corporation, perhaps formed by the utilities, which would be subject to regulatory controls. This type of entity offers several advantages. It would link ownership of and responsibility for the wastes to the producers, make it simpler to use common law remedies and clarify the producers' financial liabilities. A second alternative is a Crown corporation or similar entity created by federal legislation. Such an entity offers other advantages. Its work can be reviewed regularly, and it would be subject to the oversight mechanisms and public scrutiny that apply to government operations. Such an entity's accountability to the government and to Parliament would be clear. Between these extremes, a number of hybrid options based on public-private partnership should be considered.

Whatever structure is chosen, however, the agency's purposes, responsibilities and accountability must be spelled out as clearly and explicitly as possible, whether by legislation or in a charter of incorporation. 

6.1.2.8 Panel Recommendations

Taking into account the views of participants in our public hearings and our own analysis, we have developed the following basic recommendations to governments with respect to a management agency:

  • that a NFWMA as described in this section be established quickly, at arm's length from the utilities and AECL, with the sole purpose of managing and co-ordinating the full range of activities relating to the long-term management of nuclear fuel wastes;
  • that it be fully funded in all its operations from a segregated fund to which only the producers and owners of nuclear fuel wastes would contribute;
  • that its board of directors, appointed by the federal government, be representative of key stakeholders;
  • that it have a strong and active advisory council representative of a wide variety of interested parties;
  • that its purposes, responsibilities and accountability, particularly in relation to the ownership of the wastes, be clearly and explicitly spelled out, preferably in legislation or in its charter of incorporation; and
  • that it be subject to multiple oversight mechanisms, including federal regulatory control with respect to its scientific-technical work and the adequacy of its financial guarantees, policy direction from the federal government and regular public review, preferably by Parliament. 

6.1.3 Public Review of AECB Regulatory Documents

Another measure to be initiated in Phase I is a public review of the AECB regulatory documents pertinent to managing nuclear fuel wastes. Risk and safety must be placed in a social context, so that people can make decisions based not only on technical and scientific factors, but also on societal values. A key part of this process is embodied, either explicitly or implicitly, in regulations that determine whether the regulatory body will judge a facility to be acceptable. Thus, such regulations have both a technical and a social dimension. As noted by the AECB, the criteria contained in the relevant regulatory documents (R-71, R-72, R-90 and R-104) "attempt to embody not only technical considerations but also much broader social and ethical ones." [Atomic Energy Control Board, Atomic Energy Control Board Criteria: Request for Supplementary Information from Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel (Ottawa: Atomic Energy Control Board, enclosure accompanying letter from J.G. McManus to J.B. Seaborn, February 5, 1993), p. 3.] These include issues of intergenerational responsibility, reflec-tion of current social values in setting quantitative risk limits, and simultaneous consideration of both social and technical issues.

The regulatory documents define requirements that various types of nuclear fuel waste facilities must meet. Thus, they form a critical component of the criteria by which safety and acceptability will be judged. However, a number of participants in the hearings felt that these requirements did not, in fact, reflect an adequate process of social input, nor were they consistent with the regulation of other types of contaminants. After comparing the regulatory criteria for managing nuclear fuel and other wastes (see section 2.2.1 and Appendix J), the Panel thinks that it would be desirable to develop common risk assessment and management methods, and common and publicly accepted risk criteria, so that relative risks might be fairly judged.

I think R-104 in itself and its development and acceptance in 1987 with only nine public comments, I don't think it meets the test of public participation. I think we have to question the kind of scientific work that was done, the peer review that was done for that work and so on. And I think if R-104 can't meet those tests itself, can it serve as an appropriate test for assessing the AECL concept or any other projects that it is used in the assessment of?

Brennain Lloyd, Northwatch [Brennain Lloyd, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, March 27, 1997, p. 169.]

The AECB should consider designing and implementing a more effective process for consulting the public during the production of regulatory standards. In most cases, few people participate in the AECB's current 90-day period for written comments. This process does not adequately achieve the AECB's goal of ensuring effective public participation. It also does not give the public confidence that the AECB has placed technical considerations of risk and safety into a societal context.

Panel Recommendation

Taking into account the importance of a trustworthy regulator in gaining acceptability, we recommend that the AECB design and implement a more effective process for consulting the public during the production of regulatory standards; and that it undertake a public review of all relevant regulatory documents based on this process and on the new Nuclear Safety and Control Act.

This review should start immediately so that the revised regulatory documents can influence the development and comparison of options in Phase II. However, the documents may require further revision in light of the ethical and social assessment framework to be developed later in Phase II. While the Panel does not wish to be unduly prescriptive, a number of issues that emerged during our hearing process should receive full consideration during the review of regulatory documents. These are enumerated in Appendix P. In addition, the Panel wishes to highlight one critical issue: the Regulatory Document R-104 requirements concerning the analysis of exposure scenarios. 

6.1.3.1 Scenario Development and Analysis

Discussions at our hearings of what constitutes reasonable "worst-case scenarios" for the release of radiation from spent fuel revealed an important interface between the technical and social perspectives of safety. The public is vitally concerned with this issue. Its confidence in any conclusions reached through analyzing such scenarios will depend, in part, on the degree to which it has been involved in defining the cases to be analyzed. A number of participants mentioned that it is very difficult to define "worst-case scenarios," because even more extreme events can always be imagined. While recognizing this difficulty, the Panel believes that the public can balance conservatism and realism when defining the events.

Furthermore, some participants believed that the standard practice of accounting for the probability of an event when calculating its risk is not in step with public concerns. These concerns tend to focus on the potentially high consequences of extreme events, rather than on their low probability of occurrence. Thus, the affected public(s) should be consulted to ensure they understand and agree with the proposed methods of analysis and the way conclusions will be drawn from the results.

Panel Conclusion

Open and well-publicized public participation in defining extreme events of concern, and the methods used to analyze them, will be a prerequisite for gaining broad acceptance that public safety has been thoroughly considered.

This advice applies not only to the review of AECB regulatory documents, but also to the NFWMA's develop-ment of options and a public participation plan during Phase II, and to the assessment of a site-specific design in Phase III. 

6.2 Phase II: Concept Acceptance

The purpose of the concept acceptance phase is to determine which concept for managing nuclear fuel wastes is most acceptable to the general public. The NFWMA should develop and compare options, including a modified AECL disposal concept, in the context of an ethical and social assessment framework, revised AECB regulatory documents and technical considerations. To involve the public fully, the NFWMA should develop and implement a public participation plan. In addition, the Aboriginal participation initiated in Phase I should continue through the steps of Phase II. The Panel anticipates that Phase II would last about two years. 

6.2.1 Public Participation Process

As indicated in other parts of this report, the Panel believes that the chances of finding an acceptable concept and site(s) will be remote unless there is early and thorough public participation in all aspects of managing nuclear fuel wastes. Broad Canadian public participation must be an integral part of any of the remaining steps and processes described in this chapter. To achieve this, the NFWMA must develop and implement a plan for informing and communicating with the public. Past public participation strategies, although well intended, do not appear to have been effective because a significant portion of the public did not trust the nuclear industry and the regulatory agency. The creation of the NFWMA provides a new opportunity. To this end, the NFWMA should identify a comprehensive group of professional communicators and adult educators who will work with related professionals and the public to develop and direct the plan. A critical task of this group will be to recommend methods for testing public opinion and benchmarks for measuring public acceptance. The NFWMA will apply these when deciding which options to recommend.

The Joint Committee considers that, to carry for-ward the long term management and disposal of Canada's nuclear fuel waste, the implementing organization will need to give the highest priority to developing a group skilled in public education and the processes of public involvement.

Joint Committee of the Canadian Academy of Engineering and The Royal Society of Canada [Joint Committee of the Canadian Academy of Engineering and The Royal Society of Canada, Presentation, Phase I, p. 2.]

Panel Recommendation

Governments should direct the NFWMA to develop a comprehensive public participation plan.

6.2.1.1 Information and Communication Plan

The plan should consist of an ongoing interactive process between citizens and the NFWMA, which will act as the proponent. It should include two important components: information and communication.

The plan should aim to:

  • ensure that the public has an appropriate level of knowledge of and control over nuclear fuel waste management in Canada and that such management is in keeping with changing public priorities, particular-ly in light of the dread factor about nuclear issues;
  • develop and sustain trust and confidence in the NFWMA authorities and the scientific community over a long period of time; and
  • achieve informed and collective acceptance at every stage of development.

Public participation must be incorporated in a comprehensive and credible manner throughout future steps. This implies that the public must accept the plan before it is implemented.

As an important part of the plan, a decision-making scheme should be prepared that clearly outlines the following processes, step by step: how future steps will unfold; what decisions will be made, by whom and based on what information; and when the public or potential host or affected communities will be able to participate or help make decisions. In particular, the decision-making roles and responsibilities of the provinces should be delineated. The NFWMA needs to communicate this information to everyone concerned in the process, so that they know what to expect. 

6.2.1.2 Principles and Procedures for Development and Implementation
  • Throughout the process, information must be made accessible to the public in ways appropriate to a variety of constituencies.
  • Sharing information that highlights uncertainties as well as certainties is likely to foster trust and to enhance the credibility of the NFWMA.
  • Information and communication should be structured as a two-way system between the public(s) and the NFWMA.
  • During Phase III, the public, as well as potential host and affected communities, will need access to expertise in scientific and social science disciplines. Hence, a participant funding program will be needed.
  • The NFWMA should develop a professional com-munication management structure to respond to various regional and local requirements. Communication tools should be integrated to activate and support working groups representing all communities of interest, such as marginalized and non-organized groups, local governments, and community and interest groups.
  • The NFWMA should pay particular attention to involving regional and local media, as the media play an important role in a two-way communication plan. 

6.2.2 Development of Options

As explained in sections 2.2.3 and 4.3, being able to make an informed choice between options for managing nuclear fuel wastes is an important component of acceptability. For that purpose, the NFWMA must begin to develop comparative information on the risks, costs and benefits of a number of practicable options, including a modified version of the AECL concept. While it would be ideal to have as much information on other options as has been developed for the AECL concept, this is not only impractical, but unnecessary.

... 15 years ago-it was believed that to adequate-ly assess the risk of more than one alternative was going to be impossible because it was believed that we needed to take that risk assessment, to be credible and to be professional about it, to the degree that AECL has done it, which is an amazing amount of work. What we have subsequently discovered is that we can screen alternatives using risk-based screens, moral and ethical base screens, intergenerational screening criteria... . Then you can short list, if you will, the disposal alternatives...

Dr. Stella Swanson, Golder Associates [Stella Swanson, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, March 15, 1996, pp. 193-194.]

Panel Recommendation

Governments should direct the NFWMA to develop practicable long-term waste management options for Canada, including the following: a modified AECL concept for deep geological disposal; storage at reactor sites; and centralized storage, either above or below ground. Should additional options become technically and economically feasible, they should also be considered. In addition, governments should direct the NFWMA to monitor closely all international progress on options for managing nuclear fuel wastes.

In the preceding recommendation, the Panel has listed the options it believes the NFWMA must consider. In doing so, it has retained deep geological disposal based on the AECL concept for several reasons: it is the technically preferred research option internationally; much effort has already been devoted to its realization; and it is consistent with current regulations. Authorities in other countries, however, are increasingly considering centralized storage as one element of a program for managing nuclear fuel wastes, due to possible greater public acceptance of a facility that is readily amenable to long-term monitoring and waste retrieval. We have also recommended that the NFWMA consider storage at reactor sites. Current storage practices, while they would require modification for very long-term use, are already widely considered to be safe, economical and acceptable; they would also minimize transportation of nuclear fuel wastes. Some advantages and disadvantages of the various options are outlined in Appendix L.

In addition to developing comparative information on the options, the NFWMA should develop solutions for some outstanding technical and social questions that are important to building and determining acceptability of a concept. With regard to the AECL disposal concept, the Panel believes that better technologies for safe post-closure monitoring and retrieval must be developed and incorporated. These modifications would not only help provide the degree of security needed to earn public confidence; they would also satisfy the need to strike a balance between minimizing the responsibility placed on future generations and maximizing their choices.

... the performance of any initial repository of this magnitude will have to be closely monitored for a very long time in order to verify if the engineering predictions are validated. To think the repository will necessarily perform essentially as we predict is an enormous arrogance... . We recommend that retrievability, repositioning and even movement of the waste also be considered as options if serious geologic discoveries or engineering problems indicate such a need.

The Geoscience Aspects of Nuclear Fuel Waste Disposal Committee of the Canadian Geoscience Council [Canadian Geoscience Council, Geoscience Aspects of Nuclear Fuel Waste Disposal Committee, Review of the AECL Environmental Impact Statement, pp. 10-12.]

We presented the position that the degree of uncertainty about the potential performance of the disposal system is so great that the public would require the assurance that we could continually monitor any potential leakage from the containers so that, if problems were to develop, appropriate remedial action could be undertaken... . If containers are leaking, we want to know about it before the contaminants have a chance to move beyond the confines of the vault... . we accept that at present it is unclear how a non-invasive system could be designed for perpetual monitoring of the area surrounding the containers. This suggests to us that the technology is not yet available to provide the degree of security through long-term monitoring which would be required for public confidence in a permanent disposal system.

Ann Coxworth, Saskatchewan Environmental Society [Ann Coxworth, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, November 20, 1996, pp. 103-104 and p. 108.]

The issue of post-closure monitoring is difficult from both the technical and social viewpoints. It is debatable whether any sensible safety case can be made for monitoring post-closure. The repository system is expected to evolve very slowly and there are no performance related parameters which are clearly amenable to measurement and also of obvious safety relevance. However, there may be a social demand for some kind of monitoring which must be met... . The necessity and the requirements for post-closure monitoring need further consideration in all countries and, if considered a desirable course of action, the concepts and technology would need further development.

OECD Nuclear Energy Agency Review Group [Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Nuclear Energy Agency Review Group, The Disposal of Canada's Nuclear Fuel Waste, p. 18 and p. 21.]

At this stage, the NFWMA must also develop modelling methodologies and estimate the availability of sites. While these items address criticisms of the AECL concept, they apply to all options. The Panel believes that the best available predictive modelling techniques should be used, and that these should be consistent between options. Specifically, the Panel is convinced that the models should be critically reviewed and updated, and that this process should include significant and transparent external input. Also, the NFWMA should develop preliminary technical and social siting criteria, and best estimates of the availability of sites for each option based on these criteria, to permit better comparisons and decisions on the most acceptable concept for managing wastes.

6.2.3 Development of an Ethical and Social Assessment Framework

To assess broad public acceptability, the NFWMA must measure options for managing nuclear fuel wastes against not only the technical criteria, but also the predominant values held by Canadian society. To delineate these values, the NFWMA should either hire or contract a group of social scientists and ethicists, who would establish an assessment framework with input from the public. Based on what we heard, the framework would address ethical issues such as those discussed in Chapter 4 and those listed below, in the contexts of managing nuclear fuel wastes and of linking these issues to policy decisions:

  • the rights and responsibilities of current and future generations;
  • responsibilities to the environment and ecological integrity;
  • societal versus individual rights;
  • the needs of significant minorities who may incur risks involuntarily;
  • the degree to which the public should be able to hear different schools of thought in discussions preceding decisions;
  • risks that are worth taking, given the probability of harm;
  • procedures for arriving at collective consent; and
  • retrievability versus irretrievability of the wastes, and which option is morally preferable. [The last three points are rephrased versions of information from Hardy Stevens and Associates, Moral and Ethical Issues, cited in Anna Cathrall et al, A Report to the FEARO Panel, Volume 2, pp. 26-27.]

The framework would also address social and environmental issues and priorities such as the following:

  • socially oriented siting criteria, such as valued cultural and ecosystem components;
  • the consistency of the options with Canadian policies on hazardous waste management, environmental protection and sustainable development;
  • effects on communities' self-image, economic vitality, social development and cohesion, and relationship with the land;
  • trade-offs in terms of potential siting territories, affected natural resources, economic advantages and disadvantages, and social controversies;
  • the degree to which a demonstration project should be part of a waste management approach;
  • liabilities in case of accidents; and
  • cost effectiveness.

We would recommend to the Panel, and to the scholarly community at large, that (as the above review shows) we have barely begun to address the obvious philosophical themes, let alone their complex interweaving with social, distributional, psychological, and other contributing elements to the nuclear waste issue.

Anna Cathrall, Mary Lou Harley, Brenda Lee, and Peter Timmerman, Canadian Coalition for Ecology, Ethics, and Religion [Anna Cathrall et al, A Report to the FEARO Panel, Volume 2, p. 30.]

No single framework can properly capture every relevant societal value over a long period of time, as values change and new generations come into being. Given the extended time frame for implementing a concept for managing nuclear fuel wastes, the NFWMA should design a step-by-step evaluation process. This process would allow present and future generations to re-evaluate periodically the acceptability of the concept according to the values and priorities of the day, and to make choices as decisions are taken.

We are aware that the Terms of Reference ask the Panel to consider the degree to which we should relieve future generations of the burden of looking after the wastes. Some participants saw looking after the wastes not as a burden, but as an opportunity for future generations to make appropriate and responsible choices within the ethical and social framework. They viewed it as a way of keeping some measure of control over decisions affecting their lives and thereby of retaining public confidence. In that sense, a step-by-step evaluation process was not considered to be a burden, even if more diligent management would be required. However, in the panel's view, this must not preclude the current generation's right and responsibility to take action. An appropriate balance between the rights of current and future generations must be found.

The burden of an imposed responsibility may be a lesser evil if the alternative is to inflict a threat of harm with no possibility of mitigating the harm. The monitoring system/retrieval option gives future generations options they might not otherwise have. So yes, responsibility is a burden. On the other hand, that's not all it is.

Dr. Peter Miller, University of Winnipeg [Peter Miller, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, March 12, 1996, p. 200.]

The issues concerned include the impact the program will have on generations, regions, race and income. Considerable emphasis is placed on the responsibility not to burden later generations with finding the solution to the waste being generated today. The Joint Committee agrees with this general principle but also cautions that flexibility needs to be retained to allow for changing approaches to the disposal problem and views on the future value and usefulness of nuclear fuel waste. Does the nuclear fuel waste indeed present an urgent problem at this time requiring rapid attention? Even if this is the case, is the AECL concept necessarily the best solution?

Joint Committee of the Canadian Academy of Engineering and The Royal Society of Canada [Joint Committee of the Canadian Academy of Engineering and The Royal Society of Canada, Presentation, Phase I, p. 5.]

Panel Recommendation

Governments should direct the NFWMA to develop an ethical and social assessment framework.

6.2.4 Technical Considerations

It is self-evident that many scientific and engineering factors must be incorporated into the development of any approach for managing nuclear fuel wastes. Among these are issues such as the choice of appropriate methods of modelling and analysis, the evaluation of safety from a technical perspective, considerations of efficiency and cost. However, as noted in Figure 6, such technical considerations must not be developed in isolation but must be informed by ethical and social considerations to provide a comprehensive framework for assessing various options for managing nuclear fuel wastes. 

6.2.5 Comparison of Options to Decide Which is the Most Acceptable

Having set the stage through all prior steps, the NFWMA should publicly examine the options for managing nuclear fuel wastes. It will recommend to governments ways to measure the broad public support needed to proceed with Phase III. These could include, among other methods, a poll, a referendum, an expert panel process, or a parliamentary committee with public hearings. Options and their proposed siting territories should be compared on the basis of the following:

  • the revised AECB regulatory documents;
  • the ethical and social assessment framework, includ-ing risks, costs and benefits;
  • technical considerations; and
  • the degree of acceptance by Aboriginal people and the public in general.
Panel Recommendation

Governments should direct the NFWMA to compare the risks, costs and benefits of practicable long-term options for managing nuclear fuel wastes. It will present these options to the public, along with their proposed siting territories, in sufficient detail to enable governments to make an informed choice that reflects public preferences. The means by which governments will take public preferences into account must be made formal and explicit. 

6.3 Phase III: Project Acceptance

The purpose of the project acceptance phase is to determine whether a site- and design-specific application of the concept selected in Phase II is acceptable, not just to the general public, governments and the regulator, but especially to the potential host community and other directly affected communities. To this end, the NFWMA would undertake a siting and facility design process that would culminate in public hearings and a final decision on project acceptability.

At the end of Phase II, if the AECL disposal concept is chosen as the most acceptable one for managing nuclear fuel wastes, it will require additional development beyond that warranted for the comparison of options. This should take place before the NFWMA proceeds to siting and facility design.

Panel Recommendation

If the AECL concept is chosen as the most acceptable concept at the end of Phase II, governments should direct the NFWMA, together with Natural Resources Canada and the AECB or its successor, to undertake the following: review all the social and technical shortcomings identified by the SRG and other review participants; establish their priority; and generate a plan to address them. The NFWMA should make this plan publicly available, invite public input, then implement the plan. 

6.3.1 Siting and Facility Design

It may also review general criteria for site selection and advise governments on a future site selection process in addition to examining, in general terms, the costs and benefits to potential host communities.

Terms of Reference

The suggested process outlined in this section would apply if the AECL disposal concept was selected at the end of Phase II. Many aspects would also apply to siting another type of centralized disposal, storage and/or treatment facility, or even decentralized storage at the reactor sites. However, the process may be incompatible with those appropriate for Aboriginal people. In such a case, the NFWMA must try to reconcile the two perspectives.

AECL proposed that any waste management organization should be committed to the principles of safety and environmental protection, voluntarism, shared decision-making, openness and fairness throughout siting and concept implementation. The Panel acknowledges and commends AECL for its work; however, some public participants and panel members felt it lacked detail and specificity. Therefore, the Panel has expanded AECL's principles and incorporated additional requirements into a suggested siting process.

In the EIS, AECL described the technical aspects of the potential availability of suitable sites in the Canadian Shield, and of a methodology for characterizing sites. These are described briefly in section 3.3.1 of this report. We have reservations as to whether AECL has adequately demonstrated the availability of technically suitable sites. In general, we agree with the AECL proposals for technical site characterization, though we have suggestions as to how the public should be involved in establishing the siting criteria. 

6.3.1.1 Essential Considerations

Essential considerations for the siting process are threefold:

  • First, the commitment to safety, health and environmental protection must never be compromised. If any of these are jeopardized, the site must be rejected.
  • Second, no search for a site should be undertaken in areas that do not meet basic siting criteria on both social and technical grounds.
  • Third, an informed public must help establish decision-making processes at an early stage and throughout the project. To win public confidence in the process, the NFWMA must commit itself to an extensive, balanced, and ongoing two-way public communication, education and information program.

There are lessons we can draw from the siting of hazardous waste facilities, some of which have been successful. These studies suggest the importance of building agency credibility through genuine commitment by policy makers to public participation, the designing of methods for meaning-ful information exchange and public dialogue on the issues, promotion of equity in risk distribution, sharing in project benefits (in part through compensation to communities bearing the risks), and the adoption of mitigation and control procedures that include strict safety standards and significant citizen roles in facility oversight and operating decisions.

Dr. Michael Kraft,

University of Wisconsin-Green Bay [Michael Kraft, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, March 27, 1996, pp. 112-113.] 

6.3.1.2 Principles and Safeguards

Experience with siting waste facilities of any kind, and particularly those for hazardous wastes, indicates that the public is just as concerned with the process used to select a site as with the technical safety of the facility. The socio-economic aspects of siting are inextricably interwoven with the technical aspects.

Successful Canadian siting process experience shows us that the thought that goes into the design of the siting process, the public involvement and communications strategy and socio-economic considerations have major implications on the overall chances of success. The most important choice involves the design of the process to be used to seek approval.

David R. Hardy,

Hardy Stevenson and Associates Limited [David R. Hardy, "High-level Radioactive Waste Siting Processes: Critical Lessons from Canadian Siting Successes," Proceedings of the 1996 International Conference on Deep Geological Disposal of Radioactive Waste, pp. 10-18.]

The siting process must therefore adhere to the following principles and safeguards adapted from a number of sources, including D. Hardy, K.R. Ballard and R.G. Kuhn, [See preceding entry and K.R. Ballard and R.G. Kuhn, "Testing Community Empowered Siting for Canadian Nuclear Waste," Proceedings of the 1996 International Conference on Deep Geological Disposal of Radioactive Waste, pp. 10-1-10-20.] and review participants.

  • Willingness of a community to invite site investigation would not represent a final commitment to host a facility.
  • No community would host a facility against its will. A potential host community must have the right to opt out of the siting process until the final binding agreement is signed. It must also have the right to decide, at an early stage, how that final decision would be taken. A simple majority would not necessarily indicate acceptance of a facility.

... Deep River, like every volunteer community, had the right to withdraw from the process at any time... . It made it possible to stay in the process, to the final decision point, by choice, as the community was in control, not some other body.

Mayor John Murphy, Town of Deep River [John Murphy, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, May 2, 1996, p. 4.]

  • The NFWMA should negotiate with the potential host community to offer it a net benefit commensurate with its part in resolving the problem.
  • At an early stage, the NFWMA would work with the community to develop proposals for monitoring and compensation, in order to track and offset unavoidable negative effects, to build public confidence and to enhance local benefits. These proposals would be in addition to all reasonable measures to reduce and mitigate adverse effects. The negotiating parties would fully review this package before finalizing the agreement.
  • Even if an informed community voluntarily agrees to host a facility, construction would not proceed until it had been demonstrated that the safety, health and environmental protection standards set by the regulatory authority could be met and enforced.
  • Adequate time should be built into the process to allow citizens to understand the technical, social and environmental implications of the project before final decisions are taken.
  • Early in the process, the negotiating parties would agree on processes for resolving conflict and mediating disputes, and would find ways to include significant minority opinions in decision-making.
  • The NFWMA would bear the costs related to the following: access by potential host and affected communities to the services of a community facilitator and to social scientists, as recommended in this report; access to independent social, technical and environmental consultants for peer reviews of the final proposal, on behalf of the community; and any work done by the community liaison group (CLG) that relates to the public participation processes for potential host and affected communities. (See section 6.3.1.6 for a description of a CLG.) 
6.3.1.3 Siting and Transportation Criteria

First, the NFWMA and its advisory council would propose and publicize the criteria for selecting a site and transportation routes. These would be used to judge a region's suitability to host a facility. Based on existing or readily available technical and social information, these criteria would indicate the characteristics a suitable region must have and include aspects of social, environmental and technical acceptability for siting. The site selection criteria should relate to such matters as:

  • geology, hydrogeology, topography and seismic activity;
  • present and future land use (agriculture, forestry, resource extraction, Crown and Aboriginal lands);
  • environmentally sensitive areas (such as parks and habitats of endangered species);
  • socially valued areas (recreational and archaeological sites, and culturally, spiritually and historically significant areas); and
  • areas protected by legislation and regulations.

Any future proponent should be encouraged to quickly develop a site selection and screening process which focuses both on technical and social factors, and how they interrelate, as well as on site screening and rejection mechanisms which could be used during early stages of the siting process.

Atomic Energy Control Board Staff [Atomic Energy Control Board Staff, AECB Staff Response, p. 7.]

The criteria applicable to transportation routes would relate to such matters as:

  • availability and suitability of existing infrastructure;
  • safety of existing or new infrastructure under varying weather conditions;
  • service infrastructure along the route for normal and accident conditions;
  • socio-economic impacts on affected communities; and
  • impact on the environment and wildlife and avoidance of sensitive areas.

The proposed site and transportation route selection criteria should be submitted to the broad Canadian public for consideration. The NFWMA should give particular consideration to the interests and concerns of people in specific locations (remote, northern, Aboriginal and developed areas) and the potential effects on their environment. It should use a structured process, agreed to by all parties, to give major interested parties input into developing the criteria. The NFWMA should solicit comment from the federal and provincial governments, Aboriginal people, regulators, existing nuclear host communities, northern communities and participants in the public hearings of the Panel. Once agreed to, the criteria would be applied by the NFWMA to the siting territories to produce a map indicating possible siting regions. The map would be made widely available to the public, before communities are invited to express an interest in hosting a facility. At a later stage in the process, these criteria would be refined to suit specific locations. 

6.3.1.4 Call for Expressions of Interest

The NFWMA would publicly invite communities within the siting regions to submit expressions of interest in hosting a facility. It would release an information package that would include, at a minimum, the following details:

  • background information on how and why the present waste management option was chosen;
  • the siting criteria and the map of siting regions and territories;
  • a statement of the NFWMA's commitment to adhere to the essential considerations, principles and safeguards presented earlier in this section, all of which should be available in the information package;
  • a description of the type of facility envisaged, and the estimated cost and duration of construction, operation and decommissioning phases;
  • the NFWMA's plans to appoint a siting task force (STF) as its agent to pursue detailed negotiations with interested communities;
  • the STF's terms of reference and work plan for the siting process; and
  • an announcement that the NFWMA would organize regional briefing sessions for interested communities to clarify questions. 
6.3.1.5 Definition of Community

After the briefing sessions, interested communities should study the information package to clarify concerns, and to understand opportunities for community participation in the siting process. One pertinent question is, "What is a community?" Addressing this question, the Mayor of Deep River stated, "I would strongly advise that this issue be resolved early in any future use of the Co-operative Siting Process." [John Murphy, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, May 2, 1996, p. 16.] A potential host community may be a municipality, region or Aboriginal community. In some instances it may extend beyond present political jurisdictions and be identified by environmental, sociological or economic criteria. However, it must be a body or bodies with authority to enter into legal agreements. Community boundaries may overlap several jurisdictions, and their definitions should be jointly established as soon as possible with adjacent territories and "affected communities." An unique definition of community was put forward by an Aboriginal group.

The problem with this principle [voluntarism] , from an Aboriginal perspective, is that the definition of community appears to be bound to municipal boundaries. Nishnawbe Aski Nation is an organization of 50 First Nations with a common interest in their collective traditional territory. As noted earlier, this is an extensive territory covering much of the land mass of Ontario. To site a nuclear fuel waste facility in any part of this territory affects the whole of NAN... . At the very least, the concept of community voluntarism should be expanded to the level of Tribal Council where First Nations communities act closely with one another in the use and development of their lands.

Nishnawbe Aski Nation [Nishnawbe Aski Nation, Review of the AECL Environmental Impact Statement on the Nuclear Fuel Waste Management and Disposal Concept (Pub.028, August 1995), p. 4.]

An "affected community" is a geographically adjacent municipality, Aboriginal entity or community of common interest along the transportation routes of a facility, or in a geographic area otherwise affected by the facility or its transportation activities. The boundaries of "affected communities" could be defined by several criteria, not just political ones. While affected communities would not have the power of veto, they could and should negotiate their particular terms in the siting process with the STF and the potential host community.

If a potentially suitable site is identified on Crown lands, the appropriate authorities would have to involve the people of potentially affected communities using the same methods that would be used for communities with legal authority over the land.

After the issue of the definition of "community" has been negotiated and resolved, the municipal council or equivalent body of a potential host community may pass a formal resolution to continue with the siting process. If so, the NFWMA should offer the community a more substantial information package containing the specific details of the siting process, as set out in this chapter and in Appendix O. 

6.3.1.6 Preliminary Steps Leading to Agreement of a Community to Host a Facility

It is very important that Council establish firmly, in advance, what the community's priorities are.

Mayor John Murphy, Town of Deep River [John Murphy, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, May 2, 1996, pp. 20-21.]

  • A social scientist(s) appointed by the municipal council would prepare a community profile, in consul-tation with the STF.
  • A community facilitator from outside the community would be appointed by the municipal council, in consultation with the STF, and would be confirmed later by the CLG.
  • On the basis of the community profile, and with the expertise of the facilitator, a CLG would be formed to involve citizens substantively in all stages of decision-making. It would advise the municipal council and communicate with the STF and with people in various sectors of the potential host and affected communities. The facilitator would develop the CLG's terms of reference and help establish the CLG. Members of the CLG should represent existing groups in different sectors of the community and serve with limited, staggered terms of office.

We would suggest that some liaison group ... advisor group, a direct link to the community and of the community is essential in a siting process that aims for voluntary acceptance.

Donna Oates, Insight and Solutions [Donna Oates, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, May 2, 1996, p. 66.]

  • All parties should make full use of the community facilitator and the CLG to explore possible agreement.
  • If interest in hosting a facility was still significant, the municipal council would seek a preliminary agreement from the community to continue with the process and to enter into detailed negotiations with the STF.

More detail is provided in Appendix O.

6.3.1.7 Detailed Negotiations

The STF and the municipal council, in close collaboration with the CLG and affected communities, as appropriate, would do the following:

  • refine the previously agreed-on general siting criteria and develop other siting criteria specific to the community;
  • identify potential candidate sites and their design options;
  • negotiate measures to mitigate adverse impacts and maximize benefits, such as employment, upgrading of local residents' skills and use of local suppliers;
  • negotiate and agree on monitoring procedures for all phases of the project; and
  • negotiate and agree on other related matters important to the community, such as transportation routes.

More detail is provided in Appendix O. 

6.3.1.8 Community Checkpoint

The potential host community would solicit independent technical, social and environmental peer assessments of the facility design and relevant transportation design options before making a final decision. Following the completion of the assessments, a thorough community review and discussion among all interested parties should take place. The community may want to assess whether the NFWMA has honoured the "Essential Considerations" and "Safeguards and Principles" outlined in this report. Possible revisions to any previous agreements would then be negotiated. After such a review, an agreement-in-principle would be negotiated between the potential host community and the NFWMA. It would include all the points listed in section 6.3.1.7.

... once you have your technical plan clearly understood by the community, they may not think that their concerns are being addressed. You may have to modify that technical plan to allow the community to keep pace with it, to allow them time to understand the fundamentals of the studies as they come out, and you may need to modify the plan to allow for adequate consultation at certain stages...

Donna Oates, Insight and Solutions [Donna Oates, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, May 2, 1996, p. 68.] 

6.3.1.9 Steps Leading to the Final Selection of a Site for the Facility
  • The agreement-in-principle would first be presented to the NFWMA for approval.
  • The agreement-in-principle would then be given to the potential host community in accordance with the agreed-on method for ratification or rejection.
  • If the community approves the agreement-in-principle, the municipal council or equivalent would enter into a formal, binding agreement with the NFWMA as to the conditions under which the development will proceed.
  • The NFWMA would then undertake detailed exploration of the site(s) to determine whether a facility design meets all the requirements of the regulator for safety and the protection of health and the environment. If the regulator's requirements cannot be met, the potential host community would no longer be bound by the agreement.
  • If transportation routes were not previously identified, the STF would then select preferred transportation routes and modes of transport. Consultations would be held with affected communities along the transportation route to negotiate mitigation measures.
Panel Recommendation

Governments should direct the NFWMA to commit itself, to the degree desired by potential host and affected communities, to the process suggested in this section.

6.3.2 Public Hearings to Decide Whether Project is Acceptable

A full environmental assessment and public hearings should be held as the final step in Phase III to ensure broad public support for developing the proposed facility at the selected site. A candidate site may still be rejected as a result of these hearings. If the project is accepted, it would be implemented. If not, governments and the NFWMA would have to re-evaluate their plan, taking into account the circumstances of the rejection.

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7.0 Matters Outside the Mandate

The panel's terms of reference explicitly state that the following matters fall outside the panel's mandate: federal and provincial energy policies; the role of nuclear energy within these policies, including the construction, operation, and safety of new or existing nuclear power plants; fuel reprocessing as an energy policy; and military applications of nuclear technology. However, these issues were very important to some participants, who believed that several or all of them greatly affected public acceptance of any waste management approach. For these partici-pants, compartmentalizing the nuclear fuel cycle created significant difficulties for the review. In their opinion, the scope of the review was limited and future steps in waste management could not be determined until after a public discussion of these subjects. 

7.1 General Energy Policy

A number of participants wanted the federal government to initiate a public discussion on energy policy before the Panel made its recommendations on the AECL disposal concept. Others found it impossible to define the scope of the nuclear fuel waste problem in Canada in the absence of clear policies on the future of nuclear power. Still others proposed a moratorium on or phase-out of nuclear energy in Canada, along with a public review of federal and provincial energy policies and the role of nuclear power within them. This review would consider energy demand and supply management, and provide a full cost accounting for all energy options. These participants believed that such a review would give the public balanced and unbiased information on available energy options.

