Potential for Acts of Terrorism and Sabotage During Transportation of Nuclear Fuel Waste

The Nuclear Waste Management Organization is seeking approval of their general proposal to transport high-level nuclear waste long-distances from nuclear generating stations to a site between Ignace and Dryden where they would repackage and then bury the highly radioactive wastes.

These comments are provided on behalf of the North Bay Peace Alliance. Founded in 1985 the North Bay Peace Alliance is concerned with peace, disarmament and security, including connections between the use of nuclear technology for “peaceful” purposes and for military use.

As a local group in a small city in northern Ontario, we have not previously expressed concern about the risks of terrorist attacks or malevolent acts on the civilian use of nuclear power or attacks on its byproducts (e.g. nuclear waste) as there are no nuclear power stations in our area or region. However, with the introduction of a project that includes 2-3 trucks per day carrying high-level nuclear waste through our city that changes and we are writing to express our concerns.

In a recent workshop in North Bay we learned that the Nuclear Waste Management Organization has not addressed the risk of terrorist attacks or malevolent acts against the highly radioactive nuclear waste shipments they envision moving through our city. We also learned that the draft guidelines produced by the Impact Assessment Agency do not require them to do so.

While there are many other issues that warrant attention, or comments will focus on the issue of security of the nuclear waste shipments.

Our comment on the draft guidelines is that they must instruct the NWMO to provide detailed information about how they have considered the risk of terrorist attacks on the nuclear waste shipments. This should include how they have considered the risk / potential for attacks on the waste containers during transportation, what the potential consequences would be, and how the NWMO or others (such as the federal government) would respond following an attack.

What will the NWMO do to prevent such attacks? What will the NWMO do to detect and stop potential attacks? What parts of the federal government will be involved in preventing attacks (CSIS, the RCMP, local police)? How will local municipalities and police and fire and emergency departments be given notice of the shipments? How do other countries (such as Germany) deal with the risk of attack on transportation containers? Will there be an armed escort with each transportation container? If so, how will those armed escorts be supervised and by who? If not, will the local police be providing an escort through our community? What would be the effect of a “successful” terrorist attack on one or more of these shipments (e.g. radiation levels, evacuation zones)? Will the 2-3 trucks per day be travelling together or separately? How is the risk increased or decreased by having the trucks travel together or separately? Will the trucks be allowed to take rest stops along the route and if so, how will the shipments be protected during those rest stops? Will the trucks be allowed to take rest stops with the City of North Bay? How will the “rules” be developed and applied for these shipments?  

These are serious issues. Please ensure that they are addressed by including them in the final guidelines.