When it announced the Panel, ministers committed the government to conducting a parallel review in a different forum that would put the nuclear fuel waste question in a broader context. A task force on electricity and environment was to look at the environmental effects of nuclear and other methods of generating electricity. Despite repeated written reminders from the Chairman, the ministers have not held this parallel review. According to a Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) official at the hearings, some stakeholders had criticized the proposed review as a federal intrusion into an area of provincial jurisdiction, and as inopportune given that many of the provinces and utilities were already conducting their own reviews. Reportedly, the Minister of the Environment and the Minister of Natural Resources were still considering the usefulness of yet another review. [Peter Brown, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, March 11, 1996, pp. 38-39.]

Despite the absence of the promised review and a formal policy statement, the federal government is clearly on record as supporting nuclear power. In 1988, the House of Commons Standing Committee on Environment and Forestry recommended a moratorium on the construction of nuclear power plants until Canadians had agreed on an acceptable solution for disposing of high-level radioactive wastes. [Standing Committee on Environment and Forestry, B. Brisco, Chairman, High - level Radioactive Waste in Canada: The Eleventh Hour, p. 37.] In response, the government stated that it was not prepared to impose such a moratorium.

The provinces are responsible for the supply of electricity in Canada, and they decide on the most appropriate sources for electricity generation. The federal government sees nuclear power as a valuable part of Canada's energy mix and believes that this option should remain available for the provinces. If nuclear power were not available, new capacity would have to be supplied by other sources that might be less attractive economically, environmentally and in terms of the waste that they would produce. . . . A moratorium based on public acceptance of long-term waste-management practices or on the need for proven disposal methods with minimal long-term effects would shut down most of the waste-producing activities in the country.

Government of Canada [Government of Canada, Response of the Government of Canada to the Report of the Standing Committee on Environment and Forestry, "High-level Radioactive Waste in Canada: The Eleventh Hour" (Ottawa: Energy, Mines and Resources Canada, June 1988), p. 15.]

Early in the hearings, an NRCan official confirmed that the federal government continued to support nuclear energy and the CANDU reactor option. [Peter Brown, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, March 11, 1996, p. 39.]

7.2 Renewable Energy Sources

Throughout the review, two opposing viewpoints were presented on the costs and benefits of alternative renewable energy sources compared to nuclear power.

Several participants challenged the view that nuclear power provided an affordable and environmentally benign energy source for Canadians and, in particular, Ontarians. From their perspective, the rates charged for nuclear-generated electricity did not fully reflect the large subsidies that governments provide to the nuclear industry, the cost of repairing and decommissioning reactors, and the costs associated with disposing of nuclear fuel wastes. They believed that there were too many hidden costs associated with the industry, and that continuing with it would be a drain on limited societal resources. They advocated phasing out nuclear energy and phasing in various renewable energy sources, such as wind, solar and small-scale hydro power. In their opinion, increased research and development expenditures would enable these technologies to compete economically with nuclear energy. They argued that recent advances had increased their generating capacity and reduced their costs.

Supporters of the nuclear industry acknowledged that renewable energy sources would play a role in meeting future energy needs. However, they maintained that, even if these sources were used to the greatest extent possible, they could only complement and not replace nuclear and fossil fuel sources. These participants pointed out the difficulties in calculating the costs and benefits of alternative energy sources: federal and provincial tax and subsidy structures are always changing, and generation rates and costs vary depending on the facilities' geographical locations. Nuclear advocates argued that nuclear power provides a significant net benefit to society in terms of revenue, employment, spin-off industries and the environment. The Canadian Nuclear Society estimated that the economic benefit to Ontario throughout the lifetime of a single reactor would be approximately $200 billion dollars. [Jerry Cuttler, in letter to Blair Seaborn (Toronto: Canadian Nuclear Society, March 10, 1997, Undertaking 108), p. 1.] According to the Society, the utilities will be able to pay the costs of decommissioning reactors and disposing of nuclear fuel wastes using the surcharge on electricity they are collecting for these purposes. For example, Ontario Hydro is charging 0.1 cent per kilowatt-hour for disposal of spent fuel [Ken Nash, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, March 11, 1996, p. 45.] and about 0.1 cent per kilowatt-hour for decommissioning reactors and disposing of low- and intermediate-level radioactive wastes. [Ian Wilson, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, March 27, 1997, p. 103.] These participants believed that nuclear power provides for sustainable development because it does not contribute to global warming, nor does it release large quantities of chemical and radioactive toxins.

7.3 Improtation of Foreign Wastes and Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel

A number of participants asserted that AECL's disposal concept and the strategy for long-term management of nuclear fuel wastes could not be properly assessed until the issues of importing wastes and MOX fuel for burning in CANDU reactors had been discussed in a public forum. They strongly believed that these activities would lead Canada to become the "nuclear waste dump of the world," and that Canada should choose a strategy for dealing with its own wastes before entertaining the idea of accepting wastes from other countries for disposal. 

7.3.1 Foreign Wastes

Many participants suspected that the federal government is planning to accept foreign spent fuel for disposal in Canada on a commercial basis. As evidence, they cited the fact that AECL's reference disposal facility was designed to accommodate 10 million spent fuel bundles, even though Canada's existing reactors are expected to produce only 3.6 million bundles during their lifetimes, and there are no plans to refurbish them or build new ones. They also noted statements made by AECL officials to the media concerning the possibility of integrating power plant sales with waste management services to give the Canadian industry a unique advantage in the export market, and the possibility of importing spent fuel from countries that purchase Canadian uranium. [Anne Lindsey, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, April 29, 1996, p. 41.] These participants felt that the federal government might make a great deal of money by importing foreign wastes, at the expense of the Canadian public and environment.

A representative of NRCan reported that "it is not the policy of Canada to import nuclear fuel waste for disposal in Canada," and that if there was a move to do so, ministers had said that the "policy would be subject to full environmental and regulatory requirements, including public review." [Peter Brown, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, March 12, 1996, p. 9.] Furthermore, "neither the North American Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA, nor the World Trade Organization would oblige Canada to import such material." Participants preoccupied with this issue were not reassured by these statements, noting that policies can easily change.

7.3.2 Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel

An agreement-in-principle between the Canadian and American governments envisages the importation and burning of MOX fuel in CANDU reactors and subsequent disposal of the spent fuel in Canada. Some participants worried that MOX fuel would significantly affect the AECL repository design and barrier performance. Because the spent MOX fuel bundles would contain more plutonium, several participants were particularly concerned about the potential for criticality (self-sustaining fission chain reaction) in the vault. In addition, the proposal requires spent MOX fuel to be irretrievable, so that its residual plutonium content cannot be diverted. As a result, some participants were concerned that future generations would be unable to retrieve the co-disposed conventional spent fuel for purposes such as recycling. Furthermore, the proposal compounded participants' fears regarding the importation of foreign wastes. At an extreme, the initiative was seen as a device for disposing of the global inventory of surplus weapons-grade plutonium in Canada.

If the MOX proposal were to proceed, rough calculations by the Panel indicate that between 190,000 and 290,000 MOX fuel bundles would be required to accommodate 100 tonnes of surplus weapons plutonium. The MOX fuel would thus represent about five to eight per cent of the 3.6 million spent fuel bundles that would require disposal if no new reactors were built.

According to a 1994 feasibility study prepared by AECL Technologies Incorporated (a U.S. division of AECL) for the U.S. Department of Energy, to which Ontario Hydro contributed, "no new technology will be required for interim storage, transportation or ultimate disposal of spent MOX CANDU fuel over and above that required for spent natural uranium CANDU fuel," and "there are no new or significant environment, safety and health issues." [AECL Technologies Incorporated, Plutonium Consumption Program, CANDU Reactor Project (Rockville, Maryland: final report prepared for U.S. Department of Energy, July 31, 1994, Undertaking 67), pp. 6-8.] However, AECL representatives involved in the panel's review said that the disposal of MOX fuel and its effects on the disposal concept have not been examined in detail, and would require further study. Since the burn-up (amount of energy produced per unit mass of fuel) and heat output of the MOX fuel would be greater than those of conventional fuel, MOX fuel would require longer cooling periods in storage or additional space in the repository. Any need for increased space could be offset by the reduced amount of waste per unit of electricity generated. [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Environmental Impact Statement, p. 32.] However, the potentially higher temperature of the container surface could affect buffer and backfill performance. While recognizing that it would have to investigate the potential for criticality in the vault, AECL considers it highly unlikely. [Ken Dormuth, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, January 13, 1997, p. 245.]

An official from NRCan at the hearings noted that the CANDU MOX proposal is at the feasibility study stage and would have to be approved by the federal government. According to her, it would be subject to the assessment and licensing approvals of federal and provincial regulatory authorities, including "full public review as required by the Atomic Energy Control Act and theCanadian Environmental Assessment Act." [Géraldine Underdown, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, June 12, 1996, pp. 160-169.] More recently, the Minister of the Environment and the Minister of Natural Resources promised that "a full environmental review," including "a public study by an independent panel," would occur before any final decisions were made. [Anne Dawson, "'Hot' Idea from Marchi," p. 26, and Glen Schaefer, "Public Study Promised on Taking U.S. Plutonium," p. A6.]

7.4 Reprocessing and Recycling of Nuclear Fuel Wastes

Portions of this subject are covered in greater detail in Appendix L.

The fact that the AECL disposal concept can accommodate either solidified high-level wastes from reprocessing or spent CANDU fuel bundles led some participants to question whether a reprocessing facility was included in the concept, and whether the concept was intended to accept imported reprocessing wastes. A number of participants advocated reprocessing and recycling nuclear fuel wastes because these processes could extract unused energy, reduce waste volumes and hazards, or destroy plutonium. For others, reprocessing had a number of serious disadvantages from economic, environmental and security viewpoints. Reprocessing used fuel would produce low- and intermediate-level wastes, as well as high-level wastes requiring separate disposal. It would also introduce several unknowns, such as where the reprocessing, fuel fabrication and associated waste facilities would be located, and what their effects would be.

AECL explained that, when it began developing its concept, reprocessing was considered a stronger possibility in Canada than it is today. Although the concept could accept solidified reprocessing wastes, AECL did not consider an overall reprocessing system within the concept. NRCan officials have stated that there are currently no plans to reprocess nuclear fuel wastes in Canada. [P.A. Brown and R.W. Morrison, "Radioactive waste management policy in Canada," Waste Management '92, Working Towards a Cleaner Environment, Proceedings of the Symposium on Waste Management, Volume 1 (Tucson, Arizona: 1992), pp. 145-148, cited in Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Environmental Impact Statement, p. 29.] According to nuclear industry representatives, the once-through fuel cycle is currently more economical than one based on reprocessing and recycling. 

7.5 Other Observations

The Panel believes that, without public trust and confidence, any initiative to manage nuclear fuel wastes in the long term will face difficulties. Unless the issues of public concern presented in this chapter are addressed, they will continue to haunt a nuclear fuel waste management agency no matter which option for managing nuclear fuel wastes it pursues.

Nuclear Fuel Waste Management and Disposal Concept Environmental Assessment Panel

  • Mr. Blair Seaborn Panel Chairman
  • Dr. Denis Brown
  • Ms. Mary Jamieson
  • Dr. Louis LaPierre
  • Dr. Dougal McCreath
  • Ms. Louise Roy
  • Mr. Pieter Van Vliet
  • Dr. Lois Wilson

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Appendix A - Terms of Reference: Environmental Assessment Panel

Introduction

The Environmental Assessment Panel is to undertake a review of Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd.'s (AECL) concept of geologic disposal of nuclear fuel wastes in Canada along with a broad range of nuclear fuel waste management issues. It will examine AECL's proposed concept along with other approaches for nuclear fuel waste disposal being developed elsewhere in the world.

As a result of this review, the Panel will make recommendations to assist the governments of Canada and Ontario in reaching decisions on the acceptability of the disposal concept and on the steps that must be taken to ensure the safe long-term management of nuclear fuel wastes in Canada.

Project Proposal Backgrouund

In 1977, the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources commissioned an independent expert group to provide the government and the public of Canada with views on the subject of nuclear waste disposal. Its report concluded that, after considering the available options, burial in geological formations of igneous rock in the Canadian Shield was the preferred option for research in Canada.

In June 1978, the governments of Canada and Ontario announced a program of research and development to assess whether permanent disposal in a deep underground repository in intrusive igneous rock is a safe, secure and desirable method of disposing of nuclear fuel wastes. Since 1978, as directed by the Government of Canada, AECL has been pursuing a research program on the immobilization and disposal of nuclear fuel wastes. Ontario Hydro has supported AECL's work and pursued its own related studies on interim storage and transportation of used nuclear fuel.

In August 1981, the governments of Canada and Ontario jointly announced a process for the evaluation of the disposal concept. It was agreed then that no site selection for a permanent disposal facility would be undertaken until the concept had undergone a public review and had been accepted by both governments.

Scope of the Review

The Panel will review the safety and acceptability of AECL's concept of geological disposal of nuclear fuel wastes in Canada, along with a broad range of nuclear fuel waste management issues.

To facilitate evaluation of scientific and technical matters, a Scientific Review Group of distinguished independent experts will be established by the Panel to conduct a specific in-depth examination of the safety and scientific acceptability of AECL's concept of disposal in intrusive igneous rock formations of the Canadian Shield. A report on their findings and recommendations will be submitted to the Panel which will distribute it to the public. The Scientific Review Group will also provide advice on other issues to the Panel when requested.

Nuclear fuel wastes consist of solid used fuel bundles discharged from CANDU reactors or derived high-level radioactive waste, should the used fuel ever be reprocessed at some future date. They do not include intermediate and low-level radioactive wastes such as components of a decommissioned nuclear reactor or uranium tailings.

In its review, the Panel will take into consideration the various approaches to the long-term management of nuclear fuel wastes which are presently being stored at reactor sites. These long-term management approaches include long-term storage with a capability for continuing intervention in the form of monitoring, retrieval and remedial action; and the transition from storage to permanent disposal. In addition, the impact of transportation of nuclear fuel wastes to a generic site will also be examined.

After considering various geological media, the government of Canada directed AECL to concentrate its research resources on intrusive igneous rock formations of the Canadian Shield as the preferred geological medium for developing its disposal concept. In reviewing AECL's concept, the Panel should become fully aware of the programs of other leading countries in this field, in particular those countries' consideration of different geological media and their development of appropriate plans and schedules for siting and construction of nuclear fuel waste management facilities.

In conducting its review, the Panel will include the examination of the criteria by which safety and accept-ability of a concept for long-term waste management and disposal should be evaluated. The Panel will also examine the general criteria for the management of nuclear fuel wastes as compared to those for wastes from other energy and industrial sources. In addition, the impact of recycling or other processes on the volume of wastes should be examined.

In examining the future steps to be taken with respect to the management of nuclear fuel wastes in Canada, the Panel will take into consideration the degree to which we should relieve future generations of the burden of looking after the wastes. It should also examine the social, economic and environmental implications of a possible nuclear fuel waste management facility.

Since site selection will not take place until a disposal concept has been accepted as safe, the Panel shall not consider any specific potential sites. However, the Panel may review the methodology required to characterize sites and the potential availability of sites in Canada. It may also review general criteria for site selection and advise governments on a future site selection process in addition to examining, in general terms, the costs and benefits to potential host communities.

The energy policies of Canada and the provinces; the role of nuclear energy within these policies, including the construction, operation and safety of new or existing nuclear power plants; fuel reprocessing as an energy policy; and military applications of nuclear technology are issues that are outside the panel's mandate and should not be addressed during the review.

Review Process

The Panel review will be conducted under the requirements of the federal Environmental Assessment and Review Process (EARP) and should concentrate its activities in those provinces where nuclear reactors are located: Ontario, Quebec and New Brunswick.

The Scientific Review Group will report its findings to the Panel and its report will be part of the documentation for the public review.

The main components of the review process will be as follows:

  1. Formation of the Panel and release of its Terms of Reference;
  2. Preparation and issuance by the Panel of the Operational Procedures for the review;
  3. Formation of the Scientific Review Group (SRG) by the Panel, and issuance of its terms of reference;
  4. Convening of public scoping workshops;
  5. Release of the Panel draft guidelines to the public, government agencies and the proponent for review and comment;
  6. Finalization of guidelines and issuance to the proponent;
  7. Completion of the proponent's documentation in response to the guidelines and submission of it to the Panel;
  8. Distribution of the proponent's documentation by the Panel to the SRG, the public and to the government agencies;
  9. Review of the proponent's documentation by the SRG, the public and government agencies;
  10. Submission of the SRG report on the safety and acceptability of AECL's concept for geological disposal of nuclear fuel wastes;
  11. Panel's request for additional information if deficiencies are identified;
  12. Completion of the proponent's response to deficiencies and submission of it to the Panel;
  13. Convening of public hearings by the Panel to review the environmental, safety, health and socio-economic implications of the proposal;
  14. Preparation of the Panel's final report addressing
    1. whether AECL's concept for geological disposal of nuclear fuel wastes is safe and acceptable or should be modified;
    2. the future steps to be taken in the management of nuclear fuel wastes in Canada; and
  15. Submission of the Panel's final report to the Minister of the Environment and the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources.

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Appendix B - Members of the Panel

Current Panel Members

Mr. Blair Seaborn, Panel Chairman

Mr. Seaborn is a former federal deputy minister of the environment and past chairman of the Canadian section of the International Joint Commission. He has had a long and varied career in the public sector, spending 22 years in the Canadian foreign service, with postings in The Hague, Paris, Moscow and Saigon, before moving to domestic departments of government. In 1989, he retired as Intelligence and Security Co-ordinator at the Privy Council Office.

Dr. Denis Brown

Dr. Brown is a consultant health physicist in Saskatchewan, where he was formerly in charge of the provincial government's radiation safety program. He has also worked as a health physicist for the Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB) and is particularly interested in the radiation risks associated with uranium mining.

Before emigrating from the U.K. to Canada in 1978, Dr. Brown followed an academic career, teaching in London, Cambridge and, later, Scotland, where he was a member of the medical faculty of the University of Aberdeen and held an associated honorary staff position with the Grampian Health Board. Dr. Brown has been extensively involved in radiation safety issues relating to nuclear medicine.

Ms. Mary Jamieson

Ms. Jamieson is the Vice Chairperson of the National Aboriginal Economic Development Board and past president of Economic Development for Canadian Aboriginal Women. As the owner-operator of Native Management Services, a First Nations-based consulting company, she has completed research and policy contracts in the areas of human resource development, health and the arts. In 1992, Ms. Jamieson was a regional finalist for the Canadian Woman Entrepreneur of the Year Award.

Ms. Jamieson has been active in promoting indigenous cultures and business opportunities in Canada and Central America.

Dr. Louis LaPierre

Dr. LaPierre is a professor in the Department of Biology and past director of the Environmental Sciences Research Centre at the University of Moncton. He has been involved in environmental issues since 1970 and has authored numerous papers throughout his career. Dr. LaPierre is a member of the Premier's Round Table on Environment and Economy and chairperson of the Fundy Model Forest of New Brunswick. Dr. LaPierre was appointed recently to the Chair in Sustainable Development.

Dr. Dougal McCreath

Dr. McCreath is currently a professor in the School of Engineering at Laurentian University, after spending more than 20 years as a consulting engineer in private industry. He has a PhD in fracture mechanics from the University of London, a MEng in geotechnical engineering from the University of Alberta and a BSc in civil engineering from the University of Manitoba. Dr. McCreath has more than 30 years of world-wide experience in the practical solution of geotechnical engineering problems in civil and mining projects.

Ms. Louise Roy

Ms. Roy is currently a senior associate of Consensus, the Quebec Centre for Environmental and Social Mediation. As an environmental consultant, she has more than 25 years of experience in social system analysis, public consultation and conflict management. She was a member of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Research Council. Ms. Roy has been involved in the review of several projects and programs in Quebec and she recently served as vice chair of the Quebec Expert Review Panel on dam management after the Saguenay flood.

Ms. Roy is also a professor of environmental conflict resolution at the International Academy for the Environment in Geneva.

Mr. Pieter Van Vliet

Mr. Van Vliet is currently the President and Chief Executive Officer of the Canadian Institute for Broadband and Informa-tion Network Technologies Incorporated, located at the University of Regina. He is also the President of Van Vliet Consulting, with senior managerial experience in a number of national and international projects. A mechanical engineer, Mr. Van Vliet spent much of his professional career working with Saskatchewan Telecommunications in positions includ-ing chief engineer and vice president. He has served as president of various local, provincial and national engineering and business organizations, and as a member or director of many other committees or advisory boards in the communi-cations technology or engineering arenas.

Dr. Lois Wilson

Dr. Wilson is the former president of the Canadian and World Councils of Churches. She is also a minister and past Moderator of the United Church of Canada. Dr. Wilson was awarded the Pearson Peace Prize in 1984 by the United Nations Association of Canada. She is a recipient of the Order of Ontario and is an officer of the Order of Canada.

Dr. Wilson is an active board member in the voluntary sector and is the Chair of the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development. Currently, Dr. Wilson is the Chancellor of Lakehead University in Thunder Bay, Ontario.

Former Panel Chairman

  • Mr. Raymond Robinson (October 1989 to March 1990)

Former Panel Members

  • Dr. William Fyfe (October 1989 to May 1996)
  • Dr. Lionel Reese (October 1989 to June 1993)
  • Ms. Maddy Howe-Harper (April 1991 to December 1994)

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Appendix C - Terms of Reference: Scientific Review Group

Introduction

A federal Environmental Assessment Panel (Panel) will review the safety and acceptability of AECL's (Atomic Energy of Canada Limited's) concept of disposal of nuclear fuel wastes in Canada, along with a broad range of nuclear fuel waste management issues. This review will be conducted under the requirements of the federal Environmental Assessment and Review Process (EARP) and be administered by the Federal Environmental Assessment Review Office (FEARO).

The Scientific Review Group (SRG), appointed by and responsible to the Panel, will conduct a specific in-depth examination of the scientific and engineering aspects of the concept, developed by AECL, to dispose of high-level nuclear fuel wastes in igneous rock of the Canadian Shield.

Membership

  1. Members of the SRG will be independent and distinguished, and have scientific backgrounds rele-vant to the review of AECL's disposal concept.
  2. Members will be appointed by and responsible to the Panel.
  3. Each member is expected to serve in his/her own personal and professional capacity and not as a representative of any organization.
  4. The Panel will appoint one of the members of the SRG to serve as chairman.

Responsibilities

Over the course of its examination of AECL's disposal concept, the SRG will:

  1. critically review and comment on the acceptability and applicability of AECL's high-level nuclear fuel waste disposal concept from a scientific and engineering point of view;
  2. review and comment on the choice of predictive techniques, the underlying assumptions and the validity of the results of the predictive techniques used to assess the long-term performance and safety of the disposal concept;
  3. provide advice on other issues when requested by the Panel.

Procedure

  1. The SRG will be responsible for its own internal organization and will discharge its responsibilities as it wishes, subject to the concurrence of the Panel. The findings of the SRG will be made available to the public.
  2. The SRG may, if required, seek technical assistance from other sources, including government agencies, universities and the consulting community, to assist it in carrying out its responsibilities.
  3. The SRG will meet in such places and at such times as it deems appropriate.
  4. The SRG may organize workshops or technical meetings with invited external experts, as it deems appropriate.

Reporting / Publication

In accordance with the timetable outlined by the Panel, the SRG will produce a comprehensive report containing conclusions and recommendations on the acceptability and applicability of the scientific and engineering aspects of AECL's concept for disposal of high-level nuclear fuel wastes, and the validity of the predictive modelling results.

Publication of interim and final reports from the SRG shall be made by the Panel and shall be made available to the public.

Administrative Structure and Support

  1. FEARO will engage a suitably qualified person to act as secretary of the SRG.
  2. A FEARO officer will be designated to act as liaison to facilitate managerial and administrative matters and to ensure ongoing communication between the Panel and the SRG.
  3. FEARO will provide administrative support, as well as some office space.
  4. FEARO will pay an honorarium and all reasonable expenses accrued by the SRG members.

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Appendix D - Memebers of the Scientific Review Group

Dr. Raymond A. Price (Chairman)

Dr. Price is a professor in the Department of Geological Sciences at Queen's University and a registered professional engineer in the province of Ontario. He is a graduate of the University of Manitoba, and he received a PhD in geology from Princeton University in 1958. Dr. Price worked as a petroleum geologist with the Geological Survey of Canada from 1958 to 1968, before moving to Queen's University, where he was Head of the Department of Geological Sciences from 1972 to 1977. Between 1981 and 1988 he was director general of the Geological Survey of Canada and assistant deputy minister in the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources (currently the Department of Natural Resources). He was president of the International Litho-sphere Program from 1980 to 1985 and President of the Geological Society of America in 1989-90.

Dr. Price is a fellow of the Royal Society of Canada, a foreign associate of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences and an honourary foreign fellow of the European Union of Geosciences. He received the R.J.W. Douglas Medal from the Canadian Society of Petroleum Geologists in 1984, the Sir William Logan Medal from the Geological Association of Canada in 1985, the Leopold von Buch Medal from the Deutsche Geologische Gesellschaft in 1988, and the Major Edward Coke Medal from the Geological Society of London in 1989. He was made an officer in l'Ordre des Palmes Académique of France in 1988. He has been awarded the degree DSc (honoris causa) by Carleton University and Memorial University.

Dr. Price's research interests include structural geology and tectonics, global change in the geosphere and the biosphere, and science and public policy. He is a member of the board of directors of the Canadian Global Change Program, and a member of the Commission on Geosciences, Environment and Resources of the U.S. National Research Council.

Dr. James F. Archibald

Dr. Archibald is an associate professor in the Department of Mining Engineering at Queen's University, where he also obtained a PhD. His work experience is primarily in the academic field, with some associated private consultation. Dr. Archibald holds memberships in the Canadian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy (CIM), the CIM Backfill Subcommittee (Rock Mechanics Group) and the American Institute of Mining Engineers.

Dr. Archibald's research interests include measurement of radiation levels in underground mines, mine ventilation systems, in-situ stress analysis and rock burst prediction, and structural mine design evaluation.

Dr. Denis Roy Cullimore

Dr. Cullimore is a professor of microbiology in the Department of Biology at the University of Regina and the Director of the Regina Water Research Institute. He completed a PhD in agricultural microbiology at the University of Nottingham, England. Dr. Cullimore holds memberships in a number of professional societies including the Canadian Society of Microbiology, the American Society of Microbiology and the National Water Well Association. He has provided consultation for private and governmental organizations including Environment Canada, Agriculture Canada and the National Research Council. Dr. Cullimore's research interests include micro-organisms and groundwater pollution, and water quality.

Dr. David J. Duquette

Dr. Duquette is a professor in the Department of Materials Engineering at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in Troy, New York. He received his PhD from the Department of Metallurgy and Material Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dr. Duquette is a fellow of the American Society of Metals and is associated with a number of societies and divisions within the American Institute of Metallurgical Engineers. In 1990, he received the Willis Rodney Whitney Award from the National Association of Corrosion Engineers.

Dr. Duquette's current research interests include the physical, chemical and mechanical properties of metals and alloys, and the development of methods to predict the very long-term degradation problems of metals and alloys.

Dr. Emil O. Frind

Dr. Frind is a professor of hydrogeology in the Department of Earth Sciences at the University of Waterloo, and a founding member of the Waterloo Centre for Groundwater Research. He received his PhD in civil engineering from the University of Toronto. Dr. Frind holds memberships in the American Geophysical Union and the Association of Professional Engineers of Ontario, and he is an associate editor for the Journal of Water Hydrology and the Journal for Numerical Methods for Partial Differential Equations.

Dr. Frind's research interests focus on the physical processes in groundwater systems including flow, transport and mass transfer phenomena for multiphase, multicomponent systems, as well as on the use of numerical techniques in the study of such processes. The applied side of his research is concerned with the development and protection of groundwater resources, and groundwater remediation by natural degradation and immobilization of contaminants.

Dr. Ernest R. Kanasewich

Dr. Kanasewich is the Chairman of the Department of Physics at the University of Alberta, and the Associate Director of the Institute of Geophysics, Meteorology and Space Physics. Dr. Kanasewich obtained his PhD in geophysics from the University of British Columbia and worked as a consulting seismologist before returning to academia. He is a fellow of the Royal Society of Canada and has honorary life memberships in the Canadian Society of Exploration Geophysicists and the Society of Exploration Geophysicists. He is a professional geophysicist with the Association of Professional Engineers, Geologists and Geophysicists of Alberta.

Dr. Kanasewich's current area of research lies in three-dimensional investigations of the earth's crust. His previous research has involved diverse areas of geophysics including seismic reflection studies of the deep earth's crust and earthquake studies.

Dr. Robert Kerrich

Dr. Kerrich is a professor and holds the George J. McLeod Chair in the Department of Geological Sciences at the University of Saskatchewan. He received his PhD in geology from Imperial College, London, England and holds memberships in the Geological Society of Canada, the Mineralogical Society of Canada, the Geological Society of America and the American Geophysical Union. He held an NSERC Steacy Fellowship from 1986-88 and is a fellow of the Royal Society of Canada.

Dr. Kerrich's research interests include the study of geochemistry as it relates to groundwater-rock interactions, hydrothermal transport systems, the analysis of stable and radiogenic isotopes, and radionuclide retardation processes in rock.

Dr. Niels C. Lind

Dr. Lind, presently an adjunct professor in the Department of Mechanical Engineering at the University of Victoria, is a distinguished professor emeritus. He received his PhD in theoretical and applied mechanics from the University of Illinois.

Dr. Lind is a former director of the Institute for Risk Research at the University of Waterloo and is a member of the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety for the Atomic Energy Control Board. He is a fellow of the Royal Society of Canada and the Canadian Academy of Engineers, and holds membership in the Society for Risk Analysis and the International Association for Structural Safety and Reliability. Dr. Lind's research interests include engineering reliability and risk analysis, and the modelling of uncertainty in engineered systems.

Dr. Kwan Yee Lo

Dr. Lo is a professor in the Department of Civil Engineering at the University of Western Ontario. He completed a PhD in civil engineering at the University of London, England. Dr. Lo is currently the President of the Tunnelling Association of Canada and holds membership in the Engineering Institute of Canada and the International Society of Rock Mechanics. In 1989, he received the Legget Award from the Canadian Geotechnical Society. Dr. Lo has conducted major lecture tours in Canada and China and has chaired several national and international technical committees.

Dr. Lo's research covers a wide spectrum of geotechnical engineering including the design of underground structures in rock and the response of these structures to deformation and thermal stresses.

Dr. S. P. Neuman

Dr. Neuman is the Regents' Professor in the Department of Hydrology and Water Resources at the University of Arizona in Tucson. He obtained his PhD from the Department of Civil Engineering at the University of California at Berkeley. Dr. Neuman has been elected a member of the U.S. National Academy of Engineering and a fellow of the American Geophysical Union and the Geological Society of America. He has received prestigious awards from the American Geophysical Union, the Geological Society of America, the National Water Well Association and the American Institute of Hydrology.

Dr. Neuman's research centres on subsurface transport processes with heavy emphasis on the storage of high-level radioactive wastes in fractured rocks. His specialties include field testing and characterizing rock flow and transport properties, determining their use in predicting the subsurface migration of contaminants and assessing the reliability of such predictions.

Dr. Ernest F. Roots

Dr. Roots is currently science advisor emeritus to Environment Canada. He was a science advisor to Environment Canada from 1973 to 1989. Originally from British Columbia, Dr. Roots received his PhD in geology from Princeton University. From 1945 to 1972, he served with the Geological Survey of Canada and the Polar Continental Shelf Project.

In addition to his involvement in Canadian government activities, Dr. Roots has been active in a number of scientific and environmental committees and activities run by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP). His awards include the Distinguished Services Medal (Norway), the Polar Medal (U.K.), the Polar Merit Pin (U.S.S.R.) and the American Polar Medal (U.S.). Dr. Roots is a fellow of the Royal Society of Canada and an officer of the Order of Canada.

Dr. Roots' general scientific activities include earth sciences, glaciology, hydrology, environmental aspects of energy production and use, changes in regional and planetary environments including climate change, and the use of scientific knowledge in social and economic decisions. In 1988, at the request of Finland's minister of the environment, he chaired an international review of environmental and water research in Finland. From 1985 to 1991, he was Chairman of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Research Council. He is currently Chairman of the Advisory Board of the Environmental Impact Research Centre of Carleton University.

Dr. Rangaswamy Seshadri

Dr. Seshadri is currently the Dean of Engineering and Applied Science at Memorial University in St. John's. Before moving into this position, Dr. Seshadri was dean of engineering at the University of Regina. He completed his PhD in mechanical engineering at the University of Calgary. He has worked for Syncrude Canada Ltd. as an engineering associate and senior mechanical engineer. Dr. Seshadri holds membership in the Association of Professional Engineers of Saskatchewan and the American Society of Mechanical Engineers. Dr. Seshadri's research focuses on the design and structural performance analysis of elevated temperature-pressure components.

Dr. Stella Swanson

Dr. Swanson is currently an associate and senior scientist with Golder Associates Ltd. in Calgary. She formerly held the position of senior research scientist with the Saskatchewan Research Council. She received her PhD in limnology from the University of Saskatchewan, and has served as a representative to the Joint Panel on Occupational and Environmental Research for Uranium Production. She currently holds an adjunct professorship in the Department of Biology at the University of Saskatchewan and is a research associate of the Toxicology Research Centre at the University of Saskatchewan.

Dr. Swanson's current research focuses on pathways analysis and risk assessment of radionuclides, metals and chlorinated organics in the biosphere.

Dr. Normand Thérien

Dr. Thérien is a full professor in the Department of Chemical Engineering, part of the Faculty of Applied Sciences at the University of Sherbrooke. He received a PhD in chemical engineering from McMaster University. He is a member of several professional associations, including the International Society for Ecological Modelling, the International Association for Water Pollution and Control, the Canadian Association on Water Pollution Research and Control, and the Fédération québécoise de l'environnement. He is a consultant for various engineering consulting firms that specialize in the environment and for Hydro-Québec's Office of the Vice-President, Environment.

Dr. Thérien's courses and research interests focus on modelling and simulating the dynamics of aquatic ecosystems to quantify the effects of industrial activities.

Dr. Donald R. Wiles

Dr. Wiles is a professor of radiochemistry in the Chemistry Department at Carleton University. In the past, he has served as chairman of the Chemistry Department. He received a PhD in nuclear chemistry from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is a fellow of the Chemical Institute of Canada and has held many positions within this institute.

Dr. Wiles' research has focused on nuclear fission, corrosion, radioanalytical chemistry and the measurement of environmental radioactivity from heavy natural decay products of uranium.

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Appendix E - Chronology of Panel Activities

September 23, 1988: The Honourable Marcel Masse, Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources, referred the proposal for public review.

October 4, 1989: The Honourable Lucien Bouchard, Minister of the Environment, appointed the Panel and issued its terms of reference.

December 1, 1989: The Federal Environmental Assessment Review Office (FEARO) announced the availability of two documents, one prepared by the Lura Group ( An Issue Paper on the Management of Nuclear Fuel Wastes, April 1989) and the other prepared by Acres International (A Review of Various Approaches Being Undertaken by Industrialized Nations for the Management and Disposal of High-Level Nuclear Waste, April 1989). FEARO also publicized the availability of an AECL document entitledManaging Canada's Nuclear Fuel Wastes and a nuclear fuel waste database consisting of a list of documents and associated key words. These documents were intended to assist participants to prepare for the scoping meetings.

March 23, 1990: The Honourable Lucien Bouchard, Minister of the Environment, appointed a new panel chairman.

Spring 1990: The Panel began publishing Dialogue, a news bulletin. It produced six issues periodically between spring 1990 and spring 1994.

May 3 and May 18, 1990: Dates and locations were announced for open houses to be hosted by the panel secretariat. Twenty sessions were held in 16 communities.

Spring 1990 Open Houses

  • New Brunswick
    • May 22: Lord Beaverbrook Hotel, Fredericton
    • May 23: Holiday Inn, Saint John
    • May 24: Rodd Park House, Moncton
  • Quebec
    • May 28: Loews Le Concorde, Quebec City
    • May 29: Hotel des Gouverneurs, Trois Rivières
    • May 30-31: Le Centre Sheraton, Montreal
  • Ontario
    • June 5: Venture Inn, Ottawa
    • June 6: Oshawa Civic Auditorium, Oshawa
    • June 7-8: Ramada Hotel Downtown, London
    • June 11: President Hotel, Sudbury
    • June 12-13: Senator Hotel, Timmins
    • June 14: Red Oak Inn, Thunder Bay
    • June 25-26: Delta Chelsea Inn, Toronto
  • Manitoba
    • June 18: Winnipeg Convention Centre, Winnipeg
  • Saskatchewan
    • June 19: Regina Inn, Regina
    • June 20: Sheraton Cavalier, Saskatoon

Summer 1990: Panel members visited AECL's Whiteshell Underground Research Laboratory at Pinawa and Ontario Hydro's Pickering Nuclear Generating Station.

August 15, 1990: The Panel appointed the Scientific Review Group and issued its terms of reference.

August 24 and October 11, 1990: Dates and locations of scoping meetings were announced. Nineteen sessions were held in 14 communities.

Scoping Meetings

  • Ontario
    • October 22-23: St. Lawrence Hall, Toronto
    • October 23: Robert McLaughlin Gallery, Oshawa
    • October 24: Marconi Club, London
    • October 29: Red Oak Inn, Thunder Bay
    • October 30: President Hotel, Sudbury
    • November 8: Venture Inn, Ottawa
  • New Brunswick
    • November 5-6: Aitken Bicentennial Exhibition Centre, Saint John
    • November 6-7: Fredericton Inn, Fredericton
  • Quebec
    • November 13: Hotel des Gouverneurs, Trois Rivières
    • November 14: Club des employés civiques de Québec, Québec
    • November 15-16: Le Nouvel Hôtel, Montreal
  • Saskatchewan
    • November 19: Regina Inn, Regina
    • November 20-21: Holiday Inn, Saskatoon
  • Manitoba
    • November 22: Delta Winnipeg, Winnipeg

November 5, 1990: The Panel released operational procedures, weekly compilations of scoping meeting submissions and transcripts of scoping meetings.

March 6, 1991: The Panel held a workshop in Thunder Bay on Aboriginal issues related to the proposed disposal concept.

March 15, 1991: Three panel members participated in the seventh national conference of Canadian Student Pug-wash at the University of Ottawa to hear students' concerns about the proposal.

April 23, 1991: Some panel members visited the Serpent River First Nation and the Sagamok Anishnawbek First Nation.

April 24, 1991: The panel chairman announced the appointment of an Aboriginal panel member, Ms. Maddy Howe-Harper.

June 13, 1991: Draft guidelines were issued for public review during a period ending September 16, 1991.

November 1991: The panel chairman visited nuclear waste authorities in Europe and produced a report.

March 18, 1992: Final Guidelines for the Preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement were issued to AECL and released to the public.

March-June 1992: The Panel developed a future activities program to obtain information on issues relevant to its mandate that were outside AECL's mandate. It sent information requests to five government agencies and the three provincial utilities producing nuclear power. Responses were received between September 1992 and October 1994.

August 2, 1994: The Panel released its phased approach for public hearings.

October 26, 1994: The Panel released the EIS submitted by AECL for a public review period ending August 8, 1995.

October 26, 1994: The panel chairman announced the appointment of Dr. Denis Brown to replace Dr. Lionel Reese, who died in 1993.

October 26, 1994: Dates and locations for autumn open houses were announced. Ten sessions were held in eight communities.

Autumn 1994 Open Houses

  • Ontario
    • November 16: York Lanes, York University, North York
    • November 17: Davis Centre, University of Waterloo, Waterloo
  • New Brunswick
    • November 21: Rémi-Rossignol Building, University of Moncton, Moncton
    • November 22-23: Saint John Regional Library, Saint John
    • November 24: Lord Beaverbrook Hotel, Fredericton
  • Saskatchewan
    • November 28: Language Institute, University of Regina, Regina
    • November 29-30: Delta Bessborough Hotel, Saskatoon
    • December 1: Chapel Gallery, North Battleford

January 4, 1995: The dates and locations for winter open houses were announced. Twenty sessions were held in 17 communities.

Winter 1995 Open Houses

  • Manitoba
    • January 16: Centennial Library, Winnipeg
    • January 17: Legion Hall, Lac du Bonnet
  • Ontario
    • January 19: The Agora, Lakehead University, Thunder Bay
    • February 6: Science and Natural Resources Building, Sault College of Applied Arts and Technology, Sault Ste. Marie
    • February 7: W.H. Collin Centre, Elliot Lake
    • February 8: Science North, Sudbury
    • February 9: Timmins Square Merchants, Timmins
  • Quebec
    • February 20: Station de métro McGill, Montreal
    • February 21: La Place, Complexe Desjardins, Montreal
    • February 22: Centre culturel Larochelle, Bécancour
    • February 23: Pavillon Maurice Pollack, Université Laval, Quebec
    • February 24: Cour des promotions, Place Laurier, Ste. Foy
  • Ontario
    • March 6 (afternoon): Legion Hall, Kincardine
    • March 6 (evening): Kincardine District Secondary School, Kincardine
    • March 8: Oshawa Centre, Oshawa
    • March 9-10: Elizabeth Beeton Auditorium, Metro Toronto Reference Library, Toronto
    • March 22: Policy Studies Building, Queen's University, Kingston
    • March 23 (day): Eaton Court, Rideau Centre, Ottawa
    • March 23 (evening): The Agora, University of Ottawa, Ottawa
    • March 24: Bayshore Shopping Centre, Nepean

March 30, 1995: The panel chairman announced the appointment of Ms. Mary Jamieson to replace Ms. Maddy Howe-Harper, who died in late 1994.

July 16, 1995: The Panel issued draft public hearings procedures for comments and reminded participants of the August 8 deadline for comments on the EIS.

October 6, 1995: The Scientific Review Group submitted its report to the Panel and made it public.

December 12, 1995: The Panel released a request for additional information to AECL and announced that public hearings, to be held in three phases, would begin on March 11, 1996.

February 1, 1996: Dates, locations and topics for Phase I hearings were announced and hearings procedures were released. This phase of hearings focused on broad societal issues related to long-term management of nuclear fuel wastes. Three weeks of hearings were held.

Phase I Hearings - Ontario

March 11-15: Third-Floor Auditorium, 4900 Yonge Street, North York

  • March 11: General
  • March 12: Ethical considerations, including perspective of Aboriginal people
  • March 13: Risk and uncertainty
  • March 14: Risk, cost and benefit
  • March 15: Criteria for safety and acceptability

March 25-26: Dan Beer Arena, Pickering

  • March 25: General
  • March 26: Siting of facility and siting criteria

March 27-29: Third-Floor Auditorium, 4900 Yonge Street, North York

  • March 27: Site selection process
  • March 28: Transportation
  • March 29: Implementing and management agency

April 29: Bartley Residence, Lakehead University, Thunder Bay

  • General discussion and perspectives of Aboriginal people

April 30: Canisius Hall, Laurentian University, Sudbury

  • General discussion

May 2-3: Lyons Hall, Chalk River

  • General discussion with emphasis on site selection process

February 27, 1996: The Panel released a list and short biographies of invited speakers for Phase I public hearings on broad societal issues.

April 15, 1996: Dates, locations and topics for Phase II hearings were announced. This phase consisted of technical sessions focused on the long-term safety (postclosure period) of AECL's concept of geologic disposal from scientific and engineering viewpoints. Two days were also dedicated to issues related to the preclosure period of the proposed disposal facility. Two and a half weeks of hearings were held.

Phase II Hearings - Ontario

June 10-14 and 17-21: Third-Floor Auditorium, 4900 Yonge Street, North York

  • June 10: Technical aspects of site characterization and site availability
  • June 11: General session with emphasis on the multiple barrier system
  • June 12: Disposal container and nuclear fuel waste form
  • June 13: Disposal vault environment
  • June 14: Enclosing rock mass or geosphere
  • June 17: Surface environment and biosphere
  • June 18: Performance assessment criteria, risk and uncertainty
  • June 19: Performance assessment and modelling, and analogues
  • June 20: General session
  • June 21: General session

June 27-28: Elizabeth Beeton Auditorium, Metro Toronto Reference Library, Toronto

  • June 27: Environmental and health impacts of disposal facility
  • June 28: Socio-economic impacts of disposal facility

May 9, 1996: The Panel released additional information requested from the proponent in December 1995.

May 30, 1996: The panel chairman announced the appointment of Dr. Dougal McCreath to replace Dr. William Fyfe, who resigned at the end of April 1996.

July 18, 1996: The Panel announced an extension to its Phase II hearings to allow for discussion of new information submitted or referenced by AECL in its Response to Request for Information (May 1996) and during the June hearings. It also announced the availability of a list of documents being reviewed during the extension, as well as the postponement of Phase III hearings to January 1997.

September 25, 1996: The dates and locations of the Phase II hearings extension were released. Four days of technical hearings were held.

Phase II Hearings Extension - Ontario

November 18-21: The Great Hall, St. Lawrence Hall, Toronto

  • November 18: Multiple barrier disposal concept, including components, options, flexibility, robustness
  • November 19: Postclosure assessment, including suitability and flexibility of the methodology, and acceptability
  • November 20: Preclosure assessment, including reference design, methodology and effects
  • November 21: General technical session with presentation on long-term storage

November 1, 1996: Dates and locations for Phase III (community) hearings were announced. These hearings consisted of visits to 16 communities, including three First Nations communities, to hear participants' views on the safety and acceptability of the disposal concept for nuclear fuel wastes and on any other issues relevant to the panel's mandate. Twenty-two sessions were held.

Phase III Hearings

  • Saskatchewan
    • January 13-14: Commonwealth Ballroom, Ramada Hotel, Saskatoon
  • Manitoba
    • January 16: Multiplex Arena, Sagkeeng First Nation, Manitoba
    • January 27-28: The Club, Hotel Fort Garry, Winnipeg
  • Ontario
    • January 29: Scanbia Room, Valhalla Hotel, Thunder Bay
    • January 30: Ginoogaming Complex, Ginoogaming First Nation, Long Lac
    • January 31: Royal Canadian Legion Hall, Atikokan
    • February 10: Main Hall, Porcupine Dante Club, Timmins
    • February 11: Empress Ball Room, Howard Johnson Hotel, North Bay
    • February 13: Cutler Community Centre, Serpent River First Nation, Serpent River
    • February 24: Branch 340, Royal Canadian Legion, Port Elgin
    • February 25-26: Third-floor Auditorium, 4900 Yonge Street, North York
    • February 27: Branch 43, Royal Canadian Legion, Oshawa
  • New Brunswick
    • March 10-11: Loyalist Room, Saint John Trade and Convention Centre, Saint John
  • Quebec
    • March 13: Salle Grande Hermine, Pavillon Jacques Cartier, Parc de l'île St-Quentin, Trois-Rivières
    • March 24-25: Salle Dorchester, Le Nouvel Hôtel, Montreal
  • Ontario
    • March 26-27: Branch 351, Royal Canadian Legion, Ottawa

January 24, 1997: The Panel announced a modification to its operational procedures to allow hearings participants to submit written closing statements by April 18, 1997.

February 1998: The Panel submitted this report to the federal Minister of the Environment and Minister of Natural Resources.

Return to Table of Contents

Appendix F - List of Submissions to Panel at Public Hearings

Oral Presentations Made at Public Hearings (* indicates that a written submission was supplied to accompany the oral presentation.)

Phase I

  • Aboriginal Rights Coalition (E. Bianchi, N. Martell, R. O'Sullivan, E. Soloman)
  • Acton High School (G. Finlay, P. Olsen, E. Savage, S. Stroud, P. Tamblyn)*
  • Alberta Indigenous Women Environmental Foundation (M. Iron)
  • Algoma Manitoulin Nuclear Awareness (L. Greenspoon)
  • Appraisal Institute of Canada (D. Dybvig)*
  • Assembly of First Nations (K. Conn)
  • Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs, Assembly of First Nations of Quebec and Labrador, Grand Council of the Crees of Quebec (A. Orkin)*
  • Atomic Energy Control Board (K. Bragg, C. Maloney, M. Measures)*
  • Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (K. Dormuth, S. Whitaker)*
  • Baker, D.*
  • Burt, E.
  • Campagne contre l'expansion du nucléaire (M. Chénier)*
  • Canadian Academy of Engineering, the Royal Society of Canada (D. Smith)*
  • Canadian Coalition for Ecology, Ethics and Religion (A. Cathrall, P. Timmerman)*
  • Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility (R. Del Tredici, G. Edwards)*
  • Canadian Nuclear Association (J. Richman, I. Wilson)*
  • Canadian Nuclear Society (J. Cuttler, K. Smith)*
  • Canadian Nuclear Workers' Council (D. Shier)*
  • Carleton University (A. Brook)*
  • Carleton University (J. Buschek)*
  • Carlman, I., Sweden *
  • Chem-Security (Alberta) Ltd. (G. Latonas)*
  • Clean North (K. Brisemer)
  • Concerned Citizens of Manitoba (A. Lindsay, D. Plummer)*
  • Concerned Citizens of Renfrew County (O. Hendrickson)*
  • COSUN (W. Robbins)*
  • Dalhousie University (P. Brown)*
  • Decision Research (J. Flynn)*
  • Energy Probe (E. Brubaker, N. Rubin)*
  • Environment Canada (G. Cornwall, J. Mills)*
  • Federal New Democratic Party (I. Angus)
  • Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations (A. Adam)
  • Golder Associates (S. Swanson)*
  • Hardy Stevenson and Associates Ltd. (D. Hardy)*
  • Health Canada (S. Bartlett)*
  • Insight and Solutions (D. Oates, D. Thompson)
  • Inter-Church Uranium Committee (M. Penna, P. Penna)*
  • Inter Group (D. Martz)*
  • Jackson, R.
  • Kukkee, G.*
  • La ligue des femmes du Québec (C. Jobin)*
  • Lang, P.*
  • Laurentian University (C. Summers)*
  • Low-level Radioactive Waste Management Office (R. Pollock)*
  • Low-level Radioactive Wastes Siting Task Force (D. Hall, V. Lafferty)*
  • Lynham, T.
  • Maki, D.
  • Manitoba Métis Federation (L. Carriere)*
  • Mason, R.G.*
  • McMaster Institute for Energy Studies (W. Anderson, A. Collins)*
  • McMillan, M.
  • Meyer, R.*
  • Minnesota Department of Public Service (J. Kundert)*
  • National Action Committee on the Status of Women (A. Ritchie)
  • National Council of Women of Canada (C. Sly)*
  • Natural Resources Canada (P. Brown)*
  • Nishnawbee-Aski Nation (B. Davey)*
  • Northumberland Environmental Protection (E. de Quehen, P. Lawson)*
  • Northwatch (B. Lloyd)*
  • Nuclear Awareness Project (I. Kock)*
  • Ontario Association for Environmental Ethics (J. Davie)*
  • Ontario Hydro (C. Fraser, K. Johansen, T. Kemp, F. King, F. Long, R. Mayer, K. Nash, J. Peters, M. Smith)*
  • Ontario Native Alliance (D. Bailey)*
  • Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (J.P. Olivier)*
  • Parlee, B.*
  • People Against Lepreau II (Janet Dingwell, Julie Dingwell)
  • Planetary Association for Clean Energy (P. Calante)*
  • Power Workers' Union (B. Menard, J. Murphy)*
  • Queen's University (B. Leiss)*
  • Raging Grannies
  • Ramsay, D.*
  • Ranni, A.
  • Renfrew County Citizens for Nuclear Responsibility (T. Cowan)*
  • Riley, T.L.
  • Robertson, J.A.L.*
  • Sagkeeng First Nation (G. Fontaine)
  • Saskatchewan Environmental Society (A. Coxworth, P. Prebble)*
  • Saveland, W.*
  • Science for Peace (P. Brogden)*
  • SENES Consultants Ltd. (G. Case)*
  • SKB Sweden (C. Thegerstrom)*
  • Student Nuclear Action Group, University of Waterloo (D. Rainham)*
  • Town of Deep River (J. Murphy, D. Walker)*
  • Town of Massey (N. Bishop, B. Bratko, E. McNenly)
  • Transport Canada (K. Plourde)*
  • Trent University (R. Paehlke)*
  • Union of Ontario Indians (G. Peters)
  • United Church of Canada (S. Farlinger, D. Hallman, M.L. Harley, C. Ridd)*
  • University of Michigan (B. Rabe)*
  • University of Victoria (N. Lind)*
  • University of Waterloo (J. Shortreed)*
  • University of Waterloo, Conrad Grebel College (C. Brunk)*
  • University of Winnipeg (P. Miller)*
  • University of Wisconsin-Green Bay (M. Kraft)*
  • White Mines Environmental Action Club, Sault Ste. Marie (D. Lamontagne)
  • Woodbeck, B.*

Phase II

  • Atomic Energy Control Board (K. Bragg)*
  • Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (B. Amiro, D. Chandler, J. Cramer, C. Davison, K. Dormuth, B. Goodwin, L. Johnson, G. Simmons, S. Whitaker, A. Wikjord, D. Wuschke, R. Zach)*
  • Bertell, R.*
  • Campaign for Nuclear Phase-out (G. Edwards)*
  • Canadian Academy of Engineering, the Royal Society of Canada (M. Dence, L. Gold, M. Grey, D. MacDonald, F. Matich, N. Wardlaw)*
  • Canadian Coalition for Ecology, Ethics and Religion (A. Cathrall, P. Timmerman)*
  • Canadian Geoscience Council (S. Keiffer, G. West)*
  • Canadian Nuclear Association (M. Stewart, I. Wilson)*
  • Canadian Nuclear Society (K. Smith)*
  • Canadian Nuclear Workers' Council (D. Shier)*
  • Chemical Institute of Canada (N.S. McIntyre, D. Minns)
  • Citizens Concerned about Free Trade (D. Orchard)*
  • Concerned Citizens of Manitoba (D. Plummer)*
  • Driedger, A., Hare, K., Jennekens, J. and Shemilt, L.*
  • Energy Probe (N. Rubin)*
  • Farlinger, S.*
  • Haudenosaunee Environment Delegate (C. Jacobs, N. Jacobs)*
  • Health Canada (D. Grogan)*
  • Inter-Church Uranium Committee (S. Fortugno, P. Penna)*
  • Jansen, T.*
  • Larkin, P.*
  • Lawson, T.*
  • Metis Nation of Saskatchewan (A. Morin)*
  • M.T.C. Holdings N.V. for the S.R.G. (M. Elzas)*
  • Natural Resources Canada (P. Brown, J. Ramsay, G. Underdown)*
  • Nishnawbe-Aski Nation (C. Fox)*
  • Northumberland Environmental Protection (E. de Quehen, I. Fairlie)*
  • Northwatch (B. Lloyd, J. Jackson, R. Northey, P. Richardson)*
  • Ontario Hydro (K. Johansen, T. Kemp, F. King, K. Nash, M. Smith)*
  • Peto MacCallum Consulting Engineers (M. Mortazavi)*
  • Saskatchewan Environmental Society (A. Coxworth, P. Prebble, D. Shettel, G. Simpson)*
  • Saugeen First Nation (M. Mason)*
  • Science for Peace (H. Burkhardt)*
  • Scientific Review Group (D. Duquette, E. Frind, R. Kerrich, S. Neuman, R. Price, E.F. Roots, S. Swanson, N. Therrien, D. Wiles)*
  • Shukla, B.*
  • Tammemagi, H.*
  • Technical Advisory Committee to AECL (L.W. Shemilt)*
  • University of Alberta (W. Harris)*
  • University of Pittsburgh (B. Cohen)*
  • Voice of Women (U. Franklin)*
  • York University, Centre for Applied Sustainability (N. Waltho)*

Phase III

Saskatoon-January 13-15, 1997
  • Adamson, W.*
  • Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (K. Dormuth)*
  • Bantjes, J.*
  • Cameco Corporation (S. Frost)*
  • Canadian Academy of Engineering, the Royal Society of Canada (D. Smith)*
  • Canadian Nuclear Society (R. McLeod)*
  • Canadian Nuclear Workers' Council (D. Shier, G. Telfer)*
  • Catholic Women's League (M. Penna, M. Reindl)*
  • Citizens Concerned about Free Trade (G. Orchard)
  • Community Outreach and Education Centre (M. Bidwell)
  • Friends of the Earth, Germany (G. Wippel)*
  • Gagné, L.*
  • German Federal Parliament (U. Schoenberger)*
  • Global Citizens Forum on High-level Nuclear Waste (D. Kossick, L. Tuhanavau Salabula)*
  • Greenfield, D.
  • INTAC, Germany (J. Kreusch)
  • Inter-Church Uranium Committee (P. Penna)*
  • Inter-Church Uranium Committee (R. Regnier)*
  • Lawrence, S.*
  • Metis Nation of Saskatchewan (A. Morin)*
  • Murphy, L.
  • Norris, J.
  • North Saskatoon Business Association (B. Reimer)*
  • Parrot, D.*
  • Penna, J.*
  • Penna, M.*
  • Progressive Conservative Party of Saskatchewan (D. D'Autremont)*
  • Roy, S.*
  • Sailor, K.
  • Saskatchewan Environmental Society (A. Coxworth)*
  • Saskatchewan Environmental Society (P. Prebble)*
  • Saskatchewan Environmental Society (G. Simpson)*
  • Saskatoon Indigenous Coalition (J. Barclay)
  • Schmidt, M.*
  • Shiell, M.*
  • Sinclair, N.*
  • Smillie, A.*
  • Smillie, B.*
  • Synergy Today (R. Phillips)*
  • Transnational Working Group on Uranium and Waste Disposal (S. Shumard)
  • University of Saskatchewan, Indigenous People's Program (P. Settee)
  • Veterans Against Nuclear Arms, Saskatchewan Branch (J. Bury)*
  • Weingeist, K.*
  • Wilson, M.*
  • Wright, R.*
Sagkeeng First Nation, Sagkeeng-January 16, 1997
  • Abraham, F.
  • Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (K. Dormuth)
  • Benay, B.
  • Benton-Benay, E.
  • Centre for Indigenous Environmental Resources (J. Leary)
  • Citizens Concerned about Free Trade (D. Orchard)
  • Courchene, E.
  • Courchene, J.A.
  • Courchene, K.
  • Courchene, M.
  • Fontaine, A.
  • Fontaine, G.*
  • Frazer, B.
  • Guimond, D.
  • Hollow Water First Nation (W. Monias)
  • Kelly, P.
  • LeTander, H.
  • Mandamin, J.
  • Morrisseau, F.
  • Nishnawbe High School (D. Courchene, T.L. Fontaine, J. Henderson)
  • Norton, R.Saskatoon Indigenous Coalition (J. Barklay, A. Bell)
  • Spence, L.
  • Youth Council (J. Blackbird, J. Henderson)
Winnipeg-January 27-28, 1997
  • Aiken, L.
  • Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (K. Dormuth)
  • Brathour, E.*
  • Canadian Nuclear Workers' Council (K. Reimer, D. Shier)*
  • Coalition for Social Justice (K. Aasland)*
  • Concerned Citizens of Manitoba (A. Lindsay, D. Plummer)*
  • Concerned Citizens of Manitoba (G. Ylonen)*
  • Dutton, V.*
  • Emberley, K.
  • Graham, J.*
  • Hems, D.*
  • Iverson and Associates (S. Iverson)*
  • Johnson, H.
  • Jovanovich, J.*
  • Kenora Committee Against Nuclear Waste (G. Elder)*
  • Kopelow, L.
  • Miller, K.*
  • O'Connor, P.
  • Penner, H.
  • Penner, T.
  • Project Peacemakers (R. Bartleman)*
  • Radioactive Waste Management Associates (M. Resnikoff)*
  • Rauh, S.*
  • Richards, A.*
  • Ridd, C.*
  • Sagkeeng First Nation (L. Morrisseau)
  • Sourisseau, J.P.
  • Taylor, D.*
  • United Church of Canada (G. Clarke, F. Rajatte)*
  • United Steel Workers (H. Summerfeld)*
  • Veterans Against Nuclear Arms, Manitoba Branch (C. Muldrew)*
  • Whiteshell District Association Inc. (J. Bigelow, H. Dubowits)
  • Whiteshell Support Group (W. Zarecki)*
Thunder Bay-January 29, 1997
  • Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (K. Dormuth)*
  • Baarschers, W.*
  • Environment North (J. Boulter)Holenstein, J.*
  • Hrdyka, M.
  • Lang, P.*
  • Morton, C.*
  • Morton, P.*
  • Pretlac, R.
  • Puttagunta, R.*
  • Ramsey, D.*
  • Saunders, G.
  • Skelton, J.*
  • United Church of Canada, Cambrian Presbytery (J. McLean)*
  • Ward, N.
Ginoogaming First Nation, Long Lac-January 30, 1997
  • Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (K. Dormuth)*
  • Chapais, A.
  • Chapais, N.
  • Chapais, S.
  • Deperry, E.
  • Echum, C.
  • Echum, Gabriel*
  • Echum, Genevieve
  • Echum, R.
  • Finlayson, M.
  • Fisher, E.
  • Fox, C.
  • Gagnon, T.
  • Goulet, N.
  • Knowles, R.*
  • Labelle, E.
  • Mendowegan, J.
  • Meshake, C.
  • Nabigon, B.
  • Rich, E.
  • Taylor, E.
  • Taylor, G.
  • Taylor, M.
  • Towegishig, L.
  • Waboose, A.
Atikokan-January 31, 1997
  • Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (K. Dormuth)*
  • Myata, T.*
  • Nolan, G.*
  • Paradis, P.
  • Pringle, J.
  • Stradioto, J.
Timmins-February 10, 1997
  • Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (K. Dormuth)*
  • Beauregard, M.*
  • Bobula, K.
  • Ciccone, M.
  • Gaudreau, P.
  • Gow, S.*
  • Northwatch (B. Lloyd)*
  • Rastif, A.*
  • Reinsborough, A.*
  • Roland Michener Secondary School, South Porcupine (C. MacRory, J. Romanowsky, C. Torresan, K. White)*
  • Scripnik, G.
  • Ten Days for Global Justice (J. Riesberry)*
  • Timmins Chamber of Commerce (B. Foster)*
  • Timmins Economic Development Corporation (G. Scripnik)*
North Bay-February 11-12, 1997
  • Allen, K.
  • Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (K. Dormuth)*
  • Brown, L.*
  • Canadian Auto Workers' Union Local 103 (B. Stevens)*
  • City of North Bay (J. Burrows, S. Sejatovic)*
  • Doyle, D.
  • Hiner, R.*
  • Nipissing Environmental Watch (P. Walsh-Craig)*
  • Nipissing University (M. Alkins, J. Morris)*
  • Northwatch (B. Lloyd)*
  • Osleeb, D.
  • Patterson, E.
  • Patterson, F.
  • Project Preservation (J. Stewart)
  • Silverman, R.
  • Temagami Lakes Association (J. Hasler)*
  • Thomas, R.*
  • Timiskaming Greens (D. Fraser, L. Panozza)
Serpent River First Nation, Cutler-February 13, 1997
  • Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (K. Dormuth)*
  • North Shore Tribal Council (N. Toulouse)
  • Serpent River First Nation (E. Commanda, K. Lewis)*
  • Sheshegwaning First Nation (J. Endanawas)
  • Union of Ontario Indians (E. Commanda for J. Hare)
  • United Chiefs and Councils of Manitoulin (J. Endanawas)*
  • Wahnapitae First Nation (WFN Resolution read by E. Commanda)*
  • Whitefish River First Nation (G. Francis, L. McGregor, E. Pitawanakwat)*
Port Elgin-February 24, 1997
  • Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (K. Dormuth)*
  • Bruce County (M. McIntosh)*
  • Bruce Township (H. Ribey)*
  • Citizens for Renewable Energy (S. Kleinau)*
  • Nawash First Nation (J. Johnson)
  • Power Workers' Union (L. Keenan)*
  • Saugeen First Nation (R. Kahgee, L. Mandawaub, A. Solomon)
  • South Bruce Impact Advisory Committee (M. Thomson)*
  • Town of Port Elgin (J. Van Bastelaar)
Toronto-February 25-26, 1997
  • Algoma Manitoulin Nuclear Awareness (L. Greenspoon)*
  • Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (K. Dormuth)*
  • Bender, D.*
  • Burt, E.
  • Canadian Academy of Engineering, the Royal Society of Canada (F. Matich)*
  • Canadian Environmental Law Association (K. Cooper)
  • Canadian Radiation Protection Association (M. Walsh)
  • Chippewas of the Nawash First Nation (R. Akiwenzie)
  • Clean North, Sault Ste. Marie Chapter (C. Fernandez)
  • Energy Probe (N. Rubin)*
  • Farlinger, S.*
  • Fisher, B.
  • McBrien, M.
  • Mississaugas of the New Credit (C. King)*
  • NAC Environment Committee and Toronto Women for a Just and Healthy Planet (D. Golden-Rosenberg)
  • Provincial Council of Women of Ontario (G. Janes)*
  • Saugeen First Nation (R. Kahgee)
  • Society of Ontario Hydro Professional Administrative Employees (M. Germani)*
  • Spiritual Healers and Earth Stewards Congregations and Citizens for Renewable Energy (L. Thomson)*
  • Toronto Action for Social Change (B. Birch)*
  • United Chiefs and Council of Manitoulin (D. McGraw)*
  • Veterans Against Nuclear Weapons, Metro Toronto Branch (T. Gardner)*
  • Voice of Women (A. Adelson, E. Pritchard)*
  • Wahnapitae First Nation (G. Rock)
  • Walpole Island First Nation (D. Wrightman)*
  • Young, J.
Oshawa-February 27, 1997
  • Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (K. Dormuth)*
  • Canadian Auto Workers' Union (N. DeCarlo)*
  • Elston, S.
  • Nuclear Awareness Project (I. Koch)*
  • Ontario Toxic Waste Research Coalition (J. Jackson)*
  • Power Workers' Union (B. Menard, D. Milton, J. Murphy)*
  • Ryerson Polytechnic University (T. Jansen)*
Saint John-March 10-11, 1997
  • Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (K. Dormuth)*
  • Bannister, A.
  • Brown, R.
  • Canadian Coalition for Ecology, Ethics and Religion (M.L. Harley, P. Timmerman)*
  • Conservation Council of New Brunswick (J. Abouchar)*
  • Dingwell, Janet
  • Écoversité (M. Morency)
  • Enviro-Clare (J. Slakov)
  • Greater Fredericton Economic Development Corporation (J. Dubé)*
  • People Against Lepreau II (Julie Dingwell, D. Thompson)*
  • Tweeddale, R.*
  • University of New Brunswick (D.H. Lister)*
  • University of New Brunswick (G. Ward)
Trois-Rivières-March 13, 1997
  • Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (A.M. Girard)*
  • Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility (M. Chénier)
  • Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility (G. Edwards)*
  • Hydro-Québec (M. Rhéaume)*
  • Lacourcière, E.
  • Mouvement Vert Mauricie (P. Rasmussen)*
  • Syndicat canadien de la fonction publique (R. Boisvert)*
  • Trudel, S.
Montreal-March 24-25, 1997
  • Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (W. Joubert)*
  • Bak, J.
  • Benoit et associés (F. Benoit)*
  • Boily, S.
  • Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility (M. Chénier)*
  • Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility (G. Edwards)*
  • Canadian Federation of University Women (D. Anderson)
  • Concordia Public Interest Research Group (R. Rowan, S. Sairan)*
  • Groupe de recherche en intérêt public du Québec (S. Guilbeault)*
  • James Bay Committee (T. Holzinger)
  • Julien, R.*
  • Montreal Raging Grannies (B. Siefred)*
  • Mouvement Vert Mauricie (P. Rasmussen)*
  • National Council of Women (C. Sly)*
  • Parent, J.F.
  • Power Workers' Union (R. Dugas, A. Gélinas)*
  • Sealy, A.
  • Siefred, B.
  • Spevack, Dorothy
  • Spevack, Dylan
  • St. Amand, I.
  • Union St-Laurent, Grands Lacs (S. Gingras)*
  • Zadel, A.*
Ottawa-March 26-27, 1997
  • Aboriginal Rights Coalition (D. Berman, E. Bianci)*
  • Algonquin of Golden Lake First Nation (R. Whiteduck)*
  • Assembly of First Nations (O. Mercredi)
  • Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs (A. Orkin)*
  • Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (K. Dormuth)*
  • Campaign for Nuclear Phase-out (K. Ostling, J. Ostroff)*
  • Canadian Chapter of Women in Nuclear (E. Lamothe)*
  • Canadian Nuclear Association (C. Hunt, M. Stewart, I. Wilson)*
  • Canadian Nuclear Society (H. Huynth, K. Smith)*
  • Chippewas of the Nawash First Nation (R. Akiwenzie)
  • Concerned Citizens of Renfrew County (O. Hendrickson)*
  • Dixon, R.*
  • Grassy Narrows First Nation (M. Nelson)Inter-Church Uranium
  • Committee (P. Penna)
  • Metis Nation of Saskatchewan (A. Morin)
  • Missionary Oblates of St. Peter's Prairie (T. Cassidy)*
  • Mississaugas of the New Credit (C. King)
  • Northwatch (B. Lloyd)
  • Nuclear Awareness Project (I. Koch)
  • Ontario Hydro (K. Nash)*
  • Ontario Provincial Council of the Catholic Women's League of Canada (P. Beattie, S. Smith)*
  • Robertson, J.A.L.*
  • Sagkeeng First Nation (L. Morrisseau)
  • Sanger, P.
  • Saveland, W.
  • Technical Advisory Committee to AECL (L. Shemilt)*
  • Village of Petawawa (W. Ramsay)
  • Walpole Island First Nation (D. Wrightman)

Written Submissions Not Presented Orally at the Hearings

Phase I

  • Ability on Line (J. Patterson)
  • Action against Nuclear Waste (K. and B. Chapeskie)
  • Adams, M.
  • Adamson, D.
  • Ager, P.
  • Albarda, H.
  • Arklie, H.
  • Atikokan Citizens for Nuclear Responsibility (R. Hiner)
  • Baird, J.R.
  • Benoit and Associés (F. Benoit)
  • Bonnell, A.
  • Boulanger, L.
  • Brown, W.
  • Catholic Women's League of Saskatchewan (M. Reindl)
  • Centre for Environmental Health (B. Glickman)
  • Chambers, J.
  • Chapman, J.
  • Corporation of the Town of Massey (A. Hobbs)
  • Corporation of the Township of Bruce (H. Ribey)
  • Crane, M.
  • Danko, K.
  • Davies, N.
  • Dodd, M.
  • Draak Family
  • Elder, G.
  • Gamble, A.
  • Gear, P.
  • Gordon, J.
  • Hare, K.
  • Harrison, R.
  • Hutzal, B.
  • Hydro-Québec (R. Emard)
  • Inglis, R.
  • Jasmin, J.
  • Johnson, M.
  • Jolicoeur, V.
  • Jones, S.
  • Kahan, Z.
  • Kam, D.
  • Katsilieris, J.
  • Komeychuk, K.
  • Kruk, L.
  • Lavoie, G.
  • Lawrence, S.
  • Lemieux, E.
  • Magel, G.
  • Mailhot, M.
  • Manker, E.
  • Martinello, T.
  • May, T.
  • McAlpine, J.
  • McDonald, L.
  • McFarlane, M.
  • Meadow Lake Tribal Council (R. Ahenakew)
  • Meyer, R.J.
  • Michalak, M.
  • Mitchell, I.
  • Moore, J.
  • Pacific Institute for Advanced Study (P. Tinari)
  • Parry, K.
  • Patterson, J. W.
  • Phillips, J.
  • Pollard, E. A.
  • Poniecki, J.
  • Robbins, P.
  • Rondot, B.H.
  • Santos, C.
  • Siegner, A.
  • Silvester, D.
  • Sinclair, N.
  • Smith, A.
  • Smolen, P.
  • Sones, R.
  • South Bruce Impact Advisory Committee (H. Thede)
  • Spartalis, J.
  • Steeves, K.
  • Stephens, S.
  • Strnad, J.
  • Sudbury Mines, Mill and Smelter Workers' Union Local 598 (G. Hrystak)
  • Sutherland, J.
  • Swim, K.T.
  • Todd, M.
  • Van der Meer, S.
  • Veitch, S.C.
  • Webb, C.
  • Whitton, M.
  • Yee, M.

Phase II

  • Berg, T.
  • Big Mountain Aktionsgruppe e.V. (B. Muller)
  • Cairnlins Petroleum Services (C. Cochrane)
  • Ceramics Kingston Inc. (R. Sood)
  • Kenora Committee Against Nuclear Waste in Canada (G. Elder)
  • Khanna, S.
  • Lawson, P.
  • Metzger, W. T.
  • Robertson, J.A.L.
  • St. Solange Catholic Women's League (J. Small)
  • Sheppard, J.
  • University of Toronto, Department of Physics (D. Paul)
  • Williams, A.
  • Wolofsky, L.

Phase III

  • Albarda, H.
  • Algonquin of Golden Lake First Nation, Band Council Resolution
  • Armason, G.
  • Association of Professional Engineers of New Brunswick (E. Kinley)
  • Baird, J.
  • Belec J.
  • Bertell, R.
  • Boulter, J.
  • Bruce Peninsula Environment Group (J. Molnar)
  • Canadian Environmental Law Association (M. Swenarchuk)
  • Carcasole, L.
  • Catholic Women's League, Alberta Chapter (M. Cameron)
  • Catholic Women's League, Manitoba Chapter (A. Makodanski)
  • Chawla, K.
  • Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point (F. Jackson)
  • Citizens Environment Alliance (P. Schincariol)
  • Cote, A.
  • deJong, F.
  • Energy Probe (N. Rubin)
  • Forbes, F. M.
  • Froese, D.
  • Garrett, J.
  • Groupe écologiste, Université de Moncton
  • Halton Rape Crisis Centre (B. Le François)
  • Hansen, A.
  • Hansen, H.
  • Hauta, S.
  • Inverhuron and District Ratepayers Association (N. De La Chevrotière, R. Jackson)
  • Knudsen, D.
  • Kowalchuk, B.
  • Johnson, H.
  • Lancaster, K.
  • Lett, S.D.
  • Lin Griest, E.
  • MacDougall, D.
  • Mackesy, F.
  • McAlpine, J.
  • McColm, J.
  • Mendelson, J.
  • Michipicoten First Nation (S. Stone)
  • Miller Guinsburg, A.
  • Narsted, G.
  • National Council of Women (C. Sly)
  • National Farmers' Union (C. Tait)
  • New Brunswick Health and Community Services (K. Davies)
  • New Brunswick Power (A.R. Johnson)
  • Novecosky, P.Oakhill Environment (H. Tammemagi)
  • Ojibways of Sucker Creek
  • Ojibways of the Pic River First Nation
  • PANE (B. McLaughlin)
  • Preston, G.E.
  • Red Rock Indian Band, Band Council Resolution
  • Reed, J.
  • Risk Assessment Society (R. Cheesman)
  • Robertson J.A.L.
  • Rondot, B.
  • Samis, J.
  • Saskatchewan Environment and Resource Management (S. Kramer)
  • Serpent River First Nation (K. Lewis)
  • Sheshewaning First Nation, Band Council Resolution
  • Six Nations Council (W. Staats)
  • Sloan, J.
  • Slomka, J.
  • Strnad, J.
  • Testaet, L.
  • Thessalon First Nation, Band Council Resolution
  • Thompson, B.
  • Todd, S.
  • Treaty and Aboriginal Rights Research Centre of Manitoba (D. Peristy)
  • Trueman, T.
  • University of N.B., Dept. of Engineering (K. Sollows)
  • Uranerz (A. Shpyth)
  • Villeneuve, G. R.
  • Vincent, L.
  • Von Kaldenberg, J.
  • Wahnapitae First Nation, Band Council Resolution
  • Weber, L.
  • West Bay First Nation
  • White, J. F.
  • Whitefish River First Nation (L. Nahwegabbow)
  • Wikemikong Unceeded Indian Reserve No. 26, Band Council Resolution
  • Women of Halton Action (H. Brown)
  • Young, E.
  • Young, J.

Return to Table of Contents

Appendix G - Bibliography of Key Review Documents

Acres International. A Review of Various Approaches Being Undertaken by Industrialized Nations for the Management and Disposal of High-level Nuclear Waste. Niagara Falls, 1989.

Atomic Energy Control Board. Regulatory Guide: Geological Considerations in Siting a Repository for Underground Disposal of High-level Radioactive Waste. Regulatory Document R-72. Ottawa, Septem-ber 21, 1987.

Atomic Energy Control Board. Regulatory Policy State-ment, Deep Geological Disposal of Nuclear Fuel Waste: Background Information and Regulatory Requirements Regarding the Concept Assessment Phase. Regulatory Document R-71. Ottawa, January 29, 1985.

Atomic Energy Control Board. Regulatory Policy State-ment, Policy on the Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities.Regulatory Document R-90. Ottawa, August 22, 1988.

Atomic Energy Control Board. Regulatory Policy State-ment, Regulatory Objectives, Requirements and Guidelines for the Disposal of Radioactive Wastes: Long-term Aspects. Regulatory Document R-104. Ottawa, June 5, 1987.

Atomic Energy of Canada Limited. Environmental Impact Statement on the Concept for Disposal of Canada's Nuclear Fuel Waste. Report AECL-10711, COG-93-1. 1994.

Atomic Energy of Canada Limited. Managing Canada's Fuel Wastes. Report WWM-89-05-01. 1989.

Atomic Energy of Canada Limited. Response to Request for Information. Report AECL-11602-V1, COG-96-237-V1. May 1996.

Atomic Energy of Canada Limited. Response to Request for Information. Appendix A: Lists of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited and Ontario Hydro Publications Relevant to the Topic Areas Identified by the Panel. Report AECL-11602-V2, COG-96-237-V2. May 1996.

Atomic Energy of Canada Limited. Response to Request for Information. Appendix B: Cross Reference Be-tween the Guidelines and the Environmental Impact Statement and Primary References.Report AECL-11602-V3, COG-96-237-V3. May 1996.

Atomic Energy of Canada Limited. Summary of the Environmental Impact Statement on the Concept for Disposal of Canada's Nuclear Fuel Waste. Report AECL-10721, COG-93-11. 1994.

Baumgartner, P., D.M. Bilinsky, Y. Ates, R.S. Read, J.L. Crosthwaite and D.A. Dixon. Engineering for a disposal facility using the in-room emplacement method. Atomic Energy of Canada Limited Report AECL-11595, COG-96-223, Part of Undertaking 58, Additional Information 6. 1996.

Boyd, Frederick C. Acceptability-A Discussion Paper for the Environmental Assessment Review Panel on Nuclear Fuel Waste Management and Disposal Concept. Hull, 1995.

Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency. Compendium of Comments Received on the Adequacy of the Environmental Impact Statement on the Nuclear Fuel Waste Management and Disposal Concept, Volumes 1-2. Hull, 1995.

Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency. Compendium of Written Closing Statements. Hull, 1997.

Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency. Compendium of Written Submissions for Phase I Hearings, Volumes 1-4. Hull, 1996.

Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency. Compendium of Written Submissions for Phase II Hearings, Volumes 1-3. Hull, 1996.

Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency. Compendium of Written Submissions for Phase III Hearings, Volumes 1-4. Hull, 1997.

Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency. Nuclear Fuel Waste Management and Disposal Concept Public Hearing Transcripts, Volumes 1-54. Hull, 1996, 1997.

Davis, P.A., R. Zach, M.E. Stephens, B.D. Amiro, G.A. Bird, J.A.K. Reid, M.I. Sheppard, S.C. Sheppard and M. Stephenson.The disposal of Canada's nuclear fuel waste: The biosphere model, BIOTRAC, for postclosure assessment (R-Biosphere). Atomic Energy of Canada Limited Report AECL-10720, COG-93-10. 1993.

Davison, C.C., A. Brown, R.A. Everitt, M. Gascoyne, E.T. Kozak, G.S. Lodha, C.D. Martin, N.M. Soonawala, D.R. Stevenson, G.A. Thorne and S.H. Whitaker. The disposal of Canada's nuclear fuel waste: Site screening and site evaluation technology (R-Siting). Atomic Energy of Canada Limited Report AECL-10713, COG-93-3. 1994.

Davison, C.C., T. Chan, A. Brown, M. Gascoyne, D.C. Kamineni, G.S. Lodha, T.W. Melnyk, B.W. Nakka, P.A. O'Connor, D.U. Ophori, N.W. Scheier, N.M. Soonawala, F.W. Stanchell, D.R. Stevenson, G.A. Thorne, T.T. Vandergraaf, P. Vilks and S.H. Whitaker. The disposal of Canada's nuclear fuel waste: The geosphere model for postclosure assessment (R-Geosphere). Atomic Energy of Canada Limited Report AECL-10719, COG-93-9. 1994.

Federal Environmental Assessment Review Office. Compilation of Written Submissions on the Draft Guidelines for an Environmental Impact Statement. Hull, 1991.

Federal Environmental Assessment Review Office. Compilation of Written Submissions to the Panel at Scoping Phase, Volumes 1-6. Hull, 1990.

Federal Environmental Assessment Review Office. Nuclear Fuel Waste Database, Volumes 1-2. Hull, 1990.

Federal Environmental Assessment Review Office. Transcript of the Canadian Student Pugwash's Seventh National Conference, Options for the Future, Forum on Nuclear Waste Disposal. Hull, 1991.

Federal Environmental Assessment Review Office. Transcript of the Workshop on the Nuclear Fuel Waste Management and Disposal Concept, Native Issues and Concerns. Hull, 1991.

Federal Environmental Assessment Review Office. Transcripts of the Scoping Meetings on Nuclear Fuel Waste Management, Volumes 1-18. Hull, 1990.

Federal Environmental Assessment Review Panel. Final Guidelines for the Preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement on the Nuclear Fuel Waste Management and Disposal Concept. Hull, March 1992.

Frost, C. R. Current Interim Used Fuel Storage Practice in Canada. Ontario Hydro Nuclear Report N-03710-940052. 1994.

Goodwin, B.W., D.B. McConnell, T.H. Andres, W.C. Hajas, D.M. LeNeveu, T.W. Melnyk, G.R. Sherman, M.E. Stephens, J.G. Szekely, P.C. Bera, C.M. Cosgrove, K.D. Dougan, S.B. Keeling, C.I. Kitson, B.C. Kummen, S.E. Oliver, K. Witzke, L. Wojciechowski and A.G. Wikjord. The disposal of Canada's nuclear fuel waste: Postclosure assessment of a reference system (R-Postclosure). Atomic Energy of Canada Limited Report AECL-10717, COG-93-7. 1994.

Goodwin, B.W., T.H. Andres, W.C. Hajas, D.M. LeNeveu, T.W. Melnyk, J.G. Szekely, A.G. Wikjord, D.C. Donahue, S.B. Keeling, C.I. Kitson, S.E. Oliver, K. Witzke and L. Wojciechowski. The disposal of Canada's nuclear fuel waste: A study of postclosure safety of in-room emplacement of used CANDU fuel in copper containers in permeable plutonic rock. Volume 5: Radiological assessment. Atomic Energy of Canada Limited Report AECL-11494-5, COG-95-552-5, Part of Undertaking 58, Additional Information 72. 1996.

Greber, M.A., E.R. Frech and J.A.R. Hillier. The disposal of Canada's nuclear fuel waste: Public involvement and social aspects (R-Public). Atomic Energy of Canada Limited Report AECL-10712, COG-93-2. 1994.

Grondin, L., K. Johansen, W.C. Cheng, M. Fearn-Duffy, C.R. Frost, T.F. Kempe, J. Lockhart-Grace, M. Paez-Victor, H.E. Reid, S.B. Russell, C.H. Ulster, J.E. Villagran and M. Zeya. The disposal of Canada's nuclear fuel waste: Preclosure assessment of a conceptual system(R-Preclosure). Ontario Hydro Report N-03784-940010 (UFMED), COG-93-6. 1994.

Johnson, L.H., D.M. LeNeveu, D.W. Shoesmith, F. King, M. Kolar, D.W. Oscarson, C. Onofrei and J.L. Crosthwaite. The disposal of Canada's nuclear fuel waste: A study of in-room emplacement of used fuel in copper containers in permeable plutonic rock. Volume 2: Vault model. Atomic Energy of Canada Limited Report AECL-11494-2, COG-95-552-2, Part of Undertaking 58, Additional Information 28. 1996.

Johnson, L.H., D.M. LeNeveu, D.W. Shoesmith, D.W. Oscarson, M.N. Gray, R.J. Lemire and N. Garisto. The disposal of Canada's nuclear fuel waste: The vault model for postclosure assessment (R-Vault). Atomic Energy of Canada Limited Report AECL-10714, COG-93-4. 1994.

Johnson, L.H., J.C. Tait, D.W. Shoesmith, J.L. Crosthwaite and M.N. Gray. The disposal of Canada's nuclear fuel waste: Engineered barriers alternatives (R-Barriers). Atomic Energy of Canada Limited Report AECL-10718, COG-93-8. 1994.

Lura Group. An Issue Paper on the Management of Nuclear Fuel Wastes. Toronto, 1989.

Oakhill Environmental. A Comparison of How Nuclear and Non-nuclear Wastes are Managed and Disposed. Prepared for the Nuclear Fuel Waste Management and Disposal Concept Environmental Assessment Panel. St. Catharines, 1996.

Owen, T. Social Impact Assessment Case Study. Prepared for the Federal Environmental Assessment Review Office. Winnipeg, 1993.

Safety Assessment Management. An International Comparison of Disposal Concepts and Postclosure Assessments for Nuclear Fuel Waste Disposal. Prepared for Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Whiteshell Laboratories, Pinawa. TR-M-43, Undertaking 57, Additional Information 42. 1996.

Scientific Review Group. An Evaluation of the Environmental Impact Statement on Atomic Energy of Canada Limited's Concept for the Disposal of Canada's Nuclear Fuel Waste. Report of the Scientific Review Group. Hull: Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, 1995.

Scientific Review Group. An Evaluation of the Environmental Impact Statement on Atomic Energy of Canada Limited's Concept for the Disposal of Canada's Nuclear Fuel Waste. An Addendum to the Report of the Scientific Review Group. Hull: Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, 1996.

Seaborn, J.B. Consultation with European Authorities on Nuclear Waste Management and Disposal. November-December, 1991. A Report by J.B. Seaborn, Chairman, Environmental Assessment Panel, Nuclear Waste Management and Disposal Concept. Hull: Federal Environmental Assessment Review Office, January 22, 1992.

Simmons, G.R. and P. Baumgartner. The disposal of Canada's nuclear fuel waste: Engineering for a disposal facility (R-Facility). Atomic Energy of Canada Limited Report AECL-10715, COG-93-5. 1994.

Stanchell, F.W., C.C. Davison, T.W. Melnyk, N.W. Scheier and T. Chan. The disposal of Canada's nuclear fuel waste: A study of postclosure safety of in-room emplacement of used CANDU fuel in copper containers in permeable plutonic rock. Volume 3: Geosphere model. Atomic Energy of Canada Limited Report AECL-11494-3, COG-95-552-3, Part of Undertaking 58, Additional Information 51. 1996.

Wikjord, A.G., P. Baumgartner, L.H. Johnson, F.W. Stanchell, R. Zach and B.W. Goodwin. The disposal of Canada's nuclear fuel waste: A study of postclosure safety of in-room emplacement of used CANDU fuel in copper containers in permeable plutonic rock. Volume 1: Summary. Atomic Energy of Canada Limited Report AECL-11494-1, COG-95-552-1, Part of Undertaking 58, Additional Information 60. 1996.

Wiles, Anne. Analysis of Areas of Possible Accommodation Between Pro- and Anti-nuclear Positions on Nuclear Fuel Waste Disposal. Prepared for the Nuclear Fuel Waste Management and Disposal Concept Environmental Assessment Panel. Hull, 1994.

Wiles, Anne. Analysis of Ethical Assumptions Underlying Positions of Pro- and Anti-nuclear Intervenors to EARP Review Scoping Hearings. Prepared for the Nuclear Fuel Waste Management and Disposal Concept Environmental Assessment Panel. Hull, 1994.

Wiles, Anne. Environmental Review of the Nuclear Fuel Waste Management and Disposal Concept. Public Hearings, June 10-28, 1996: Summary of Proceed-ings of Technical Hearings. Prepared for the Environmental Assessment Panel Secretariat, Cana-dian Environmental Assessment Agency. Hull, 1996.

Wiles, Anne. Environmental Review of the Nuclear Fuel Waste Management and Disposal Concept. Public Hearings, March 11-15 and March 25-29, 1996. Participants' Views on Broad Social Issues related to Nuclear Fuel Waste Management. Prepared for the Environmental Assessment Panel Secretariat, Cana-dian Environmental Assessment Agency. Hull, 1996.

Wiles, Anne. Evaluation of the Process Innovations Used in Phase I Hearings on Broad Societal Issues March 11-15 and 25-29, 1996. Prepared for the Environmental Review Panel. Hull, 1996.

Zach, R., B.D. Amiro, G.A. Bird, C.R. Macdonald, M.I. Sheppard, S.C. Sheppard and J.G. Szekely. The disposal of Canada's nuclear fuel waste: A study of postclosure safety of in-room emplacement of used CANDU fuel in copper containers in permeable plutonic rock. Volume 4: Biosphere Model. Atomic Energy of Canada Limited Report AECL-11494-4, COG-95-552-4, Part of Undertaking 58, Additional Information 78. 1996.

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Appendix H - Radiation Hazards: A Review

Many participants expressed concern about the acceptability of the risk estimates made by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). Some felt that history has shown continuing increases in the assessed risk per unit dose (risk factor) and that this process must be expected to continue. Others felt the present risk estimates were unduly conservative and would soon be relaxed.

Participants also expressed concerns about the composition of the ICRP, which has been described as a "self-perpetuating oligarchy." This body was established by the International Congress of Radiology in 1928 and originally comprised experienced radiologists who advised their less experienced colleagues. New members are appointed by the existing membership, as needs dictate, based on relevant research experience and scientific publications. Today, the Commission incorporates radiologists, radiation physicists and radiobiologists with extensive research experience in the biological effects of radiation. This membership enables the ICRP to provide effective guidance on scientific questions relating to the health hazards arising from radiation exposures. However, it also means that the Commission is somewhat insulated from the concerns of many members of the general public, who have no direct representation on it.

The Panel has recognized its responsibility to study all the information brought before it and to state clearly whether it believes the risk estimates published by the ICRP in 1991 (ICRP Publication 60) provide an appropriate basis for assessing radiological risks. This appendix reviews the information that the Panel considered and the conclusions that it reached.

Scientific knowledge of the hazards arising from exposure to ionizing radiation has been gradually accumulating throughout this century, often at the personal cost of the individuals exposed. The Panel appreciates that this is an ongoing process and that many unanswered questions remain.

Wilhelm Roentgen discovered X-rays in 1897, and hospitals quickly began to use them. Tissue injuries due to overexposure were soon reported. By the end of the last century, it became evident that, in severe cases, these were likely to develop into malignancies. Most early radiologists lost thumbs or fingers as a result of holding film holders in position during exposures. Many eventually died from the resulting malignancies.

A similar but smaller-scale story followed the discovery of radium by the Curies. Its use for medical implants to treat malignancies developed quickly, but the need to restrict direct handling of such sources was not fully appreciated until later.

Other concerns developed when laboratory experiments showed that exposures to ionizing radiation could lead to mutagenic effects in fruit flies and, possibly, other animals. Before World War I, the radiological societies of several countries generated detailed recommendations for establishing approved radiation safety practices. Later, the ICRP was established and issued more formal recommendations, which were continuously updated until the start of World War II.

There was, therefore, a substantial and well-developed understanding of radiation risks when the development of atomic weapons began in the U.S. and Canada. Many hospital physicists with knowledge of radiation hazards, particularly those experienced in handling radium, were recruited by the Manhattan Project. They developed techniques for controlling and chemically processing the large quantities of radioactive substances generated by the reactors in which plutonium was being produced. These scientists founded the health physics profession, and established safe procedures for working with the raw products on a very large scale. It was many years before comprehensive data on the risks associated with ingesting or inhaling all these new artificial radioactive isotopes could be generated. Nevertheless, the working practices developed by the scientists responsible for the Project minimized detrimental health effects among the staff working on it, to such an extent that little useful data for establishing a numerical relationship between exposures and risk could be obtained.

When two atomic bombs were dropped on Japan in 1945, thousands of individuals received very large or fatal exposures to radiation. It was quickly recognized that the study of future illnesses among the irradiated survivors would provide a unique source of data on the direct risks associated with radiation exposures. Their offspring could provide similar data about genetic risks to the population. The U.S. and Japanese governments set up the joint Radiation Effects Research Foundation (RERF) to conduct these studies and evaluate the results.

The main problem lay in accurately estimating the radia-tion doses received by the survivors. Since they obviously had not been wearing radiation dosimeters, some very sophisticated procedures were developed to evaluate individual doses. However, there was a limit to the precision these procedures could achieve, particularly at the lower exposure levels. Therefore, the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) has collected additional international information on human radiation exposures on an ongoing basis. UNSCEAR has reported periodically to the United Nations General Assembly since 1958. Virtually all significant data have been collated and reviewed in RERF and UNSCEAR reports.

The RERF studies showed that elevated levels of leukemia among the atomic bomb survivors became evident after about three years, peaked after seven years and then declined to normal levels after 11 or 12 years. It was expected that an excess incidence of solid tumour cancers would appear much later. Scientists anticipated that this would show a similar curve, which would rise more slowly and peak after a much longer interval of perhaps 30 or 35 years. However, the expected peak in observed excess cancers has not appeared; although more than 50 years have now elapsed, cancer incidence among the highly irradiated survivors has remained about two per cent higher than among a control group of non-irradiated Japanese throughout the last two decades. This led to the adoption of what is known as the "relative risk model." This model predicts that the excess risk of solid tumours arising from radiation exposure is not an absolute quantity (as it appears to be with leukemia), but is instead proportional to their natural level of incidence. Since cancer incidence rises with advancing age, this model predicts a larger total number of radiation-induced cancers, although most of these would arise very late in life.

Following these studies, the ICRP lowered the recommended occupational dose limits to avoid the total lifetime risk of death from a radiation-induced cancer being greater than that predicted by the old radiobiological model (regardless of the fact that most of these cancers are now expected to occur later in life, and to lead to a much smaller loss of life expectancy than formerly predicted). The new recommended dose limits, based on average doses over a five-year period, have not yet been incorporated into the Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB) regulations-a fact that was stressed repeatedly during the panel hearings.

The atomic bomb survivors received their radiation dose more than 50 years ago. Estimates of the excess lifetime cancer risk they have experienced will be updated regularly until they have all died. As a result, radiation risk estimates based on these survivors will be revised frequently. However, since most survivors are now very elderly, it is unlikely that this risk estimate will change significantly.

Many participants who do not fully understand why such changes have taken place suggested to the Panel that future large increases in the risk estimates should be expected. The Panel does not accept these suggestions. It also notes that a significantly larger proportion of the bomb survivors studied has remained alive over this 50-year period than would be the case for a similar control group of non-irradiated Japanese with the same age distribution. This means that the bomb survivors actually have a greater life expectancy than their contemporaries. Although cancer deaths among these survivors are, on average, about two per cent higher than for the control population, deaths from all other causes are lower by an even greater percentage.

Many scientists regard this as evidence that moderate doses of radiation can stimulate the immune system and thereby increase resistance to a wide range of other diseases-a view supported by thousands of animal studies reported in the scientific literature-but many other scientists believe such a conclusion is premature. Any increased resistance of the study population to disease may result from better medical care provided to the bomb survivors as a group, or from the early death of those bomb survivors who were constitutionally less strong during the immediate postwar period, before the detailed study of the remaining survivors began.

Since the excess cancer risk remains small even for the most highly irradiated individuals, it is impossible to determine whether the origin of any given cancer in any irradiated individual is related to radiation. Radiation-induced cancer risks are therefore referred to as "stochastic" risks, which can only be expressed as a probability-even if the individuals concerned have actually developed cancers.

There are two difficulties in estimating this stochastic risk from data relating to the atom bomb survivors. Inaccurate data, including uncertainty about the actual radiation doses the survivors received, may make the risk estimate incorrect; and the applicability of data derived from these survivors to workers experiencing occupational radiation exposures may be limited. Whereas the survivors received a single, almost instantaneous, acute radiation dose when the bomb exploded, most occupationally exposed workers slowly build up a significant radiation exposure as a result of chronic low-level exposure over many years. Risk estimates derived from other irradiated populations are needed to confirm the applicability of data derived from the bomb survivors. Many such studies have been undertaken of other exposed populations, including groups living in areas of high background radiation and groups exposed to unusually large medical or occupational radiation doses. Although such studies have been fairly compatible with those of the atomic bomb survivors, either the numbers of exposed individuals or the doses involved have been such that the statistical reliability of the derived radiation risk estimate is lower than for the bomb survivor studies.

To fill this gap, the International Agency for Research on Cancer has sponsored large-scale studies of workers in major nuclear establishments who have received significant occupational exposures over periods of many years. The results from the agency's first study were presented to the Panel during the public hearings. [Bliss Tracey, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearings Transcripts, March 13, 1996, pp. 65-66.] The study combined the data from such workers in three different countries (the U.S., Canada and the U.K.). All the workers involved had been using approved dosimetry devices, so their actual radiation exposures were known with relative accuracy. There was a very small and not statistically significant excess of leukemias among the most highly exposed group, but no excess of solid tumours. Although the numbers involved in this collective international study were sufficiently large to provide reasonable statistical confidence in the results, an even larger study, involving a longer follow-up period and workers from more countries, is now in progress.

In addition, a great deal of data relating to the lung cancer risk arising from high radon levels in homes has now been collected. In general, no excess cancers have been demonstrated. Health Canada conducted a large-scale study in Winnipeg which, if the risks calculated from studies of uranium miners applied, would have conclusively identified an association between lung cancer incidence and radon levels in homes. No such association could be identified. Professor Cohen of the University of Pittsburgh has collected a large amount of data, covering most of the U.S., which strongly suggests a negative relationship between radon levels in homes and lung cancer incidence.

On the basis of these results and other data, many health physicists have come to believe that the linear relationship between radiation exposure and risk adopted by the ICRP in 1949 is not correct and that, in practice, there is a threshold level below which radiation exposures are not harmful but may even be beneficial. In the opinion of the Panel, this belief is not sufficiently supported to justify abandoning the current conservative approach to radiation control. However, it has been tentatively adopted by the Health Physics Society, the largest single organization of professional health physicists in the world.

The theoretical basis for a linear-no-threshold relationship was the demonstration, from radiobiological experiments, that the number of chromosome breaks associated with radiation exposure was directly proportional to the dose. From this it was assumed that, since cancerous cells have experienced chromosomal changes, there would be a risk of cancer induction that would also be proportional to the dose.

It is now recognized that numerous chromosomal breaks occur in every living person all the time, that most of these are repaired, and that damaged cells that cannot be repaired are eliminated by the immune system. The efficiency with which the immune system does this is the primary factor governing the cancer risk experienced by any individual. This risk increases with age, primarily because the effectiveness of the immune system de-creases with increasing age.

Many scientists believe it can be demonstrated in the laboratory that, while large radiation doses depress the immune system, chronic low-level exposures stimulate it. This debate is ongoing among many groups of physicians and scientists who estimate other stochastic risks, such as those associated with environmental chemicals and other factors. These groups have come together in the BELLE (Biological Effects of Low-level Exposures) organization. BELLE publishes a regular newsletter to maintain contact between scientists interested in this problem but working in different fields. It also maintains an Internet Web site that enables those interested to follow some of the ongoing scientific studies.

Most of the scientific information about the carcinogenic effects of radiation on humans has been obtained from studies of people irradiated at levels between 10 millisievert (mSv) and 30,000 mSv. Around the world, the typical annual background radiation dose is about 3 mSv (the EIS quoted an average figure of 2.6 mSv for Canada [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Environmental Impact Statement, p. 35.] ). The ICRP-recommended annual dose limit for additional non-medical exposures of members of the public is 1 mSv (ICRP Publication 60). Diagnostic X-ray procedures may involve local tissue doses of anywhere between about 1 mSv and 30,000 mSv.

The atomic bomb survivor studies showed no statistically significant increase in cancer incidence for doses below 20 mSv, but for doses above this the cancer risk appears to vary linearly with the received dose. The present controversy relates to whether this linear response extends down as far as the lowest doses for which experimental data can be generated. Adequate scientific data to answer this question definitively are not yet available.

AECB regulatory documents require that the annual risk to any individual following the closure of a high-level waste repository be below one in a million fatal cancers and serious genetic effects. On the basis of the linear hypothesis, this corresponds to a radiation dose of below 0.05 mSv per year, which means that any resulting health effects would be so small that they would fall on a part of the response graph far below that for which any experimental data will ever be available. Unless and until non-linearity in the response has been conclusively demonstrated for all types of radiation exposure, this leaves little alternative except to use the linear response hypothesis to calculate a ceiling value for the risk associated with such very small exposures, while recognizing that this is probably a conservative approach. The Panel has therefore accepted that the ICRP Publication 60 radiation risk factor currently provides the most appropriate basis for evaluating the radiological health implications associated with developing a high-level waste repository.

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Appendix I - The Federal Government's Radioactive Waste Policy Framework

The elements of a comprehensive radioactive waste policy framework consist of a set of principles governing the institutional and financial arrangements for disposal of radioactive waste by waste producers and owners.

  • The federal government will ensure that radioactive waste disposal is carried out in a safe, environmentally sound, comprehensive, cost-effective and integrated manner.
  • The federal government has the responsibility to develop policy, to regulate, and to oversee producers and owners to ensure that they comply with legal requirements and meet their funding and operational responsibilities in accordance with approved waste disposal plans.
  • The waste producers and owners are responsible, in accordance with the principle of "polluter pays," for the funding, organization, management and operation of disposal and other facilities required for their wastes. This recognizes that arrangements may be different for nuclear fuel waste, low-level radioactive waste and uranium mine and mill tailings.

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Appendix J - Comparison with Management of Other Wastes

The Panel will also examine the general criteria for the management of nuclear fuel wastes as compared to those for wastes from other energy and industrial sources. In addition, the impact of recycling or other processes on the volume of wastes should be examined.

Terms of Reference

Comparable Wastes

Nuclear fuel wastes are the most concentrated wastes that arise from nuclear electricity generation, but there are others, including solid wastes from reactor operation and decommissioning, and gaseous and liquid emissions. A notable feature of nuclear fuel wastes is that they contain uranium and plutonium that could one day become economically valuable. The most closely analogous wastes from other energy sources-although their potential economic value is dubious-might be ash and residue from coal power generation. These solid hazardous wastes contain heavy metals, some of which are radioactive. However, the combustion of coal and other fossil fuels also releases substantial quantities of environmentally hazardous substances into the air. Comparable wastes from other industrial sources will be dealt with under the broad headings of hazardous wastes and chemical contaminants.

Characteristics

The characteristics of nuclear fuel wastes are described in section 2.1.5 of this report. Some constituents of nuclear fuel and hazardous wastes, particularly heavy metals, remain toxic essentially forever. Some of them are carcinogenic. Radioactivity, which at certain levels is carcinogenic and mutagenic, decreases over time. These periods are short for some radionuclides and very long for others. Gaseous emissions from fossil fuel combustion contribute to global warming and acid precipitation, which have the potential to harm the environment and biota.

In their present quantities, non-nuclear wastes may pose an even greater risk to human health and the environment than nuclear wastes do, but it is not possible to say with certainty which are, overall, more threatening. That question aside, the very long duration during which some elements of nuclear wastes are hazardous, and public perceptions and fears related to nuclear questions, require that nuclear wastes be managed at least as rigorously as other hazardous wastes. Indeed, the "dread factor" related to nuclear matters may well require more stringent standards if public concerns are to be met.

Regulation

The federal government regulates radioactive wastes, including uranium mine tailings and nuclear fuel wastes. The existing Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB) requirements for these wastes are not entirely equivalent to the requirements for managing other hazardous wastes. This is due, in part, to historical reasons: the AECB has been solely responsible for nuclear matters for a long time, whereas multiple federal, provincial and even municipal authorities share the regulatory responsibility for other wastes. In most cases, provincial regulations meet or exceed federal guidelines and regulations. The federal and provincial governments harmonize their regulations through such bodies as the Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment (CCME), which develops hazardous waste management and other guidelines that form the basis of provincial regulations and practice. At the local level, municipal governments set the allowable limits for the discharge of hazardous wastes into their sanitary sewer systems. Even with a certain degree of co-ordination, these divisions of responsibility have led to a rather uneven approach to waste management.

Current Criteria

The principal federal criteria for managing nuclear fuel wastes and, in some cases, other radioactive wastes, are found in the regulations and regulatory documents (R-71, R-72, R-90 and R-104) issued by the AECB. Corresponding criteria for hazardous wastes are found in CCME guidelines, especially the National Guidelines for the Landfilling of Hazardous Wastes (1991); in Environment Canada's Toxic Substances Management Policy (1995); in Health Canada's Guidelines for Canadian Drinking Water Quality; and in commentary by senior government officials and other review participants. Although we did not receive information on criteria for emissions from fossil fuel combustion, we know various reduction targets and regulations exist. Regardless of which regulations, policies or guidelines are consulted, not all the criteria are explicitly stated. Some are implicit in the acceptance of a general approach for managing wastes, and of the quantities of wastes allowed to be produced and managed in that manner.

Both similarities and differences can be found in the criteria applied to different types of wastes. Without attempting an exhaustive analysis, we have noted a few of the more significant ones.

General Management Approaches

While all nuclear fuel wastes in Canada are currently being stored at the sites where they are generated, the long-term management method preferred by the regulator is deep geological disposal. [Atomic Energy Control Board, Regulatory Policy Statement: Regulatory Objectives, Requirements and Guidelines for the Disposal of Radioactive Wastes, Long-term Aspects (Atomic Energy Control Board, Regulatory Document R-104, June 5, 1987), p. 2; and Regulatory Guide: Geological Considerations in Siting a Repository for Underground Disposal of High-level Radioactive Waste (Atomic Energy Control Board, Regulatory Document R - 72, September 21, 1987), p. 5.] This represents a "contain and isolate" approach. Because the sites where the wastes are stored are not necessarily suitable for such disposal, managing the wastes would likely require transporting them to another site.

For hazardous wastes, the increasingly preferred approach is the 4Rs waste management hierarchy (reduce, re-use, recycle, recover), followed by disposal only as a last resort. This preferred approach stands in contrast to past and many current waste management practices. However, the costs of disposal and the difficulty of finding acceptable landfill or treatment sites, as well as public perception, are driving the trend towards waste reduction. The federal government has pledged to reduce the total quantity of hazardous wastes produced in Canada by 50 per cent by the year 2000, using a 1988 baseline measurement. [G.M. Cornwall, Paper presented at the Federal Environmental Assessment Panel for Nuclear Fuel Waste Management and Disposal Concept Review 11 March 1996 on Department of Environment Criteria for Hazardous Waste Management (Hull: Environment Canada, Environmental Protection Service, Hazardous Waste Branch, PHGov.005), p. 4.] In Canada, 60 per cent of hazardous wastes is either landfilled (a "contain and isolate" approach) or discharged to municipal sewers (a "dilute and disperse" approach), while 40 per cent is treated through either incineration or physical-chemical-biological means. [Government of Canada, Canada's Green Plan (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1990), p. 57.] Whichever approach is used, about 60 per cent of the wastes is dealt with at the generation site, while 40 per cent is sent elsewhere. [G.M. Cornwall, Paper presented at the Federal Environmental Assessment Panel, p. 4.]

Priority toxic substances are identified and managed according to the federal Toxic Substances Management Policy. Those that are toxic, persistent and bioaccumula-tive, and that result predominantly from human activity, are to be eliminated from the environment through either a ban or a phase-out. Other toxic substances or substances of concern are to be managed throughout their entire life cycles to prevent or minimize their release into the environment.

Attempts are being made to reduce emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels, but success has been mixed. Surprisingly large quantities are allowed to be released through this "dilute and disperse" approach.

Many participants in our hearings insisted that the 4Rs should apply in the nuclear field. They also felt it was essential to start by decreasing the nuclear generation of electricity in order to reduce or even halt the creation of nuclear fuel wastes. This would entail either significantly reducing overall electricity consumption or switching to other sources of generation. It would be necessary to analyze carefully the feasibility and the environmental and health impacts of switching to alternative sources to determine whether there would be a net benefit. One submission to the Panel indicated that, even with optimal use of renewable electricity sources such as solar and wind power, conventional energy sources would still be required. [Canadian Nuclear Association, Canadian Nuclear Association Presentation to the Federal Panel on Geologic Disposal of Canada's Used Nuclear Fuel (Canadian Nuclear Association, PH3Pub.218, March 27, 1997), pp. 9-10.] Other presenters believed that, if switching were to occur, Canada should move away from coal-fired generation rather than from nuclear generation, for both health and environmental reasons.

As for the rest of the 4Rs, re-use appears to be impractical at present, as the spent fuel cannot be used for any other purpose as is. Recycling and recovery can be achieved, at least in part, by reprocessing and recycling the wastes, as discussed in Appendix L. But this, too, would have many implications. For instance, high-level and other wastes would still require disposal, and mixed oxide (MOX) fuel would have to be fabricated and burned to make full use of the extracted products. Unfortunately, there is currently no proven method of reducing the volume or toxicity of nuclear wastes that is equivalent to methods for treating other hazardous wastes. Research on transmutation may lead to a comparable result, but it is impossible to predict whether a breakthrough in this regard will provide a clear alternative to storage or disposal.

Waste Quantities

It is difficult to predict the quantities of nuclear wastes to be dealt with in the future, since these quantities depend on future policy decisions on nuclear generation and, possibly, the importation of nuclear fuel wastes. Nuclear fuel wastes are currently removed from Canadian reactors at a rate of about 85,000 bundles, or about 2,040 metric tonnes, per year. Assuming that existing nuclear reactors are operated for 40 years, but that no new reactors are constructed, about 3.6 million bundles or 86,000 tonnes of spent fuel will exist in Canada by 2033. Atomic Energy of Canada Limited's (AECL's) reference case study repository was designed to accommodate 10 million bundles or 240,000 tonnes of spent fuel, which represents the amount that would exist by 2035 if nuclear generating capacity were to increase by three per cent per year, or the amount that would exist in 2073 if current capacity were maintained.

The quantities of hazardous wastes greatly exceed those of nuclear wastes. A hazardous waste landfill in the Sarnia area, for example, will contain 7.5 million tonnes when full. It has over 30 times the capacity of the nuclear waste repository in AECL's reference case study, and is only one of three major hazardous waste facilities in Canada. [Hans Tammemagi, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearings Transcripts, June 20, 1996, p. 37.] An estimated total of 5.9 million tonnes of hazardous wastes was generated in Canada in 1991. [George Cornwall, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearings Transcripts, March 11, 1996, p. 171.]

We compared some of the wastes generated by nuclear and thermal energy options. In 1994, equivalent amounts of electricity were produced from nuclear and fossil fuels, each comprising about 19 per cent of Canadian production. Nuclear generation required 1,740 tonnes of uranium [Canadian Electricity Association and Natural Resources Canada, Electric Power in Canada 1994, p. 64.] and produced about 2,200 tonnes of spent fuel (assuming 19 kilograms of uranium in a 24-kilogram fuel bundle); 917,000 tonnes of waste rock; 91,700 tonnes of tailings; 26,600 cubic metres of processed low-level wastes; and liquid and airborne effluents. [Waste quantities estimated according to values given in Standing Committee on Energy, Mines and Resources, B. Sparrow, Chairman, Nuclear Energy: Unmasking the Mystery, pp. 115-116.] Fossil fuel generation required about 46 million tonnes of coal and 5.6 million cubic metres of oil and natural gas, and produced approximately 4.2 million tonnes of ash containing 3,780 tonnes of heavy metals, some radioactive; 21,100 tonnes of escaped ash air emissions; [Ash yields and compositions were estimated according to values given in William R. Baarschers, On the Disposal of Nuclear Fuel Waste (PH3Pub.067), p. 3.] 95 million tonnes of carbon dioxide; 542,000 tonnes of sulphur dioxide; 168,000 tonnes of nitrogen oxide (NOx) air emissions; [Canadian Electricity Association and Natural Resources Canada, Electric Power in Canada 1994, pp. 63-64 and p. 66.] and other wastes. To give an indication of the overall situation, a total of 475 million tonnes of carbon dioxide was emitted from all Canadian energy activities in that year.

Exposure Limits

According to a study recently completed by the Joint AECB Advisory Committees/Health Canada Working Group on Risk Assessment Methods for Chemical and Radiological Hazards, there are discrepancies in the manner in which exposure limits are set for chemical versus radioactive contaminants. While the final report was not completed in time for the Panel to consider it, the Panel did have access to a summary of draft 10. [David Myers, Assessment and Management of Cancer Risks from Chemical and Radiological Hazards .] To begin with, exposure limits for radiation normally refer to the sum from all radionuclides, the total number of which is known, and to all industrial sources and exposure pathways. They are often compared to natural background radiation levels. Limits for chemicals apply to individual toxins, not all of which have yet been recognized, and to natural and synthetic sources combined, but usually do not include all exposure pathways. Since not all chemicals are found in nature, background levels are usually not considered in setting limits. [David Myers, Assessment and Management of Cancer Risks from Chemical and Radiological Hazards, p. 2 and pp. 16-19.]

Risk management practices for both nuclear fuel wastes and chemicals are designed to minimize risks, yet balance the benefits of reducing risk with the costs and feasibility of controls. [David Myers, Assessment and Management of Cancer Risks from Chemical and Radiological Hazards, p. 17.] This is otherwise known as the ALARA principle: exposures shall be kept as low as reasonably achievable, economic and social factors being taken into account. However, the Panel was told that exposure limits for radiation are set such that the ALARA principle is to be applied to achieve exposures that are a small fraction of the specified limits, whereas the limits for chemicals are set to include a form of ALARA. [David Myers, Assessment and Management of Cancer Risks from Chemical and Radiological Hazards, p. 20, and J.A.L. Robertson, Some Additional Comments on Submissions to the Panel, p. 2.] Thus, there remains some inconsistency regarding the precise role of the ALARA principle in meeting or exceeding regulatory limits. For both types of substances, lower acceptable risk levels are specified for the general population than for workers.

As a result of the factors outlined above, as well as the fragmented responsibility for regulation, different levels of acceptable risk are inherent in the exposure limits for radioactive versus chemical contaminants, and even within contaminant categories. According to one interest group, acceptable lifetime risks for all cancers caused by chemical carcinogens range, in general, from a high of one in 10,000, to a low of one in 100,000,000, while those for fatal cancers caused only by radioactive carcinogens range from a high of one in 50 (today's legal limit for artificial public doses of radiation from nuclear facilities) to a low of one in 2,000 (today's Ontario Drinking Water Objective for tritium). [Norman Rubin, Risk Methodology and Criteria for a Nuclear Waste Disposal Facility, Part 4 of Energy Probe's Submission to the Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel (Toronto: Borealis Energy Research Association, March 1, 1996, PHPub.041), p. 22.] They argue even further that the ways used to calculate the figures and apply the limits add more discrepancies between the strict standards for chemicals and the lax standards for radionuclides.

Yet, we also received contradictory information indicating that the limits for continuous water consumption at maximum acceptable concentrations specified in the Guidelines for Canadian Drinking Water Quality correspond to estimated individual lifetime cancer risks of one in 2,500 for all radionuclides combined, versus about one in 1,000 for all designated chemicals combined. [David Myers, Assessment and Management of Cancer Risks from Chemical and Radiological Hazards, Table 4.] And, as we shall see in the next section, the acceptable risk designated for a nuclear fuel waste disposal facility for 10,000 years after closure corresponds to a lifetime risk of fatal cancers and serious genetic effects of about one in 14,286 (assuming a lifetime of 70 years).

Comparison of Disposal and Landfilling

Given the analogy between nuclear fuel waste disposal and hazardous waste landfilling, a more detailed look at the criteria for each is in order. According to AECB regulatory documents, disposal should occur deep underground (R-72); minimize the burden on future generations; not rely on long-term institutional controls as a necessary safety feature; and maintain the annual risk to individuals of fatal cancers and serious genetic effects from radiation below one in a million for 10,000 years after closure (R-104).

In contrast to deep geological disposal, landfilling takes place at or near the surface. Like the regime specified for disposal, the CCME National Guidelines for the Landfilling of Hazardous Waste recommend that a combination of natural and engineered barriers be used to minimize adverse environmental effects; barrier materials be selected according to their compatibility with site and waste characteristics; site assessments include the development of a contaminant transport model; and facility closure be executed in a manner that minimizes the need for further maintenance. [Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment, National Guidelines for the Landfilling of Hazardous Waste (Report CCME-WM/TRE-028E, April 1991), pp. xii-xv.] However, the guide-lines do require some institutional controls in the postclosure period, including maintenance, monitoring and operation of a leachate collection and removal system; environmental monitoring; protection and maintenance of survey benchmarks; site access control; maintenance of facility records; provision of contingency financing; and legal registration of the facility on the land deed or title. [Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment, National Guidelines, pp. xiv-xvi.]

One review participant noted that, generally, unlike the nuclear fuel waste regime, risk assessment and pathways analysis are not required for hazardous waste; rigorous consideration is not given to long-term, postclosure impacts; and design and regulation is focused on a few decades to a century or so after closure, failing to recognize that maintenance is required in perpetuity. [Hans Y. Tammemagi, The Wrong Wastes are on Trial: A Presentation to the Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel (St. Catharines: Oakhill Environmental, PH2Tec.023, June 20, 1996), p. 2, and Oakhill Environmental, A Comparison of How Nuclear and Non-nuclear Wastes are Managed and Disposed (St. Catharines: Oakhill Environmental, October 1996), p. 14 and pp. 31-32.] Hence, it can be said that the CCME recommendations place more emphasis on immediate postclosure controls and less on very long-term safety than those of the AECB, which rule out dependence on such controls in an attempt to ensure long-term passive safety.

These two disposal approaches lead to two types of disposal: either a facility deep underground that does not require maintenance and monitoring and from which waste retrieval would be difficult; or a facility at or near the surface that does require maintenance and monitoring and from which retrieval would be easy. A preference for one type over the other seems to boil down to the interpretation of and importance given to criteria relating to our obligations to future generations, as discussed in chapters 4 and 5.

A Common Approach for Nuclear Fuel Wastes and Other Hazardous Wastes?

Through both our public hearings and a lively exchange of written material, participants asked which criteria were or should be more strict, and whether a common set of criteria should apply to both nuclear and other hazardous wastes. One argument was that nuclear wastes are already subject to more stringent controls than most other hazardous substances, even though they are not more dangerous (in some ways, they are less dangerous, as their toxicity decreases over time). The opposing argument was that nuclear wastes are much more leniently controlled than other persistent toxic substances, and that they should be subject to the same regime, especially to a ban or phase-out. It is unlikely that these differences will be readily resolved, in part because they come from very different views about the future of nuclear energy in Canada.

It would nevertheless be desirable to work towards common methods for assessing and managing risk, as well as common and publicly accepted risk criteria, so that relative risks might be fairly judged, whether they arise from radioactivity or not. At this stage, common methods and criteria have neither been developed nor accepted.

The Panel has learned, however, that the AECB intends to work with Environment Canada and the provinces to establish an approach for regulating environmental protection from industrial radiation sources consistent with that used for other potentially toxic substances, which would include regulating effects on non-human species. To this end, the two federal agencies are conducting an ecological risk assessment of radionuclide releases from nuclear facilities, including waste management facilities, in accordance with the Toxic Substances Management Policy. If such releases are determined to be "toxic," then the agencies would develop regulatory and other options for reducing them, including banning them or phasing them out, in conformance with the Policy. [Patsy Thompson, Environment Canada, Assessment of Radionuclides under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, oral presentation at the Symposium on Radiological Impacts from Nuclear Facilities on Non-human Species (Ottawa: Canadian Nuclear Society, December 2, 1996).] The recently completed study by the Joint AECB Advisory Commit-tees/Health Canada Working Group on Risk Assessment Methods for Chemical and Radiological Hazards may also lead to some convergence in this area.

Lessons Learned

Our examination of the general criteria for managing wastes from other energy and industrial sources did not provide explicit analogues to use in formulating our advice. We have therefore relied more on the specific characteristics of nuclear fuel wastes, and public views on those characteristics. In the course of our hearings, however, we gleaned much useful information about the general management of low-level radioactive wastes and hazardous wastes, and interim storage practices for nuclear fuel wastes. A number of the lessons learned and procedures adopted for good management-safe on-site storage, safe transportation, federal-provincial co-operation, selection of a facility site, postclosure measures, societal aspects and public involvement-should be given close attention when developing policy and procedures for managing nuclear fuel wastes. This information has proven valuable in framing the conclusions and recommendations provided elsewhere in this report.

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Appendix K - International Experience

In reviewing AECL's concept, the Panel should become fully aware of the programs of other leading countries in this field, in particular those countries' consideration of different geological media and their development of appropriate plans and schedules for siting and construction of nuclear fuel waste management facilities.

Terms of Reference

This appendix provides a global context for high-level nuclear fuel waste management and illustrates where Atomic Energy of Canada Limited's (AECL's) concept for deep geological disposal fits into the international consensus on managing wastes. It highlights nine countries' programs for managing nuclear wastes. For specific details concerning the disposal concepts of these countries, refer to Table K-2 at the end of this appendix.

Most countries with significant nuclear power programs are developing a management strategy involving geological disposal of radioactive wastes. These programs and research focus on one waste facility in each country. These facilities are expected to be operational by the first quarter of the next century. To date, no country has successfully implemented a disposal facility for high-level nuclear wastes. The contributions of nuclear power to the total electricity produced in each country in 1995 are shown in Table K-1.

Belguim

Organization

The National Agency for Radioactive Waste and Enriched Fissile Materials (ONDRAF/NIRAS) is a public agency established under Belgian legislation that is responsible for managing nuclear wastes. It will centralize all domestic radioactive wastes at one site for several decades and then proceed to dispose of the material in deep geological formations. Fiscal responsibility for disposal lies with the waste producers. who contribute to a fund managed by ONDRAF/NIRAS.

Primary Concept

In addition to protecting human life and the environment from the risks of radiation, the Belgian management program is designed to maintain the safety of future generations and provide a non-reversible, long-term concept for disposing of high-level nuclear wastes.

Table K-1: Nuclear Power Contributions to Total Electricity Generation in 1995*
Country Number of Operating Nuclear Reactors Percentage of Country's Electricity Generated by Nuclear Reactors
Belgium 7 55.5
Canada 21 17.3
Finland 4 29.9
France 56 76.1
Germany 20 29.1
Netherlands 2 3.7
Sweden 12 46.6
Switzerland 5 39.9
United Kingdom 35 25.0
United States 109 22.5

* "Nuclear Power Contributions in 1995," Nuclear News, June 1996, p. 36.

The Belgian concept involves disposing of wastes at a depth of 200 to 300 metres within the plastic "Boom" clay formation, which underlies the Mol-Dessel nuclear generating station. [F. Decamps, Radioactive Waste Management and Dismantling of Nuclear Facilities in Belgium - General Organization and Implementation, (paper presented at the International Conference for Peaceful Applications of Nuclear Energy, October 1992), p. 22.] The proposed repository is an axial burial configuration consisting of secondary burial galleries that lead to two main galleries. High-level vitrified reprocessed wastes, along with severed spent fuel rods encased in a concrete matrix, will be disposed of in the repository. The disposal galleries will be lined with concrete blocks and vitrified reprocessed wastes will be placed parallel to the central axis of the secondary galleries, surrounded by spent fuel canisters.

Centralized Interim Storage

The Belgian program is based on the principles of reducing waste volumes; standardizing waste packages; and placing wastes in a central storage facility until the responsible parties choose a method and site for final disposal. High-level nuclear wastes will be kept in interim storage for 50 years. Wastes will be collected from nuclear sites throughout the country and transported to the nuclear facility site at Mol-Dessel. At the site, wastes will be standardized, if necessary, then stored in specially designed buildings. The storage facility for high-level vitrified reprocessed wastes at Mol-Dessel was completed in 1996.

Site Selection Process and Public Participation

The site selection process is highly dependent on the geological factors of seismicity, lithology, hydrology, permeability and geometric characteristics. The Belgian Nuclear Waste Management Authorities (CEN/SCK) began compiling an inventory of potential locations for repositories based on these factors in the 1970s. However, they agreed to cease siting investigations and concentrate their repository research and development on the Boom clay site beneath the Mol-Dessel nuclear generating facility. They decided to investigate only one method and one site for disposal because of the advantages of centralizing all high-level wastes under a nuclear facility: land availability, presence of multi-disciplinary personnel and laboratories, proximity to the site and an immediate solution for disposing of reprocessed wastes produced at the reactor.

There is no formal public participation process; however, ONDRAF/NIRAS distributes literature and promotes educational programs on nuclear waste management and disposal.

The current reference schedule for nuclear waste management activities is as follows:

  • detailed study of repository: 2015
  • construction of underground burial installation: 2020
  • burial of non-vitrified wastes: 2035
  • burial of vitrified wastes: 2040
  • closure of site: 2070-2080 [National Agency for Radioactive Waste and Enriched Fissile Materials, The Belgian Deep Repository Project, (1990), p. 4.]

Finland

Organization

The Finnish approach to long-term management of nuclear wastes is embodied in legislation. The two largest utility companies in the nation, TVO and IVO, have formed a jointly owned company named Posiva Oy to manage and dispose of nuclear wastes. Fiscal responsibility for the disposal of wastes has been defined in national legislation. Utilities contribute to a segregated fund overseen by the Ministry of Trade and Industry.

Primary Concept

Because they have limited financial resources for managing high-level wastes, Finnish officials would prefer a joint project with a larger national waste management program over an individual venture. Regardless of these preferences, Posiva Oy is developing a concept for deep geological disposal of high-level nuclear wastes.

The Finnish concept proposes burial of spent fuel at a depth of 500 metres in crystalline plutonic rock formations. The tunnel network will be adapted to features of the local bedrock. [Veijo Ryhanen, "Posiva - A New Company for the Disposal of Spent Fuel in Finland", p. 10, (paper presented at the International Conference on Deep Geological Disposal of Radioactive Waste, Winnipeg, September 16-19, 1996).] Spent fuel canisters will be vertically emplaced and surrounded with a bentonite clay buffer in drilled boreholes in the floors of disposal tunnels.

Centralized Interim Storage

The Finnish program includes an extended period of interim storage of waste fuel, to leave the option of disposal or reprocessing open for discussion; however, the main focus of the management program is deep geological disposal.

Site Selection Process and Public Participation

All potential sites for a repository are situated in crystalline plutonic rock formations. Introductory site investigations were carried out between 1987 and 1992 in five areas. [Veijo Ryhanen, "Posiva - A New Company for the Disposal of Spent Fuel in Finland", p. 10-11.] These sites were analyzed for their geological, geophysical, hydrogeological and geochemical attributes. Results from these investigations eliminated two sites from the five potential host locations. The remaining three continue to undergo detailed characterization studies. Posiva Oy intends to identify a final location by 2000 and commence disposal of wastes by 2020. [Veijo Ryhanen, "Posiva - A New Company for the Disposal of Spent Fuel in Finland", p. 12.]

No formal public review process is planned in Finland; however, the landowner and Posiva Oy must reach an agreement before siting activities proceed. The company encourages local municipalities to participate in its activities and promotes open dialogue by hosting forums and public consultations, and by distributing information in affected community areas.

France

Organization

French legislation states that a government entity, ANDRA, is responsible for the long-term management of radioactive wastes. Waste generators must pay the cost of disposing of wastes, as defined in government policy. The collected monies are not placed in a segregated fund, but will be available when required. The ministers of environment, industry and research will oversee the distribution of these funds.

Primary Concept

National legislation, resulting from a review of the waste management program, requires the construction of two underground research laboratories. Vitrified reprocessed wastes will be placed in these facilities only after a 15-year interim storage period and after the French parliament approves the transformation of the underground laboratory into a geological repository. A nuclear waste negotiator will conduct the site selection process, which will be voluntary.

Site Selection Process and Public Participation

Since 1990, many sites have been screened for a potential underground research laboratory, using geological criteria. Three areas (two in clay and one in granite) with sufficient local support were chosen for preliminary investigations. In the near future, the government will recommend two sites.

Public participation in the siting process takes place through the construction and planning applications. Each permit and authorization is subject to a safety evaluation and public consultation. Project information and the environmental impact statement are made available to the public for comment. A local committee considers these comments and makes recommendations on the applications, which local courts and councils then review. A public hearing can be held to examine the concerns of the local community.

Geological Disposal

The government has decided to initiate site analyses related to geological disposal in various media (granite, clay and salt). It has not developed specific details concerning canisters, vault design, vault sealing and waste emplacement.

Alternative Approaches

The High-level Waste Act 1992 states that research and development programs will be undertaken concurrently to study waste storage in deep geological formations; transmutation; packaging and processes involved in long-term surface storage; and the feasibility of retrievable or non-retrievable disposal in deep geological formations.

Germany

Organization

The German government has delegated authority for the long-term storage and disposal of radioactive wastes to the Federal Agency for Radiation Protection (BFS). BFS will implement the German concept for disposing of high-level nuclear fuel wastes. Under theNational Financing Act, waste generators and the federal government must fund the management of wastes, as required. The Ministry of Environment will oversee these resources.

Primary Concept

Due to the country's high population density, the federal government decided to dispose of all forms of radioactive wastes within deep geological formations. In the 1980s, comprehensive studies were undertaken to compare the feasibility of reprocessing of nuclear wastes and of deep geological disposal. Based on those studies, direct disposal is now the favoured option.

Plans are to dispose of high-level nuclear wastes at a depth of 840-1200 metres in a large salt dome formation at the Gorleben site. [H. Rothemeyer, "The Role of Performance Assessment", p. 4, (paper presented at the International Conference on Deep Geological Disposal of Radioactive Waste, Winnipeg, September 16-19, 1996).] The repository design entails two exploratory driftways, which will be driven to the northeast and southwest of the site. These driftways will be connected by eight cross cuts, and numerous exploratory drifts will be drilled horizontally and vertically in the repository.

Centralized Interim Storage

High-level nuclear wastes will remain in an interim storage facility at Gorleben for at least 50 years before permanent disposal. After such time, a final decision will be taken on the deep geological disposal of nuclear fuel wastes.

Site Selection Process and Public Participation

The siting process explores the sub-surface environment to acquire information to evaluate the safety of a repository. In the initial stages, geological criteria are used to locate suitable sites. Once potential sites are identified, these areas are evaluated for potential health, environmental and socio-economic impacts.

To construct a repository, applicants must seek a "planned approval licence." The licensing body must evaluate the licence application and take into account all interests and concerns expressed by those involved in the project, including the federal government, the implementing organization, non-governmental organizations and local communities.

A public consultation process takes place before a decision is made; however, there is no formal public review process. Only one site, Gorleben, is involved in siting investigations at this time. The German government intends to begin disposing of nuclear wastes at the Gorleben site no earlier than 2012. [H. Rothemeyer, "The Role of Performance Assessment", p. 5.] However, these disposal plans may not succeed because there is significant public opposition to plans for managing nuclear wastes. In 1996, many public demonstrations took place during the transportation of reprocessed wastes to the Gorleben storage site.

Netherlands

Organization

The Central Organization for Radioactive Waste (COVRA) manages and disposes of nuclear wastes in the Netherlands. A joint venture between waste producers and the government, it will be the implementing organization for disposal. Waste producers fund COVRA's activities.

Centralized Interim Storage

All radioactive wastes in the Netherlands will be stored at one location for between 50 to 100 years before disposal. [Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Nuclear Energy Agency, "Update on Waste Management Policies and Programs," Nuclear Waste Bulletin, 11 (June 1996), p. 37.] During this period, the Dutch government will choose a more permanent strategy for managing wastes. COVRA has designed a dry storage system for high-level nuclear wastes and applied for a new permit to construct the facility. Officials feel there is no urgency to proceed to the next step of field investigations and siting activities for a deep geological repository.

Site Selection Process and Public Participation

Local and regional permits must be issued before actual field and site investigations can occur. Public comments are made on licence applications for field investigations, but there is no formal public review of these activities.

Geological Disposal

COVRA has investigated three types of geological formations for a deep geological repository for non-retrievable wastes: rock salt, clay and metamorphic rock. After performing initial research studies, COVRA decided that rock salt had the most favourable geological properties. Research programs concentrated on three particular salt formations: bedded salt, salt domes and salt pillows. The vault layout was based on a conventional mine design. Canisters containing high-level nuclear fuel wastes would be emplaced in boreholes drilled into the floors of galleries. Major decisions concerning canister fabrication, canister material and sealing materials were not made, pending selection of a specific geological medium. However, the Dutch government recently decided that a method that did not permit retrieval was not acceptable. Therefore, the government rejected non-retrievable disposal of nuclear fuel wastes in rock salt and recommended terminating these research activities.

Alternative Approaches

The Dutch program for managing nuclear fuel wastes is designed to be flexible. COVRA is taking a new direction; it is now researching the use of geological media for retrievable disposal of nuclear fuel wastes. By investigating disposal concepts that permit retrieval, continuing transmutation research and storage of wastes at the COVRA facility for an extended period, COVRA is laying the basis for alternative approaches to long-term management of nuclear fuel wastes.

Sweden

Organization

In Sweden, legislation assigns fiscal and technical responsibilities for the safe management of nuclear fuel wastes. The Swedish Nuclear Fuel Waste and Management Company, SKB, is a jointly owned organization established by four nuclear utility companies to meet the legislative requirements for managing and disposing of nuclear wastes. To cover the costs of the management program, the utilities contribute to a fund controlled and overseen by the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources.

Sweden currently endorses a moratorium on building nuclear power plants and intends to phase out nuclear power by 2010. [Claes Thegerstrom, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearings Transcripts, March 11, 1996, p. 187.] The planned nuclear phase-out has helped advance the disposal program. However, the issue of nuclear power is still being debated in Parliament and details on implementing the phase-out have not been determined. A decision on electricity production may not be taken until 2010, and so the use of nuclear power may continue. [Claes Thegerstrom, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearings Transcripts, March 11, 1996, p. 187.]

Primary Concept

SKB intends to implement a safe deep geological disposal option that does not rely on long-term institutional controls. The concept is based on a multiple barrier design (KBS-3), which is not dependent on a single barrier for absolute safety. Final disposal of high-level nuclear wastes will take place at a depth of approximately 500 metres within crystalline plutonic rock. [Claes Thegerstrom, The Swedish Programme for Long-term Management of Nuclear Fuel Waste (PHPub.082, March 1996), p. 3.] The repository will consist of a system of parallel tunnels interconnected to one central tunnel. Spent fuel assemblies will be encapsulated in canisters and vertically emplaced in boreholes drilled into the floors of the tunnels.

The Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI) plays an important role in nuclear waste management. The organization researches and develops alternative waste disposal methods and reviews the nuclear-related activities of other organizations, such as SKB. It is SKI's responsibility to evaluate SKB's disposal concept and to determine its feasibility. To do so, SKI initiated a performance assessment project, SITE-94, in 1992. It completed the final report on the initiative in 1996.

The project assessed the performance of a hypothetical repository located in the Aspo Hard Rock Laboratory, using SKB's KBS-3 design and actual field data. Its main objectives were to determine how site-specific data should be used within the assessment; to evaluate how uncertainties in site characterization would influence performance assessment results; to develop a practical and defensible methodology for defining, constructing and analyzing scenarios; to develop approaches to treating uncertainties; to evaluate canister integrity; and to develop and apply an appropriate quality assurance plan for performance assessments. [Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Nuclear Energy Agency, "Update on Waste Management Policies and Programs," Nuclear Waste Bulletin, 8 (July 1993), p. 29.] After analyzing the performance assessment results, SKI reaffirmed its conclusion that safe final disposal of spent fuel is feasible in Sweden and that the KBS-3 disposal concept is a realistic main choice for SKB's future research and development. Future SKI research initiatives will focus on uncertainties in the area of long-term performance of the canister and the geosphere.

Centralized Interim Storage

SKB has decided to place all forms of long-lived nuclear wastes into interim storage for at least 40 years. This will allow the radioactivity of the spent fuel to decay further and give Sweden time to choose an option for the final disposal of nuclear fuel wastes. The country will not make ultimate decisions on final disposal until the strategy and technology for disposal have been optimized and there is little risk that the method proposed will be an incorrect choice in the future.

After it is removed from nuclear reactors, all spent fuel is currently stored at the Central Interim Storage Facility (CLAB) for at least 40 years. The facility is 30 metres underground in a rock cavern that is reinforced with shotcrete and sheet metal. [Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company, Central Interim Storage Facility for Spent Nuclear Fuel - CLAB, pp. 4-5.] The storage area consists of four water pools lined with stainless steel, with one central pool connected to a transport channel. Each pool can store 1,200 tonnes of nuclear fuel wastes and all handling of storage canisters is done under 8 metres of water. [Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company, Central Interim Storage Facility, pp. 4-5.] SKB intends to expand the storage facility over the next 10 years to accommodate another rock cavern parallel to the first facility.

Demonstration Disposal

A fundamental principle of the Swedish waste management program is that final disposal of nuclear fuel wastes should proceed in stages, with appropriate checkpoints and opportunities for remedial action throughout. A full-scale demonstration repository would be built before a full-sized permanent facility. The demonstration facility would accommodate 5 to 10 per cent of the fuel inventory to be contained in a full-sized repository. [Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company, SKB RD&D - Programme: Treatment and Final Disposal of Nuclear Waste, (September 1992), p. 51.] It will use the concept discussed previously for disposing of nuclear fuel wastes. After an extensive trial period (approximately 10 years) and after analyzing the repository, SKB will decide whether to continue the disposal of wastes and to convert the facility into a permanent site, or to retrieve the containers and seek alternative management practices. If SKB retrieves the containers, it could remove the wastes and return them to the CLAB facility.

Site Selection Process and Public Participation

Local municipalities, nuclear agencies and the government must effectively interact in the site selection process if it is to succeed. SKB promotes the participation of local municipal governments and their citizens in the siting process. In addition, municipalities along transportation corridors and in neighbouring areas are included in the consultation process throughout the siting activities.

The siting process is based on physical, safety, technical, social and legal considerations. During the pre-investigation period of the site selection process, feasibility studies are carried out for those municipalities interested in the repository concept. A steering committee consisting of SKB officials and members of the local communities oversees and reviews the pre-siting studies. Four communities are doing pre-siting and feasibility studies. When these investigations are complete, the municipal councils of the participating host sites will hold referenda on whether to continue the siting process or to remove themselves from further consideration. Communities lose their right to veto the process if the government classifies the facility as nationally important or cannot locate another suitable area.

Six phases constitute the Swedish site selection process: pre-study; detailed characterizations; construction and installation of the repository; commissioning of a demonstration facility; operation; and decommissioning. Two sites in Sweden will advance to the detailed characterization phase, but only one will be selected for a final repository. The following is an estimated schedule of activities:

  • pre-studies: 1995-2002
  • detailed characterizations/construction: 2002-2008
  • initial demonstration: 2008-2020
  • operation: 2020-2040
  • closure/decommissioning: 2040- [Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company, SKB RD&D - Programme, p. 126.]

On May 15, 1996, the Swedish government appointed a national co-ordinator of nuclear waste disposal. The co-ordinator will gather information and technical studies for municipalities involved in siting, and act as a liaison between municipalities and all other agencies involved in the process. With the government's decision to conduct 5 to 10 feasibility studies in the immediate future, the co-ordinator will establish conditions to ensure that these studies are completed and provide potential "feasibility study" communities with advice and information concerning siting. [National Co-ordinator for Waste Disposal, Work Programme for the National Co-ordinator for Nuclear Fuel Waste Disposal, (M1996:C), p. 4.]

The co-ordinator will also clarify the decision-making process in waste management, give all parties involved an opportunity to participate, and help define the roles of government agencies and municipalities at all stages of the siting process. Finally, the co-ordinator will develop various processes for national consultation on waste management.

To ensure the future success of the program for managing nuclear wastes, the decision-making process must remain transparent and accountable. This new direction in Swedish waste management policy is designed to establish a consistent and stable process for siting a repository. [National Co-ordinator for Waste Disposal, Work Programme, p. 4.]

Alternative Approaches

Deep geological disposal is the primary option that Sweden is currently pursuing. It has also investigated two other viable approaches: centralized interim wet storage and above-ground dry storage. The "zero alternative" involves long-term wet storage of wastes for at least 100 years, possibly at the CLAB facility. Sweden plans to conduct a full safety assessment of this option in the near future. The "secondary to zero" option would place wastes at a centralized dry storage facility. The dry storage option is at the initial stages of development and SKB may perform a full safety assessment at a later date.

Switzerland

Organization

National legislation defines the funding and management of nuclear waste disposal. The utilities and the government have formed the National Co-operative for Storage of Nuclear Waste (NAGRA) to manage and dispose of nuclear wastes. Funding for NAGRA activities is provided by the utilities and placed in a segregated fund. The Ministry of Transportation and Energy oversees the fund.

Primary Concept

Switzerland has a small nuclear program compared to other nations; however, it provides approximately 40 per cent of the country's electricity. [Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Nuclear Energy Agency, "Update on Waste Management Policies and Programs," Nuclear Waste Bulletin, 11 (June 1996), p. 48.] The Swiss government proposes to manage its nuclear wastes through geological disposal.

The Swiss concept for deep geological disposal consists of a repository located within crystalline plutonic rock or an opalinus clay formation. A repository in crystalline plutonic rock would be located 1000 metres underground. In a clay formation, the vault would be placed at a depth of 850 metres. [National Board For Spent Fuel, Survey of Siting Practices for Selected Management Projects in Seven Countries, Report 60 (June 1992), p. 52.] In either case, the vault will consist of an underground central area at the bottom of two main shafts. A system of parallel repository tunnels will be excavated at the base of vertical shafts and will provide access to horizontal tunnel arrays. Waste canisters will be centrally emplaced in the horizontal tunnel arrays and surrounded by compacted bentonite clay.

Centralized Interim Storage

All high-level vitrified reprocessed wastes will be held in interim storage for approximately 40 years before disposal. The Swiss parliament is considering the centralized interim storage facility. It is expected that construction licences will be granted in the near future, allowing for the commissioning of the facility in 1999. [Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Nuclear Energy Agency, "Update on Waste Management Policies and Programs," Nuclear Waste Bulletin, 11 (June 1996), p. 49.]

Site Selection and Public Participation

A strictly defined program for site selection and public participation in Switzerland has not been implemented; however, regional investigations of potential sites have been ongoing. A three-phased approach has been developed to select possible host locations. Phase I consists of regional studies of large areas; Phase II entails intensive technical investigations and socio-economic studies of smaller areas; and Phase III provides forin situ and characterization studies with the co-operation of local communities. [C. McCombie, A Phased Strategy Towards Implementation of a Swiss Deep Geologic Repository (paper presented at the International Conference on Deep Geological Disposal of Radioactive Waste, Winnipeg, September 16-19, 1996), p. 35.] During preliminary investigations, a commission will be organized with representatives of the federal government, cantonal governments and locally affected communities, to review and monitor siting activities. Potentially interested host communities will participate voluntarily in the site selection process. These communities can withdraw from the siting process at any stage without penalty. Using this approach, NAGRA hopes to demonstrate the feasibility of siting a repository by the year 2000. [Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Nuclear Energy Agency, "Update on Waste Management Policies and Programs," Nuclear Waste Bulletin, 11 (June 1996), p. 50.]

United Kingdom

Organization

The United Kingdom's approach to waste management is embodied in a national nuclear policy. Various agencies are involved in waste management, ranging from government departments to the private nuclear industry. The Nuclear Industry Radioactive Waste Executive (NIREX) is jointly owned by waste generators and the national government. NIREX is responsible for developing a management program for intermediate-level radioactive wastes. The producers of the wastes must finance the cost of disposal. There is no segregated fund to cover the costs of managing wastes; however, the Ministry of Environment will oversee the allocation of disposal funds. In addition, the Radioactive Waste Management Advisory Committee (RWMAC) advises the Minister of Environment on major decisions concerning nuclear issues. It is an independent multi-disciplinary body of experts which produces annual reports on nuclear activities.

Primary Concept

NIREX is developing a single deep geological repository to accept reprocessed intermediate-level radioactive wastes over a 50-year operational period. The concept would not rely on monitoring and retrievability to ensure the safety of the system. Clay, granite and salt formations have been studied for suitability. Each vault design is based on the geological medium in which the vault would be situated. The designs are similar to other countries' designs (i.e. the Swedish concept for granite, the German concept for salt and the Belgian concept for clay). Currently, high-level reprocessed vitrified wastes will be stored for 50 to 100 years at Dounreay in a concrete vault-type storage facility.

Site Selection Process and Public Participation

During the 1980s, NIREX limited the selection process for a geological repository to 12 areas. Locations were examined on the basis of environmental and geological data. Precise locations were identified for physical site investigations, and two potentially suitable sites-Dounreay and Sellafield-were selected for initial drilling. After completing a public information and local consultation program in both places, NIREX selected Sellafield as the most promising site to concentrate its investigations.

The government has committed itself to full public consultation for all developments, proposals and licensing applications within the waste management program. Nuclear agencies have attempted to incorporate public interests and concerns into their initiatives.

Like waste management agencies in other countries, NIREX proposed to construct an underground rock laboratory to investigate the geology and hydrology of the Sellafield area. The planning application for the facility was submitted in July 1994. In 1995, the local county council rejected NIREX's application for the laboratory based on incomplete surface investigations and scientific uncertainties in modelling and data. NIREX launched an appeal against the county decision and the matter was placed in the hands of the Secretary of State for the Environment.

A public inquiry was held over 66 days between September 1995 and February 1996 to examine the proposed underground research laboratory. Members of the public who participated in the inquiry felt that NIREX withheld scientific information and evidence that called the feasibility of the site into question, and that such information only became available during the inquiry. In its defence, NIREX said it has always made it publicly known that scientific uncertainties existed and remained to be solved. This was one of the motivations for building an underground research laboratory. NIREX claimed that all scientific information, evidence and reports have always been publicly available and discussed at the inquiry.

The inspector presiding over the public inquiry submitted his report to the Secretary of State and reaffirmed the county council's rejection of the application. The following are some of the issues the inspector considered when deciding on NIREX's appeal: the direct relationship between the proposed research laboratory and an ultimate disposal facility; the lack of examination of alternative sites; potential effects on marine and local environments; violations of local laws, policies and regulations; the fact that the local area was too economically dependent on the nuclear industry; the inadequacy of transportation routes and planned infrastructure; negative effects on local non-human biota and habitats; inconsistent and premature application of siting criteria in the siting process; insufficient knowledge of the hydrogeology and geology of the area; and use of inadequate modelling methodologies and tools.

The Secretary of State supported the inspector's decision to uphold the council's rejection of the planning application. He agreed with most of the inspector's conclusions within the report, but he disputed the direct relationship between the proposed research laboratory and an ultimate disposal facility and the fact that the Sellafield area was too economically dependent on the nuclear industry. NIREX accepted the Secretary of State's decision and did not file an appeal. The company has yet to finalize plans for its waste management program; however, the Secretary of State's decision reaffirmed the national policy of constructing a deep repository for radioactive waste disposal as soon as reasonably practicable, once a suitable site is found.

United States

Organization

The management and disposal strategy for civilian nuclear fuel wastes is contained in national legislation. The Department of Energy, through the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM), is responsible for developing and operating geological repositories for civilian wastes and for implementing theNuclear Waste Policy Act. Waste generators contribute to a national segregated fund to cover the costs of the management program. The U.S. Congress oversees the fund.

Primary Concept

The U.S. disposal concept proposes geological burial of wastes, 300 metres underground, in the Yucca Mountain region in Nevada. [John Cantlon, Nuclear Waste Management in the U.S. - The Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board's Perspective, (June 1996), p. 1.] The geology of the site consists of unsaturated welded tuff, a dense form of volcanic ash. The design will resemble that of a large mining complex containing three parallel main horizontal tunnels. These tunnels will contain rooms with boreholes drilled into the floors for waste emplacement; following emplacement of wastes, boreholes and disposal rooms will be backfilled.

By 1998, regulators will decide whether it is feasible to build a repository at the Yucca Mountain site. After the Department of the Environment, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the public analyze all the scientific investigations, the Secretary of Energy will produce a report. It will determine the feasibility of the site for waste disposal and advise the President whether a licence application should be pursued by 2001. [U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, Report to the U.S. Congress and the Secretary of Energy (1996), p. 7.]

Centralized Interim Storage

Long-term above-ground storage for high-level nuclear wastes is becoming an alternative for managing nuclear fuel wastes. By law, the OCRWM will be required to accept nuclear wastes from state utility companies by 1998. [U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, Report to the U.S. Congress and the Secretary of Energy (1996), p. vii.] Because there is no alternative site to Yucca Mountain, nor contingency plans if the site proves unsuitable, Congress is considering an interim storage facility for the Yucca Mountain location. This facility would provide temporary dry storage for the wastes until a permanent site was determined. The construction of a federal centralized storage facility would be deferred until a decision on the suitability of Yucca Mountain for a repository is made. If needed, the storage facility would be built and operational by 2010. [U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, Report to the U.S. Congress and the Secretary of Energy (1996), p. 48.]

Site Selection Process and Public Participation

Amendments made to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act in 1987 suspended all site investigations throughout the United States and focused all activities at the Yucca Mountain site. There is no formal public participation mechanism in the nuclear management program. Public comment is sought only during the review of the environmental impact statement before a licence is granted for the repository. Ultimately, the NRC makes all decisions concerning the management of nuclear fuel wastes and the disposal site.

Alternative Approaches

With the uncertainty of the Yucca Mountain project at this time, the United States government is preparing alternatives for managing its inventory of nuclear fuel wastes. The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), located in New Mexico, is evaluating the safe disposal of military wastes in salt beds at a depth of 655 metres. [George Dials, The Current Strategy for Safe Management and Disposal of Transuranic Radioactive Waste in the U.S.A . (paper presented at the International Conference on Deep Geological Disposal of Radioactive Waste, Winnipeg, September 16-19, 1996), p.7.] Wastes would be transported to WIPP in shielded casks of carbon steel, then placed in one of the boreholes in the facility's walls and sealed. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) are currently conducting a review to determine whether the WIPP facility can demonstrate postclosure safety that would meet international standards for disposing of civilian radioactive fuel wastes.

Observations

According to 1995 figures, there are more than 430 operating nuclear power stations in 30 countries. ["Nuclear Power Contributions in 1995", Nuclear News (June 1996): 36.] Plans for permanent geological disposal facilities are not limited to the countries with the most advanced economies; however, these countries have made the greatest investment in research, so their programs were discussed in the earlier part of this appendix. In most cases, published proposals from less wealthy countries in Asia, South America and Eastern Europe involve developing a deep geological disposal site not unlike that proposed by Canada. Some of these countries favour deposition in granite, but most have chosen salt as the preferred medium. The one country that currently favours long-term storage is South Korea.

Demonstration disposal projects and centralized interim storage are two fundamental elements of various national programs for managing wastes. These steps in the waste disposal process make management programs flexible and robust and allow authorities adequate time to make sound decisions.

A demonstration disposal project will ensure that Sweden can implement its waste disposal program in a step-wise manner. In addition, establishing the Central Interim Storage Facility has allowed SKB to reflect on the direction of its disposal program, to incorporate new information obtained from concurrent research and development programs into the final disposal concept, and to consider long-term storage if demonstration disposal proves unsuitable.

For Finland, the Netherlands and Switzerland-countries with relatively small nuclear programs and minimal volumes of wastes-centralized interim storage is an attractive alternative. The storage period for wastes at these facilities is roughly 40 to 100 years. As in Sweden, this management approach allows governments to take more time to make decisions concerning final disposal and even to discuss joint disposal projects with other countries. France has taken an unique approach to waste management by opting to build an underground research facility first and then to determine its feasibility as a geological repository. However, these countries feel there is no urgency to move to deep geological disposal, or even to begin siting investigations. They believe centralized interim storage provides an adequate solution for waste management at least for the intermediate term.

Currently Belgium, Germany and the United States are concentrating exclusively on deep geological disposal. Each is examining only one location for potential repositories. The United States does not have any contingency plans in the event that the Yucca Mountain site is deemed unsuitable for waste disposal. Recently, the U.S. Congress began considering the possibility of building a central interim storage facility at Yucca Mountain. However, the OCRWM continues to advocate final deep geological disposal at Yucca Mountain, even after a period of interim storage.

In the U.K., NIREX's Sellafield experience clearly illustrated the importance of early public involvement in waste management and the siting process. Without two-way communication between the local community of a selected site and the company responsible for managing wastes, irreparable problems can arise. To build confidence in the site selection process and to avoid accusations of "suppressing" information, the nuclear industry must give the public open access to all available information related to managing wastes.

The international scientific community shares research that influences individual national programs, including Canada's. AECL's concept is similar to other countries' initiatives in the field of nuclear waste management. Although different countries use various geological media, the generic characteristics of deep geological disposal of canisters of wastes in a vault are consistent throughout most national programs. The Canadian management program has not been developed in isolation, but in an environment of extensive exchange of information within the international scientific and technical community.

The Canadian waste management program is unique among national programs because an environmental assessment and a public review of deep geological disposal have been conducted at the stage of concept development. The federal government has stated that no site would be selected for a disposal facility until the concept had been approved. The Canadian program is also unusual because there is currently no national legislation assigning technical and fiscal responsibilities for managing and disposing of nuclear fuel wastes.

Table K-2: International Waste Management Programs
Country Primary Concept for the Long-term Management of Nuclear Fuel Wastes Unique Characteristics of the Program for Managing Nuclear Fuel Wastes Plans and Schedules for Siting and Constructing Facilities Alternative Approaches to Long-term Nuclear Fuel Waste Management
Belgium

Geological medium: deep geological disposal in plastic "Boom" clay

Depth: 200-300 m

Wastes: high-level vitrified reprocessing wastes and spent fuel rods

Vault design: main access galleries with three disposal galleries

Emplacement method: vitrified wastes placed parallel in central axis of disposal galleries and spent fuel positioned around it (disposal will be irreversible)

Container and lifetime: carbon steel, titanium and nickel alloys with a minimum lifetime of 500 years

Buffer: galleries lined with concrete blocks

Backfill: compacted bentonite clay or dried Boom clay

Sealing: bentonite clay or cement

Centralized interim storage

- a building for the interim storage of vitrified reprocessing high-level wastes will be completed at Mol-Dessel

- wastes will be stored for a minimum 50-year period

Implementing organization

- ONDRAF/NIRAS is a public agency established under legislation to manage and dispose of nuclear wastes

- waste producers contribute to a fund managed by ONDRAF to cover the costs of managing wastes

Siting process and public participation

- the process is based largely on geological factors

- there is no formal public participation process

- all domestic waste operations are to be centralized under one site, the Mol-Dessel nuclear facility

- advantages of the Mol-Dessel site include land availability, presence of multi-disciplinary personnel and laboratories, and an immediate solution for the disposal of reprocessing wastes produced at the site

Schedule of activities

- detailed study of the facility: 2015

- construction of the underground facility: 2020

- burial of non-vitrified wastes: 2035

- burial of vitrified wastes: 2050

- closure: 2070-2080

 
Finland

Geological medium: deep geological disposal in crystalline bedrock

Depth: 500 m

Wastes: spent fuel assemblies

Vault design: adapted to bedrock conditions

Emplacement method: canisters vertically placed in boreholes in the floors of tunnels

Container and lifetime: copper shell (60 mm) with an inner steel container (55 mm) with a lifetime of up to one million years

Buffer: bentonite lined with concrete blocks

Backfill: bentonite and sand mixture

Sealing: bentonite clay

Centralized interim storage

- there will be an extended period of interim storage of waste fuel

- this allows for pre-processing and direct deep geological disposal

Implementing organization

- Posiva Oy is a company jointly owned by two utility companies, TVO and IVO

- Posiva Oy is responsible for disposing of and managing nuclear wastes

- utilities contribute to a segregated fund overseen by the Ministry of Trade and Industry to cover the costs of managing wastes

Site selection process and public participation

- the process consists of geological, geophysical, hydrogeological and geochemical studies

- there is no formal public review process; however, the landowner and Posiva Oy must agree before siting activities begin

- local municipalities are encouraged to participate in open forums and public consultations, and to acquire information in affected communities

Schedule of activities

- initial site investigations: 1987-1992 (five sites)

- detailed site investigations: 1993 (three sites)

- final site selection: 2000

- disposing of material: 2020

- seek international aid in management services
France

- national legislation resulting from a review of the waste management program requires the construction of two underground research laboratories

- placement of vitrified reprocessed wastes will only occur after a 15-year interim storage period and approval by the French parliament to transform the underground laboratory into a geological repository

 

Implementing organization

- ANDRA, a national government organization, manages radioactive wastes

- waste generators are responsible for the disposal costs of vitrified reprocessed wastes

- funds will be available when required and will be overseen by the ministries of industry, environment and research

Site selection process and public participation

- sites for an underground research laboratory are screened on a geological criteria basis

- local support in three areas triggered preliminary investigations

- in the future, the government will recommend two sites for a research facility

- all construction and planning applications have a public consultation and comment period

Geological disposal

- the government plans to initiate site analysis for a possible geological repository in various media (granite, clay and salt)

- specific details concerning the canister, vault design, vault sealing and waste emplacement have not been fully developed

Alternative approaches

- under the High-level Waste Act 1992, regulators will research and develop storage in deep geological formations; transmutation; the packaging and process involved in long-term surface storage; and the feasibility of retrievable or non-retrievable disposal in deep geological formations

Germany

Geological medium: deep geological disposal in salt dome (140 m thick)

Depth: 840-1200 m

Wastes: spent fuel assemblies and vitrified reprocessing wastes

Vault design: two exploratory driftways with several connecting drifts

Emplacement method: canisters vertically placed in boreholes in the floors of drifts; vitrified wastes placed along drifts

Container and lifetime: cast-iron casks for spent fuel; steel containers for vitrified wastes

Backfill: salt, cement or excavated rock

Centralized interim storage

- high-level wastes will be stored at an interim storage facility at Gorleben for at least 20 years until a final decision is taken on disposal

Implementing organization

- the Federal Agency for Radiological Protection (BFS) disposes of and manages nuclear wastes

- waste producers and the federal government will supply the funds for managing wastes when required

- the Ministry of the Environment would oversee the funds

Site selection process and public participation

- the process explores the subsurface environment to acquire information to evaluate safety of a repository

- geological criteria are used initially in the selection process, and suitable sites are evaluated for health, environmental and socio-economic impacts

- the project requires a "planned-approval licence for repository"

- the governing licensing body evaluates and weighs all interests in the project (government, private sector, NGOs and local communities)

- the public consultation process is to be completed before a decision is made

- there is no formal public review process

- only one site in Germany is being considered

Schedule of activities

- disposal of nuclear wastes: 2020

 
Nether-lands  

Centralized interim storage

- all radioactive wastes are to be stored at one location for a period of 50 to 100 years

- during this period, the government will choose a more permanent waste management strategy

Implementing organization

- the Central Organization for Radioactive Waste (COVRA) manages and disposes of nuclear wastes

- this company is a collaborative effort of the waste producers and the government

- waste producers fund COVRA's activities

Site selection process and public participation

- the siting process includes issuing local and regional permits before actual field investigations

- the public can comment on licence applications for field investigations, but there is no formal public review process

Schedule of activities

- application for permit to construct high-level waste storage facility: 1996

Geological disposal

- retrievable deep geological disposal in various geological media was considered

- it would have used a conventional mine layout

- vitrified reprocessing wastes would have been emplaced

- canisters would have been vertically placed in boreholes, in floors of tunnels

Alternative approaches

- research continues into other geological media for retrievable disposal

- research continues into transmutation and long-term surface storage of wastes

Sweden

Geological medium: deep geological disposal in crystalline rock

Depth: approximately 500 m

Wastes: spent fuel assemblies

Vault design: main tunnel interconnected to parallel tunnels

Emplacement method: vertically in boreholes in floors of tunnels

Container and lifetime: copper shell (50 mm); cast steel inner composite (50 mm) filled with quartz sand, lead shot or glass beads; and a lifetime of up to one million years

Buffer: bentonite clay

Backfill: compacted bentonite clay

Sealing: bentonite plugs

Centralized interim storage

- spent fuel is currently stored at the Central Interim Storage Facility (CLAB) for at least 40 years following removal from nuclear reactors

- CLAB is located in a rock cavern 30 m underground

- CLAB contains four stainless steel-lined storage pools, with one central pool connected to a transport channel

- expansion is planned over the next 10 years

Demonstration disposal

- a demonstration repository (5-10% of a regular facility) is to be built before a full-sized repository

- after a trial period, regulators will decide whether the deposited wastes will be retrieved for alternative treatment or returned to CLAB, or whether the facility will be converted into a permanent site

Implementing organization

- nuclear power companies have formed a jointly owned company, SKB, to dispose of and manage nuclear wastes

- utilities contribute to a segregated fund controlled and overseen by the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources to cover the costs of managing wastes

Siting process and public participation

- the process is based on physical, safety, technical, social and legal considerations

- it includes municipal government and all affected communities (including those along the transportation route and neighbouring communities)

- four sites are in various stages of the process, such as pre-studies and feasibility studies

- a steering committee of SKB officials and members of the local community oversees the siting studies

- upon completion of the initial pre-studies, the municipal council of the potential host site will hold a referendum on whether to continue the siting process

- communities lose their right to veto the process if the facility cannot be situated in another area and if the facility is classified as nationally important

- detailed characterizations of two sites will be done and a final site chosen by the year 2002

Schedule of activities

- siting: 1995-2002

- detailed characterization and construction: 2002-2008

- demonstration operation: 2008-2020

- operation: 2020-2040

- closure and decommissioning: 2040-

"Zero alternative"

- this would entail long-term interim wet storage that would be prolonged for at least 100 years, possibly at the CLAB facility

- a full safety assessment is planned for this option

"Secondary to zero option"

- this would entail dry storage at a designated facility

- it is currently in the initial stages of development

- the SKB may perform a full safety assessment in the future

Switzer-land

Geological media: deep geological disposal in crystalline or sedimentary rocks (Opalinus clay)

Depth: 1000 m in crystalline rock; 850 m in Opalinus clay

Wastes: vitrified reprocessing wastes

Vault design: underground central area with parallel tunnels

Emplacement method: canisters horizontally placed in tunnel arrays

Container and lifetime: self-supported cast carbon steel shell (25 cm) with a minimum lifetime of 1000 years

Buffer: bentonite

Backfill: bentonite blocks, or bentonite and sand mixture

Centralized interim storage

- vitrified reprocessing wastes are to be held in interim storage for approximately 40 years before disposal

- specific projects are under way to provide the required intermediate facilities

Implementing organization

- the utilities have jointly formed the National Co-operative for Storage of Nuclear Waste (NAGRA) to manage and dispose of nuclear wastes

- waste producers contribute to a segregated fund overseen by the Ministry of Transportation and Energy to cover the costs of managing wastes

Site selection and public participation

- a strictly defined program has not been established

- regional investigations of potential sites have been ongoing using a three-phase approach (regional studies, intensive technical and socio-economic studies of smaller areas, in situstudies with local community participation)

- during preliminary investigation, a commission is set up with representatives from government, canton governments and locally affected communities to review and monitor activities

- the process is voluntary and allows communities to withdraw from the siting process at any stage

Schedule of activities

- centralized intermediate storage facility application: 1995

- construction licences: 1996

- commissioning of the facility: 1999

- demonstration of the feasibility of siting: 2000

 
United Kingdom

Geological media: clay, granite and salt

Wastes: intermediate-level vitrified reprocessing wastes

Vault design: based on Belgian concept for clay, Swedish concept for granite and German concept for salt

 

Implementing organization

- the Nuclear Industry Radioactive Waste Executive (NIREX), jointly owned by waste generators and the national government, is responsible for developing a management program for intermediate-level radioactive wastes

- waste generators are responsible for financing the costs of disposal

- there is no segregated fund to cover costs; the funds will be made available when necessary and the Ministry of the Environment will oversee their allocation

Site selection and public participation

- during the 1980s, NIREX limited the site selection process to two sites, Dounreay and Sellafield

- Sellafield was chosen as the most promising site to concentrate research investigations

- in 1994, NIREX submitted a planning application to build a underground rock laboratory to conduct research in the Sellafield area

- in 1995, the local county council rejected the proposal and NIREX appealed the decision before the Secretary of State for the Environment

- a public inquiry into this issue was held over a six-month period from 1995 to early 1996

- a report was submitted to the Secretary of State reaffirming the county's decision to reject the proposal

- the Secretary of State supported the report's recommendations and NIREX accepted the decision

Schedule of activities

- in 1997, the Secretary of State for the Environment reaffirmed the national policy to construct a deep repository for intermediate-level radioactive waste disposal as soon as reasonably practicable once a suitable site is found

 
United States

Geological medium: geological disposal in porous and non-porous tuff (dense volcanic ash)

Depth: 300 m

Wastes: vitrified reprocessing wastes and spent fuel

Vault design: mining configuration with three parallel horizontal tunnels

Emplacement method: canisters vertically placed in boreholes in the floors of rooms

Container and lifetime: no decision (titanium, copper/iron, stainless steel and nickel materials are being investigated)

Backfill: no decision (cement mixtures, solid and liquid metal, and glass are being investigated)

 

Implementing organization

- the Department of Energy includes the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM), which manages and disposes of civilian nuclear fuel wastes

- waste generators contribute to a national segregated fund to cover the costs of the management program

- the U.S. Congress oversees the fund

Site selection process and public participation

- no alternative site or contingency plans exist in the event the site is found to be unsuitable

- there is no formal public participation mechanism

- states, Aboriginal communities and other stakeholders provide input into the process but have no authority in decision-making

Schedule of activities

- regulators will continue to build the Exploratory Studies Facility

- termination of investigations on multi-purpose canisters, transport canisters and generic transportation work: 1996

- completion of the U-shaped tunnel loop and two access tunnels from the main loop to a fault zone: 1997

- a decision on the viability of the Yucca Mountain site: 1998

- disposal of wastes at Yucca Mountain, if the site is suitable: 2010-

Storage facility at Yucca Mountain

- Congress will make a decision by 1998

- site would include a centralized storage and transport system

Long-term above-ground storage and centralized monitored retrievable storage (surface and subsurface)

- a monitored facility with retrievable storage could prepare spent fuel for transport to a permanent repository

Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)

- the plant is located in New Mexico

- it is evaluating the safe disposal of military radioactive wastes in salt beds at a depth of 655 m

- wastes would be transported to WIPP in shielded casks of carbon steel, placed in one of the boreholes in the facility's walls and sealed

- an OECD/NEA review to determine if the WIPP facility could demonstrate postclosure safety is currently underway

Return to Table of Contents

Appendix L - Various Approaches to Long-Term Management of Nuclear Fuel Wastes

It will examine AECL's proposed concept along with other approaches for nuclear fuel waste disposal being developed elsewhere in the world. . . . In its review, the Panel will take into consideration the various approaches to the long-term management of nuclear fuel wastes which are presently being stored at reactor sites. These long-term management approaches include long-term storage with a capability for continuing intervention in the form of monitoring, retrieval and remedial action; and the transition from storage to permanent disposal.

Terms of Reference

Elsewhere, the Terms of Reference also instruct the Panel to examine "the impact of recycling or other processes on the volume of wastes." Since treatments such as reprocessing, recycling and transmutation could form part of a long-term strategy for managing wastes, we examine them below, alongside the other options.

We were not asked to propose a different method for long-term management of spent nuclear fuel, but to be aware of the alternatives when formulating recommendations on the safety and acceptability of AECL's concept and on future steps. However, judging the safety and acceptability of one method selected in 1978, rather than deciding which of the feasible options available today was the most safe and acceptable, was problematic for both the Panel and the public.

Some participants felt that it was inappropriate or even impossible to gauge the acceptability of one option without information adequate to compare its acceptability with that of all possible options. In the words of a U.S. National Research Council panel reviewing the management of nuclear defence wastes in that country, "it is unsuitable to foreclose any technology or alternative before the various benefits, risks, and costs have been thoroughly delineated and carefully reviewed." [National Research Council, 1992, cited in Committee on Remediation of Buried and Tank Wastes, Board on Radioactive Waste Management, Barriers to Science: Technical Management of the Department of Energy Environmental Remediation Program (Washington: National Research Council, 1996), p. 9.] One participant reasoned that, since there is no good solution to the waste problem at present, "we are going to have to choose a least bad option rather than a good one." [Ann Coxworth, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearings Transcripts, March 11, 1996, p. 340.] Other participants argued that it was unfair and unethical to evaluate a waste management option without examining the pros and cons of the entire nuclear fuel cycle and comparing them to those of other energy options. They also felt the Panel should address questions related to continuing nuclear power generation and to importing foreign mixed oxide (MOX) fuel or fuel wastes.

The panel's attempts to obtain information on each of the approaches, at levels of detail sufficient to permit meaningful comparisons with the AECL concept, were not entirely successful. The lack of social research and information relevant to the various approaches was particularly marked. In some cases, information did not exist or was not readily available. In other cases, participants may have been reluctant to provide it. This hesitation may have stemmed in part from the perception that, since governments had already opted to pursue disposal in plutonic rock, there was no sense in going over other options. Clearly, governments had only given AECL and Ontario Hydro the mandate to focus on deep geological disposal and interim storage, so AECL and Ontario Hydro had no obvious incentive to supply information on other approaches. Nonetheless, AECL did provide some detail on other approaches in chapters 2 and 8 of the EIS, in one of its additional information documents, [Safety Assessment Management, An International Comparison of Disposal Concepts and Postclosure Assessments for Nuclear Fuel Waste Disposal (report prepared for Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Whiteshell Laboratories, Pinawa, TR-M-43, Undertaking 57, Additional Information 42, 1996).] and in response to specific requests from the Panel. The Hare Report, although somewhat dated, and participants' submissions and presentations were also useful.

The various approaches to the long-term management of used nuclear fuel can be viewed as falling into one of three overall types-treatment, storage or disposal-or some combination thereof. Our attention will first turn to treatment.

Treatment

The key treatment approaches that have come to the panel's attention are recycling and transmutation, both of which require reprocessing in advance. These are discussed, not only in the EIS, but also in section 2.3 and Appendix A of R-Barriers.

Reprocessing and Recycling

Reprocessing is a chemical separation process used to extract valuable materials, such as plutonium and uranium, from spent nuclear fuel. One or both of the extracted materials can then be recycled by fabricating them into fresh enriched uranium or mixed oxide (MOX) fuels. The process results in high- and low-level radioactive waste products and can result in excess quantities of separated plutonium and uranium that require storage. The high-level liquid wastes are immobilized by incorporating them into a solid host matrix. For instance, they can be immobilized through vitrification, which involves dissolving them in molten glass and casting them into a solid block. The low-level wastes come in various physical states and also require immobilization. While the immobilized wastes represent a smaller long-term radioactive hazard than the original spent fuel, they still require storage or disposal.

In the EIS, AECL compared the volumes of wastes requiring disposal if 63,400 CANDU fuel bundles were disposed of directly and if they were reprocessed. For direct disposal in the reference case study containers, the total volume of filled containers would be 622 cubic metres. Reprocessing would produce 107 cubic metres of containers filled with vitrified high-level wastes, 746 cubic metres of less radioactive wastes, 185 cubic metres of separated uranium and an unspecified volume of low-activity liquids. Further developments in technology could reduce the vitrified waste volumes from 107 cubic metres to about 21 cubic metres and the volumes of less radioactive wastes from 746 cubic metres to about 135 cubic metres. Thus, waste volumes could be reduced at best from 622 cubic metres to 156 cubic metres overall, and from 622 cubic metres to 21 cubic metres for high-level wastes only, if the separated uranium was recycled into new fuel. While these estimates are quite promising, AECL points out that the inventory of heat-generating fission products in the high-level vitrified wastes would not be reduced. Given thermal design constraints, the size of the disposal vault required for the vitrified wastes alone would be about the same as for direct disposal of the spent fuel. [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Environmental Impact Statement, pp. 31-32.]

Reprocessing and recycling raise a number of unanswered questions. How would the less radioactive wastes be disposed of? Where would a reprocessing plant be located and what would its effects be? What are the implications of burning enriched uranium or mixed oxide (MOX) fuels? To what degree would these processes increase the exposure of workers and the public? How safe would the handling and disposal of all the products be? For example, short-term experiments by AECL on solidified high-level waste forms indicate that contaminants would dissolve very slowly. However, the long-term performance of solidified wastes is not yet well understood. [L.H. Johnson et al, R-Barriers, p. 45 and p. 341.] A recent AECL long-term comparative safety assessment of the radionuclide release rates of Scottish spent fuel and derived vitrified reprocessing wastes found that release rates were greater for vitrified wastes, even for radionuclides whose initial inventories were much lower in the vitrified wastes. For some radionuclides, release rates were greater by up to six orders of magnitude. [P. McKay, D.S. Kendall, E.G. Watt and D.M. Wuschke, "Assessment of the direct disposal of spent AGR fuel," in S. Slate, F. Feizollahi and J. Creer, editors, Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Radioactive Waste Management and Environmental Remediation ICEM '95, Volume 1, Cross-cutting Issues and Management of High-level Waste and Spent Fuel (Undertaking 61, Additional Information 73), pp. 215-219.]

Reprocessing is carried out in India, Russia, Japan, the United Kingdom and France; the latter two countries also do it on a commercial basis for several other countries. In total, between 25 per cent and 30 per cent of the spent fuel produced world-wide is expected to be reprocessed. [B.A. Semenov, "Disposal of spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste: Building international consensus," IAEA Bulletin, Volume 34, Number 3 (1992), pp. 2-6, cited in Safety Assessment Management, An International Comparison of Disposal Concepts and Postclosure Assessments for Nuclear Fuel Waste Disposal, p. 6.] This widespread application is due to the inclusion of fuel reprocessing and recycling in those nations' nuclear energy policies and systems. With the "once-through" CANDU reactor fuel cycle, the relatively low cost of natural uranium and the excess of plutonium on world markets, there are currently no economic incentives for reprocessing in Canada, nor are there any plans to implement it. Even if it were adopted, AECL states that, for used CANDU fuel, reprocessing and immobilization technologies remain to be determined.

Some review participants advocated reprocessing and recycling to eliminate the portion of fissile plutonium in spent fuel (about 0.3 per cent for CANDU fuel [C. R. Frost, Current Interim Used Fuel Storage Practice in Canada, p. 63.] ) and the risk of future terrorists mining such plutonium from a disposal vault. Others were more concerned that the separated plutonium yielded by reprocessing would be vulnerable to terrorism and that it had the potential for criticality.

We believe that, although reprocessing and recycling would reduce the volume of high-level wastes, the many other factors discussed here could negate that benefit at present.

Reprocessing and Transmutation

As described in the EIS, transmutation is a nuclear process using specialized nuclear reactors or particle accelerators to transform some long-lived radionuclides into either stable or shorter-lived nuclides. It requires reprocessing of the spent fuel to separate its components according to the transmutation method they require. Thus, it has many of the drawbacks of reprocessing, including the need to dispose of long-lived wastes. Although the U.S., Japan and France are studying transmutation, AECL maintains that it is not a currently available or readily achievable technology. On the other hand, one participant cited a recent report as proof that the feasibility of transmutation had been established. [P.J. Richardson, Examining the "International Consensus" on Nuclear Fuel Waste Management and Disposal (North Bay: Northwatch, PH3Pub.088, February 1997), p. 1.] Nevertheless, various studies over the last two decades have concluded that there are no safety or cost incentives associated with transmutation. An analysis by Ramspott et al. (1992) of the potential of transmutation to reduce U.S. spent fuel wastes concluded that the total volumes of wastes produced may not differ significantly from those arising from reprocessing. In addition, many of the long-lived fission products, the major contributors to long-term risk, would not be eliminated. [L.H. Johnson et al, R-Barriers, p. 48.] Similar information was not provided for Canadian or other types of spent fuel.

A number of participants put forward transmutation options that were not discussed in the EIS. None of these transmutation technologies appears to be either technically or economically viable in the short term. In addition, reprocessing-a prerequisite to classical transmutation-has uncertain benefits and risks for Canada.

Storage

For our purposes, storage is defined as the safekeeping of used fuel with the intention of possible future use or disposal. As opposed to disposal, storage relies on continual monitoring and remediation, when necessary, and permits easy waste retrieval. These features, combined with fear and uncertainty about the long-term safety of disposal and hopes for a future technological solution to the waste problem, made long-term storage the option preferred by many participants. Any long-term storage option gives future generations more choices for retrieving and managing the wastes than disposal does. However, long-term storage forces future generations to make a choice, and transfers to them the responsibilities and risks of caring for the wastes. The Panel heard that there would over time be an unpredictable but increasing risk of the loss of institutional control over the wastes, due to social or economic collapse. Even without full-scale collapse, there would be a risk that the required funds or expertise might not be available if and when they were needed for disposal. For these reasons, critics, notably from the scientific community, felt that the wastes must not be allowed to accumulate indefinitely in storage.

Current interim storage practices in Canada are described in section 2.2 of the EIS and in an Ontario Hydro document entitled Current Interim Used Fuel Storage Practice in Canada. [C. R. Frost, Current Interim Used Fuel Storage Practice in Canada.] At present, about 1.2 million used fuel bundles are stored either in water-filled pools (wet storage) or in concrete canisters (dry storage) on the surface at nuclear generating sites. The AECB regulates and licenses these facilities. In Ontario, the sites have enough space to accommodate all the wastes that the existing nuclear reactors will produce until the year 2035, which is the end of all their life cycles. [C. R. Frost, Current Interim Used Fuel Storage Practice in Canada, p. 17.] These wastes will total 3.3 million fuel bundles. [Ken Nash, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, March 11, 1996, p. 51.]

Studies show that used fuel with undamaged sheaths should maintain its integrity in either type of storage for at least 100 years, and that fuel with damaged sheaths should maintain its integrity for at least 50 years. The dry storage canisters should last at least 50 years, and could be replaced with new ones as needed. To make the transition from storage to disposal, Ontario Hydro plans to transfer the fuel bundles into special shipping containers, transport them to a disposal site and transfer them there to another container for disposal. Bundles with defective sheaths would require special treatment. According to Current Interim Used Fuel Storage Practice in Canada, with continued maintenance and monitoring, current storage practices should continue to provide safe, economic and retrievable waste management for as long as needed. [C. R. Frost, Current Interim Used Fuel Storage Practice in Canada, p. 67, cited in Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Environmental Impact Statement, p. 51.] Thus, although there may be insufficient storage space at existing sites after 2035 if nuclear power generation is maintained, continuing current storage practices could be viewed as a possible long-term approach to managing wastes.

During the hearings, representatives from Ontario Hydro stated that they have no reason to believe that extended surface storage is not technically feasible. However, they pointed out that neither an optimized design nor sufficient information has been developed that would allow them to conclude that relying solely on such storage over the long term is an acceptable strategy. A number of factors would have to be considered: regulatory and public expectations; location; design alternatives; safety under normal, accident and security threat conditions; fuel integrity during storage and handling; transition to disposal or other options; impact on reactor decommissioning plans; and maintenance and cost considerations. [Ken Nash and Frank King, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, November 21, 1996, pp. 24-34.]

In terms of risks to human health and the environment,current storage practices normally pose a fraction of the risk posed by nuclear power generation, which itself falls well within regulatory limits. However, wastes at the earth's surface are more vulnerable to man-made and natural hazards, such as terrorism and earthquakes, than wastes stored or disposed of underground. Some existing storage sites are located in densely populated areas, which may make them potentially more attractive to terrorists and of more concern when considering collective or population dose and the effects of increasing waste inventories over time. Communities may not necessarily accept the idea of keeping the wastes indefinitely.

On the other hand, some participants have argued that continuing on-site storage would justifiably locate the wastes near the beneficiaries of nuclear energy; keep the wastes near the seats of government, thereby avoiding the "out of sight, out of mind" mentality; eliminate the problems and costs of finding a disposal site; and preclude transportation and handling, and their associated risks. The Panel cannot resolve the question of who does or does not benefit from nuclear energy.

France, Scotland, South Korea, the Netherlands and others are considering long-term storage as part of their waste management strategies. Furthermore, interim centralized underground storage is being used in Sweden and has been proposed in the U.S. Underground storage would help to isolate the wastes from the biosphere and from surface hazards such as terrorism and earthquakes (which have greater effects at the surface). However, according to the EIS, it would also increase used fuel handling, construction hazards and costs. Compared to current practices, centralized storage offers no clear engineering, safety or economic advantages, according to studies cited in the EIS. [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Environmental Impact Statement, p. 333.]

However, if a centralized underground storage facility could be easily converted to disposal, it would significant-ly reduce the cost of disposal for future generations. In addition, such a facility would permit the monitoring of performance and the integration of scientific advances before any final commitment to disposal, and would be safer than surface storage in case of a lapse of institutional controls. It may be a useful compromise between maximizing choice for future generations and minimizing the responsibility placed on them. In any case, it is worth considering in the event of either a delay in implementing disposal or a decision to continue with storage for the medium or long term.

At the panel's request, AECL considered underground storage that could be readily adapted to disposal without any need to re-handle the used fuel. Initially, this option would be the same as AECL's disposal concept up to the end of the operation stage, when the wastes would be emplaced and rooms would be backfilled and sealed with concrete bulkheads. Afterwards, tunnels, shafts and some monitoring boreholes would remain open. A number of design and related safety issues would have to be resolved, but no feasibility problems were identified. AECL estimated that this option would entail a workforce of about 110 people and annual costs of at least $20 million (1991 dollars) once the rooms had been sealed. [Ken Dormuth, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Transcripts, November 21, 1996, pp. 11-14.]

Disposal

We define disposal as the permanent placement of used fuel with no intention of future use. It has the goal of achieving long-term safety without the need for continuing intervention. If achieved, this goal is the major advantage of disposal over storage. Compared to wastes in storage, wastes in disposal would be more isolated and their retrieval and long-term monitoring would be difficult or impossible. If all goes as planned, disposal would reduce the responsibilities and risks of future generations, but it would also reduce their degree of choice in re-using, monitoring or otherwise managing the wastes.

Supporters of disposal argue that the current generation, as the originator and beneficiary of the wastes, has a moral obligation to produce the technology, site and resources necessary to dispose of it safely. Depending on the precise option chosen, disposal does not necessarily preclude other options. Its implementation could span many decades, during which time better alternatives could arise and be used. Natural Resources Canada also reasoned that disposal would make nuclear energy more sustainable by not passing costs on to future generations and by closing the nuclear fuel cycle.

Opponents of disposal counter that closing the nuclear fuel cycle would perpetuate and even expand nuclear power generation and waste production, resulting in an ever-increasing waste inventory and hazard from both on-site storage and disposal facilities. Since the long-term safety of disposal is uncertain, they feel that we owe it to future generations to stop producing wastes, to keep a close watch on existing inventories and to await the development of a safer alternative. Concerns about long-term safety could possibly be partially addressed through disposal approaches that permit small-scale demonstrations of disposal and long-term monitoring.

Several means of disposal have been considered over the years and are discussed in Chapter 9 of the EIS and in the Hare Report. This appendix discusses disposal in space, in ice sheets, on or beneath the seabed, and underground in geological formations.

Space Disposal

Disposing of used fuel by sending it into space has been considered since before the Hare Report. A number of people advocated this approach during the review. Of all disposal methods, it has the greatest potential to isolate the wastes permanently from the biosphere. Accordingly, it would not permit waste retrieval. Although we know that it is technically possible, we also recognize that its costs would be very high. Studies cited in the EIS indicate that, since the number of flights required to transport the existing volume of spent fuel would be impractical, space disposal could be feasible only for a smaller volume of reprocessed high-level wastes. This would entail all the advantages and disadvantages of reprocessing, including the need to manage intermediate- and low-level wastes in some other way. AECL reported that the risk of catastrophic accidents was about one per cent per flight, and thus that the radiological risk of disposal in space would be higher than that of geological disposal. Combined with the fact that Canada has neither the required facilities nor international approval to dispose of nuclear wastes in this manner, it does not appear to be a viable or acceptable solution at this time.

Ice Sheet Disposal

While disposing of spent nuclear fuel in ice sheets has been suggested for quite some time and appears to be feasible, it has not been extensively researched. This concept would have the advantage of situating the wastes in a slowly changing environment, devoid of living organisms. If it used an anchored emplacement technique, it could permit waste retrievability for up to a few hundred years. Unfortunately, Canadian glaciers are too small for this method, so ice sheets in Greenland or the Antarctic would have to be employed. Correspondingly, the wastes would have to be transported over great distances. As neither of these regions is part of Canadian territory and because Canada interprets its treaty obligations as precluding disposal in the Antarctic, this cannot currently be regarded as an acceptable option.

Seabed Disposal

Proposals for seabed disposal range from placing used fuel on or beneath deep oceanic plains, far from continental margins, to placing it in zones of subsidence along continental margins such as the Pacific coast. The former proposal was studied over 10 years and partially demonstrated by an international seabed working group, including AECL and the Geological Survey of Canada. Many scientists consider it to be the best disposal option. It is potentially safe, except for transportation accidents where containers could not be recovered. Preliminary estimates suggest that its costs could compare favourably with those of other disposal methods. [Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Nuclear Energy Agency, Faisabilité de l'évacuation des déchets de haute activité sous les fonds marins. Volume 1: Bilan des recherches et conclusions (Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1988), p. 41.] Sites away from the continental margins have the advantages of being located in geologically and geochemically stable areas, as well as being well removed from areas of human habitation or intrusion, and areas of important biological and mineral resources.

Disposal in subduction zones (areas along some continental margins where the oceanic plate is subsiding below the adjacent continental plate) has not been thoroughly investigated, but was promoted by one participant advocating a concept involving access from land by underground tunnel to a sub-seabed repository located in or near a subduction zone. This approach does not share the locational advantages of the other proposal, but has the unique capability to carry the wastes deeper into the earth's core over time. This participant contended that, if implemented on an international, aggregate basis, this approach would be less expensive than multiple national land-based disposal facilities. [J.R. Baird, Subductive Waste Disposal Method, Comments on the Environmental Impact Statement (Nanaimo: March 31, 1994), p. 12.] Retrieval of the wastes is presumed to be difficult if not impossible with either form of seabed disposal.

Since Canada interprets its obligations under the London Dumping Convention (1972) as prohibiting seabed disposal, these approaches would require renegotiated international acceptance and an international regulatory framework, neither of which is currently being pursued. The Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA) prohibits "ocean dumping" (better described as disposal executed at sea) and thus would appear to preclude seabed disposal. The subduction disposal advocate argued that, since such disposal would occur within Canada's 200-mile economic coastal zone, it could not be reasonably interpreted as a violation of the London Convention. For instance, Sweden is building a repository for low- and intermediate-level radioactive wastes 50 metres beneath the Baltic Sea. We also note that, since the subduction proposal does not involve disposal executed at sea but via an access tunnel running beneath the seabed, the CEPA may not apply to it either. Nonetheless, the Panel is not in a position to investigate these assertions or the merits of the proposal any further.

Land-based Geological Disposal

Land-based geological disposal involves burying spent fuel deep underground in one of several feasible types of rock and vault configurations. As such, it can be based in part on existing mining technologies. Geological disposal is the long-term management option being pursued by most other countries with nuclear fuel wastes. It is supported by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD/NEA). Extensive research and development have been devoted to it, and there is a strong scientific consensus that it is feasible. AECL's concept for deep disposal in plutonic rock is one variation of this approach.

Compared to space, ice sheet or seabed disposal, land-based geological disposal would make it easier to monitor or retrieve wastes. A room-and-pillar vault design, such as that used in the AECL concept, would be superior to deep borehole or other vault designs in terms of ease of retrieval or other intervention. Although participants' preferences for storage over geological disposal could be addressed, in part, by improving postclosure monitoring and retrieval capabilities, these improvements could also compromise the passive safety objective of disposal. While less vulnerable to natural and man-made hazards than surface facilities, an underground repository could be prone to risks arising from a borehole being inadvertently left open, accidental or deliberate human intrusion, earthquakes, glaciation and long-term environmental change.

The various geological media considered for underground disposal include clay, volcanic tuff, basalt, plutonic rock (granite, gabbro), salt and shale. Since Canada reportedly has suitable deposits only of the latter three, [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Environmental Impact Statement, pp. 328-329.] and since the Hare Report named these as the top three choices respectively for Canada, we shall limit our consideration to them. Neither salt nor shale have undergone field investigation as part of the Canadian Nuclear Fuel Waste Management Program. Tuffaceous rock is being pursued as a disposal medium in the U.S. Thick clays have been selected in Belgium and are being studied in France, Spain and Switzerland.

Plutonic rock is being pursued as the disposal medium of choice in Finland and Sweden and is being studied by France, Japan, Spain, Switzerland, Argentina and India. AECL has proposed using plutonic rock in the Canadian Shield for its disposal concept, and has been studying such rock for the last 18 years. The Canadian Shield is widely distributed across central and eastern Canada. Plutonic rock also exists elsewhere in Canada, buried beneath sedimentary strata. Its wide distribution, especially in Ontario where most of the wastes are produced, allows for more choice in siting than do salt and shale. Other beneficial characteristics of plutonic rock in the Canadian Shield include geological stability; low topographic relief conducive to slow groundwater movement; low or partially known and avoidable economic mineral potential; and the known existence of units of sufficient size to contain a vault and possessing suitable physical and chemical properties. Among its disadvantages are the occurrence at repository depths of saline groundwater that could cause container corrosion in the presence of oxygen; fractures that may extend to the surface and serve as conduits for contaminant transport; and, in unfractured bodies, high stresses requiring special design measures.

Salt has been selected for disposal use in Germany, Russia and Ukraine, and investigated in Spain, the Netherlands and the U.S. The Hare Report recommended it as Canada's second choice. In Canada, salt deposits exist in Ontario, the Hudson Bay area, the prairie provinces and the Northwest Territories, and on the Atlantic coast. Databases exist for many of these deposits. Only the Ontario deposit lies within a province that generates nuclear power, but its distribution there is limited and its location in the southwest of the province places it near high population densities and the international border.

In addition to indicating the long absence of groundwater, salt has low permeability and high thermal conductivity, which make it conducive to nuclear waste disposal. Its unfavourable properties are corrosiveness, high solubility and low sorption capacity. Salt's plasticity renders it less vulnerable to geological instability than other rock, but could create difficulties in maintaining a stable repository. The frequent association of salt with potash or hydrocarbon deposits and its value as a commodity in itself renders it incompatible with AECB Regulatory Document R-72, which states that "there should be little likelihood that the host rock will be exploited as a natural resource." This requirement is intended to reduce the probability of future inadvertent human intrusion into the repository.

Shale was recommended as Canada's third choice in the Hare Report. Thick shale formations can be found in the same regions of the country as salt, with the exception of the Atlantic coast, and are more widely distributed in southern Ontario. The advantages of shale are its low permeability and excellent sorption characteristics. Detracting from these are its low strength, its variable composition and properties, and its association with hydrocarbons or with rock carrying large amounts of groundwater. The same conclusions can be drawn for shale as for salt with respect to its geographic distribution and its proximity to exploitable natural resources.

A number of participants suggested a variation on land-based geological disposal: disposal below the nuclear power stations where the wastes are currently stored. Even theHare Report raised this possibility, noting that an attractive feature of shale was its presence directly beneath most of the stations in existence at that time in Ontario. The EIS states that none of the current sites has been investigated for technical suitability, nor is any site located on the Canadian Shield. However, they are all either situated on plutonic rock of the same age as the Shield lying beneath sedimentary strata, or located near the Shield or other younger plutonic rock. Nonetheless, if we exclude sites outside seismic zones 0 and 1, as AECL suggests, the reactor sites in Quebec and New Brunswick would not be suitable (see Figure 5 in Chapter 3 of this report).

On-site disposal is a decentralized approach that would have many of the advantages and disadvantages of on-site storage. However, AECL estimates that the cost of implementing two facilities, each capable of disposing of five million fuel bundles, would be 30 per cent greater than the cost of building one 10-million-bundle facility. The already substantial cost of building just one facility is likely the primary reason why no country has selected decentralized disposal.

Other related options put forward by participants aredisposal in abandoned mines or in natural caves. We have not received much information on either of these options, but abandoned mines have been used to dispose of some types of radioactive wastes. We assume that such sites may not be technically suitable due to the type and properties of the host rock; their proximity, especially in the case of abandoned mines, to mineral deposits and hence their potential for intrusion via mineral exploration; and the presence of natural or man-made fractures or cavities in the rock, which could be unsafe. These drawbacks may reduce the effectiveness of the geosphere as a component of a multi-barrier system. On the other hand, there are many known sites. The chances of finding a suitable site seem slim, but the cost and time savings in site identification, characterization and excavation may warrant further investigation of this approach.

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Appendix M - Summary of Siting Steps Presented in the EIS

This appendix summarizes pages 149 to 163 of the EIS.

Abbreviations used:

  • IO: implementing organization
  • EC: exclusion criteria
  • ORT: organization(s) responsible for transportation
  • PHC: potential host community

Overall Siting Stage Considerations

  • The IO and ORT would be committed to the principles of safety, environmental protection, voluntarism, shared decision-making, openness and fairness.
  • At some point during the siting stage, the IO would require a binding commitment from the PHC that it was willing to be a host; negotiations would determine the conditions for the PHC's commitment.
  • EC could be applied more than once as information was obtained from progressively more detailed investigations.

Site Screening Substage

  1. Governments and waste owners would define siting territories consisting of areas of plutonic rock, which would not necessarily be contiguous.
  2. The IO would specify its EC, which would include seismically active zones.
  3. The IO would consult with regulators and provincial governments to develop EC that reflect their concerns.
  4. Using available data, the IO would screen out unacceptable areas using EC, to identify siting regions within siting territories.
  5. The IO would offer information, including EC, and consult with governments and the public throughout each siting region.
  6. The IO would encourage the involvement of the PHCs.
  7. The IO and PHCs would jointly define their interaction framework(s).
  8. The IO would negotiate with the PHCs to determine conditions for their participation.
  9. The PHCs could develop additional EC for their areas.
  10. The IO would seek potential candidate areas of approximately 25 square kilometres. It would need access to a surrounding area of at least 400 square kilometres to characterize the hydrogeological setting.
  11. The IO would conduct reconnaissance studies.
  12. The IO would determine the technical suitability of potential candidate areas by considering favourable characteristics (pp. 154-155 of the EIS). It would establish the relative importance of these characteristics in consultation with the PHCs.
  13. A potential candidate area would also have to meet any previously negotiated conditions for the participation or commitment of the PHC.
  14. The IO would identify two or three candidate areas, using a ranking process mutually acceptable to the PHCs and the IO, if necessary.

Site Evaluation Substage

  1. The IO and any other potentially affected community would jointly establish a procedure to seek and address community views.
  2. To identify potential vault locations, the IO would undertake detailed and costly characterization of each candidate area and a surrounding area of at least 400 square kilometres.
  3. The IO would determine the technical suitability of potential vault locations by considering favourable characteristics (pp. 158-159 of the EIS); it would determine the relative importance of these characteristics in consultation with the PHCs.
  4. A potential vault location would also have to meet any previously negotiated conditions for the participation or commitment of the PHC.
  5. If more than one potential vault location was identified, the IO would select the preferred one using preliminary safety assessments, technical characteristics it considers favourable and the preferences of the PHCs.
  6. The candidate site(s) would include 25 square kilometres surrounding the preferred vault location in each candidate area.
  7. For each candidate site, the IO would undertake surface and borehole studies, develop engineering conceptual designs of facilities and system models, and prepare a preclosure and postclosure environmental assessment.
  8. A candidate site could be excluded on the basis of the assessment results, available site information, unfavourable technical characteristics, any applicable EC, and any previously negotiated conditions for the participation or commitment of the PHC.
  9. If more than one candidate site remains, the IO would identify a preferred candidate site using a ranking process mutually acceptable to the PHCs and the IO.
  10. The ORT would identify potential transportation routes.
  11. The ORT would consult with potentially affected communities along the potential transportation routes to establish a procedure to seek and address their views.
  12. The ORT would characterize and select a preferred transportation route and mode.
  13. The ORT would prepare detailed transportation system designs.
  14. The ORT would conduct an environmental assessment of the transportation system.
  15. The IO would conduct detailed studies in exploratory shafts and tunnels at the preferred vault location within the preferred candidate site.
  16. If the technical suitability of the site is confirmed, the IO would prepare detailed designs and continue the environmental assessment, addressing the views of the PHC and other potentially affected communities.
  17. If the preferred candidate site is still considered technically suitable and if the previously negotiated conditions for the participation or commitment of the PHC have been met, the IO would consider that site to be the preferred site.
  18. If the IO decides the preferred candidate site is unsuitable, the IO would undertake exploratory excavation at the candidate site that had ranked second when the preferred candidate site was identified.

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Appendix N - Implications of a Facility Based on the AECL Concept

It should also examine the social, economic and environmental implications of a possible nuclear fuel waste management facility. . . . in addition to examining, in general terms, the costs and benefits to potential host communities.

In addition, the impact of transportation of nuclear fuel wastes to a generic site will also be examined.

Terms of Reference

The Panel examined the various implications of a facility and its associated transportation based on Atomic Energy of Canada Limited's (AECL's) disposal concept. Some of these implications could very well apply to other options for managing nuclear fuel wastes. A few implications of other options are outlined in Appendix L, but the Panel received insufficient information to examine them fully.

The Panel considered five categories of implications of the AECL concept. Accordingly, this appendix is divided into sections covering human health, environmental, economic, social and transportation implications, although the Panel recognizes that the content of these sections is greatly interrelated. Discussion of the costs and benefits to potential host communities is integrated throughout. While human health and transportation implications were well developed in the EIS and supporting documents, the other subjects were not. Therefore, most review participants did not discuss them in any detail.

Human Health Implications

The Panel accepts the World Health Organization's definition of health as "a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity." This is an all-embracing definition that requires a very broad review of all the possible implications of developing a high-level waste facility, for both the individuals and the communities concerned.

Like any major industrial project, a nuclear fuel waste facility or other long-term management facility may significantly affect the health of project workers and of members of the public living near the site or along affected transportation routes. These health effects may be positive or negative. To justify the project, there ought to be a net benefit to public health. The Panel draws attention to a draft Health Canada report on procedures for assessing the human health effects of any industrial development. [Health Canada, A Canadian Health Impact Assessment Guide, Volume 1: The Beginner's Guide, Draft 1 (January 1997), pp. 38-40.]

The possible health effects associated with the proposed facility are not limited to those resulting from exposure to radiation, nor to those experienced by individuals working at, or living near, the selected waste site. Equally, they may not be limited to the period during which the facility is built, filled and sealed, but may arise many centuries in the future. Health is a matter of the physical, mental and emotional well-being of an individual, and the effects of a facility on the mental and emotional health of many individuals may be greater than the effects on their physical health.

Both physically and mentally, there will be wide variations between different individuals who might be affected. Participants in the hearings frequently emphasized that possible health effects cannot be adequately determined by making certain calculations based on some generalized "reference person." Instead, we repeatedly heard that separate consideration needs to be given to different groups, such as men, women, adolescents, children and the unborn foetus; to groups of different ethnic origin, including Aboriginal people; and to groups with different types of physical or mental characteristics.

The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) recommendations for limiting radiation exposures were developed to provide all-encompassing protection, so there would be no need to consider each group separately. Further information on the ICRP can be found in Appendix H. However, it was made clear during the hearings that many individuals are not prepared to consider themselves as part of one all-embracing group, and would therefore expect detailed consideration of possible health implications to be given to some smaller group with which they could associate more closely. This issue, which greatly complicates any discussion of the health effects of a waste facility, is discussed in more detail later.

There would be five different stages to the life of a nuclear fuel waste facility. The most probable health effects of each stage would differ. Many participants in the public hearings were particularly concerned about possible radiation-related health effects. Table N-1 summarizes the important issues for each stage. It distinguishes between non-radiological and radiological health effects, as well as between on-site health effects that will predominantly affect employees of the facility and off-site health effects that may affect both employees and members of the public. For the purpose of this table, site-related effects include both those arising at the disposal facility and those arising at the site where the wastes are currently being stored. They also include illnesses, injuries and fatalities.

Table N-1: Potential Health Effects
Phase Non-radiological Effects Radiological Effects
On Site Off Site On Site Off Site
Siting

Site characterization will be in progress. No major activities will take place at existing storage sites.

There will be very few health effects.

Activities will be primarily office-based ones associated with field research and evaluation studies. They will involve some transport hazards.

Some stress-related symptoms are probable in areas under consideration for a facility. Otherwise, few health effects are expected.

Some research personnel may have limited exposures to radiation. Drilling equipment will be transported using radioactive logging devices. Although transport accidents to vehicles carrying radioactive sources may arise, no health effects are likely.
Construction

Vault mining and building construction will be the predominant activities.

Potential lost time due to industrial accidents is significant.

Extensive transport of materials and supplies will take place throughout this phase.

There will be transportation accidents.

Some industrial radiography personnel will probably have small-scale exposures. Transportation of gamma sources for industrial radiography may lead to some public concerns.
Operation

Transportation of used fuel to the site, loading and sealing of containers, emplacement underground and backfilling of the vault will be ongoing. Mining of new disposal vault areas will continue.

Over the lifetime of the project, these activities are expected to lead to significant lost time due to accidents and some fatalities.

Continued transportation of non-radioactive materials will take place.

Transportation of used fuel from storage sites will also occur.

Transport accidents will occur. Dust releases from the site and modification of lifestyles after site development may affect the health of members of the community.

Handling of fuel during loading and unloading will lead to occupational exposures. Small exposures of transport workers will also occur. Workers placing used fuel bundles in containers and emplacing these containers underground will also be exposed. Regulatory application of the ALARA principle should keep all doses well below AECB occupational exposure limits.

Very small exposures of some members of the public will occur during transport procedures.

Off-site releases of small quantities of radioactive gases or dust from the facility site may also occur. Any resulting public exposures will have to meet AECB regulatory requirements, and are not likely to lead to significant health effects.

Decommissioning

This phase will mainly involve mining-related activities carried out on site, together with the decontamination and dismantling of all surface structures.

These activities can be expected to lead to lost time accidents.

Transportation of supplies will continue, but on a much reduced scale. Health effects among the off-site community and transportation accidents are both likely to continue, but their frequency should gradually drop. Some underground on-site exposures will continue, at reduced levels. Workers may be exposed to radiation while dismantling contaminated above-ground facilities. Regulatory application of the ALARA principle should keep all doses well below AECB occupational exposure limits. No further transportation of radioactive fuel will take place. Dismantling and possible transport of contaminated above-ground facilities will lead to off-site release of small quantities of radioactive dust or gases. Health effects among the off-site community and transportation accidents are both likely to continue, but their frequency should gradually drop.
Postclosure The only continuing non-radiological health effects will result from concerns about possible radioactive pollution leading to stress on people living or working on site or in the vicinity. No exposures will occur until containers fail. When this happens, radioactivity could be released to ground-water, which could lead to doses predicted to be within AECB regulatory criteria for individuals living in the immediate vicinity of the facility.

To assess the overall health impact of a facility on workers and other residents in the host community, site-specific data are needed. This impact should be calculated and compared to the overall health impact of the waste storage sites that would be used if the facility was not built. These calculations are not practicable in the case of a generic site, such as the one that the Panel is currently considering.

However, by assuming 10 million bundles of used fuel will be placed in a facility at a remote northern Ontario site, and that all transport will be by truck, it is possible to use data provided by Ontario Hydro to estimate a ceiling or "highest volume projection" value for the number of injuries and deaths likely to be associated with both transportation and the operation of the facility. Similarly, by using ICRP risk estimates for exposures to ionizing radiation, the maximum potential number of fatal and non-fatal cancers that workers and the general public might develop can also be estimated. Such estimates are given in tables N-2 and N-3.

Based on this data, the normal industrial risks associated with transportation, construction and mining activities would greatly exceed those associated with the likely radiation exposures of workers or the general public. By rearranging the data in tables N-2 and N-3, it is also possible to compare the risks associated with activities taking place on site and those taking place off site. It can then be shown that the total number of deaths to be expected from on-site activities is very similar to the number likely to arise from transport operations, but that the number of injuries is estimated to be about 60 per cent greater on site.

The Adequacy of Current Radiation Protection Standards

During the public hearings, many people told the Panel that they were concerned about the adequacy of current radiation protection standards. Some participants felt that these standards were unduly stringent. However, others thought the reverse was true, and that the Panel should recognize that future standards might be much more stringent. Panel members therefore realized they had to review carefully the basis for the standards currently recommended by the ICRP, and enforced in Canada as Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB) regulations. A summary of the data used to conduct this review can be found in Appendix H.

Setting acceptable radiation exposure levels for either workers or the general public is a two-part process. With sufficient data, scientists can evaluate the risks associated with a given exposure, and provide a definite numerical answer. However, they cannot be expected to define a risk level that workers and the general public will accept. The ICRP makes some recommendations in this area, which are the basis of the current dose limits enforced by the AECB. They are based on risk levels generally regarded as acceptable for other types of industrial activity and do not have the same scientific basis as ICRP calculations of the risk associated with a given radiation exposure.

After studying this data carefully, the Panel accepts that, at this time, the ICRP estimate for the numerical risk per unit of radiation dose received is an adequate basis for limits designed to protect the public from radiation.

Comparing Expected Health Effects with Those for Other Types of Activities

The overall health effects associated with the proposed facility should not be more severe than those normally expected from comparable operations that follow the best currently available industrial practices. Data that Ontario Hydro presented to the Panel showed that the lost time accident rate achieved in all types of Ontario Hydro facilities, as well as during construction work carried out for the corporation, is significantly below average rates for industrial accidents. Similar data were presented for the AECL underground research laboratories. [Ontario Hydro, Response to Undertaking No. 60, Part C (Toronto: October 7, 1996), pp. 1-4.] The Panel believes that the effects predicted in tables N-2 and N-3 are not unusual for such a large and extended operation.

Direct industrial accidents are only part of the non-radiological health impact of such a development. For example, although no site has been identified, the geological requirements for any facility mean that it is likely to be remote from major industrial centres or developments. This fact has several consequences. The environment should be relatively clean and pollution-free compared with the environments in which most of the industrial workers would have lived if they had continued with their former work. This may also be true for any miners working on site. It follows that most workers employed at such a facility for a large part of their working lives should experience small positive health benefits. However, these potential positive health benefits may be more than offset by social and community stresses arising from construction of such a large project.

One of the most difficult effects to estimate is the possible significance of postclosure radiation exposures resulting from residual radioactivity entering groundwater after the fuel bundle containers have lost their integrity. In the case of a generic site and a generic container design, no

Table N-2: Breakdown of Estimated Injuries and Fatalities due to Non-radiological Accidents Associated witha Northern Region Reference Facility and Truck Transport Onlya
Preclosure Phase Health Effects to Workers Percentage of Total Health Effects to Public
(Off-site Traffic Accidents)
Percentage of Total

Construction

(7 years)

77 injuries

0.4 fatalities

2

3

4 injuriesb

0.08 fatalitiesb

<1

<1

Used Fuel Transport

(41 years)

996 injuriesc

2.1 fatalitiesc

(mostly off site)

28

16

102 injuriesd

1.9 fatalitiesd

17

17

Operation

(41 years, excluding used fuel transport)

2433 injuries

10.3 fatalities

68

77

496 injuriese

8.8 fatalitiese

82

81

Decommissioning

(16 years)

81 injuries

0.5 fatalities

2

4

4 injuries

0.08 fatalities

<1

<1

Total

(64 years)

3587 injuries

13.3 fatalities

100

100

606 injuries

10.9 fatalities

100

100

a After Response to Undertaking No. 93 by Ontario Hydro. Refer to associated notes and assumptions. Assumes linear scaling is valid.

b Values from Response to Undertaking No. 93 have been scaled up by a factor of 100/50 = 2 in order to extend the transport of raw materials to an assumed average distance of 100 kilometres instead of only within 50 kilometres of the Used Fuel Disposal Centre (UFDC).

c Values from R-Preclosure Table 7-19 (based on used fuel transportation from Ontario Hydro reactors at the rate of 180,000 bundles/year) were scaled up by a factor of 250,000/180,000 = 1.39 to take into account used fuel from all Canadian sources, consistent with the UFDC reference capacity of 250,000 bundles/year.

d Values from Response to Undertaking No. 93 have been scaled up by a factor of 1900/50 = 38 to extend the transportation component to cover the entire 1900-kilometre Northern Region reference route instead of only the area within 50 kilometres of the UFDC.

e Values from Response to Undertaking No. 93 have been scaled up by a factor of 1700/50 = 34 to extend the transport of raw materials to an assumed average distance of 1700 kilometres instead of only a distance of 50 kilometres or less of the UFDC.

Table N-3: Breakdown of Estimated Health Effects due to Normal Operational Radiation Exposure Associated with a Northern Region Reference Facility and Truck Transport Onlya
Preclosure Phase Estimated Serious Health Effects and Fatal Cancers in Workers Estimated Serious Health Effects and Fatal Cancers in Public (Off-site Exposures)

Used Fuel Transport

(41 years)

0.46 non-fatal

1.15 fatal

0.10 non-fatal

0.23 fatal

Operation

(41 years, excluding used fuel transport)

1.18 non-fatal

2.96 fatal

0.00023 non-fatal

0.00049 fatal

Decommissioning

(16 years)

0.21 non-fatal

0.52 fatal

small

small

Total

(57 years)

1.85 non-fatal

4.63 fatal

~0.10 non-fatal

~0.23 fatal

a Calculated from total collective dose values in Table 1 of Response to Undertaking No. 60a by Ontario Hydro. Refer to associated notes. Assumes ICRP 1991 risk coefficients of 0.04 and 0.05 fatal cancers and 0.016 and 0.023 serious health effects per sievert for workers and the public respectively (R-Preclosure, p. E-3 and p. E-6).

definitive calculation of this is possible. The Panel recognizes, however, that no facility would obtain an operating licence until the AECB is satisfied that the facility meets its regulatory criteria. These criteria are intended to set an upper limit on the risk to any individual, now or in the future. Elsewhere in this report, the Panel comments on these AECB regulatory criteria.

Social and Psychological Health

It is clear that many individuals show a severe fear of radiation effects, referred to elsewhere in this report as the "dread factor," and that this has sometimes led to psychological stress. Such extreme concerns about radiation risks may not be limited to people living in the community in which the facility is to be located, but may also arise among those living along the expected transport corridor. These concerns will, in turn, lead to high levels of stress among some of the individuals and communities affected.

Non-radiological stress-related health concerns will also arise. As the operational life of the facility draws to an end, employees and their families may be subject to the stress of knowing that a major change in their lifestyle is not far away. Such concerns are well known in mining towns and frequently extend to many residents associated with supporting activities, such as transport services, schools and shops.

Moreover, the social cohesion of a given community may show signs of strain because of the magnitude of the development. This adds to the stress on individuals, and may manifest itself in behaviour detrimental to a healthy community. An active psychological monitoring and counselling program may be necessary to address these problems.

Health Implications for Special Groups

While Health Canada presented no specific data on potential effects of a disposal facility on the health of Aboriginal people, they emphasized that the health of Aboriginal communities near a facility would need special consideration. [Health Canada, Health Canada Submission to the Public Hearings of the Environmental Assessment Panel for the Nuclear Fuel Waste Management and Disposal Concept (June 11, 1996, PH2Gov.011).] Many Aboriginal speakers felt a development that would disrupt a community's social and cultural fabric would have a devastating impact on their lifestyles.

Other groups within the host community may warrant special consideration. These include the unborn and very young, as well as individuals with special handicaps, such as respiratory problems. Particular attention will need to be given to the unique needs of all such groups during any siting process.

Major Accident Scenarios

The potential health impacts of possible major accidents, which might or might not be associated with releases of radiation, also require consideration. These were discussed in AECL's EIS and primary reference documents. These documents presented much evidence to suggest that any additional effects would be minimal. Nevertheless, as recognized in Chapter 5, it is difficult to achieve agreement on what constitutes a worst-case accident scenario. Clearly, some of the most acute implications for human health arise from accident scenarios, so it is important to get such agreement.

Environmental Implications

The proposed activities associated with a high-level nuclear waste disposal site and their effects on the natural environment are expected to be comparable to those of existing major mining projects. Thus, if proper regulations are applied and good engineering and management practices are followed, adverse environmental effects are not expected to be of such a magnitude that they cannot be effectively mitigated. The Panel concurs with the Scientific Review Group's (SRG's) judgment that a disposal facility based on the AECL concept will have the greatest environmental impact during the preclosure phase, [Scientific Review Group, Report of the Scientific Review Group (1995), p. 3.] and also with Ontario Hydro's assessment that the construction stage of preclosure would be the most disruptive. [L. Grondin et al, R-Preclosure, p. viii.] We would like to draw attention to some of the non-radiological effects that would originate primarily during the construction phase and require appropriate mitigation.

The reference disposal facility would require a block of land roughly 16 square kilometres in area, most of which would remain undeveloped, and a linear strip of land for road or rail access up to 25 kilometres long. [L. Grondin et al, R-Preclosure, p. 5-8.] An undetermined area would also be needed to construct an electrical transmission line, and possibly a construction camp or even a new town for workers and their families.

The transportation routes used to bring in materials and supplies would also be affected, both during and after construction. Some routes would be quite long and some portions of routes, particularly those closest to the facility, would be heavily frequented. If only trucks were used, the estimated daily average number of one-way trips (in full or out empty) would be 31 during construction and 60 during operation. [L. Grondin et al, R-Preclosure, p. 5-21 and p. 6-108.] For comparison, nuclear fuel waste transport would entail about 11 daily one-way trips by truck. [Calculated from data in the Environmental Impact Statement, p. 222 and p. 224: 1302 round trips by truck per year divided by 230 transport days per year = 5.7 round trips per day, and 5.7 round trips per day ~ 11 one-way trips per day.] Assuming a 10-hour work day, these figures represent a truck passing every 10 to 20 minutes. They also lie, plus or minus 40 per cent, within the average traffic counts given by Ontario Hydro related to opening a new mine or lumber mill in an isolated area, and are less than 2 per cent of the daily traffic of all types on the northern Ontario region reference route. [Calculated using traffic data in L. Grondin et al, R-Preclosure, p. 7-63 and p. 3-20.]

Like any major project carried out in a natural environment, the construction of surface facilities and access corridors could destroy or alter terrestrial and wetland habitat, change surface water flow, cause silting of streams or destroy fish spawning grounds. Habitat loss and alteration, along with vehicle and construction noise and emissions, could affect the abundance and composition of vegetation and wildlife. New access corridors could lead to increased hunting and fishing, with a corresponding reduction of targeted populations. While acknowledging that some effects would be unavoidable, Ontario Hydro suggests ways to eliminate or mitigate others. For instance, certain effects could be reduced through careful planning of construction activities to protect wetlands and fish habitat, or to reduce noise during sensitive periods for wildlife, such as migration and breeding periods.

During the site evaluation and operational stages, underground shafts, tunnels and disposal rooms will be excavated. Some 12.6 million tonnes of excavated rock will either be placed in a rock disposal area or used elsewhere for construction. [G.R. Simmons and P. Baumgartner, The disposal of Canada's nuclear fuel waste: Engineering for a disposal facility (R-Facility) (Atomic Energy of Canada Limited Report AECL - 10715, COG - 93 - 5, 1995), p. 162.] This is comparable to the amount of waste rock that would be left on the surface at a small open pit mine.

Regardless of the quantities, waste rock could generate surface water runoff containing acid, toxic elements, salts, explosives residue or suspended sediment. Groundwater pumped from the excavation could have similar components. If this water was discharged directly to the natural environment, it could contaminate surface water or groundwater, alter aquatic habitat and affect aquatic organisms. Given the intended host rock characteristics and experience at the Underground Research Laboratory, AECL does not anticipate major problems with the acidity or composition of these waters. [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Environmental Impact Statement, p. 236, and L. Grondin et al, R-Preclosure, pp. 5 - 22-5-24 and pp. 6-92-6-97.] However, AECL says that water from the rock disposal area and from underground would be pumped to holding ponds to reduce its solids content. Before re-using or discharging the water to the environment, chemical contaminant levels would be monitored to ensure they did not exceed applicable regulations and standards. Although a water treatment facility was not included in the conceptual design, AECL notes that one would be built if necessary. [G.R. Simmons and P. Baumgartner, R-Facility, p. 161.]

The potential contamination of waterways and alteration of wildlife migration patterns could have implications for Aboriginal people and northerners who depend upon them for survival. These implications are further described later in this appendix.

The release of radionuclides to the natural environment during the preclosure or postclosure phases of the project was also considered. Before receiving approval to develop a facility, the proponent would have to meet all AECB and other regulatory requirements. Otherwise, it would not be licensed. However, the SRG concluded that the postclosure performance assessment based on the reference case study could not reliably assess the release of radionuclides to the natural environment. This is due in part to inadequate modelling of the biosphere as defined by AECL, and specifically to the omission from the modelling of the potential effects of the microbiological processes taking place within the vault and geosphere. [Scientific Review Group, Report of the Scientific Review Group (1995), p. 154 and p. 12.] Microbiota and microbiological processes are active within the entire rock mass, so they should be considered an essential component of the active transfer routes within the near-surface and surface biosphere.

All chemical elements within the geosphere, including the essential elements of protoplasm, tend to circulate through the biosphere within defined paths from environment to organism and back to the environment. The movement of these elements, and of the inorganic compounds needed to maintain life, is integrated within the natural nutrient cycling process essential to the survival of all living organisms. Such chemical elements are never homogeneously distributed in nature, nor are they present in the same chemical form throughout the biosphere. Radionuclides within this process do not move in a linear manner to the surface, as they are also subjected to a similar variety of pathways and complicated flow-through networks. To assess and describe the pathways radionuclides follow through the biosphere, models have to account for their constant and continuous movement within the complex geochemical cycling process. In the future, the AECB will require the proponent of a nuclear facility to show that it will protect the environment from the release of radionuclides.

Economic Implications

The potential economic implications related to existing activities, to facilities and services, to property values, and to the financial resources and the supply of materials required to implement a facility are all important.

The community or regional economic effects of a disposal facility for nuclear fuel wastes depend on the size and nature of the economy already present, and the views of residents. From one viewpoint, a facility would offer local employment and business opportunities over a relatively long term. A facility based on AECL's reference case study would require, on average, about 1,000 employees during 48 years of construction and operation, and fewer at other times, for a total of 62,000 person-years over its lifetime. This is two to three times the direct employment forecast for major mining proposals such as the recently approved diamond mine in the Northwest Territories and the Voisey's Bay development under review in Labrador. However, the disposal facility's average annual employment is only about one fifth of that of the Bruce Nuclear Power Development. [L. Grondin et al, R-Preclosure, p. 6-159.] Increased employment and spending could stimulate and diversify the local wage economy. Many studies show that increased economic well-being is generally a good indicator of increased health and certain other aspects of social well-being.

Viewed from a different perspective, a disposal facility could overwhelm or displace the existing economies of small communities. [L. Grondin et al, R-Preclosure, p. 6-157.] Due to real or perceived environmental contamination and risks to human health, it could disrupt economies based on tourism, outdoor recreation, agriculture or subsistence food gathering, fishing, hunting or trapping by Aboriginal people and northerners. It could also preclude future economic opportunities of these or other types. Such disruptions and other effects would be more pronounced in the event of an accident involving nuclear fuel wastes, either at the facility or in transport. Increased access to a region by means of improved or extended transportation routes could positively or negatively affect rural or Aboriginal livelihoods.

A disposal facility and its workforce could significantly increase demands on community and regional infrastructure, facilities and services, including transportation routes, utilities, schools, health services and recreational facilities.

For example, in the early 1970s, after the commencement of the Bruce Nuclear Power Development, the large inmoving [sic] workforce and the workers' families placed a tremendous strain on the infrastructure of the small rural communities in the vicinity of the construction project. The additional project-related construction activities further affected local roads and services. Both local and regional adverse impacts resulted. These events led Ontario Hydro to commence community impact payments to these communities in 1975.

R-Preclosure [L. Grondin et al, R-Preclosure, p. 6-132.]

Besides compensatory payments to the community, other methods to prevent or offset such impacts include housing non-local workers and their families in a new town; fly-in commuting; providing new housing and services within the existing community; and restoring or building upgrades and bypasses to transportation routes.

A potential decrease in property values would also be a serious concern for residents of the host community and along transportation routes. Property values may increase or decrease, depending on details such as proximity to the facility or its transportation routes, altered accessibility and housing demand. The proponent could address such concerns by negotiating a property value protection plan with affected communities.

The availability of financial resources for construction capital and operating expenses was a major concern for many during the hearings. They were concerned about three major issues: whether nuclear utilities were collect-ing sufficient funds through disposal fee levies; whether the funds were invested prudently and available when required; and whether provincial regulators had given this matter sufficient attention.

The way disposal fee levies are set lacks transparency and could be influenced by factors unrelated to ensuring the adequacy and availability of funds. Calculations by participants at the hearings indicate that some doubt exists about the adequacy of the disposal fees that the utilities are now collecting to cover the cost of disposal, raising the spectre that the general taxpayer may have to bear at least part of the cost. The cost of managing nuclear fuel waste disposal will depend on which option is selected for implementation. Considering the total multi-billion-dollar cost of the disposal concept, the cost effectiveness of the concept will strongly influence the overall economic impact of the project.

The availability of the non-renewable resources required to construct and operate a disposal facility was also a focus of attention during the review. At issue was whether there was an adequate supply of these materials, and whether the needed amounts would represent a disproportionate consumption of resources in local, regional, national or international terms. The EIS states that "it is expected that there would be sufficient reserves and production of all these materials in Canada or other countries that traditionally supply these materials." [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Environmental Impact Statement, p. 229.] Nonetheless, participants were particularly concerned about the availability of copper or titanium for disposal containers, and bentonite clay for backfill, buffer and other vault-sealing materials.

Although fabricating enough copper containers to meet the reference facility schedule would require only one per cent of recent annual Canadian refined copper production, [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Environmental Impact Statement, p. 132.] the world supply of copper may be limited beyond the year 2015. [L. Grondin et al, R-Preclosure, p. 5-19.] Furthermore, the capability to fabricate thick-walled copper containers does not currently exist in Canada and would have to be developed.

Fabricating sufficient titanium containers would consume a small fraction of Canada's current annual output of titanium ore. [L. Grondin et al, R-Preclosure, p. 6-103] However, as long as Canada lacks titanium metal production facilities, the equivalent of about 2.25 per cent of the 1988 production in the U.S. would have to be imported. [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Environmental Impact Statement, p. 132.]

As for bentonite clay, the reference facility would call for about 80 per cent of the currently known Canadian reserves and almost the full annual capability of the only production site in Canada; alternatively, it would consume about 18 per cent of annual Canadian imports. [L. Grondin et al, R-Preclosure, pp. 6-104-6-105.] A 10-million-bundle facility based on in-room emplacement would require about double these amounts. [Kurt Johansen, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, November 20, 1996, p. 14.]

Social Implications

The type and magnitude of social effects cannot be determined before the social setting is known, but would depend on several factors, including the following: the types of potential host and affected communities; the values, needs and desires of these communities and their ability to manage effects; and the relationships among individuals, communities and their natural environment.

At the outset of the siting stage, even a voluntary site selection process embodying the principles of shared decision-making, openness and fairness could initiate widespread concern among those living in the siting areas. Residents may become deeply divided as supporters or opponents of the proposal. While some will be preoccupied with potential health and safety risks, others will focus on potential job and other economic opportunities. Consequently, a variety of political repercussions arising from conflicting values, opinions and interests could affect a community, leading to either increased cohesion or conflict. Once a site was selected, these effects would likely continue within the host and affected communities. Depending on the chosen transportation routes, a large number of communities may be affected.

During construction and operation, many of the socio-economic effects will hinge on the size, demography, place of residence and other characteristics of the workforce and their families, and how well the host community can supply workers and assimilate non-local workers and their families. For example, the influx of a large, highly skilled, younger workforce into a small or remote community could have significant implications for that community's housing and property values; infrastructure and services; recreation facilities; perceptions of security and safety; social structure; and demographic profile. In addition, either cohesion or conflict would develop between the new and "original" residents of the host community. A collective stress could result from either a rapid population increase or, at the decommissioning stage, a rapid decrease, and the social and cultural changes that accompany boom and bust developments. Furthermore, a non-Aboriginal population introduced into traditional Aboriginal territory may conflict with Aboriginal values, culture and language, and traditional ways of life. Special measures reflecting the wishes of the community would be needed to avoid or minimize such effects.

Experience in similar projects shows that any forced relocation of residents to acquire property for a facility would be one of the most significant socio-economic effects. [L. Grondin et al, R-Preclosure, p. 6-140.] This could cause physical and psychological strain, and the disruption or loss of family and social networks. People who voluntarily move into or out of a community as a result of the facility may experience similar effects.

Residents may also perceive that a large portion of their physical environment is being modified and dedicated to high-risk activities. This could alter community land use patterns and traditional, recreational or economic activities that depend upon them. Some of these effects may be avoided by working with the community to identify valued ecosystem components, and excluding them from the site selection area.

Throughout its operation and decommissioning stages, the disposal facility would handle many shipments of radioactive waste materials. Although Ontario Hydro concluded that radiation health risks to the public and workers would be very small, during both normal and accident conditions, the possibility of a harmful exposure could create significant anxiety within the host and affected communities. This stress would be one of the most severe social implications for community residents and facility workers. To reduce fears of harmful radiation exposure and loss of control over safety, facility owners and affected communities should jointly monitor community effects and plan for emergencies.

Ontario Hydro maintained that most potential social and cultural effects could be eliminated or mitigated through an impact management agreement jointly developed and managed with the host community. A number of possible measures and processes are suggested elsewhere in this appendix, in section 6.3.1 and in Appendix O.

Transportation Implications

The potential effects of nuclear fuel waste transportation depend on many factors that remain to be determined, including the location of the facility, the distance from reactor sites, and shipping modes and routes. Except for the highly radioactive nature of the cargo and its implications, effects would be similar to those of transporting materials and supplies to build and operate the facility. The transportation of spent nuclear fuel would differ in few respects from the transportation of hazardous or other radioactive substances, which occurs frequently. For example, more than eight million road shipments of dangerous goods take place each year in Ontario alone. [L. Grondin et al, R-Preclosure, p. 7-63.] Society's tolerance of these risks is quite high, in spite of occasional serious accidents.

As reported by Transport Canada's Transport Dangerous Goods Directorate millions of radioactive material shipments have taken place around the world over the past 30 years,. Canada, as the second-largest transporter, accounts for about 800,000 packages annually. While the AECB has recorded about 15 to 20 incidents or accidents per year during such transport, in the vast majority of cases, no contents were released. In the few remaining cases, only small amounts of radioactive material were involved, so there was no significant radiological hazard. [Karen Plourde, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, March 28, 1996, pp. 16-17.]

Although the transport of radioactive material in Canada has an excellent safety record, most of it has not involved nuclear fuel wastes. Apart from limited shipments of nuclear fuel, Ontario Hydro ships between 1,000 and 1,500 shipments of low- and intermediate-level radioactive wastes each year among its nuclear sites and to AECL's research facilities. Of more than 25,000 shipments covering over five million kilometres in 30 years, only three accidents have occurred, none involving any release of radioactive material. [Theo Kempe, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, March 28, 1996, pp. 36-38.] However, thousands of shipments of spent fuel have taken place in Europe, either by road, rail or water, largely for reprocessing.

For the preclosure assessment, Ontario Hydro presented a quantitative analysis of used fuel transportation from its reactor locations to three generic facility locations in southern, central and northern Ontario. The utility also gave a qualitative analysis of transporting wastes from other provinces. Even though most spent fuel in Canada is produced in Ontario, a number of reviewers, including the AECB, deemed this analysis inadequate. They also criticized the fact that Ontario Hydro had assessed the effects of an Ontario disposal site only, when the AECL concept was applicable to the entire Canadian Shield.

Ontario Hydro assessed rail, road and water transportation modes and combinations thereof. Transportation by air was ruled out because of the lack of necessary facilities at the reactor sites, excessive cost and the weight of the loaded casks. Furthermore, Transport Canada does not consider air transport feasible at this time. [Transport Canada, Transport Dangerous Goods Directorate, Response of Transport Dangerous Goods Directorate to Ontario Hydro's Preclosure Assessment Primary Reference Document (Gov.008, August 1995), p. 5.] Transport Canada also does not regard water transport very favourably, due to the time and difficulty that would be involved in retrieving a cask in the event of an accident. [Karen Plourde, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, March 28, 1996, p. 230.] In addition, water transport would probably require a transfer of the cargo to another mode to complete the trip to a disposal facility, thus increasing cask handling. The same would be true for rail transport, since the Bruce and Point Lepreau nuclear stations do not have nearby rail access, and the facility site would not necessarily have it either. [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Environmental Impact Statement, p. 164 and p. 155.]

Thus it appears that the used fuel would probably be shipped by road. Not surprisingly, road transportation was a prime preoccupation during the review. Nonetheless, some participants called for more in-depth study of the relative risks of different modes. For example, some suggested that building or extending rail lines, while expensive, could eliminate many risks.

Assuming truck transport only, and a "highest volume projection" of 10 million fuel bundles shipped to a northern region reference facility, the Panel estimates that vehicles carrying used fuel would make up about 15 per cent of all facility traffic during operations, and 13 per cent over the entire life of the project. [Calculated from data in the Environmental Impact Statement, p. 224, and L. Grondin et al, R-Preclosure, p. 5-21, p. 6 - 108 and p. 8-5.] At about 11 truck trips per day (in full or out empty), [Calculated from data in the Environmental Impact Statement, p. 222 and p. 224: 1302 round trips by truck per year divided by 230 transport days per year = 5.7 round trips per day, and 5.7 round trips per day ~ 11 one-way trips per day.] used fuel trucks would comprise less than 0.4 per cent of average daily traffic on the northern region reference route. [Calculated using northern region reference route traffic data in L. Grondin et al, R-Preclosure, p. 7-60.] At 1302 truck shipments per year, such vehicles would also represent less than 0.02 per cent of annual dangerous goods traffic in Ontario. [Calculated using data in Environmental Impact Statement, p. 224 and L. Grondin et al, R-Preclosure, p. 7-63.] Ontario Hydro has made 25,000 radioactive waste shipments over 30 years, with an average distance of 200 kilometres each. In contrast, the reference used fuel transportation system would handle a total of 53,382 truck shipments over 41 years, with an average distance of between 400 and 1900 kilometres each, depending on the facility location.

The Panel estimates that, precluding radiological accidents, used fuel transport in this scenario would result in about five fatalities and 1100 injuries over 41 years of operation (see tables N-2 and N-3). Of these, about two fatalities and 100 injuries would be incurred by members of the public in traffic accidents. Another two fatalities and the remainder of the injuries would be incurred by workers during cask handling and other transportation activities. The remaining fatality would occur when a worker contracted a fatal cancer due to radiation exposure. Overall, used fuel transport would account for about one sixth of the fatalities and one quarter of the injuries estimated for all preclosure activities.

The review highlighted several predominant concerns related to transportation, including highway safety, cask integrity, security threats, emergency response capabilities, liability and insurance, and public consultation.

Some participants feared that accidents would happen because of long travel distances, poorly maintained or inadequate roads, increases in traffic density, unsafe trucks, hazardous weather conditions (such as snow-storms, floods, washouts and forest fires) or frustrated drivers trapped behind trucks. Some were concerned that an accident in a remote area, especially one involving a release of radioactive materials, would cause long blockages of the only available highway, isolating communities for long periods. Many of these concerns could be mitigated by optimizing transportation distances to reduce risk; maintaining, upgrading or bypassing inadequate roads; improving driver training; and carefully planning emergency responses, selecting routes and scheduling trips in consultation with communities along transportation routes. The existing highway infrastructure in northern Ontario may need upgrading to handle long-haul trucks transporting nuclear fuel wastes.

Used fuel transportation would be regulated under Transport Canada's Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act and Regulations and the AECB's Transport Packaging of Radioactive Materials Regulations, among others. Transportation casks must meet the AECB requirements for the Type "B" package used for highly radioactive materials, which are based on IAEA recommendations as described in the EIS (Appendix B.2.3) and R-Preclosure (p. B-4). Ontario Hydro noted that "although there have been incidents during transportation, there has never been a release of radioactive material from a Type "B" package as a result of conditions encountered in a transportation accident." [Theo Kempe, in Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, March 28, 1996, p. 45.] About 80,000 Type "B" packages are shipped in Canada every year. [L. Grondin et al, R-Preclosure, p. 2-83.] Nonetheless, participants questioned the structural integrity of the casks, the use of half-scale models for testing and whether the tests incorporate the full range of trauma to which a cask might be exposed in a transport accident on the Canadian Shield.

Transport Canada observed that, while half-scale model testing is an acceptable approach, the analysis would be more credible if some of the results were compared with full-scale tests. [Transport Canada, Transport Dangerous Goods Directorate, Response of Transport Dangerous Goods Directorate to the CEAA Panel re: The Adequacy of the Environmental Impact Statement on the Concept for Disposal of Canada's Nuclear Fuel Waste in Addressing the Issues Requested in the Panel's Guidelines for the Preparation of the EIS, March 1992 (Ottawa: Transport Canada, Gov.001, July 1995), p. 4.] While actual road conditions may vary from the test conditions, the transportation casks as currently designed and tested should provide adequate protection to humans and the natural environment, with very little, if any, leakage of radioactive materials during most accident scenarios. However, in Canada, no full-scale transportation cask has been subjected to testing under actual field conditions. The Panel supports the Transport Canada recommendation that full-scale testing should occur before any implementation phase.

Some participants also feared theft or sabotage of the cargo, especially along remote sections of the transportation routes. As Ontario Hydro points out, several characteristics of the used fuel (such as its high radiation fields and the difficulty of extracting its less than 0.4 per cent plutonium content) and of the transportation casks (such as their minimum weight of 35 tonnes and their ability to withstand extreme accident conditions) would render them relatively unattractive to would-be criminals. [L. Grondin et al, R-Preclosure, p. 7-99.] The AECB and the IAEA would impose various security provisions and safeguards, as outlined in R-Preclosure (pp. 7-97-7-100). The proponent did not anticipate that used fuel transport would require military or police escorts or highway closures, given that these are not currently used in Canada. In a worst-case scenario of a missile penetrating a transportation cask, Ontario Hydro estimated that the consequences would be similar to those of a severe transport accident. [Ontario Hydro, Attachment 1, Ontario Hydro Response to the Critique of Ontario Hydro Irradiated Fuel Transportation Assessment prepared by Dr. M. Resnikoff (Toronto: Ontario Hydro, PH3PUB051, Undertaking 125), p. 18 and p. 31.]

Some participants viewed nuclear fuel waste transportation, its risks and its effects as unnecessary, given potential options for managing wastes on site. Therefore, they could not accept disposal off site. They also noted that shipments of nuclear fuel wastes could become targets for political action and protest groups, subjecting the system to deliberate or inadvertent interruptions, as witnessed in Europe.

Nuclear fuel wastes cannot be transported without an emergency response plan approved by Transport Canada's Transport Dangerous Goods Directorate. The plan must provide assurance that the organization shipping a radioactive product "can act to prevent an imminent accidental release or respond to mitigate the effects of an actual accidental release." This includes stopping an ongoing release. [J.A. Read, in letter to Blair Seaborn (Ottawa: Transport Canada, Transport Dangerous Goods Directorate, September 10, 1992), p. 3.]

Ontario Hydro presented a conceptual plan (Appendix J of R-Preclosure), based in part on its current road emergency response plan, that relies on teams and equipment located at its nuclear power stations and local emergency responders. Many participants, including the AECB, were dissatisfied with the plan, which they felt did not deal adequately with such issues as: response times and capabilities in northern Ontario or outside the province; tracking of shipments; temporary emergency storage facilities for cargo en route; layover locations in case of bad weather or highway closures; and training and notification of local emergency response personnel.

Ontario Hydro said that the actual emergency response plan would be developed in consultation with route emergency response authorities and reviewed by the public, and that similar plans would be developed for Quebec and New Brunswick. It also pointed out that the nuclear utilities and AECL have formally agreed to assist each other during emergencies, if necessary.

A quick-response system would be needed to deal with the accidents and emergencies that would inevitably occur. Rapid deployment personnel and equipment should be located at strategic locations along transportation corridors and at the disposal facility. A carefully thought-out mechanism to notify emergency agencies of shipping schedules, combined with general surveillance and instant communications, would also help the proponent handle emergencies. Security and emergency response measures along transportation routes should be put in place and fully tested with mock exercises before the transportation phase of any project begins. This should be done in close co-operation and consultation with emergency response teams and communities along the transportation corridor.

Related to transportation accidents and emergency responses are the issues of responsibility, liability and insurance. Under the Transportation of Dangerous Goods Regulations, shippers are responsible for responding to and mitigating an accidental release. Under the Nuclear Liability Act, facility operators could also be liable for incidents involving their wastes until these wastes were transferred to the disposal facility. Moreover, a number of participants questioned the adequacy of the $75 million in liability insurance required by the same act. The implications of all these factors for the utilities and a waste management agency are currently unclear.

As part of the site selection process, an effective method for consulting communities along the transportation corridors will have to be established.

The rights of communities affected by transportation were extensively discussed during one of the round tables, but no consensus was reached. [See Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel Public Hearing Transcripts, March 28, 1996, pp. 198-249.] If the principle of voluntarism was universally applied, each community could decide whether or not it wished nuclear materials to pass through or nearby. But some participants argued that since the right to veto does not apply to any other type of transportation, it should not apply in this case. In the panel's judgment, while affected transportation communi-ties should not have the right to veto, equitable negotiation with them is an essential part of dispute resolution.

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Appendix O - Details of a Siting Process Proposed by the Panel

It may also review general criteria for site selection and advise governments on a future site selection process in addition to examining, in general terms, the costs and benefits to potential host communi-ties.

Terms of Reference

This appendix provides additional detail on the siting and facility design process suggested in section 6.3.1.

Preliminary Siting Steps

If the municipal council (MC) or equivalent expressed an interest in site investigations through a formal resolution or motion, the siting task force (STF) and the MC would take the following steps to strengthen community structure.

Community Profile

The MC, in consultation with the STF, would appoint social scientist(s) who would conduct a sociological or community profile study to understand the social issues related to siting. This process would include, but not be limited to, establishing a database; identifying the key players and interest groups; identifying the way both formal and informal decisions are made; and describing the possible social effects of a facility. This work would be updated periodically to incorporate changing values and priorities in the community. The profile would establish a database to facilitate public participation over the lifetime of the project and to monitor social, health and environmental impacts.

Community Facilitator

When this study has been completed, the MC, in consultation with the STF, would appoint a community facilitator from outside the potential host community (PHC) to work primarily for the community liaison group (CLG). This appointment would be confirmed later by the CLG. The STF and the MC would negotiate the job description and accountability of the facilitator. Particular attention should be paid to including the views of Aboriginal people, women and minority groups whose first language may be neither English nor French. The facilitator would have experience in social dynamics and community animation and should remain in place at least until the PHC made a final decision on hosting a facility.

Community Liaison Group

The CLG's main task would be to advise the community's formal decision-making authority (MC or equivalent) from the perspectives of the community sectors it represented. This would involve three-way communication among the people in various sectors of the community, the STF and the MC.

Membership

The CLG should be representative of the groups in particular sectors of the PHC and potentially affected communities (PACs), and should consist of people those sectors select. On the basis of the community profile and database, and with the help of the community facilitator, sectors (e.g. media, business, environmental, educational, religious, leisure and sports) should be encouraged to hold an open meeting of all related organizations in their area to select one or two persons to serve on the CLG. Attention should be given to gender balance. Those selected would serve limited, staggered terms of office. If a second person is selected in the sector, he or she would serve as an alternate. The CLG structure should be flexible, since it would function throughout the life of the project. The proposed terms of reference would be circulated for comment from all interested parties, followed by revisions and agreement.

Functions

The duties of the CLG would vary from community to community, but the Panel suggests its functions should include, but not be limited to, the following:

  • ensuring interactive public communication and participation with the STF and MC, which would include involving minority or marginalized groups and groups in the PACs, and establishing a complaints and mediation procedure;
  • meeting early with the STF and MC to build trust and to clarify their respective mandates and roles for the life cycle of the project; and
  • reporting back to people in its various sectors using printed material, radio and TV interaction, phone-ins and electronic information systems.

The CLG should have the support of the community facilitator, in part to involve marginalized people in its work. It should also have an adequate budget to allow citizens to participate in the process. This would cover such things as access to technical or social expertise as needed, office support, and costs for forums, printed material, communications and use of public media.

The revolving membership of the CLG should allow it to exist over a period of some years, or until the end of the project.

Refining Siting and Transportation Criteria

Previously established site and transportation route selection criteria should be refined at this stage. The PHC and PACs would carefully study the general criteria and add siting criteria specific to their own communities. The criteria should be openly reviewed through public participation mechanisms that the STF, MC and CLG would develop. This would provide another checkpoint for the community in the process.

The STF would conduct reconnaissance studies, apply criteria and determine the suitability of potential candidate areas by considering favourable characteristics. Two or three candidate areas might be identified using a ranking process that was mutually acceptable to the PHC and the STF. The potential candidate area would also have to meet all previously negotiated conditions between the STF and the PHC.

Refining Design Options

Following the identification of candidate areas, design options would be refined to suit a specific community and site, based on appropriate levels of investigation. As with the refinement of the general siting criteria, the PHC would have to review and accept design options. Negotiations with the STF would also include agreements on compensation, monitoring, retrievability and co-management.

Transportation Routes

With the identification of a preferred candidate site, the STF would select potential transportation routes. Public consultations would be held with the appropriate PACs to establish a procedure to identify and address their concerns. With this information, the STF would characterize and select a preferred transportation route and mode, and prepare detailed transportation system designs. Finally, the STF would conduct an environmental, technical and social assessment of the transportation system, as part of the final environmental review.

Negotiations

Community Decision-making Process

The PHC, through its MC, would decide on the process of decision-making (e.g. referendum) and the actual question to be asked in siting a waste management facility. They would also decide on the percentage of votes that would constitute agreement to host a facility.

Compensation

The siting of a waste management facility should leave any community in a "better position" than it would be if it did not host a facility. The MC and STF negotiators must use substantial input from residents to define "better position," and must not view "better position" solely in economic terms.

Monitoring

The STF and MC, in consultation with the CLG, should decide who could be responsible for monitoring social and environmental impacts and technical factors related to construction, operation and postclosure of a waste management facility. Indicators should include, but not be limited to, health effects; community social cohesion or conflict; use of psychological services and counselling; safety and security incidents; and economic and environmental impacts.

The MC or equivalent should select the members of the monitoring team, who would work on a revolving basis. These citizens would be accountable to the MC or equivalent. Preparation work for monitoring should be done in conjunction with the STF. Monitoring would be necessary throughout the siting process and beyond. Because monitoring would be needed for a long time, the STF and the MC or equivalent should pay special attention to structures and processes for monitoring. These structures and processes should be part of the agreement-in-principle.

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Appendix P - Issues for Consideration during a Public Review of AECB Regulatory Documents

The Panel suggests that the following issues receive full consideration during a public review of AECB regulatory documents, as recommended in section 6.1.3 of this report.

  1. With regard to Regulatory Document R-104, the reviewers should determine whether the public accepts the use of a numerical risk factor-such as an annual risk no greater than one in a million fatal cancers and serious genetic effects-coupled with a fixed risk conversion factor that describes the relationship between dose and health risk. They may even decide to discontinue the use of such numerical risk factors. Safety evaluations for a waste repository calculate average annual (probable) effective doses to members of the critical group. Currently, R-104 specifies what is regarded as an acceptable level of risk and then converts this risk to an equivalent dose using a specified dose-risk conversion factor. However, new scientific data are likely to lead to ongoing, although small changes in this factor. Thus, consideration should be given to a regulatory safety standard based on a specified dose to the exposed individual, rather than on the associated risk. The scientific and public debate on the complex relationships between dose and risk is ongoing. This process should not be obscured, nor should it be allowed to call constantly into question a proposed facility's compliance with the regulations. A dose-based regulation might help to make the dose-risk discussion more explicit and visible, while giving the public a clear understanding of a proposed facility's compliance with the regulatory standards.
  2. In any revision of Regulatory Document R-104, reviewers should consider how the calculated distribution of postclosure dose estimates for a proposed facility should be compared with the regulatory standards. Simply comparing the mean dose value derived from a population of results does not give the public any clear understanding of the way the results are distributed-that is, whether the results are tightly clustered or widely distributed around the mean value. Yet this is an important consideration in public perceptions of safety and uncertainty.
  3. The Panel recognizes the AECB's concern, expressed in Regulatory Document R-104, about the uncertainties inherent in evaluating quantitative doses for periods greater than 10,000 years. This uncertainty leads to doubts about the usefulness of such calculations. However, with a well-engineered repository, the maximum dose to members of the critical group may not arise until long after this time period has elapsed. Consideration should be given to a regulatory requirement that states that, despite uncertainties, numerical dose estimates must be given for the postclosure period extending at least to the point at which they reach their maximum.
  4. The Panel has received a number of submissions recommending that postclosure collective population doses be evaluated for any proposed repository design. The Panel notes that this is a requirement of applying the ALARA (as low as reasonably achievable) principle to operating nuclear facilities. [Atomic Energy Control Board, The Requirement to Keep All Exposures as Low as Reasonably Achievable, A Proposed Regulatory Policy Statement (Ottawa: Atomic Energy Control Board, Consultative Document C-129, issued for comments July 29, 1994), pp. 2-3.] This matter should be considered. However, the relationship between collective dose and collective detriment is highly controversial. In addition, current knowledge about population distribution and density in the distant future will likely be insufficient for making meaningful calculations.
  5. The AECB should also review the directions in Regulatory Document R-104 that state that the lifestyle of the critical group should be based on present human behaviour using conservative yet reasonable assumptions, and that the group's diet and metabolic characteristics should be based on present knowledge.
  6. At issue during the review was the Nuclear Liability Act, its applicability to a repository for nuclear fuel wastes, and the adequacy of its $75-million limit on the liability insurance that nuclear facility operators must maintain. This amount and the Act in general are currently under review. The Panel suggests that this review include a public consultation component.

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Appendix Q - Acknowledgements

The Panel thanks all the individuals and organizations who participated in this lengthy process. Their willingness to review the daunting amount of material the proponent and others submitted, their work in preparing and presenting briefs, and their attendance at our many hearings were all of great help to the Panel. This work also demonstrated the importance they attach to finding a safe and acceptable answer to the long-term management of nuclear fuel wastes. We particularly thank the three First Nations that received us on their reserves.

We also appreciate the co-operation throughout the review of the many people who appeared on behalf of AECL and Ontario Hydro under what must often have been stressful circumstances.

We are greatly beholden to the Chairman and the members of the Scientific Review Group as well as to their secretary, John McEwen. Their two reports to the Panel, and their active participation in the technical hearings, helped us better understand the scientific complexities of the nuclear fuel waste question.

Members of the Panel who have signed this report would like to acknowledge the contributions of earlier members: William Fyfe, Maddy Howe-Harper, Lionel Reese and Raymond Robinson.

Finally, the Panel especially thanks the many members of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency who helped us throughout the review, including those who were assigned to the Panel at earlier stages of its work. We acknowledge in particular the professionalism and patience of the members of its secretariat who were with us during the lengthy period of public hearings and report writing. They are:

  • Guy Riverin, Panel Manager;
  • Cindy De Cuypere, Specialist Advisor;
  • Robyn-Lynne Virtue, Technical Analyst; and
  • Ghislaine Kerry, Information Officer.

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Addendum: List of Abbreviations

4Rs
reduce, re-use, recycle, recover
AECB
Atomic Energy Control Board
AECL
Atomic Energy of Canada Limited
ALARA
as low as reasonably achievable
BELLE
Biological Effects of Low-level Exposures
BFS
(Germany) The Federal Agency for Radiation Protection
CANDU
Canada Deuterium Uranium
CCME
Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment
CEN/SCK
Belgian Nuclear Waste Management Authorities
CEPA
Canadian Environmental Protection Act
CLAB
(Sweden) Central Interim Storage Facility
CLG
Community Liaison Group
CNSC
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission
COVRA
(the Netherlands) The Central Organization for Radioactive Waste
EC
exclusion criteria
EIS
environmental impact statement
EMR
Department of Energy, Mines and Resources
IO
implementing organization
IAEA
International Atomic Energy Agency
ICRP
International Commission on Radiation Protection
KBS-3
multi-barrier nuclear fuel waste disposal concept
MC
municipal council
MOX
mixed oxide
mSv
millisievert
NAGRA
(Switzerland) National Co-operative for Storage of Nuclear Waste
NFWMA
Nuclear Fuel Waste Management Agency
NIREX
(United Kingdom) The Nuclear Industry Radioactive Waste Executive
NRCan
Natural Resources Canada
NRC
(United States) Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OCRWM
(United States) Civilian Radioactive Waste Management
OECD/NEA
Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development
ONDRAF/NIRAS
(Belgium) The National Agency for Radioactive Waste and Enriched Fissile Materials
ORT
organization responsible of transportation
PACs
potentially affected communities
the Panel
Nuclear Fuel Waste Management and Disposal Concept Environmental Assessment Panel
PDF
probability density function
PHC
potential host community
R-104
AECB Regulatory Policy Statement - Regulatory Objectives, Requirements and Guidelines for the Disposal of Radioactive Wastes - Long-term Aspects
R-71
AECB Regulatory Policy Statement - Deep Geological Disposal of Nuclear Fuel Waste: Background Information and Regulatory Requirements Regarding the Concept Assessment Phase
R-72
AECB Regulatory Guide - Geological Considerations in Siting a Repository for Underground Disposal of High-level Radioactive Waste
R-90
AECB Regulatory Policy Statement - Policy on the Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities
RERF
Radiation Effects Research Foundation
RWMAC
(United Kingdom) Radioactive Waste Management Advisory Committee
SKB
Swedish Nuclear Fuel Waste and Management Company
SKI
Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate
SRG
Scientific Review Group
STF
Siting Task Force
SYVAC
Systems Variability Analysis Code
TAC
Technical Advisory Committee (to AECL)
UNSCEAR
United Nations Science Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation
WIPP
(United States) Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

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